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Abstract
This thesis documents the historical development of debates around the public 
understanding o f science in the UK from 1985 until 2005. Testimonies from key actors 
involved in the evolution of the recent public understanding o f science arena, and an 
examination of documentary evidence, have been used to map out how this issue was 
problematised by scientists in the mid-1980s, and how it has developed into a contested 
field of activity, political interest and academic research.
I propose that this historical period can be broadly understood in four phases 
each characterised by a dominant discourse of the public understanding o f science. I 
examine how, within each phase, the various groups involved have engaged in boundary 
work: rhetorically constructing, and mobilising, ideas of ‘science’, ‘the public’, and the 
perceived ‘problem’ in the relationship between the two, in the pursuit o f defining and 
legitimating themselves and these definitions of the relationship between science and 
public.
Phase I is characterised as a rhetorical re-framing of earlier ‘problems’ of the public 
understanding of science by scientists and scientific institutions in the context o f the 
1980s. Phase II is dominated by the boundary work between scientists and social 
scientists as they contended for legitimacy and authority over competing discourses of 
public understanding o f science and the institutionalisation o f PUS activity and research. 
Phase III is characterised by a variety of discursive formulations of the ‘problem’ of PUS 
following the House of Lords report (2000) and a subsequent change in the rhetoric of 
public understanding of science to one of public engagement. Phase IV is dominated by 
the language of ‘upstream engagement’ and identifies the political interest in managing 
science’s relationship with the public and the social scientific responses to this.
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1 ‘Problems’ of PUSOr: the hows and whys 
Introduction
In 1985 the Royal Society published a report on the public understanding of science 
(PUS).1 The report problematised the public’s levels of knowledge of science, and gave rise 
to a varietyr of science communication activities which attempted to ‘correct’ a perceived 
deficit of scientific knowledge on the part of the public. Fifteen years later, a report by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000), argued that society’s 
relationship with science was in a critical phase. Almost overnight, the promotion of public 
communication and outreach activities which had been practised by scientific and 
government agencies under the banner of public understanding o f science, was replaced by 
an encouragement o f new methods of public engagement and dialogue, under the new 
label ‘Science and Society’.
Many commentators declared this a watershed moment in the public understanding of 
science movement2, with the Minister for Science going as far as to proclaim that the 
‘deficit’ approach to public understanding of science was dead.3 The idea that the public 
were deficient in scientific knowledge, and should therefore be exposed to science 
communication by scientific experts, we were told, was gone, to be replaced by a dialogical 
model of communication, which framed the public in a very different manner - a public
1 Royal Society (1985), The Public Understanding oj Science, (London: Royal Society').
2 Miller, S. (2001), 'Public understanding o f science at the crossroads', Public Understanding of Science, 
10: 1; Wynne, B. (2006), 'Public Engagement as a Means o f Restoring Public Trust in Science - 
Hitting the Notes, but Missing the Music?' Community Genetics, 9.
3 Miller (2001), op. cit.
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who should be listened to, who had something meaningful to input into scientific policy­
making, and whose trust in scientists needed rebuilding.
This thesis investigates the historical development of these debates around the public 
understanding o f science in the UK from the publication of the Royal Society report in 
1985 until 2005. It documents how this became an issue o f concern to scientists in the 
1980s; who has been involved in these debates since that time; and how this issue 
developed into a contested field o f activity, political interest and academic research. Many 
others have already provided historical accounts o f these debates,4 however, these have 
either covered only one aspect of the debates, be that focusing on a single profession, 
discipline or a smaller time frame, or have simplified the historical narrative.5 Thus, my aim 
was to provide a broader and richer account of these debates in the UK, by using a wider 
range of research data and covering a longer time span than previous studies. The picture 
o f PUS that emerges from this history shows it to be a more complex and contested area 
than some of these previous historical accounts would suggest.
While the main contribution of this thesis is a detailed historical account o f these debates, I 
have also used this history to explore, from a science and technology studies (STS) 
perspective, how the idea o f the relationship between science and public has been 
constructed, mobilised and managed over the last twenty years. This thesis initially focuses 
on how these ideas have developed within the scientific community; however, as other 
professional groups, such as social scientists, enter into this debate it considers how other 
actors and groups within the time period have framed these issues.
4 See, for example, Gregory and Miller’s (1998) detailed historical account o f  science in the public 
sphere up until 1997. Irwin and Michael (2004), Wilsdon and Willis (2004) and Broks (2006), 
amongst others, have also provided their own accounts o f  aspects o f the public understanding of 
science, focusing on social science, public engagement and popular science, respectively,
5 For example, to a simple one o f PUS in the UK being a narrative o f ‘deficit to dialogue’, for 
example, The Royal Society (2004), Science in Society Report, (London: Royal Society); The British 
Association for the Advancement o f Science, (2005), Connecting Science: What we know and what we don’t 
know about science in society, (The British Association for the Advancement o f  Science: London).
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It is retrospective, but also an account o f an issue and debates which are ongoing and still 
changing. It identifies the emergence of multiple discourses about science and the public, 
and about how to communicate between the two; and examines how rhetorically different 
social and conceptual spaces have been carved out by particular professional groups in the 
pursuit o f defining and legitimating themselves and their definitions o f the relationship 
between science and public.
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview o f my methodology, the 
theoretical perspectives that have informed my analysis o f the history, and a broad historical 
survey o f ideas o f science and the public to provide a context for the recent concerns on the 
public understanding of science, on which this thesis is focused. Chapters 2 to 9 document 
the historical development o f debates around PUS from 1985 — 2005. Chapter 10 draws 
conclusions from this whole period.
The remaining parts o f this chapter set the scene, historically and methodologically for the 
main body o f my thesis. Part I provides details of my methodology: both what I studied and 
how I studied it. Part II outlines the theory I drew on to provide a sociological perspective 
on the history documented. Part III o f this chapter presents a historical review o f science 
and the public, which will provide a context for my own period of research. Finally, Part IV 
outlines my historical framing o f the period under study.
10
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Part I: What am I analysing?
I began my research early and speculatively, rather than formulating a strict research design. 
My research began with a need to gain a broad historical perspective on the UK debates 
around science and the public within the set period 1985 - 2005. This allowed me to grasp 
both the context o f the debate and identify key institutions and individuals.
Data collection
The majority o f my data comes from policy, academic and public literature from 1985 to 
2005.1 also undertook twelve semi-structured interviews with 13 key actors from this period 
conducted over a 6-month period to provide further historical detail and personal reflection 
on specific events and developments.6
I had to limit the collection o f data to within the confines o f a PhD research project, so I 
had to make some choices as to what would and would not be analysed. First, I limited the 
scope of the thesis to a history o f public understanding o f science in the UK, even though 
PUS is a much wider phenomenon. This geographical restriction should not suggest that I 
consider the discourse in this area to be self-contained to the UK, and the academic debates 
and activity, as will be shown, have crossed international borders. However, I felt justified in 
limiting the study in this manner for several reasons. First, the UK activity in this area, 
particularly institutional programmes in the public understanding o f science, have become 
exemplars for other countries developing activities in this area.7 Second, the activities by 
particular institutions in the area o f science communication, for example, by the British 
Association for the Advancement o f Science or the Royal Society, have a long history in
6 See Appendix for a list o f all interviewees.
7 As Pitrelli (2003) has noted, following the Bodmer report in 1985, ‘Pubilc Understanding o f  
Science’ became a label employed by the Governments o f  all industrialised countries in the 
programmes for the communication o f science to the general public, most o f which used the 
recommendations from the original report as the basis for such activities.
11
Lost in Translations
Britain and the recent concerns over the public understanding o f science follow on from 
these with a continued UK focus. Equally, the UK Government’s involvement in this area 
has tended to have a nationalistic focus, with many of the justifications for funding and 
activity couched in terms o f national pride, prosperity, or crisis. I have, therefore, included 
references to wider international developments only where I felt they were direcdy relevant 
to, and had a direct impact on, events in the UK. Further research would be essential to 
broaden the scope o f this inquiry, in a similarly detailed manner, beyond the UK.
Archival research
I collated a range o f primary literature concerned with the public understanding o f science. 
This included academic journal papers, speeches, government policy documents, committee 
minutes, newspaper articles from media databases, as well as other material held at the 
Office o f Science and Technology and the Royal Society Library, the National Archives, 
Colindale Newspaper Library, The British Association archives, The Science Museum 
Library and The British Library. Such publications contribute to a discursive variety which I 
used to construct the historical narrative and then analysed to get an idea o f the competing 
interests and definitions in the debates surrounding the public understanding o f science.
I analysed these texts as contributions to historical discourses rather than as explanations in 
themselves. Hilgartner uses a theoretical framework grounded in a metaphor o f performance 
to examine struggles over credibility, authority and legitimacy in science advice, and views 
documents as key objects in these struggles.8 Hilgartner’s dramaturgical model allows the 
written document to be analysed as ‘a device for self presentation that the performer uses to 
project his or her “voice” and create the desired impression on the audience’ (p. 16). The 
Committee reports, policy documents and academic papers in my study, then, can be 
analysed in terms o f their content, but also in terms o f their function, and the extent to 
which they constitute, as well as represent, the social and political debates surrounding the 
public understanding o f science.
8 Hilgartner, S. (2000), Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press).
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Interviewing
In total, I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews. In all cases I recorded and transcribed 
the interview. I conducted the interviews between June and October 2004. Themes that were 
covered in a typical interview included questions on the interviewee’s personal history, their 
professional role and how it related to research or initiatives on the public understanding of 
science, and their reflections on specific episodes, reports, actors or institutions that they felt 
were important in shaping the historical development o f PUS. I was particularly interested in 
differences and similarities between themes that emerged from institutional and academic 
documents, and those that emerged in interviews. I was also looking for any themes initiated 
by interviewees, and not obviously prompted by my questions, particularly those that 
recurred in a similar way in a number o f different interviews.
I found all those I interviewed to be enlightening, interested in my research and generous 
with their time. There were, however, problems with my interviewing process. The main one 
was simply one o f access: only half o f the 25 people I approached agreed to be interviewed, 
o f which, almost all were social science academics or policy makers. This was disappointing, 
and were it to have been possible to have interviewed more o f the actors involved in this 
history, the finished product would have been a richer account o f events, and may have 
taken my research into other areas. However, I was restricted to who was available for 
interview (or indeed who would agree to be interviewed), and thus I ended up relying on 
documentary evidence more than I had originally intended. The high number o f refusals is 
likely to be related to the fact that those scientists and politicians who declined to be 
interviewed are what could be considered ‘elite’ figures in their field, or public life (for 
example Professor Colin Blakemore was head o f the Medical Research Council at the time 
o f my approach; Professor Susan Greenfield, Head o f the Royal Institution; Lord Sainsbury, 
Minister for Science). Contacting such individuals can be immensely difficult, and finding 
time in their diary even more so. Conversely academics are very easy to locate and contact 
through university websites and publicly available email addresses.
13
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It is also interesting to consider why no scientists (except Sir Walter Bodmer) agreed to the 
interview. This could suggest an indifference to reflecting on history o f the public 
understanding o f science by members o f this profession, but equally could suggest an 
unwillingness to engage with a researcher from STS. It may have been the case that I was 
perceived as someone, following the ‘Science Wars’, who would be hostile to science and 
scientists.9
The second problem I faced with such interview subjects was one o f reflexivity. As Aull 
Davis acknowledges, interviews are a highly artificial research situation, ‘dependent upon a 
set o f cultural understandings as to the nature of interviews, their conduct, and appropriate 
forms o f responses to them’.10 Interviews with any research participants then, are contrived 
situations that involve a relationship between interviewer and interviewee predetermined by 
expectations o f the interview process; the interview is fundamental, not incidental, to both 
the form and content o f the exchange.11 Furthermore, the responses of interviewees may be 
shaded by a desire to please (or offend) the interviewer. I felt that these factors were further 
complicated in my research by the fact that nearly all those interviewed were much more 
accustomed than me to the interview process. Some were social scientists themselves, with 
careers’ worth o f experience in conducting qualitative interviews from ‘the other side o f the 
fence’. In a few cases, I found that the difference in status between interviewer and 
interviewee saw the interviewee effectively ‘running away’ with the interview, disregarding 
my questions and instructing me in what they felt I should know, rather than what I wanted 
to ask. Although frustrating at the time, on transcribing such interviews it became clear there 
was plenty o f data to be taken from what these interviewees felt it was important for me to 
know. The interviews remained o f value, and o f interest, because I was able to track the 
themes that recurred between interviews, and those that were only mentioned by some 
interviewees, or not at all. A number o f other interviewees demanded a considerable amount 
o f participation from me, arguing certain points, or asking me to justify my stance on a 
particular question before answering it themselves.
9 See for Chapter 4 for a fuller account o f the ‘Science Wars’.
10 Davies, C. A. (1999), Reflexive Ethnography: Researching Self and Others, (London: Routledge), p. 4.
11 Briggs, C. (1986), learning How to Ask: a Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
14
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To further complicate this, in some cases I already had an established academic or 
professional relationship with the interviewee, having worked with them, or been taught by 
them as part o f my academic training in the field. This often meant that the interviewee 
spoke to me as an ‘insider’ to the history, readily assuming that my own position within the 
debates was similar to theirs (be it related to my time working at the Royal Society, or my 
training in science and technology studies) and inevitably this shaped their responses to my 
questions. These issues were a very overt reminder that ‘interview data are unavoidably 
collaborative’.12 I came to see interviews, therefore, not as a ‘path to the truth’ that, for 
example, lay behind the production o f official and institutional reports, but as data which 
performed multiple functions. They were a guide to the research process, sometimes 
pointing me in the direction o f events, reports, or people that I might otherwise have 
excluded from the historical account. Yet they also provided a source of historical narrative 
regarding actors’ own involvement in debates around the public understanding o f science. 
Finally the data also revealed an insight into the way different versions o f PUS were 
established by different actors and an opportunity in which to see on-going boundary work 
being performed.
Finally, there was the tricky decision of whether to anonymise my interview data. I decided 
against this course o f action given that the historical development o f public understanding of 
science, as will become clear through my narrative, was largely constructed and steered by 
the actions and charisma o f a few individual actors. To therefore refer to them as a ‘scientist’ 
or an ‘academic’ would remove some o f the narrative purpose o f recounting what was said, 
and for the purposes of boundary work analysis (outlined below), the personal relationships 
between certain actors was crucial. The interviewees were made aware that they were being 
recorded on tape to gather information for a PhD which would eventually be published. The 
lack of anonymity did probably account, in some cases, for an individual declining an 
interview. I felt, however, that it was important to maintain a consistent approach to all 
interview material rather than end up with certain individuals named and others not, which 
would produce an uneven historical account.
12 Holstein, J. and Gubrium,J. (1997), 'Active Interviewing', in Silverman, e d Qualitative Research: 
Theory, Method and Practice, (London: Sage), p. 114.
15
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Part II: My analytical tool-kit
Public policy debates are exercises in rhetoric. The first battle is often a struggle over 
definitions, and the winning side is usually the one most able to capture rhetorical 
primacy by having its definidons o f the situation accepted as the taken-for-granted 
landscape on which the rest o f  the game must be staged. Public debates, however, are 
not played out on neutral turf. Players make alliances, exercise power, make claims o f  
legitimacy through expertise, and struggle to gain the cultural and political authority to 
have their perspectives written into policy directives and law.
(Wolpe and McGee 2001, p. 185)
Science is viewed as commanding a large cultural authority in society, and the practice of 
science has been built up and promoted as a professional and specialised practice which is 
separate from the public, or society. Yet social studies o f science argue that where the line 
between science and non-science is drawn is flexible, subject to social and political interests, 
and thus the relationship between science and the public and political spheres can be 
constructed differently depending on who is doing the demarcation. As the above quote 
suggests, the successful definition o f a problem and o f the social identities concerned with 
managing that problem is also a political and rhetorical process.
The purpose o f this section is to outline the approaches from within STS and social science 
more widely that have both informed my historical investigation o f science and its 
relationship with the public and provided a lens through which to interpret some o f the data. 
It is worth mentioning that this section is not a typical literature review section on science in 
public, for it will not cover much research focusing on the public and science. I cover the 
relevant literature on, for example, recent thoughts on science in public, deficit models, or 
public engagement in later chapters, as it arises chronologically in the history, as a large 
proportion o f it was conducted and published in response to institutional efforts to address 
the ‘problem’ o f PUS. Thus this literature plays a role in the history and development of 
discourses surrounding the public understanding o f science and will be considered in that 
context.
16
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Science and its social context
Social studies o f science have drawn our attention to the social factors that are crucial to the 
establishment of scientific ‘facts’. Philosophers have argued for centuries that scientific 
knowledge is epistemologically privileged and should be seen as objective and value-free. 
However, as many studies have shown, scientific discovery, and the facts it produces, can 
often be led by the political or social interests at play.13 Thus science has come to be viewed 
from a wider perspective - that of social conflict and interest rather than as a separate, insular 
field that follows its own special rules.
Latour, Callon and Woolgar, alongside many others, have highlighted the social interests that 
shape what counts as science and what does not.14 My research continues within this 
constructivist view o f science, viewing it as a process o f social negotiation, and extending 
this principle not just to the knowledge content o f science but to the definition o f its 
practice, authority, and what it means to be a scientist. Central to the success o f this 
approach has been a symmetrical treatment of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. This ‘symmetry principle’ 
allows for exploration of the construction o f science and scientific knowledge regardless o f 
whether it is later expertly considered to be true or false.15
13 Dean, J. (1979), 'Controversy over Classification: A Case Study from the History o f Botany', in 
Barnes and Shapin, eds, Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, (London: Sage). For a more 
detailed argument o f  this SSK approach see Yearley, S. (1994), 'Understanding science from the 
perspective o f the sociology o f scientific knowledge: an overview', Public Understanding of Science, 3: 3, 
pp. 245-258.
14 See Callon, M. (1986), 'Some elements o f  a sociology o f translation: domestication o f the scallops 
and the fishermen o f St Brieuc Bay', in Law, ed., Power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? 
(London: Routledge).; Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. (1979), iMboratory IJfe: The Construction of Scientific 
Facts, (Beverley Hills: Sage).; Bloor, D. (1991), Knowledge and Social Imagery, (Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press).
15 Bloor (1991), op. cit., p. 7, also pp. 175-9.
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Boundaries of science
Research within STS has provided new narratives o f science which have highlighted the 
social embeddedness o f scientific practice. Just as scientific knowledge itself can be shown to 
be constructed by social factors, so the boundaries that are claimed to be between science 
and politics, or science and culture, can also be shown to be contingent and historically 
specific constructions, placed there, for example, by the active promotion o f science as a 
value-free enterprise.16 The ‘boundary problem’ in science is one that has energised much 
debate between philosophers, historians, and sociologists. The question o f where one draws 
the line between science and society, or science and non-science has been studied and 
answered in several different ways.
Largely the answers have fallen into two camps: essentialist or constructivist. Essentialists 
have argued for the possibility and analytic desirability o f identifying unique, necessary, and 
invariant qualities that set science apart from other cultural practices and pursuits. Popper 
proposed that the superiority o f scientific knowledge could be accounted for by its 
methodology. Through lack o f falsifiability, ideology, religion, metaphysics and pseudo­
science were neatly demarcated from science. Collins, however, has exposed the difficulties 
in deciding when an experiment has been successfully replicated arguing that the 
demarcation criterion that suggests some essential characteristic o f the scientific method, is a 
matter for scientists and others to negotiate. Therefore, what counts as scientific becomes a 
cultural and rhetorical process.17
Merton proposed an equally essentialist method o f demarcation, embodied in his four social 
norms of science.18 The norms o f communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and 
organised scepticism, were proposed by him as an institutionalised ethos, to which all 
scientists prescribed, and which were communicated and adopted as part o f the socialisation
16 Gieryn, T. (1995), 'Boundaries o f Science', in Jasanoff, et al., eds, The Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage).
17 Collins, H. (1985), Changing Order, (London: Sage).
18 Merton, R. (1973), The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press).
18
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process o f scientists. Certified, reliable scientific knowledge would be produced only in so far 
as these, and no other norms, actually guide scientists’ actions. Mulkay, however, has 
challenged the idea that these norms are institutionalised within the scientific community. He 
instead views the norms as a repertoire that forms part o f the dialogue or ‘moral language’ of 
scientists when communicating, evaluating and judging each other and their work. Thus 
again, the demarcation o f science from non-science can vary, and is described in accordance 
with varying social interests.19
Constructivist social scientists have denied the possibility of a single set o f demarcation 
principles that can work universally, and they argue that the separation o f science from other 
knowledges or pursuits is a context-contingent and interests-driven accomplishment. It is 
this approach that I found more useful in analysing the historical development o f debates 
concerned with defining science in a public context and managing the boundary between 
science and non-science.
Boundary work
If there is nothing inherently, universally and necessarily distinctive about the 
methodology, institution, history, or even consequences o f science, then why and how  
is science today routinely assigned a measure o f “cognitive authority” rarely enjoyed 
by other cultural practices offering different accounts o f reality?
(Gieryn 1995, pp. 404-5)
Rejecting all essentialist demarcation criteria as insufficient, how does one account for the 
paradox, outlined in the passage above, which the failure o f philosophical analyses presents? 
Gieryn argues that the demarcation o f science from non-science is a practical and day-to-day 
issue for scientists in the pursuit o f resources and professional advantage, and therefore 
studying the social actions (and here largely he refers to the discursive or rhetorical actions) 
o f scientists themselves becomes the central component of his analysis. He shifts the focus 
to the ways in which actors in society assign specific characteristics to the institution of 
science, its methods, members, and practices, which grant it its cultural authority, and
19 Mulkay, M. (1976), 'Norms and ideology in science1, Social Science Information, 15: 4 /5 .
19
Lost in Translations
subsequently draw a social boundary between science and non-science. He calls this process 
‘boundary work’.20
Boundary work, according to Gieryn, ‘occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or challenge 
the cognitive authority o f science -  and the credibility, prestige, power, and material 
resources that attend such a privileged position’ (p. 405). Demarcations o f science from non­
science are driven by a practical ‘social interest in claiming, expanding, protecting, 
monopolising, usurping, denying, or restricting the cognitive authority o f science’.21 Science, 
Gieryn argues, becomes simply a ‘spatial marker’ for cognitive authority, empty until its 
boundaries are drawn during context specific negotiations over who and what is ‘scientific’. 
The essentialist characteristics of science, as has been suggested above, then become 
provisional and contextual results o f successful boundary work, rather than being 
determinants o f what becomes science.
Gieryn’s early formulation o f the concept o f boundary work focused on the rhetorical style 
with which scientists describe science for the public and its political authorities, often hoping 
to enlarge the material and symbolic resources o f scientists or to defend professional 
autonomy. The selection o f different characteristics assigned to science reflects strains or 
ambivalence within the institution, and thus science is constructed ideologically as theoretical 
or empirical, pure or applied, private or public, depending on which o f these characteristics 
best achieves the demarcation o f science desired, and justifies the scientists’ claims to 
authority. Furthermore, Jasanoff has shown boundary work to be something scientists 
employ not just in terms o f the internal questions o f what is and is not scientific, but also in 
a more public context, allowing them to be both political and non-political.22
The study o f boundaries therefore provides a useful lens through which to study how 
different historical actors have rhetorically constructed science and scientists in public 
contexts, and how they simultaneously construct and maintain their own identity and
20 Gieryn (1995) op. cit., p. 394.
21 Gieryn, T. (1983), 'Boundary-work and the demarcation o f science from non-science: strains and 
interests in professional ideologies o f  scientists', American Sociological Review, 48: 6, p. 405.
22 Jasanoff, S. (1987), 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, 17: 2.
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cognitive authority. Indeed, Locke has argued that Svhat matters with respect to the public 
understanding o f science is not some purported division between technical and public 
knowledge but the activity o f argumentative reasoning ... actually employed in the context 
of public debates about science’.23 Equally, Irwin has argued for the importance o f exploring 
science-public relations in an open, empirical and symmetrical fashion, rather than 
dismissing public talk as unsubstantiated words and empty rhetoric.24
Susan Leigh Star and her collaborators take a different approach to Gieryn for the 
sociological study o f boundaries. Drawing on social worlds theory, rather than treating 
boundaries as markers of difference, Star conceptualises boundaries as interfaces facilitating 
knowledge production enabling interaction and communication across communities. Star 
coins the term ‘boundary object’ to describe these interfaces between social worlds. These 
objects can be material or abstract and are plastic enough to exist, and be given meaning, in 
different situations. Boundary objects lie at the intersection between two different social 
worlds, such as science and non science, and can be used by actors within each for specific 
purposes without losing their own identity.25 For example, a patent on research results can 
be used by a scientist to establish priority or for commercial gain. It can simultaneously be 
used by a politician to measure the productivity o f research.26
In his later work Gieryn employs a cartographic metaphor to describe the processes of 
boundary work:
The spaces in and around the edges o f  science are perpetually contested terrain: 
cultural maps are the interpretive means through which struggles for powerful ends 
are fought out -  the right to declare a certain rendition o f nature as ‘true’ and 
‘reliable’.27
23 Locke, S. (2002), 'The Public Understanding o f  Science - A Rhetorical Invention', Science, Technology 
and Human Values, 27: 1, p. 102.
24 Irwin, A. (2006), 'The Politics o f  Talk: Coming to Terms with the 'New' Scientific Governance', 
Social Studies of Science, 36: 2.
25 Star, S L, and Griesemer, J. (1989), ‘Institutional ecology, “translations” and
boundary objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s Museum o f  Vertebrate Zoology, 1907- 
39. Social Studies of Science, 19: 3, pp. 387-420.
26 Guston, D., (1999), ‘Stabilizing the boundary between US politics and science: The role o f  the 
Office o f Technology Transfer as a boundary organization’, Social Studies of Science, 29: 1, pp. 87-112.
27 Gieryn, T. (1999), Cultural Boundaries of Science: credibility on the line, (Chicago and London: The 
University o f Chicago Press), p. 15
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I f  science is viewed as a cultural space - one o f many classifications o f cultural territories 
that people use to make sense o f the world around them - it becomes a bounded space 
alongside other territories such as politics, religion, or social sciences. Those involved in 
credibility contests between territories engage in the process o f rhetorically constructing 
cultural maps, which are mobilised as representing ‘the way things are’. Science, he argues is 
given particular borders and territories, landmarks and labels, in order to enhance the 
credibility of one contestant’s claims over those of other authorities. The cultural maps 
become a version o f the truth, which, if accepted as such, allow others to act on that map, 
and the claims-makers to gain, or retain, their authority to make truth. Those contesting the 
borders o f science, Gieryn argues, often draw on older maps or past episodes o f boundary 
work to legitimate the validity o f their own. Thus scientific practices and antecedent 
representations o f it provide a repertoire of characteristics available for selective attribution 
at another point. Gieryn argues, it is therefore misleading to speak of the ‘epistemic authority 
o f science’ as if it were an always and already present feature o f social life. Epistemic 
authority is enacted as people debate where to locate the legitimate jurisdiction over matters 
o f fact, and is a locally and temporally contingent enterprise.
Gieryn uses a interesting geographical metaphor, yet Eden et al argue that it is important not 
to reify the boundaries themselves, as cartographic representations tend to do, but recognise 
that they are always shifting and unstable, dependent upon continual renegotiation.28 Rather 
than reducing complex entities such as ‘science’ or ‘social science’, into black and white 
immutable and homogenous objects, the boundary (and the identities o f those occupying the 
terrain that lie either side o f it) should be more properly thought of as a fuzzy zone of 
negotiation and rhetoric - a grey area which may, moreover, be very different for different 
issues. Given these dangers o f reification they suggest it is better to focus upon the 'work' 
than the ‘boundary’.
Taking this into consideration I decided to draw on Gieryn’s earlier formulation of 
boundary-work as a study o f the rhetorical style o f professional actors, as a way o f bringing
28 Eden, S, Donaldson, A and Walker, G, (2006), ‘Green groups and grey areas : scientific boundary 
work, N G O s and environmental knowledge’, Environment and Planning A , 38: 6, pp. 1061-1076.
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to the fore the social interests which can be inherent, yet often invisible, in the specific 
demarcations o f science from non-science, or scientist, from non-scientist. Given the long 
historical time period I was documenting, I also felt that social worlds theory and the 
analysis o f boundary objects, which ask for a much closer analysis o f all social worlds in a 
given setting would be difficult to sustain at the level of detail required over such a diverse, 
complex and long time period. Where Star and Griesemer focus on specific boundary 
objects and how they facilitate co-operation across many different social worlds, Gieryn’s 
original formulation o f boundary work lends itself to the study o f big epistemological 
domains such as scientific, social scientific and public knowledge. Furthermore, it is a 
rhetorical form well suited to the seizure, monopolization, and protection o f those ‘goodies’ 
like power, authority, expertise, prestige, and funding, actions which I felt came out more 
strongly from the historical data.29 When considering a historical episode which intersects 
with the so-called ‘Science Wars’, the study o f the conflict between professional groups and 
individuals also seemed more appropriate. This is not to suggest, however, that there were 
no fruitful interactions and co-operation between particular social groups within this time 
period, merely that these were not the focus o f my study.
Gieryn has identified several different types o f boundary work which are employed 
depending on the type o f contest that is occurring. While the typology outlined below is not 
exhaustive, nor describes distinct and mutually exclusive categories, it is helpful in identifying 
some o f the interests that are at stake in specific boundary conflicts, particularly those 
concerned with PUS. With reference to the history of public understanding o f science, we 
are, at times, dealing with multiple types o f boundary work along multiple boundaries. Thus, 
we can identify, for example, a group o f qualitative social scientists can be attempting to 
expel certain quantitative social scientists from their epistemological domain, while 
simultaneously attempting to expand this domain into an area previously considered to be 
the epistemological preserve o f natural scientists:30
29 Gieryn (1995), p. 440
30 See Gieryn (1999), pp. 15-18.
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Expulsion
This genre defines a contest between rival authorities each o f whom claim to be scientific.
All sides seek to legitimate their claims about the natural world as made and vetted inside the 
authoritative cultural space, while rhetorically constructing discrepant claims and claimants 
outside. Neither side wishes to challenge the epistemic authority o f science itself, but rather 
to deny the privileges o f the space to others.
Expansion
This genre describes a contest where two or more rival epistemic authorities compete for 
jurisdictional control over a contested ontological domain. As Gieryn describes, ‘those 
speaking for science may seek to extend its frontiers, or alternatively, spokespersons for 
religion, politics, ethics, common sense, or folk knowledge may challenge the exclusive right 
o f science to judge this’ (p. 16).
Protection of autonomy
This refers to a type of boundary work which involves the erection o f walls to protect the 
resources and privileges of those inside. Boundary work is employed in the struggle for 
control o f science among scientists and outside powers. For example, scientists could fight 
to retain autonomy in setting research agendas or deciding among methodological strategies, 
and they risk loss o f prestige, credibility, or even funding if blamed for unwanted 
technological developments. Or, for example, when the mass media reproduce scientific 
knowledge in a popularised format not to scientists’ liking, scientists will mobilise a model of 
science communication which places them as the only legitimate communicators o f science 
(for further discussion of this specific point, see discussion o f science communication 
below).
The history o f the public understanding o f science in the UK is a good case study to apply 
Gieryn’s boundary work analysis, for within it we find many different professional groups 
competing for public funds, and social, political and epistemic authority over definitions of 
what is science and who is scientific, or perhaps more importantly in this case, what is 
considered not to be science and who is unscientific. Although researchers have commonly 
seen boundary-work as a fairly strategic and deliberate practice, Kinchy and Kleinman have
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argued that it may be far less so, becoming normalised or unreflexively routinised within 
daily scientific and professional practice.31 Over time, with familiarity and accumulation, the 
constructions o f scientific authority may be ‘naturalised’, so that science's authority is no 
longer seen publicly as constructed, but as immanent and therefore less challengeable (if at 
all). Hence, the construction work is obscured or forgotten: ‘the repeated drawing of 
boundaries along similar lines across time reflects the historically resonant, and consequently, 
taken-for-granted character of the discourses on which actors draw’.32 What makes boundary 
work an interesting and useful layer o f analysis when documenting the history o f the public 
understanding o f science then, is that we see some of these taken for granted 
‘characteristics’, or constructions o f ‘science’ and scientific authority being challenged and re­
negotiated.
Boundary work analysis need also not be confined to the study of scientists themselves, but 
to all those who mobilise their own claims, or counter-claims, in the negotiation process 
over where the boundary lies between science and non-science, scientist and non-scientist, I 
have, therefore, considered, not just the scientists but those other professional groups 
involved in PUS debates and their attempts to construct and mobilise their own authority 
and legitimacy in society, in the process o f defining and constructing their own social world 
and the place o f science in society within it.
Discourse
This thesis studies the historical development o f debates over the public understanding of 
science, and how these have been tied up within a larger discourse concerned with the nature 
o f science, what it means to be a scientist or a member of the public, and how this discourse 
has conferred legitimacy on particular professional groups to define and manage this 
relationship. As already highlighted, social studies o f science such as those by Latour and 
Woolgar, or Gilbert and Mulkay, have examined the way in which scientific ‘facts’ and
31 Kinchy A., Kleinman D. (2003), ‘Organizing credibility: discursive and organizational orthodoxy 
on the borders o f  ecology and politics’, Social Studies of Science 33: pp. 869 -  896.
32 ibid., p. 871.
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conversations are established through a process o f argument and dispute which relies heavily 
on the presentation o f plausible accounts and the rejection o f alternative explanations.33 
These studies attempted to deconstruct the process of scientific discovery by probing the 
social context in which this takes place -  a social context, furthermore, that is mediated by 
language.
Michel Foucault’s approach to historical discourse was to see it as a realm in which 
institutions, norms, forms o f subjectivity and social practices are constituted and made to 
appear natural.34 He investigated, amongst other things, how our understanding and 
experience of sexuality was shaped by a set of moral, medical and psychological discourses, 
and, furthermore, how these discursive constructions linked to the social shaping o f 
institutions and practices o f social regulation and control. Habermas has also articulated a 
discursive account o f the manner in which ‘displays of representation’ o f power on the part 
o f ruling elites have co-constructed the public and those elites, forming the entities 
themselves and setting the terms o f their relationship and the boundaries o f power and 
authority.35
Equally, representations o f science through communication offer objective ‘ways o f seeing’ 
both science and culture, and as Macdonald argues, ‘representation - particularly rendering 
things up to be viewed — becomes a key means of apprehending and ‘colonizing reality’,36 
thus having broader political implications than simply a public understanding o f science. 
Foucault has argued that politics in this broader sense is concerned with power. In his 
interpretation, ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ are mutually implicated with power being involved in 
the construction o f truths and knowledge having implications for power.37 Traditionally, 
knowledge production, particularly scientific knowledge production, has been rhetorically
33 Latour and Woolgar (1979), op. cit.; Gilbert, N. and Mulkay, M. (1984), Opening Pandora's Box: a 
sociological analysis of scientists' discourse, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
34 Foucault, M. (1984), 'The Order o f  Discourse', in Shapiro, ed., Language and Politics, (Oxford: 
Blackwell).
35 Habermas, J. (1989), The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Oxford: Polity Press).
36 Macdonald, S. (1998), 'Exhibitions o f Power and Powers o f Exhibition: An Introduction to the 
Politics o f Display', in Macdonald, ed., The Politics of Display, (London: Roudedge), p. 10.
37 Foucault, M. (1979), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan, (London: 
Allen Lane), p. 380.
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separated from any connection with politics and hence power. Yet in Foucault’s 
interpretation the display, or communication, o f a particular discourse o f knowledge is a 
form of governance, in the sense that representing certain facts or particular ‘truths’ can 
influence how people understand the world, which in turn can influence how people act, or 
perceive they are allowed to act. This is particularly the case if these ‘facts’ are used to 
legitimate particular political ideals. Thus communication o f science, which is always tied up 
with representations of truths and knowledge, is also involved with questions o f power and 
politics.
Drawing on this, my history of the debates over the relationship between science and the 
public considers how our understandings of science, scientists, and science in public have 
been shaped by scientific, social scientific, and political discourses, and how these in turn 
have shaped those social institutions themselves.
Science communication
Gieryn argues that the rhetoric o f scientists is important in constructing the authority of 
scientists and, more broadly, the professionalisation o f science as a distinct community.38 
Indeed, Luhmann has argued that communication is the defining characteristic o f all 
communities.39 The issue o f science communication and popularisation is a central part of 
debates over the public understanding o f science, however, it is a separate academic field of 
study and so has provided theoretical insight into the way in which scientists communicate 
or view science communication. For example, Hilgartner has identified a culturally-dominant 
view of science popularisation:
38 Gieryn, T., et al (1985), 'Professionalization o f American Scientists: Public Science in the 
Creation/Evolution Trials', American Sociological Review, 50: 3.
39 Luhmann, N. (1995), Social Systems: translated by John Bednar.5 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press).
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A two-stage model is assumed: first, scientists develop genuine scientific knowledge; 
subsequently, popularizers disseminate simplified accounts to the public.40
This dominant view, he argues, holds that any differences between genuine and popularised 
science must be caused by ‘distortion’, often being attributed to outsiders such as journalists 
or by a public that misunderstands what it reads. This normative conceptualisation of the 
communication process from scientists to non-scientists has, he argues, become dominant 
within the scientific community because this model, though oversimplified and idealistic, 
serves scientists as a political resource in public discourse. This dominant view provides a 
flexible vocabulary used in rhetorical boundary work to demarcate ‘genuine’ from 
‘popularised’ knowledge. By defining what is popularisation, scientists also establish genuine 
scientific knowledge as the exclusive preserve of scientists. Scientists can popularise science 
to the public claiming they have done so at an appropriate level, yet when attacking the 
claims o f others, the notion of ‘distortion via popularisation’ can be levelled at any other 
actor or institution in an attempt to disallow the authoritative stamp o f ‘genuine’ scientific 
authority. As Hilgartner claims:
The dominant view o f science popularisation shores up the epistemic hierarchy which 
ranks sciences above such actors as policy-makers, journalists, technical practitioners, 
historians and sociologists o f  science and the public, (p. 533-34)
Dornan also identifies a similar ‘dominant concern’ within studies o f science and the media, 
that ‘lay acquaintance with science is insufficient and press coverage o f science is inadequate’ 
and needs to be improved.41 In this model o f science and the media, he argues:
Science is seen as an avenue o f access to assured findings, and scientists — in the 
dissemination o f  these findings -  as the initial sources. The members o f  the laity are 
understood purely as recipients o f  this information. Journalists and public relations 
personnel are viewed as intermediaries through which scientific findings filter, (p. 51)
This dominant representation o f how science communication should work, Dornan argues, 
has served ‘to advance [a view o f science as] an essentially heroic, apolitical, and inherently
40 Hilgartner, S. (1990), 'The Dominant View o f Popularization: Conceptual Problems, Political Uses', 
Social Studies of Science, 20: 3, p. 519.
41 Dornan, C. (1990), 'Some Problems in Conceptualizing the Issue o f "Science and the Media'", 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 7: 1, p. 65.
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rational endeavour’ (p. 50). The scientific community is privileged as the ultimate arbiter of 
the adequacy o f science coverage, and thus, he argues, these prevailing normative 
assumptions have served to legitimate a prevailing social order that places science at the top. 
Lewenstein, in response to this characterisation, has proposed a different model o f science 
communication which attempts to redress the epistemic hierarchy assumed within these 
dominant models. His web model eschews the top-down hierarchy which, in the dominant 
model, implies a distinction between expert and non-expert communications.42
Within debates over the public understanding of science, we can consider science 
communication as an act o f boundary work, selecting particular attributes for science and 
mobilising them as part o f a wider discourse, and indeed these dominant models o f 
communication become themselves constructs which are mobilised as part o f the boundary 
work between different professional groups’ ideas of how society should function.
Issues of subjectivity and reflexivity
In adopting an STS approach to the analysis o f the history it was important to draw on 
Bloor’s notion o f reflexivity to consider my own position as researcher and analyst and how 
this shaped the research project.43 The personal identity of the researcher, and their 
perspective and approach to the research, are themselves constituted through various 
discourses. It is not possible for the researcher to stand ‘outside’ discourse, observing from a 
distance and producing some type o f ‘objective’ analysis. If, as Berger and Luckmann 
suggest,44 human beings create and sustain all social phenomena through social practices, 
then the social phenomena under scrutiny, here discourses surrounding the public 
understanding o f science, are both created and sustained by that process o f scrutiny.
42 Lewenstein, B. (1995), 'From Fax to Facts: Communication in the Cold Fusion Saga', Social Studies 
of Science, 25: 3.
43 Bloor (1991), op. cit.
44 Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1966), The Social Construction of Reality: A  Treatise on the Sociology of 
Knowledge, (New York: Doubleday).
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One o f the phenomena I aimed to investigate in this study was the construction o f public 
understanding of science as a ‘problem’ by scientists and how this has been challenged. 
However, it could be argued that I am constructing problems around the problems of PUS.45 
Equally, in a research project considering how multiple constructions o f the public are 
mobilised within debates concerned with science and public, my use of the terms ‘the public’ 
and ‘public’ becomes slightly problematic. T he public’ and ‘public’ are terms that can have, 
and have had, many different meanings and uses,46 all o f which are available, not only to 
myself but to all the actors I am studying. It is difficult to step outside o f these discursive 
resources when conducting research on science and public, but so far as it is possible, I have 
endeavoured to stick to describing the rhetorical constructions mobilised by the actors in 
this time period, while, steering clear of mobilising my own. Further to this, given the focus 
on boundary work at disciplinary divides, my own allocation o f disciplinary affiliations is 
potentially problematic, and I stood in danger of constructing my own dichotomies where 
they may not have existed. Where possible I have endeavoured to allocate an actor’s 
affiliations on the basis o f their own stated professional interests/qualifications in their 
contemporary, rather than subsequent, context. Equally to avoid adopting and propagating 
the rhetorical dichotomies of concepts such as social science versus natural science, or 
quantitative versus qualitative which are mobilised by certain protagonists, I have tried to 
document their characterisation of, for example, another’s professional affiliation, or a 
generic grouping, such as ‘scientists’, or ‘social scientists’ as described by themselves at that 
point. That is not to suggest that these divisions are not present, but again, to accept that 
these are rhetorical constructions being mobilised by individuals, and my adoption o f these 
dominant discourses would run the risk o f not depicting the diversity in the literature and 
discourse o f the period.
Furthermore, if, as I claimed earlier in this chapter, reports, or documents in general, are 
seen as both constitutive and representative of phenomena, then my study, a report in its
45 For more on this see Woolgar, S. and Pawluch, D. (1984), 'Ontological Gerrymandering: The 
Anatomy o f Social Problems Explanations', Social Problems, 32: 3.
46 See for example the variety o f  discourses mobilised in the writings o f Dewey, J. (1954), The Public 
and its Problems, (Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press/University o f Ohio Press).; Lippmann, W. (2003), The 
Phantom Public, (New Brunswick, NJ/London: Transaction Publishers [1927]).; Habermas (1989), op. 
cit.; Hannay, A. (2005), On The Public, (Oxford: Routledge).
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own right, is also constituting the phenomena on which it reports. For example, my 
interview questions partially pre-determined the responses I got, and my questions were 
informed by themes I thought I had noticed in the literature and debates over PUS, as well 
as my own pre-existing understanding of, and sometimes professional relationships with, the 
interviewees, the debate and the social world at large. I therefore risked producing an 
interpretation o f interview data that was a projection o f my own preconceptions and 
imaginings.
Throughout the research, I attempted to document an accurate and faithful account o f the 
historical events and debates concerned with the public understanding o f science in the UK. 
However, I found that there were a number of obstacles to doing this in any ‘objective’ or 
straightforward manner and I felt it necessary to be reflexive about my own role in 
constructing this thesis.
Unlike many historians, I appear as an actor within the period under study, and my direct 
observations of events therefore play a part in shaping my history account. Further to this, I 
have also contributed to the intellectual content o f a few o f the reports, or initiatives that I 
have analysed. This has both advantages and disadvantages. Certainly from the point at 
which I became professionally involved in these debates, which was both in the period 
before starting this project, and during it, my access to data was not limited to archival or 
interview research. I, in a sense, became a participant observer, which provided me with an 
insider account o f events within the Royal Society in 2001, and the Office o f Science and 
Technology in 2005, as well as access to documents and data I may not have otherwise have 
had. The latter parts o f the history are therefore informed by additional types o f data than 
the former, and it was therefore important to triangulate my own observational accounts 
with other sources to ensure a fair and balanced account. However, I also felt that the 
addition o f this ‘insider’ historical detail would add to the history rather than detract from its 
validity.
Also problematic was the issue I faced o f researching and documenting ideas and actors 
within my own academic discipline. My professional training, and previous work in the field 
has meant that I myself have formed strong opinions on the way in which the relationship
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between science and the public is constructed and should be managed. While Eaglestone is 
keen to point out that ‘suggesting that [a] person’s identity is the same as their method is a 
mistake’, I feel that the only honest way to proceed is to locate my own perspective on the 
subject, rather than attempting to conceal it behind a ‘neutral’ analytical stance.47
My academic training is from within both the biological and social sciences. I have studied 
Science and Technology Studies at undergraduate and post-graduate level, with a particular 
focus on the historical, social and public dimensions o f science. I have also worked as a 
project officer and social scientific researcher within various non-academic institutions. In 
2001,1 worked at the Royal Society, where I helped develop and implement the first year of 
their Science in Society public dialogue programme. From 2002 to 2005 (a period during 
most of which I was also working on this thesis) I worked at the Royal Society of Arts on a 
project which aimed to encourage science based industry to adopt public engagement as part 
of their innovation programmes. Finally, in 2005 I worked for four months within the UK 
Office o f Science and Technology, assisting them with their interpretation and 
communication o f a national public survey on public attitudes to science, technology and 
public engagement.
Throughout all these experiences I have been largely sympathetic to what might be called a 
‘contextual view’ on the public understanding of science, that is that I believe that science 
and scientists can not claim a hegemony on public definitions and understandings of science, 
instead these are defined through a process of negotiation between different social actors 
within the context of specific settings. Further to this I have worked on projects which have 
explicitly criticised a ‘deficit model’ o f public understanding o f science, and I have worked 
towards fostering a two-way approach to communication between scientists and members of 
the public and the development o f new public engagement techniques and initiatives.
Finally, as Held points out, all historical ‘representations’ involve interpretation, which 
embodies a particular framework o f concepts, beliefs and standards.48 Eaglestone puts it
47 Eaglestone, R. (2001), Postmodernism and Holocaust Denial, (Cambridge: Icon), p. 27.
48 Held, D. (1996), Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity).
32
Lost in Translations
differently when he argues that ‘history .. is never just stories, implicitly or explicitly, and 
particular history embodies a methodology or a philosophy o f history.’49 Accordingly, 
particular interpretations o f data cannot be regarded as the correct or final history o f a 
phenomenon, or indeed a perfect reconstruction of a historical event.. As Geertz says about 
qualitative social researchers, ‘what we call our data are really our own constructions o f other 
people’s constructions o f what they and their compatriots [or colleagues] are up to’.50 
Interpretations are always open to reinterpretation from new perspectives. This thesis 
therefore represents my historical reconstruction o f debates over the public understanding 
of science, the reality o f which, as ‘debates’, is itself constructed. As with any academic study, 
it is also bounded essentially by my desire for a controlled research project and can only be 
based on the data I myself collected and analysed.
49 Eaglestone, R. (2001), op. cit. p. 30.
50 Geertz, C. (1973), The Interpretation of Culture, (New York: Basic Books), p. 9.
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Part III: Science and Public in a historical context
This section provides an overview o f the context for the rise o f concerns about the public 
understanding o f science in the 1980s. The focus of the historical review is informed by the 
theories I have outlined in the previous section, and therefore draws attention to the ways in 
which the relationship or boundary between science and the public has been historically 
constructed and negotiated. There is a particular focus on the emergence o f a discourse of 
science within which we can identify concerns with the popularisation or communcation of 
science, or the public’s understanding of science, and how these ideas have been central in 
constructing and defining the role of science, scientists and the public. My focus is on the 
UK, and specifically focuses on the role of institutions that have been involved in these 
debates. I start this history in the early nineteenth century as in this period new British 
science institutions were born, some o f which were concerned with the issue o f science 
communication. It also marks the beginning o f a process of professionalisation of science in 
Britain, both in terms o f its members and institutions.
Science in the nineteenth century
Science, in the early nineteenth century became a popular topic o f discussion, particularly 
among a growing middle class who wished to appear educated or enlightened, and it was 
common for a gentleman or a lady to own a microscope or a telescope alongside a cabinet of 
stuffed birds, or other natural objects, or to host a science discussion as an after-dinner 
activity. Popular science books, written in a less technical manner, were appearing, and newly 
written encyclopaedias played a major role in the dissemination of scientific knowledge to 
the growing middle classes. Production o f scientific facts was, however, limited to those 
deemed legitimate by other natural philosophers, all of whom occupied a largely private 
sphere.51 Having established these boundaries it became easier for natural philosophers to
51 Shapin and Schaffer (1985) argue that the practice o f experimental natural philosophy had 
constructed a boundary around science and its constituent actors, practices, and institutions. Thus 
can also be viewed as an attempt to exclude the ‘other’: that which is not considered to be science,
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discredit anyone promoting ‘alternative’ or ‘unorthodox’ knowledge or beliefs, by denying 
them access to membership o f this domain, and thus to the authority this also conferred.52
The Royal Institution o f Great Britain, which had been founded in 1799, increased its lecture 
activity in the early nineteenth century popularising science to the upper and middle classes. 
It staged elaborate demonstrations of scientific experiments, moving discussions of science 
out o f the cosy private salons and drawing rooms, and into a more public domain. Scientists 
were now regularly displaying their knowledge to large crowds, as Gregory and Miller argue, 
physically separated off from the audience by a lab-bench, bearing lots of complicated 
specialised experimental apparatus.53 By the end of the nineteenth century, few towns of any 
significance had not been visited by itinerant lecturers who offered courses o f a dozen or 
twenty lectures over a few weeks, supplementing their income by selling their books, 
apparatus and medical cures, by performing land surveys or giving private tuition.54
The Birth o f the British Association for the Advancement o f Science
A growth in the number o f scientists popularising science in the early-nineteenth century had 
coincided with a general rise in the flow o f knowledge and information into what had now 
become a large middle class. This new intermediate social class, or bourgeoisie, between the 
nobility and the peasantry, arose around mercantile functions in the cities o f Europe.55 While 
the nobility owned the countryside, and the peasantry worked the countryside, this new 
stratum of society in the cities often contained the wealthiest individuals. With this wealth
and those who do not have the authority o f one with access to ‘matters o f fact’. The first interesting 
aspect o f this discourse is the contradictory notion o f science as being semiotically public: that is 
something that should be conducted and validated by a collective ‘public’ witnessing, while at the 
same time being in practice a very closed social enterprise.
52 Gieryn provides several different accounts o f instances where ‘outsiders’ to this bounded sphere of  
science were denied authority, or their claims discredited by virtue o f their outsider status. See for 
example chapters 3 and 4 in Gieryn (1999), op. cit.
53 Gregory, J. and Miller, S. (1998), Science in Public: Communication, Culture and Credibility, (New York: 
Plenum), p. 21.
54 Porter, R. (2000), Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modem World, (London: Penguin), p. 
144.
55 Habermas (1989), op. cit.
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came a greater exchange o f goods and knowledge, and this also provided a niche for new 
cheap periodicals and lectures, and a new arena in which to discuss and debate the issues of 
the day. The rise in merchant trade also brought with it new artefacts from all over the 
world, which were displayed in newly opened public museums. Previously private Royal 
collections were opened to the public and expanded. The display o f these objects, often 
objects of science, can be seen as a medium through which the public were encouraged to 
witness the spectacle o f science.56 Thus this display also tacidy reinforced the authority and 
expertise o f scientists, who had discovered, created and understood these artefacts.
In 1830, the Cambridge mathematics professor Charles Babbage published his book 
'Reflections on the Decline of Science in England, which accused the universities o f not teaching, and 
the State of not supporting, pure science. He blamed a lack o f public interest for the 
declining prominence o f pure science in Britain, and his main attack fell squarely on the 
Royal Society for being too generalist and for not having enough influence within 
government. David Brewster, editor o f the Edinburgh Journal of Science, agreed with Babbage, 
and discussed openly his dissatisfaction with the organisation and the position of science at 
this time. He bemoaned that nobody was aware of the state o f the arts and sciences, or of 
their recent decline, and o f the ‘horrid construction o f all those institutions which are 
intended to promote them . . , ’.57 He contrasted the British situation with the state-funded 
French science, and suggested a national decline would occur if the sciences were ignored. 
Writing to Babbage after he had published Reflections, Brewster was convinced that it would 
be necessary to obtain the co-operation o f political and influential persons in order to 
produce a practical result, exclaiming:
It is a disgrace to men o f  science, and to the Royal Society, the natural guardian o f
English Science, that they have not combined in a vigorous attempt to raise public
feeling on the subject.58
56 For a more detailed discussion o f science museums and the display o f science as a form o f  
boundary work see Lock, S. (2002), Constructing the Nation: Science and Display at the Festival of Britain, 
1951, (MSc Thesis: Birkbeck College, London).
57 Morrell, J. and Thackray, A. (1981), Gentleman of Science: Early Years of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 41.
58 Brewster to Babbage, 12 Feb. 1830, British Library London fols 49-51 in Morrell, J. and Thackray, 
A. (1981), ibid., p. 47.
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Babbage and Brewster expressed envy o f the professional resources that men o f science had 
overseas and, in a bid for more public money, resources and greater job security in Britain, 
blamed the lack o f government support on a lack of public interest in science. The Royal 
Society was still operating along the idea of science needing the patronage of the aristocracy, 
and it had, as some o f the reformist Fellows argued, too many Fellows who may have been 
distinguished but had a passing interest in science. Reformers in the Royal Society wanted 
the Society to become a more professional body of scientists that belonged to them.
Brewster had suggested to Babbage in personal correspondence that ‘an Association should 
be organised for reviving science in England’,59 and a year later, the reformers in the Royal 
Society decided to form such an organisation. These men believed the solution to greater 
professional identity and more importantly greater resources for science, was to popularise 
science even more to the public. Implicidy there appeared to be a link between public feeling 
and support for science and government support. Thus the management of the relationship, 
or boundary, between the public and science was considered very important.
Thus in 1831 the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) was bom. The 
Association was, according to Caroe, designed to be a mouthpiece for science; ‘it was to 
catch the attention o f the nation, stimulate research and provide a meeting ground for 
discussion’.60 The British Association for the Advancement of Science was immediately 
popular, gaining a large membership, and providing a place for scientists to exchange papers 
and views. Its Annual Meeting, held in a different location in Britain or in a British 
Dominion each year, attracted both scientists and amateurs and was widely reported in the 
press.61 When the Association was launched in Yorkshire it immediately proposed a link with 
regional amateur societies, suggesting that its members could usefully collect data. Being 
launched in York itself was a very deliberate move: the organisation tried to move away from 
the very traditional (London, Cambridge, Oxford) base and symbolise the social integration 
of England, Scotland and Ireland. It was also at one of the early meetings o f the British 
Association, in 1833, that William Whewell coined the term “scientist” to refer to what had
59 Brewster to Babbage, 16 June 1830 British Library London fols 229 -  30 in Morrell, J. and 
Thackray, A. (1981), ibid., p. 50.
60 Caroe (1985), op. cit., p. 61.
61 Morrell and Thackray (1981), op. cit., p. 224.
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become a burgeoning professional group.62 The use o f a distinct label which rhetorically 
consolidated a distinction between professional and amateur is a further development of a 
discourse of professional science and a new resource to mobilise in continuing boundary 
work. The word ‘science’ too, began to take on a more specialised and distinct meaning. 
‘Science’, Morell and Thackray argue, like natural philosophy before it, was promoted by the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science as the ‘intellectual progenitor o f 
technology, the guarantor o f G od’s order and rule, the proper way of gaining knowledge, 
and the key to national prosperity and international harmony’.63 The old discourse o f natural 
philosophy was recast in these new, more professional terms, o f the mid-nineteenth century, 
yet we can see that many o f the ideological beliefs, for example, that science should play a 
key role in shaping society, and that the scientists had access to special knowledge continued 
to be part o f this.
As it continued to be popularised, science grew as an amateur pursuit, with natural history 
and astronomy becoming common pastimes for men and women. The onset of the 
Industrial Revolution brought technology closer to the public with many aspects o f daily life 
influenced in some way. The manual labour-based economy o f Britain was replaced by one 
dominated by industry and the manufacture of machinery. Textile industries were 
mechanised, iron-making techniques were developed and the use of refined coal increased. 
Where once travelling lecturers had brought new knowledge about agriculture and new 
technologies to the provinces, Mechanics Institutes were now established which provided 
places for often distinguished scientists to teach working men, making them qualified to do 
more technical jobs in factories and mines. Science was promoted as an entertainment for 
the middle and upper classes but as a means o f improvement for the working classes.
The British Association for the Advancement of Science harnessed the power of display to 
establish itself as an influential body in the public domain. Science as spectacle, according to 
Morrell and Thackray, became a deliberately cultivated feature o f the Association’s meetings, 
which became grand affairs not only for those distinguished guests attending the lavish
62 Gregory and Miller (1998), op. cit., p. 23.
63 Morrell and Thackray (1981), op. cit., p. 96.
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dinners with speakers, but also for the working classes who by witnessing the spectacle were 
expected to passively absorb the implicit message about the power, majesty and progressive 
nature o f science. Technological displays, they argue, became a regular feature of the 
meeting, often accompanied by ‘a band, cannons, flags and the shouts o f thousands’ (p. 96). 
In 1841 at Plymouth a battleship was lifted by wedges and launched in front o f thousands. 
The annual address at the British Association for the Advancement o f Science meetings 
became a regular ‘pulpit’ in which leading figures o f the organisation could deliver messages 
of morality and law, through the mouthpiece of natural knowledge. All these public displays 
were intended to bolster the growing cultural authority of science in a public context, while 
maintaining a boundary between scientists and lay-public. Display of science became more 
common in the nineteenth century as public museums were opened for the first time, and 
previously private collections made public. Public museums and exhibitions, such as the 
Great Exhibition in 1851, which displayed a large number of technological artefacts, can in 
this context be considered as displays o f science, or acts o f boundary work, which served to 
reinforce the authoritative role of scientists in shaping society, as well as enforcing a political 
message about the technological prowess of the British Empire. The public were thus 
constructed as passive receivers of this scientific knowledge and these other implicit 
messages.64
Professionalising science
Institutions such as the Royal Institution and the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science continued in the Victorian era to promote a more professional image o f science, 
in an attempt to demarcate the amateur from the professional. John Tyndall, who took over 
from Michael Faraday as Superintendent at the Royal Institution, continued to provide 
public lectures which displayed the progress of science. Tyndall used his prominent position 
to promote a variety of ideological arguments to justify scientists’ requests for greater public 
support. Career opportunities and research facilities available to scientists in the late- 
nineteenth century were minimal and public support was again perceived by scientists to be
64 Lock (2002), op. cit.
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crucial to garnering political leverage and resources. Tyndall and other scientists such as 
Thomas Henry Huxley, concerned at what they saw as the large amount o f intellectual 
authority religion commanded, engaged in public debates concerning natural selection and 
religious accounts of creation and the natural order, particularly following the publication of 
Darwin’s The Origin ofSpecies in 1859. Gieryn, furthermore, has argued that Tyndall’s 
Presidential address to the British Association in 1874, to deny the authority of religious 
beliefs over natural, scientifically derived ones, was boundary work, fighting for cultural 
authority and resources for science.65 Indeed, Turner has also suggested that the decades 
following the publication of Darwin’s work should be viewed as a ‘professional conflict for 
authority and prestige’ between science and religion rather than simply an academic debate 
between different accounts of natural history.66 The British Association was concerned with 
ensuring that science formed a part of the curriculum, particularly at public schools, where 
pupils would go on to hold positions o f influence as decision makers. If  they were exposed 
to science at school the British Assocation hoped pupils would then adopt a more 
favourable attitude towards it.67
By the 1880s, the presidential addresses o f the British Association’s Annual Meetings were 
routinely concerned with what they perceived as the publics’ woeful lack o f interest in, and 
support for, science. Sir Lyon Playfair, speaking in 1885, and seemingly concerned with the 
lack o f scientists coming out of the education system, asked:
“How is it that in our great commercial centres, foreigners push aside our English 
youth and take the places o f  profit which belong to them by national inheritance?
How is it that in our colonies German enterprise is pushing aside English incapacity?
How is it that we find whole branches o f manufactures, when they depend on 
scientific knowledge, passing away from this country in order to engraft themselves 
abroad, although their decaying roots remain at home?”68
65 Gieryn (1983), op. cit.
66 Turner, F. (1978), 'The Victorian conflict between science and religion: a professional dimension', 
Isis, 69., quoted in Gieryn (1983), op. cit.
67 Layton, D. (1981), 'The Schooling o f Science in England, 1854-1939', in Macleod and Collins, eds, 
The Parliament of Science, (London: Science Reviews Ltd), p. 190.
68 Playfair, L. (1886), Presidential Address, Report for 1885, (Aberdeen: BAAS).
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He answered his own question by quoting Michael Faraday’s observation that ‘our 
schoolboys are ignorant o f their ignorance at the end o f all that education’.69 Similarly John 
Burdon-Sanderson, at the Annual Meeting in Nottingham in 1893, suggested:
“It is not the fault o f  governments, but o f the nation, that the claims o f science are 
not recognised. We have against us an overwhelming majority o f the community, not 
merely o f the ignorant, but o f those who regard themselves as educated, who value 
science only in so far as it can be turned into money ... ”70
Over fifty years since similar concerns had prompted the foundation o f the British 
Association for the Advancement o f Science, the question of whether science was valued 
and supported financially by government, or exploited by industry, seemed now to be 
intricately tied up with notions of public education and support for science.
The end of the Victorian era saw science firmly established as a powerful and professional 
institution that had more influence over the educational system and commanded a large 
proportion o f public money. These new professional scientists were different from those 
amateur gentlemen who had come before them, and from the public. The scientific societies 
had become closed to those not considered professional scientists, and popularisation 
became a distinct type o f communication from the more technical internal scientific 
communication within the community. Goodell has argued that popularisation was even 
looked down upon by many scientists who believed it sullied the purity o f the scientific 
endeavour.71 However, an authoritative discourse o f science was certainly a well established 
and convenient rhetorical resource available to scientists engaging in boundary work to 
construct, maintain, or enlarge the boundaries around their profession.
Science enters the twentieth century
The effects o f the First World War on the status o f science were both positive and negative. 
The war had precipitated a large increase in government support for science in the UK, and
69 ibid.
70 Burdon-Sanderson, J. S. (1893), 'Inaugural Address', Nature, 48.
71 Goodell, R. (1977), The Visible Scientists, (Boston: Little Brown).
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the establishment of a government Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is 
testament to this, accelerating the continued professionalisation o f a distinct scientific 
community. However, the war had also highlighted the destructive capabilities of science to 
the public, with its application to military technologies. The use o f poison gas, to rather 
graphic effect, had resulted in many dubbing the conflict ‘the chemists’ war’, which was a 
blow to the public image o f chemistry. This perceived public unease prompted 
organisations such as the British Association for the Advancement of Science, which up 
until now had been a vocal cheerleader for science, to reformulate its approach to the 
popularisation of science. With dwindling support from the active science community, the 
British Association also needed to define and maintain what it saw as its central position in 
the scientific life o f the nation. Many of the Presidential addresses at Annual Meetings in the 
1920s reflect scientists’ attempts to manage the public image of science. Peter Collins argues 
that the Association was confident that, if there was any cause for disquiet about the social 
effects of science, ‘the fault lay with ‘society’ and not with ‘science’.72
The economic crisis of the 1930s in Britain, however, posed a challenge to scientists, as 
many people blamed science for many of the social problems that resulted from the 
economy. Problems such as the displacement o f large numbers o f people from work due to 
increasing mechanisation, and the shortening of working hours resulting in too much leisure 
time for the working classes, were seen as results o f an increasing industrial and 
technological society. Members of the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
responded defensively to this perception of negative public opinion, and many scientists at 
the time reconsidered the assumption that their scientific endeavours were necessarily 
making the world a better place. As J.G. Crowther, science correspondent o f the Manchester 
Guardian, recalled, the feeling that the organisation had to redefine its role, in light o f the 
financial crisis in 1931, was palpable:
72 Collins, P. (1981), 'The British Association as Public Apologist for Science', in Macleod and 
Collins, eds, The Parliament of Science, (London: Science Reviews Ltd), p. 216.
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Against this background, the Victorian form o f  the British Association seemed rather 
irrelevant. In the situation the institution had little to offer. In fact, Brewster’s British 
Association o f 1831 appeared more modern. The government o f  the Association, and 
many individual scientists, felt uncomfortable, and began to discuss what action the 
Association and scientists should take to make themselves more effective in this 
direction.73
While scientists had attempted to portray science as being devoted solely to the pursuit of 
objective scientific truth, above politics, and unaffected by social or ideological influence, 
there was now a rise in the number of scientists who argued that scientists should be more 
involved in considering the moral and social effects o f their work. High profile scientist 
popularisers J. D. Bernal and Hyman Levy spoke about the connections between science and 
socialist goals, believing that the scientific method should be applied to social and political 
affairs. The British Association for the Advancement of Science initially distanced itself from 
these radical scientists, being less concerned with social progress than about, as Collins 
suggests, ‘the dangers public apathy posed to the continued advancement o f science: in order 
to secure essential public support, it was necessary to demonstrate that the social 
consequences o f science were generally to be welcomed’.74 Thus far from being a change in 
the discourse o f science I have outlined so far, several features became more prominent at 
this time, particularly the idea that a bad image of science was in some sense the fault o f the 
public. Indeed, as Collins argues, the perception of a hostile public was so strong that the 
British Association, in their self-appointed role as mediator between science and the public, 
set itself up as a public apologist for science. In 1933 its Council introduced a specific policy 
to ensure that the Association try to allay public anxieties about the relations between the 
advances o f science and the life of the community. Josiah Stamp, President o f the 
Association in 1936, Collins argues, was so concerned to point out that science should not 
have a political agenda, and to distance the organisation from more radical scientists, that he 
stated it was far from clear that scientists had any special authority outside of their own 
discipline at all. Others at the same meeting were prepared to go further and admit that the 
public might even be partially justified in its misgivings about the social consequences of 
science, and that the socially responsible scientist should educate himself and the public on 
the social implications of science.
73 Crowther, J. G. (1970), Fifty Years With Science, (London: Barrie and Jenkins), p. 83.
74 Collins (1981), op. cit., p. 213.
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The meetings of the British Association were not, however, the only public domain in which 
conversations about the social function o f science, or impacts of science on society, were 
being held. Popular writing by scientists was a practice limited to a few of what Gregory and 
Miller call the ‘dabblers, idealists and stars of the 1920s and 1930s’, in contrast to the rather 
more common practice it had been in the Victorian period.75 A symptom of the increased 
professionalisation of science was that scientists were encouraged to write about their work 
first and foremost for their professional peers and only then was it deemed acceptable to 
write a more ‘public friendly’ popular account. A few well-known scientists and intellectuals, 
such as J. B. S. Haldane, Julian Huxley and Bertrand Russell, continued to write about 
science in newspapers, magazines and books, often providing speculative accounts o f a 
society in the future, created for better or worse by science, through which they could 
expound their thoughts on the impact of science on society. This was a much more open 
and creative forum in which to extrapolate on the implications of science than was permitted 
from within the scientific community. In the inter-war period this informal science writing 
became a place where the previous pre-war assumptions, that science could only be 
beneficial for society, were challenged. As Jon Turney has noted, the most conspicuous 
products o f this reappraisal were the literary dystopias, but there was also a growing 
literature in which the pace o f progress, the quality o f human life, and technology and social 
change were discussed in more detail.76 Haynes has also noted this ambivalence in the 
representations of scientists in films.77 Alongside these bleaker images o f scientific futures 
came a continuation o f the debate over what science is. Russell in his essay Icarus, or the 
Future of Science, feared that science would only be used ‘to promote the power of dominant 
groups’ rather than for the more utilitarian goal to ‘make men happy’.78 Julian Huxley, the 
grandson o f Thomas Henry and brother o f novelist Aldous, wrote about biology for the 
educated classes in up-market magazines, and, in his only fictional work, questioned the 
assumption that the promotion o f science to the public was automatically a good thing.79
75 Gregory and Miller (1998), op. cit., p. 38.
76 Turney, J. (1998), Frankenstein's Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press), p. 97.
77 Haynes, R. (2003), 'From Alchemy to Artificial Intelligence: Stereotypes o f the Scientist in Western 
Literature', Public Understanding of Science, 12: 3.
78 Russell, B. (1924), Icarus, or the Future of Science, (London: Kegan Paul).
79 Turney (1998), op. cit., p. 106.
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Away from the more intellectual discussion o f scientific futures, a different market for 
science fiction was growing and pulp science fiction became a popular locus for the 
discussion of science and society. A detailed discussion on science fiction is beyond the 
scope o f this thesis, but it is important to note the rise and impact o f the genre. Books such 
as Brave New World,, as Turney has argued, have entered the public consciousness in a similar 
manner to the Frankenstein myth, and have most likely played some role in subsequent public 
debates about the impact o f biology on society.80
The public’s understanding of science
Boon has provided a detailed account of the way in which scientists continued, in the 
twentieth century, to be concerned with the public’s understanding of science.81 In 1938, the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science set up a division for the Social and 
International Relations o f Science ‘to further the objective study o f the effects of advances in 
science on communities, and reciprocally the effects o f social conditions on the progress of 
science; and the encouragement o f the application o f science to promote the well-being of 
society’.82 It was the only Section o f the Association that remained active during the war, 
organising several conferences. Boon has noted that the 1943 conference, called ‘Science and 
the Citizen: The Public Understanding o f Science’, was organised by many o f those same 
scientists on the left o f the political spectrum that the organisation had distanced itself from 
in the early-1930s.
The conference followed on the heels o f several books devoted to the issues of science in 
society and, because o f their authors’ left-wing leanings, how Britain might steer science 
towards more socially beneficial goals. J. D. Bernal’s The Social Function of Science (1939), and J. 
G. Crowther’s Social Relations of Science (1941) both argued that an effective citizenship 
required some knowledge o f the potential o f science. As Daily Herald science correspondent
80 Wilson, D. (2005), The development of human tissue storage, (PhD Thesis: University o f  Manchester).
81 Boon, T. (2004), Science and the Citizen: Documentary Film and Science Communication in World War Two, 
(Oxford: Oxford University).
82 Science (1938), 'Committee o f the British Association for the Social Relations o f Science1, Science,
88: 2295.
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Richie Calder had explained at the conference, citizenship and science were intertwined 
concerns:
The scientist is a functional citizen ... this is a war for better government, and that 
better government will depend on the individual citizen being properly instructed. He 
must be made alive to the vast potential o f the twentieth century and to the vast 
complexities which science and technology have introduced into the life o f society.
The scientist has his contribution to make, not only in the shape o f  his new 
discoveries, but in impressing upon the public the implications o f  these new 
discoveries.83
Crowther echoed Calder’s emphasis on the public’s need to understand science. He argued 
that “a hundred years ago, it was desirable that the people should know about science: to-day 
it is necessary for survival”.84 He called for a “more professional and systematic” approach 
to the “explanation and appreciation of science”, arguing that scientists could no longer 
leave this task to “occasional and amateur activity” if we were to “look forward to a scientific 
civilisation supported by democratic approval, understanding and participation”.85 Boon’s 
account o f the conference shows how a dominant metaphor, present in many of the 
discussions concerning ways in which to address the public understanding o f science, was a 
transmission and reception model of science communication. The scientists differed on what 
sort of science should be popularised; however, they all appeared to agree that the goal of 
getting a message about science to the public was important. Haldane had expressed a 
similar concern with the importance of an understanding of science for democratic purposes 
in Science and Everyday Ufe (1939):
I am convinced that it is the duty o f  those scientists who have a gift for writing to 
make their subject intelligible to the ordinary man and woman. Without a much 
broader knowledge o f  science, democracy cannot be effective in an age when science 
affects all our lives continually.86
Following the conference, the Council o f the Association appointed a standing committee to 
‘consider and give effect to means of extending the public understanding o f the benefits of
83 Advancement o f Science (1943), Advancement of Science, 2, p. 335. in Boon (2004), op. cit,
84 Advancement o f Science (1943), op. cit.
85 ibid., p. 335, cited in Boon (2004), op. cit.
86 Haldane, J. B. S. (1939), Science and Everyday Ufe, (Harmondsworth: Pelican), p. 8.
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science’.87 The conference itself represents the earliest known mention o f the phrase ‘the 
public understanding of science’, and we can see that it was tied up with ideas o f how to 
manage the public, while ensuring that science was serving a greater democratic purpose. 
Thus again we also see a feature of the discourse of science from scientists, was that science 
could help shape a better democracy. Here again these scientists were advocating greater 
science communication: explicit boundary work to manage the public and its relationship 
with science and scientific knowledge.
Post-war science
Much of the history o f science in the public domain in the post-war period has yet to be 
fully researched. However, it is well established that science had a high profile in media 
coverage after the Second World War.88 Its contribution to the war effort had been central, 
and indeed Churchill even claimed that without it the war might not have been won.89 
Newspaper coverage o f scientific issues increased with, as Gregory and Miller claim, ‘the 
morale-boosting, optimistic rhetoric that had carried readers through the war’, and ‘new 
technologies in medicine, energy, transport and communications produced during the war 
were celebrated and praised’.90 As Irwin has shown, increasing ‘public understanding’ was 
viewed by many as an important task for scientists, as decisions over the social control of 
science was the responsibility o f every citizen. In 1947, the Association of Scientific 
Workers, encouraged by the post-war Labour Government, argued that the relationship 
between scientist and citizen could be summed up as saying that the scientist should play his 
part more fully as a citizen, while the citizen should acquire more scientific awareness.91
Alongside this citizenship argument, the Association also made workforce and cultural 
rationales for a public understanding of science. The former rationale was based on the need
87 Nature Editorial (1943), Nature, 151, p. 595.
88 Shortland, M. and Gregory, J. (1991), Communicating Science: A  Handbook, (London: Longman), p.
15.
89 Gregory and Miller (1998), op. cit., p. 38.
90 ibid., p. 37.
91 Irwin, A. (1995), Citizen Science, (London and New York: Roudedge).
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to address the ‘inadequate standards o f available labour’ for science and particularly industry, 
while the latter was based upon the assertion that ‘no man can be considered to be cultured 
who makes no serious attempt to understand and appreciate the broad principles of 
science’.92 They argued for the same sorts of approaches to disseminating science to the 
public as the 1943 conference delegates had: further education, and greater representation in 
media through museum exhibits, film, the press and the radio.93
A good example of both the celebration of science, and the push for a greater public 
understanding o f it, can be seen by its prominence at the Festival o f Britain in 1951. The 
Festival was an exhibition which followed in the tradition o f the Great Exhibition and 
United States’ Worlds Fairs, in that it devoted a large area to displaying material objects of 
science, with the public positioned as passive consumers to be both impressed and educated 
by the displays.94 The scientists, from many o f the scientific institutions such as the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Society, were heavily involved in 
developing the science within the exhibitions, and great emphasis was placed on getting the 
scientific information correct.
A gulf between science and public?
The mediation o f science in public after the Second World War, aside from a few o f the ‘big 
names’ in science such as Haldane and Lancelot Hogben, became the role o f a new breed of 
professional science journalists and science writers, who took to the task with their own very 
clear agenda and strategies. This resulted in placing a greater distance between the scientists 
and the public. Initially, as Lewenstein has argued in relation to science writers in the United 
States in the post-war period, journalists were committed to the promotion o f science, thus
92 Members o f the Association o f Scientific Workers (1947), Science and the Nation, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin), p. 205. cited in Irwin (1995), op. cit., p. 11.
93 Lewenstein has also shown how, in the United States, there was a similar perception that the 
relationship between scientists and the public needed to be actively managed. For a detailed history 
o f this development see Lewenstein, B. V. (1992), 'The meaning of'public understanding o f  science' 
in the United States after World War II', Public Understanding of Science, 1:1.
94 For further discussion o f the Festival and methods o f display o f science see Lock (2002), op. cit.
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continuing in the same vein as the scientist popularisers before them.95 However, this 
changed significandy over the following years. Science writers and journalists adopted a 
much more critical voice and became a public watchdog for science, rather than simply its 
cheerleader.96 Reasons for this change in tone have not yet been widely researched; however, 
it has been attributed to a general public movement away from traditional authorities and 
more specifically a feeling o f disappointment that had followed the pro-science rhetoric 
immediately following the war. It is also likely that more general shifts in news reporting and 
journalistic values and agendas changed. More significantly, it has been seen as a response to 
the perceived failures o f technology, particularly with regards to environmental degradation. 
C.P. Snow’s ‘Two Cultures’ treatise in 1956 discussed a perceived gulf between science and 
public culture,97 arguing that ‘the intellectual life of the whole of Western society is 
increasingly being split into two polar groups’ (p. 3). Referring to the relationship between 
scientists and non-scientists - here largely meaning those who had studied humanities - he 
characterised it as:
... a gulf o f mutual incomprehension -  sometimes (particularly among the young) 
hostility and dislike, but most o f  all, lack o f understanding ... . The separation between 
the scientists and the non-scientists is much less bridgeable among the young than it 
was even 30 years ago. Thirty years ago the cultures had long ceased to speak to each 
other: but at least they manage a kind o f frozen smile across the gulf. N ow  the 
politeness is gone, and they just make faces, (p. 4)
Many were critical o f Snow’s thesis, not least the arts community itself. A leading literary 
critic from Oxford, F.R. Leavis, roundly criticised Snow in his 1962 Richmond lecture and in 
the Spectator magazine, questioning his authority to speak upon such matters in the first place, 
as if a scientist had no place discussing culture.98 Edgerton has pointed out that many critics 
of Snow’s thesis were also scientists who believed him to be exaggerating the idea that 
science and the role o f scientists was somehow in decline. Indeed, Edgerton argues that 
Snow’s own position as a prominent scientist working within the Government refutes his
95 Lewenstein (1992), op. cit.
96 Bauer, M. and Gregory, J. (2007), 'From journalism to corporate communication in post-war 
Britain1, in Bauer and Bucchi, edsjournalism, Science and Society, (London: Routiedge).
97 A version o f his argument was published in the New Statesman and Nation in 1956 and then re­
iterated in a more popular format as a Rede lecture in 1959 see Snow, C. P. (1993), The Two Cultures: 
with an introduction by Stefan Collini, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Canto edition).
98 Leavis, F., 'The significance o f CP Snow', The Spectator; 9 March 1962.
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suggestion that there were no scientists in positions of power." Whether Snow’s assertions 
were founded or not, the idea o f a ‘two cultures’ divide between those in the scientific 
community and those from the arts and humanities was a focus for discussions concerning 
the relationship between the two. In many ways Snow’s argument can be seen in a context of 
the ongoing boundary work over which self-appointed professional elite commanded, or 
should command, ultimate authority in society, and therefore as a re-articulation of the same 
discourse o f science we have already seen, for example, from Boyle or The British 
Association.
A new grouping of commentators, from both sides of the Atlantic, many o f whom were not 
scientists, also came forward at this time, to articulate a wider concern with, and perspectives 
on, the public and science. American literary critic Lionel Trilling argued that the debate 
between Snow and Leavis in the mid-twentieth century should be seen as a ‘re-run’ of the 
debate at end o f nineteenth century between T. H. Huxley and Matthew Arnold, and a 
similar argument put forward by anthropologist Margaret Mead shows that it was not simply 
a British preoccupation.100 Writing towards the end o f the 1950s, Mead was concerned with 
what she perceived as a growing alienation of lay people from the worlds o f science and 
technology. She suggested that a ‘schismogenic process’ was taking place in Western culture, 
which could only be stopped by the discovery of ‘new educational and communication 
devices’ that would be able to bridge the gulf between ‘the specialized practitioners o f a 
scientific or humane discipline and those who are laymen in each particular field’.101 As the 
title o f her paper ‘Closing the Gap between Sciences and Others’ suggests, she felt scientists 
were now so specialised professionally that they were perceived even by other scientists in 
separate fields as bounded off from each other.
The term ‘scientific literacy’ was also coined at this time in the United States. Interest in the 
concept was fuelled by concerns among the American science community over public
99 Edgerton, D. (2002), 'Science and the Nation: towards new histories o f twentieth century Britain', 
Inaugural lecture, Imperial College, October 2002, published in Historical Research February 2005.
100 Trilling, L. (1967), Beyond Culture: Essays on Uterature and learning, (Harmondsworth: Penguin).; 
Mead, M. (1959), 'Closing the Gap Between Scientists and the Others', Daedalus, 88.
101 Mead (1959), op. cit.
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support for science following the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik.102 Increasing 
scientific literacy was seen by scientists as a way of ensuring that American children were 
equipped to cope with a society of increasing scientific and technological sophistication. As 
Waterman noted in 1960, in a review of the National Science Foundation, ‘progress in 
science depends to a considerable extent on public understanding and support o f a sustained 
programme of science education and research’.103 Harold Wilson also drew on this 
established discourse of science in his first speech as Labour party leader in 1964, stating:
“In all our plans for the future we are redefining, and we are restating, our socialism, 
in terms o f the scientific revolution, but that revolution cannot become a reality unless 
we are prepared to make far reaching changes in economic and social attitudes which 
permeate our whole system o f society.”104
Thus we can see that throughout this period both scientists and politicians drew on the idea 
that science should be understood and appreciated by the public in order for society to 
function successfully.
Criticisms of science
This general celebration of science and technology and its benefits to society came in for 
further criticism as concerns about the environment began to be voiced. The publication of 
Silent Spring (1962), a book in which Rachel Carson documented the degradation of the 
environment by human exploits, and particularly the dangers to wildlife from chemicals, 
brought these issues into the public domain. Over the following decades Silent Spring came to 
be seen as the start o f an environmental movement which, by the end o f the 1960s, became 
a vocal critic o f science and its goals. This critical turn also meant that scientists were 
engaging in less popularisation o f science, with the public communication o f science being 
performed solely by journalists and science writers.105 As Goodell has argued, tacit rules 
within the scientific community had developed over the past few decades, which dictated 
when a scientist could popularise and when they could not, which exercised a ‘powerful
102 Luagksch, R. C. (2000), 'Scientific Literacy: A conceptual overview1, Science Education, 84: 1.
103 Waterman, A. T. (1960), 'National Science Foundation: A ten year resume', Science, 131.
104 Transcribed from archive video footage a twww.bbc.co.uk, accessed on May 20th 2008.
105 Gregory and Miller (1998), op. cit.
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system o f social control’.106 In 1969, Franz Ingelfinger, the editor of the New England journal 
of Medicine, decreed that no scientist could publish their results in the journal if they had 
already announced their results somewhere else, such as in a newspaper or popular 
magazine. Professional science was now something that was supposed to happen in a very 
separate arena from the public.
In the late-1960s, a small group of scientists and other academics established a new 
organisation, called ‘The British Society for Social Responsibility in Science’. Their 
manifesto, as one of the founding members, biologist Steven Rose, recalls ‘criticized the 
prevailing notion of the ‘neutrality’ o f science’.107 The group, in a similar fashion to the left- 
wing radical scientists in the 1930s and the post-war years, wished to discuss and 
communicate the use of science for political ends. They were heavily influenced by the 
radical demands o f the student movements of 1968, and critical o f the uses o f science and 
technology in the Vietnam war, arguing strongly that ‘science and technology were intimately 
part o f the industrial—military complex o f advanced capitalist societies, and that it simply was 
not possible to separate a ‘pure’ science from the context in which it was commissioned, 
funded, researched, published and exploited’ (p. 308). A course on Science and Society was 
created on the Open University’s Foundation Science Course, which specifically raised the 
idea that scientists should be responsible for communicating the implications of their work 
to the rest o f society. The relationship between science and society was ‘an essential aspect 
of the whole process o f scientific advance’.108
While members o f the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science were concerned 
about the social aspects o f science, more general concerns over how scientists should be 
communicating with the public at all were being raised by social scientists throughout the 
1970s. Indeed the Program on Public Conceptions of Science, largely run by scholars from the new 
field of the social studies of science, acknowledged that the public understanding of science 
was now a matter of priority within various scientific associations and organisations and
106 Goodell (1977), op. cit.
107 Rose, S. (2003), 'How to (or not) communicate science1, Biochemical Society Transactions, 31: 2, p. 307.
108 Open University (1971), Science and Society, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).
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argued for a co-ordinated network of programmes to address this issue.109 For example, a 
seminar run in 1974 asked the questions: ‘What is the responsibility o f scientists to 
communicate to the public the aims, the methods, the results and consequences of their 
research? What are the impediments to such communication? How can the impediments be 
removed?’110
N ot all academics were in agreement that this focus on the public understanding o f science, 
which was in effect a move to closely manage the relationship between science and public 
through an increased communication, was a good thing. Trachtman questioned what he saw 
as a now unchallenged assumption that scientific organisations should be promoting and 
interpreting scientific knowledge to and for the public. A greater knowledge of science by 
the public was now perceived as ‘a good thing’ he argued, continually justified by journalists 
and scientific institutions with the argument that the enlightenment of citizens was necessary 
for a better democracy and personal decision-making, but also that it should form the basis 
of any cultured man’s knowledge.111 Trachtman, however, felt that these justifications were 
over-stated and that it may well be damaging, by raising public expectations o f what science 
was capable of and simplifying scientific controversy in the goal of straightforward 
communication.
109 McCarty, T. (1974), Newsletter of the Program on Public Conceptions of Science, 6, p. 13.
110 Perlman, D. (1974), Newsletter of the Program on Public Conceptions of Science, 6, p. 12.
111 Trachtman, L. E. (1981), 'The Public Understanding o f Science: A Critique', Science, Technology and 
Human Values, 6: 36.
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Conclusions
We can see that historically science communication and the idea that the public needs to 
know about science has been used not only as a means o f managing the boundaries between 
science and society but as a means of constructing an identity for science and scientists, in 
opposition to the identity of an ‘other’ social or professional group. This history has shown 
that to construct, expand, and maintain their cultural legitimacy, science communication has 
at particular points become a large part of the professional activity o f the scientist. This 
served, as Foucault would argue,112 as a civilizing function: scientists, by constructing and 
rhetorically mobilising a specific discourse concerned with their position in society and 
relationship with the public, show the public ‘how things are’.
The role of the scientist in public has been constructed through the mobilisation of a 
discourse of scientists as people of authority and expertise, with access to special knowledge 
which could improve society and educate the public. This implicitly therefore maintained the 
notion that the public had no part to play in the practice o f science itself: the discovery of 
‘facts’ occurred behind closed doors in the private realms of scientific institutions. We can 
also see from this history that an established discourse o f science has developed, which 
represents science as free from political influence, yet able to shape society and politics for 
the better. A relationship between public understanding, public support and government 
support is also articulated as this professional discourse o f science developed. All aspects of 
this discourse provide rhetorical resources for scientists to utilise when engaging in boundary 
work to construct and maintain a boundary around themselves. An ignorant public must be 
assumed before scientists can promote themselves as experts with authority and access to 
specialised knowledge. In what seems a contradiction, however, scientists have at points 
argued for the very boundary they are trying to rhetorically shore up to be made permeable, 
arguing also for science to be understood by the public. This is a good example of what 
Gieryn calls protection boundary work. Scientists construct science as separate to the public 
yet are careful to not construct themselves as too distant else they risk a perceived critically
112 Foucault (1979), op. cit.
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important route for their legitimation: social utility or funds. Thus scientists set themselves 
up as in control o f the ‘gate keeping’ or permeability of their ‘fence’, to allow some one-way 
movement o f knowledge, from science to the public but to restrict any in the other 
direction, for what makes science useful is its perceived objectivity and rationality. We can 
see that this co-construction o f science and society has been a continuous activity and many 
representations and science popularisation or communication can be viewed as rhetorical 
acts of boundary work which have constructed both science, its institutions and the public in 
a manner which advances the social interests of the individual or group deploying the 
rhetoric.
Many o f the studies from which this section’s history was drawn assume that the elite 
scientific discourse being communicated within any period was both successful and effective, 
that is to say that the manner in which scientists discursively constructed their relationship 
with the public is exactly how it then manifested. It would be naive to assume that this is the 
case; however, this merely serves to remind us that, as Gieryn suspects, many scientists 
assume that their representations of science ‘tell it like it is’, and thus are always solely in 
control o f their own identity and cultural authority.113
113 Gieryn (1999), op. cit.
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Part IV: My Historical Framework
In this history I document the activities and discussion related to the main individuals and 
institutions involved in the public understanding of science. I identify the different 
conceptualisations of ‘the public’, o f ‘science’ and of ‘scientists’, and beliefs about the 
manner in which their relationship should be managed. The dominant discourses of public 
understanding o f science over the whole period are identified and the boundary work being 
performed by different professional groups is analysed.
Having identified the major trends in activity and discourse, I decided that this historical 
period could be broadly understood in four phases. The phases are the results of my 
research. However, I have structured content of the thesis around them, to allow each phase 
to be characterised and discussed as it concludes chronologically, rather than leaving all my 
analysis to the final chapter. Each phase is dominated by a different discourse concerned 
with the ‘problem’ o f PUS, and characterised by different boundary work as different 
professional groups involved in the PUS debates attempt to construct and mobilise their 
own expertise. Thus while the phases do not have a discrete beginning and conclusion in the 
real world, they show how the dominant discourses, the actors involved and the boundary 
work, have changed over time. Certain types of boundary work and discourse persist 
through the successive phases, and are therefore — to varying extents — present at any given 
moment.
Phase I (Chapter 2) can be largely characterised as centring around the re-framing of a 
‘problem’ of the public understanding of science by scientists and scientific institutions from 
roughly 1985 to 1990.
Phase II (Chapters 3-5) runs from roughly 1990 to 1998, in which counter-claims about the 
problem of public understanding o f science are mobilised from a different professional 
group - social scientists - and focuses on the boundary work between these two groups as 
they contended for the legitimacy and authority to define and control the discourse of public
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understanding of science and the institutionalisation of PUS activity in both the academic 
and non-academic sectors.
Phase III (Chapters 6-8) covers the period from roughly 1998 to 2003 in which a very sharp 
change in the dominant rhetoric o f the public understanding of science occurred, and it 
centres around the House o f Lords Report published in 2000 and the reformulation o f the 
‘problems’ of PUS into a ‘crisis’ o f Science and Society. The transition from science 
communication to public engagement is examined, as well as the ensuing boundary work as 
the many different professional groups involved in constructing and managing the science 
and public relationship compete for renewed legitimacy under new formulations of the 
problem.
Phase IV (Chapter 9) finally considers the recent phenomenon of the promotion of 
‘upstream engagement’. The language of upstream engagement begins to dominate both 
social scientific and political arenas during 2004-5. It considers the political interest in 
managing science’s relationship with the public and the social scientific response to this.
At the end o f each phase a conclusion will draw together my main points of analysis on that 
period. The whole history will be considered analytically in the final concluding chapter.
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Re-inventing the Wheel?
Phase I
Concern over the relationship between the public and science rose to prominence again in 
the UK scientific community in the 1980s. The Conservative Government at this time had 
decided it had little need o f scientific advisors and without the ‘special status’ that had been 
accorded to prominent scientists in policy-making, particularly those in the Royal Society, 
their influence declined.1,4 The Conservative administration had turned away from 
academic science as a guiding influence on public spending, and believed instead that 
industry should know what they needed in the way of research and development, and should 
pay for it themselves. Members of the scientific community were faced with a lack of 
support from government, as well as declining public funds, falling numbers o f students 
studying science, and a drain of talented scientists to the United States. The Royal Society 
sent regular delegations to meet with the Secretary for Science and Education, who were told 
that the Government could not afford to spend more on science.115 The scientific 
community also perceived itself to be faced with a lack o f support from the public who, 
scientists felt, at best showed indifference to science, and at worst were likely to question its 
uses and practitioners.116 As John Ziman, a leading physicist, and Fellow of the Royal 
Society, later reflected there had been a concern within the science community that the 
efforts of those scientists over the past hundred years, who in his words ‘had made it their 
business to explain in simple terms what the scientists were doing’, had not had much
114 Yearly, S. (2000), 'What D oes Science mean in the "Public Understanding o f  Science'", in Dierkes 
and Grote, eds, Between Trust and Understanding: The Public, Science and Technology, (London: Routledge).
115 Bodmer, W. (2004), Interview, 5 October 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
116 Survey results published around this time had also suggested a general public discontent with 
science. See, for example, Garfield, E. (1982), 'Is public confidence in science declining?' Current 
contents, 45.; Herman, R. and Kenward, M. (1985), 'What do people think o f science?' New Scientist,
105.
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effect.117 This perceived lack of public understanding of science by some in the scientific 
community was baffling to them, as he recalled:
It seemed a paradox that so many people should have so little understanding o f the 
science that dominates their culture. They might find themselves quite unable to make 
sense o f important practical questions affecting their lives — small questions, such as 
the goodness o f eggs; large questions, such as the safety o f  nuclear power. In fearful 
ignorance, they might even take against science altogether, heedlessly throwing out the 
baby with the bath water, (p. 99)
In 1983 these concerns came to a head, and following a recommendation by a Royal Society 
report concerned with science education for 11-18 year olds in England and Wales,118 the 
Royal Society set up an ad hoc working group to ‘investigate ways in which the public 
understanding o f science might be enhanced’.119 Dr Walter Bodmer, Director of Research 
for the Imperial Cancer Research Fund and Fellow of the Royal Society, was appointed as 
chair. Bodmer already had experience in discussions concerned with the social aspects of 
science, having previously been asked to chair a committee on issues in biology, by John 
Maddox editor of Nature, called Biological Advances and Social Concerns.120 He had also 
been Chairman o f the BBC’s Science Consultative Committee. Thus the choice o f Bodmer 
set the focus o f the Royal Society study firmly on issues o f public communication from the 
outset. The working group’s remit was to:
• Review the nature and extent of public understanding o f science and technology in
the UK and its adequacy for an advanced industrial democracy;
• Review the mechanisms for effecting the public understanding o f science and 
technology and its role in society;
• Consider the constraints upon the processes of communication and how they might 
best be overcome.121
117 Z i m a n , et al (1991), 'Public Understanding o f Science', Science, Technology and Human Values, 16: 
l ,p .  99.
118 The Royal Society (1982), Science Education 11-18 in England and Wales The Report of a Study Group, 
(London: The Royal Society).
119 The Royal Society (1985), op. cit., p. 7.
120 Bodmer, Interview, 5 October 2004.
121 The Royal Society (1985), op. cit.
59
Lost in Translations
The working group, comprised mosdy of other Fellows of the Royal Society (including, for 
instance, well-known science broadcaster Sir David Attenborough),122 took both written and 
oral evidence from a variety of individuals and organisations professionally involved in 
science.123 The working group also made visits to media organisations such as The Guardian, 
New Scientist, ITN Channel 4 News and the Science Museum, and drew on a range of reports 
and academic papers. Though the working group spent a couple o f years examining the state 
of public understanding of science, Bodmer later admitted that much o f the final report was 
his own work:
“I think its very important that if you are chairman o f a group like that and you want 
to have any impact. In the end you’ve got to write most o f  the report yourself ... in 
the end I just sat down over a weekend or two, and decided I’ve got to make it a bit 
more forthright, more punchy, and get the main points in the executive summary”.124
The Bodmer report
The report unanimously concluded that ‘public understanding of science was inadequate’.125 
As the working group admitted in the final report, entitled The Public Understanding of Science, 
from the outset, their terms o f reference had raised three problems o f definition, that o f the 
‘the public’, ‘understanding’ and ‘science’ (p. 15). ‘Science’ they defined broadly to include 
mathematics, technology, engineering and medicine, and anything which comprised the 
‘systematic investigation o f the natural world and the practical application of knowledge 
derived from such investigation’ (p. 7). Their definition o f ‘understanding’ included a 
‘comprehension o f the nature of scientific activity and enquiry’, which they specified was not
122 The members o f the group were Mr R. Artus, Sir David Attenborough, F.R.S., Professor R.J. Blin- 
Stoyle, F.R.S., Sir Kenneth Durham, Sir John Mason, Tres.R.S., Mr M.J. Savory, Lord Swan, F.R.S., 
Professor Dorothy Wedderburn, Dame Margaret Weston and Professor J.M. Ziman, F.R.S.
123 The evidence taken was from a variety o f sources including learned and professional bodies for 
science (e.g. The Royal Society o f  Chemistry, Institute o f Physics, Institution o f  Chemical Engineers); 
Government bodies and individuals (e.g. Department o f Education, Department o f Trade and 
Industry, Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, Department for Agriculture Fisheries and Food, 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office); bodies concerned with the popularisation o f science (e.g. 
BAAS, Royal Institution); media organisations (e.g. BBC, Association o f  British Science Writers, ITN 
Channel 4 News).
124 Bodmer, Interview, 5 October 2004.
125 The Royal Society (1985), op. cit., p. 15.
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simply just knowledge o f some of the facts. The level of understanding required by each 
individual, according to the report, would depend on the purpose it was needed for. ‘The 
public’ they took to mean ‘mainly the predominantly non-scientific public’. They classified 
five different public groups according to their requirement for a greater public understanding 
of science. These five groups were (i) private individuals for their personal satisfaction and 
wellbeing; (ii) individual citizens for participation in civic responsibilities as members of a 
democratic society; (iii) people employed in skilled and semi-skilled occupations, the large 
majority o f which had some scientific component; (iv) people employed in the middle ranks 
of management and in professional and trades union associations; and (v) people responsible 
for major decision-making in our society, particularly those in industry and government (p.
7).
The working group identified PUS as, ‘an issue that is important not only, or even mainly, 
for the scientific community but also for the nation as a whole and for each individual in it’ 
(p. 5), and cited many different reasons why the public understanding of science should 
matter. The main thrust of their argument was that greater public understanding of science 
would increase national prosperity; successful exploitation of innovation required a good 
understanding of science and technology. They also felt that there were now few public 
policy issues that did not contain a scientific or technological component, and cited 
examples such as the disposal of radioactive waste, the fluoridation o f the water supply and 
the introduction o f vaccines. Furthermore, they argued, that a better understanding by 
government and the higher levels o f the Civil Service would lead to better policies for 
science. ‘Science and technology should be major considerations in public policy’ (p. 5), they 
stated, though how far this could happen would depend, according to the report, on how far 
the decision-makers and their advisers, and the public to whom they are ultimately 
responsible, understood the scientific and technological aspects o f each issue, and more 
generally, the scope and limitations of the scientific method. A greater understanding of 
science was also identified as being important for the individual when making personal 
decisions about, for example, diet, smoking, or screening programmes. Furthermore, the 
working group felt that scientific knowledge would help the individual to resist pseudo­
scientific information:
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An uninformed public is very vulnerable to misleading ideas on, for example, diet or 
alternative medicine. An enhanced ability to sift the plausible from the implausible 
should be one o f the benefits from better public understanding o f science, (p. 10)
To assist with this, the working group argued that understanding the nature o f risks and 
uncertainty was essential. The group berated those sections of society that seemed to 
demand that an industrial procedure or a nuclear power plant be free from risk. A public 
lack of understanding and knowledge of scientific information was the central problem as far 
as the working group were concerned.
To achieve all o f these goals depended ‘on the willingness and the ability of the scientific 
community to explain these aspects publicly’ (p. 10). Thus the main recommendations in the 
report were aimed at the scientific community, and its most direct and urgent message to 
scientists. This recommendation broke with the community’s prevailing attitude to science 
popularisation (that it was not part of the professional duties o f a scientist), asking scientists 
to ‘learn to communicate with the public, be willing to do so, indeed consider it your duty to 
do so’ (p. 6).
The Bodmer report (as the report was commonly referred to) raised the profile of the public 
understanding of science from something that had been a relatively private concern of a 
minority of individual scientists and academics, to something which all scientists should be 
concerned with. Science communication was something all scientists needed to learn how to 
do. That this command had come from the Royal Society was also significant, as Walter 
Bodmer later reflected:
“... it was sort o f the right time and people were thinking about these things, you 
know, nothing all that new in it. But I think that the fact that it was asked for by the 
Royal Society, was very important, and it reflected a willingness o f the Society to get 
involved in interaction with the public, which frankly it had been not very good at 
doing before, and it might have been rather aloof in some ways.”126
126 Bodmer, Interview, 5 October 2004.
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The report’s recommendations were not aimed solely at the scientific community, and many 
were more broadly targeted at other sectors of society. To assist in their communication with 
the public, scientists and politicians were also asked to learn how the media worked, and the 
constraints of using this avenue as a communications system. They were also told to learn 
how to explain science simply, without jargon and without being condescending.
Science education at school was hailed as being the ‘ultimate basis for an adequate 
understanding o f science’, and the report therefore asked for a broadly based scientific 
education at school for all to the age o f sixteen, and the resources to make this possible.127 
The working group’s perception was that there was a lack of science within the media, as 
well as a tendency to discuss science in a superficial and sensational way, and the working 
group made several recommendations to the mass media. They felt that there was a strong 
case for the inclusion o f more science in the media generally, both on television and in the 
press. The authors urged editors and senior journalists to take a much more positive attitude 
to the role of science in their newspapers, and that science, which often did not qualify as 
news, should be seen in feature articles more often. They also felt that mechanisms needed 
to be found to increase contact and collaboration between scientists and journalists. As 
science journalist, Jon Turney, reflected, this was an explicit attempt at managing members 
of another profession:
I mean Bodmer being Bodmer ... he basically wanted to tell us journalists how to do 
their job, because that’s his general attitude to other people doing less intellectually 
demanding things than him.128
British industry was also targeted in the report as an area which could help to promote the 
public understanding of science. Businesses were asked to inform the public, particularly in 
their own local communities, about the scientific and technological basis of their activities, as 
well as the benefits and problems that might arise as a result.
127 The Royal Society (1985), op. cit., p. 6.
128 Turney, J. (2004), Interview, 11 August 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
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In preparing the report the Bodmer working group had also examined recent survey work 
into public attitudes to science and technology. A Commission of the European Community 
public opinion survey had concluded in 1977 that ‘in principle, there was no crisis of 
confidence in Europe with regard to science’.129 A later Gallup poll for New Scientist in 1984, 
which examined public esteem for science and priorities for research, came to broadly 
similar conclusions.130 Overall, the working group, having considered survey results from 
both the United States and Europe, concluded that the research demonstrated that the 
general public was interested in science and would like to know more about it. They also 
concluded that the public tended to over-estimate the ability of science to solve what were 
essentially social problems, though generally the public was guardedly supportive of science, 
while being wary of some of its applications. The report’s authors, feeling that the public 
attitudes to science revealed by surveys might be a valuable guide to the improvement of 
understanding, and surveys would identify areas of concern and interest, as well as 
deficiencies in knowledge and understanding, recommended that the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) devise methods of ‘assessing the effects of an improved 
understanding’, and ‘methods o f monitoring attitudes to science’ (p. 31).
Finally, the report asserted that the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee become more 
effective at raising scientific issues within parliament more frequendy. The report also 
claimed that the Royal Society itself would make improving public understanding o f science 
one of its major activities, and this, certainly at that time, was the most implementable of its 
recommendations.
The impact o f the Bodmer report I -  practical efforts
There were two main outcomes from the Bodmer report recommendations. The first was 
the formation o f a committee. During the work of the Bodmer working group the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science had written to Bodmer to ask for his views on
129 Commission o f  the European Communities (1977), Science and European public opinion, (Brussels: 
CEC).
130 Herman and Kenward (1985), op. cit.
64
Lost in Translations
their proposal to set up their own committee on the public understanding of science. 
Bodmer’s response was to suggest that the British Association do nothing until his working 
group had reported.131 Subsequently, one o f the Bodmer report’s recommendations was that 
such a committee should be formed, but under the Royal Society. As Peter Briggs, Chief 
Executive of the British Association for the Advancement o f Science from 1990 to 2002, 
recalled, in many ways COPUS, the committee that was later formed, presented a threat to 
the organisation and had it not been in a relatively weak position in the mid-1980s, the 
outcome of the Bodmer report may, he felt, have been different:
... it [the BAAS] could hardly refuse to be part o f COPUS; neither could it sit back 
and see COPUS take over its role or allow COPUS to become simply a committee of  
the Royal Society. So the BA’s strategy -  in reality the way it undertook its role within 
COPUS rather than a thought-through approach -  was to play as active a part as 
possible and to be the body that took the lead on those COPUS activities that most 
closely overlapped with what it saw its own role to be. It was an approach that worked 
well for ten or more years.132
The resulting committee was established in 1986 as a joint committee o f the Royal Society, 
the Royal Institution and the British Association for the Advancement o f Science, with the 
title COPUS, which stood for the Committee on the Public Understanding o f Science. The 
reasoning behind the plural membership of the Committee was that the PUS agenda 
overlapped with the agenda of all three institutions. However, as Peter Briggs reflected, the 
real reason was slightly more personal:
It just so happened that the incoming President o f the Royal Society at the end o f  
1985 was George Porter, who was also Director o f  the Royal Institution and that 
year’s President o f the BAAS. Because o f  this unique coincidence, George Porter 
became the founding Chair o f COPUS rather than Walter Bodmer, who may have 
been the obvious choice, (p. 24)
George Porter, a Nobel Prize winning chemist, was an enthusiastic proponent o f the public 
understanding of science agenda, and things therefore happened quickly within the Royal
131 Briggs, P. (2003), The BA at the end of the 20th Century: A  personal account of 22 years from 1980 to 2002, 
(The British Association for the Advancement o f Science), p. 23.
132 ibid., p. 24.
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Society with him at the helm. Porter had, according to neurobiologist Colin Blakemore, 
stated that 1986 had ‘been a year when the morale of the scientific community has fallen to 
its lowest point this century’.133 So the work o f COPUS could be viewed as a means of 
boosting the morale of scientists. This low morale was also reflected in this year by the 
establishment of a lobby group for science, called Save British Science. The group was 
created following the publication of an advert in The Times, by a concerned group of over 
1500 scientists and engineers, who had raised the money to pay for the advert among 
themselves. The advert, under the headline ‘Save British Science’ had cautioned, ‘whole areas 
o f research are in jeopardy ... There is no excuse: rescue requires a rise in expenditure.. .We 
can and must afford basic research’.134 Subsequently, Save British Science set itself up as a 
lobby group and campaigned for greater funding for science in the UK. The morale of the 
scientific community thus appeared to be formulated in terms of both public and financial 
support, and a scientifically educated society was key to allowing science to continue to 
operate.
COPUS was, however, less concerned with scientific funding. It had been established with 
the general aim of raising the profile and number of public understanding o f science 
activities in the UK, particularly among scientists, and to take forward many of the direct 
recommendations from the Bodmer report. The Committee was to be representative of the 
scientific community so, in addition to the two members nominated by each o f the parent 
bodies, other members were drawn from the media, science museums, and the Research 
Councils. Early members included historian o f biology John Durant; Michael Kenward, 
editor o f New Scientist, and Sir David Attenborough, the popular science broadcaster. The 
extra administrative work that COPUS created resulted in the British Association for the 
Advancement o f Science and the Royal Society hiring new staff, though the Committee itself 
was administered at the Royal Society. So for the first time jobs specifically concerned with 
the public understanding o f science were created.
133 Blakemore, C. (1989), 'Who Cares about Science?' Presidential Address (General Section) British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, Sheffield, 12 September 1989.
134 Save British Science, 'Save British Science', The Times, 13 January 1986.
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The first activity of COPUS was to set up a grants scheme to fund those scientists who 
wished to stage science communication activities. Due to the lack o f any independent legal 
status on the part of the Committee, it was necessary to establish the scheme as a Royal 
Society scheme, with an advisory committee appointed by COPUS. The other main venture 
established by COPUS in its first year was a Media Fellowship scheme, to be run by the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science. The Fellowship was to provide 
scientists with the opportunity to work alongside a science journalist in radio, television, 
newspapers or magazines for up to two months. The idea was to try to bridge the perceived 
gap between science and the media - ‘helping scientists better to understand how the media 
worked, the pressures journalists experienced and what constituted news’.135 It was hoped by 
the Committee that the learning experience would be mutual and that journalists would also 
improve their understanding of science. Some members of COPUS hoped that by building 
this alliance with the media they would be able to change the way in which it reported 
science and suggested that Fellowships should also be provided for journalists to experience 
science, by spending time in a university or other research institution. This ambition 
however, was never realised, due largely to the unfeasibility o f journalists being able to take 
the time off. The COPUS committee hoped that it would be able not only to improve the 
way the media reported science, but also to increase the amount of science in the media.136 
Here we can see that COPUS had set themselves up in opposition to the media, and 
furthermore wished to colonise this aspect of the public sphere and improve it to their 
advantage. The ‘common sense’137 belief that the media exerted a powerful, and often, in 
their perception, dangerous, influence on the public made it a prime target o f COPUS, and 
many of the discussions at early committee meetings were preoccupied with ways of exerting 
influence over newspaper editors or broadcasting outlets.138 The public were also again 
conceptualised as being a passive ‘mass’ audience for the media, easily swayed by whatever 
messages were transmitted.
135 Briggs (2003), op. cit., p. 25.
136 British Association for the Advancement o f Science (1987), Report for COPUS, Media Fellowships 
1987, (London: The Royal Society).
137 Sonia Livingstone has suggested that this conception o f media effect is commonplace, though not 
very easy to back up with evidence. See Livingstone, S. (1996), 'On the continuing problem o f media 
effects', in Curran and Gurevitch, eds, Mass Media and Society, (London: Arnold).
138 COPUS minutes (1986), P U S /9(86), (London: The Royal Society).
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The final COPUS initiative, aimed at encouraging scientists to get involved with the public 
understanding of science, was the establishment of the Faraday Award. This was a medal 
awarded to a scientist or engineer deemed by COPUS to have contributed significantly to 
the public understanding o f science. The first recipient o f the award was Charles Taylor, 
Professor o f Physics at the University of Cardiff, who had given popular lectures on physical 
sciences to the general public for years. Taylor was awarded one thousand pounds, and was 
expected, upon receiving the award, to give a lecture at the Royal Society.
The impact o f the Bodmer report II -  research
The second recommendation of the Bodmer report was the establishment, by the Economic 
and Social Research Council, of a research programme on Public Understanding of Science. 
In 1986 the Science Policy Support Group (SPSG) was set up by the ESRC as a non-profit 
company, and registered as a charity, to run a grant selection process and to maintain a 
network of academics working on the PUS programme.139 The Chair of the SPSG was 
Ziman who, as well as having been a member of the Bodmer Committee, was also well- 
known for his writings on the social aspects of science, and his affinity with the social studies 
o f science. Ziman’s book Teaching and Learning about Science and Society (1980) had covered 
many of the basic concepts from the academic discipline o f science and technology studies. 
Though he had criticised the discipline for what he described as a ‘negative anti-scientific 
prejudice’, he nonetheless now found himself in charge of commissioning work from many 
academics within this field.140
According to Durant, there had been a tension between Ziman and Bodmer on the working 
group:
139 SPSG later took on the wider role o f promoting the application o f science, technology and 
innovation studies to policy, practice and management in Europe.
140 Ziman, J. (1980), Teaching and learning about Science and Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 55.
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there was a huge, I’m afraid, rather petty rivalry between Walter Bodmer and John 
Ziman. I think John would have preferred to be the chair o f the Committee and 
certainly believed that he knew better than Walter Bodmer what the real issues were.
It’s one o f the features you’ll probably have discovered in public understanding: 
everybody thinks they know what the real issues are.”141
Now, however, Ziman, for the first time since the publication of the Bodmer report, had a 
platform from which to not only discuss PUS in the manner which he felt appropriate, but 
also to commission further research into it. There were few academics researching the public 
dimensions of science and technology at this point in the UK, and the relatively new field of 
STS had, since the 1970s, largely been focused on scientific knowledge, the inner workings 
of science, and what happened within the laboratory.142 The Bodmer report had not taken 
any social scientific work into account when drawing up the report other than the survey 
data, which, though surprising given Ziman’s presence on the working group, may have 
reflected a prejudice from within the Royal Society more generally against the social 
sciences.143 It may also have simply reflected that some scientists within scientific institutions 
were certain that PUS was a problem for scientists to solve themselves, and thus it was 
constructed as a problem of how to communicate science to the public in greater amounts 
and more efficiendy. This did not mean, however, that there had been no interaction 
between the scientific and social scientific communities. During the early-1980s John 
Durant, who had been teaching biology in the Continuing Education Department at Oxford 
University and physicist Geoffrey Thomas, who was Head o f the Department for External 
Studies had run two one-week Science Studies seminars per year. Both Bodmer and Ziman 
had attended these seminars at different times, to report on the work of the Royal Society 
working group. Durant, reflecting later on these Oxford meetings, recalls seeing the interest 
the Royal Society was taking as an opportunity:
141 Durant, J. (2004), Interview, 28 June 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
142 See for example Latour and Woolgar (1979), op. cit.; Collins (1985), op. cit.
143 Social scientists were not eligible to become Fellows o f the Royal Society. Many years later when I 
was working at the Society in 2001 there was still a debate between Fellows as to whether statisticians 
could be accepted as members. All other social scientists were not eligible.
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. from my point o f view it was just great that in the early ‘80s, as it were, the little 
group o f us who were passionate about science communication, about public 
understanding o f science, suddenly began to find that there were receptive ears for 
this in high places in the science community. I saw what they were doing as just a 
great opportunity to get more attention paid, more funding for this thing.”144
Also implicit in this quote, and the one below, however, is the idea that now the Royal 
Society had taken an interest in this area, it validated it as a ‘real thing’, granting some 
legitimacy on the social scientists. Perhaps highlighting social scientists perception of a lack 
of their own cognitive authority in society at the time:
“... what we saw was great, the Royal Society’s coming on board, the Royal Society’s 
beginning to realise that this thing that we have known is important and interesting 
for some time, for years as it were, that it really is interesting and important. And there 
was a sense I think on our part, yes, genuinely, that the science community particularly 
at senior level, was beginning to join the party.” [my emphasis]
The ESRC research programme on public understanding of science was tasked to 
commission research which would inform the scientific institutions’ agenda o f increasing the 
public understanding o f science.146 The issue was broken down into three basic questions: 
What do people say about science in general? How do people use science? How is scientific 
knowledge supplied and received?147 SPSG was told to run the research programme as 
initiative funding, which meant that they had to solicit and encourage proposals to fit into 
the predetermined topic of public understanding o f science. Research funding was highly 
competitive in the social sciences, and this funding opportunity attracted researchers from 
anthropology, education, history, philosophy, politics, psychology and sociology, as well as 
multidisciplinary subjects such as media studies and science and technology studies. Durant 
characterises the move by all these disciplines to ‘cash in’ on PUS as a rather cynical 
reformulating of existing work to fit in with the current priorities within the Research 
Councils:
144 Durant, Interview, 28 June 2004.
145 ibid.
146 Healey, P. (1986), Public Understanding of Science Award, (ESRC/SPSG).
147 Ziman, J. (1990), 'Public Understanding o f Science', paper presented at the conference Policies and 
Publics for Science and Technology, Science Museum, London, 7-11 April 1990.
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they could see that this was kind o f the coming thing and there was money to be 
had, and what people ... what irritated me was not all o f that so much as the fact that 
people would try therefore to re-present their own existing research agenda as 
somehow being relevant to this new thing.”148
His construction of social scientists’ motivations are an indication o f the boundary work 
amongst social scientists. Each saw this thing called the public understanding of science 
differently, but each as a domain relevant to their own expertise. To sociologist Alan Irwin, 
of Brunei University, it did appear that the call for proposals was an opportunity to get more 
money for research they were already doing:
... so we, opportunistically -  I mean, I really don’t mind saying - but we’d been 
developing this research and it fitted with this [PUS] ... we weren’t thinking public 
understanding o f science I suspect.149
Thus with many different motives leading them, some empirical, others contingent on the 
current climate for funding, five projects were funded in the first phase of research, which 
SPSG said reflected a ‘new approach to research and its efforts to devise effective ‘bottom- 
up’ measure o f the public understanding of science’.150 A large proportion o f the money 
went to Durant and Thomas, who were to conduct a national scientific literacy survey 
assessing what knowledge about science the public had. As Durant later explained, their 
survey was proposed because they had found people in the United States had been doing 
similar work surveying science literacy, through the National Science Foundation since the 
early-1970s.151 The scientific literacy concept, which was already prevalent in the United 
States, had many similarities to the concept of PUS.152 Knowledge of science had been
148 Durant, Interview, 28 June 2004.
149 Irwin, A. (2004), Interview, 29 June 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
150 Healey (1986), op.cit.
151 Durant, Interview, 28 June 2004.
152 Jon Miller had defined his concept o f scientific literacy in 1983, which included four elements: (a) 
knowledge o f the basic facts o f science, (b) an understanding o f  scientific methods such as 
probability reasoning and experimental design, (c) an appreciation o f the positive outcomes of 
science and technology, and (d) the rejection o f superstitious beliefs in astrology or numerology. 
Miller had constructed indicators for scientific literacy which had become the basis o f bi-annual
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measured by quiz-like items as well as questions interrogating public attitudes to science, and 
these same aspects of the North American surveys were used as the basis of the UK survey 
research. Other bids that were awarded money focused on researching science in specific 
social contexts, rather than at a national level, and had come from social researchers such as 
Brian Wynne from Lancaster University, Steven Yearley from York and Hilary Rose from 
the Open University. All were social scientists from a variety of disciplines, and they shared a 
common interest in environmental and medical hazards and risks and had been involved in 
discussions over the public and political dimensions of science in the 1970s.
It became apparent to the researchers who had won research grants that there was a split 
between the different approaches to analysing the subject within the research programme. 
According to Durant the first programme “spent a lot of time struggling with that 
difference”.153 Put crudely, the difference was between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies; however, this split was more than simply an argument about which 
methodological tools to employ. Each side reflected different tacit models or ideologies 
concerning the nature of the public, its understanding of scientific knowledge, and the role 
o f science in society. Researchers from the programme recall the often difficult meetings 
held between all of the researchers on the PUS programme. As Durant, on the team 
employing quantitative methods, again recalls:
“... here I was looking at people who seemed to have almost nothing in common.
There were one or two others but not many in that research programme who ... 
would’ve similarly acknowledged the validity o f what we were doing. But there were 
others who would regard it all with the gravest suspicions, and actually it was 
something I had to work through with Brian Wynne. Brian was definitely on one side 
o f this, very dubious about whether there was any value in surveys at all, whereas I 
was arguing that there could be some .. .”154
science indicator surveys for the United States National Science Foundation. Some boundary work is 
obvious, highlighting that an wider examination o f these debates, for example, in the United States, 
would be fruitful.
153 Durant, Interview, 28 June 2004.
154 ibid.
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Another of the quantitative researchers, Martin Bauer at the Science Museum, also recalls:
“There was certainly an element o f dogmatism around which created a conflict ... I 
remember observing that many o f the members o f this research programme were on 
non-speaking terms. So I realised that there are these kind o f two teams, what I came 
to realise was that this conflict was about something very strange which was whether 
you used numbers or not ... qualitative or whether you use a survey.”155
What is striking about the recollections of this period is that, at the time, each side of the 
methodological divide represents the other as being given too much priority, and thus 
resources and legitimacy, within the programme. Bauer accuses the qualitative researchers 
as being ‘dogmatic’, a trait which was not considered to be good scientific practice. Durant 
meanwhile now attempts to distance himself from the conflict. The qualitative researchers, 
as Alan Irwin reflects, felt that the quantitative survey group had secured most of the 
money and most o f the subsequent publicity:
“... we went along to the first meeting, which probably was in Oxford ... and then I 
started to tune into what had happened. And, o f course, we could see that it seemed 
like the bulk o f  the money was tied up in this large-scale quantitative study which o f  
course has had so much publicity since ... that would have been the view o f the group 
at the time, it was the big number crunchers who dominated the money. I don’t know 
if that was even true, but that was how it seemed. And we’re now doing the thing 
which isn’t the big number cruncher.”156
Irwin’s use of the phrase ‘number crunchers’ minimises their understanding o f society and 
the public. In the quote below he again recalls the feeling by the qualitative researchers that 
the programme was conducting the wrong sort of research. Branding the quantitative 
research as a ‘pub quiz’ again can be seen as an attempt to downgrade the status of the other 
social research:
155 Bauer, M. (2004), Interview, 26 May 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
156 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
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“I remember at the time there was a lot o f moaning and groaning from the social 
scientists, I really remember that. ‘Well, that’s just typical. The Royal Society model on 
how to do research on public understanding o f  science. It’s a big, quantitative 
study’.”157
“So that issue o f  how to relate large-scale quantitative surveys, which I quickly 
christened the pub quiz approach o f public understanding o f science. The pub quiz 
approach being really rude about it. So we’d sit there in the pub and go, ‘this is terrible 
and the qualitative stuff is being missed out and it’s missing out the cultural angle’.”
D issecting PUS
Despite the split in approaches and the difficult joint meetings, the researchers spent the 
next few years conducting their research, while the scientific institutions continued with their 
practical efforts to influence the public understanding o f science. Calls for a greater 
understanding of science tended, in these initial years, to come only from leading figures 
within the scientific community, such as Walter Bodmer and Colin Blakemore. Thus PUS 
had apparendy not permeated beyond those directly involved in COPUS or related 
institutions. This also meant that their PUS agenda went largely unexamined. To Bodmer 
this lack o f questioning simply seemed to confirm the approach was valid, as he made clear 
in his J.D. Bernal Lecture in the year following his report:
I have sometimes asked the question in public ‘Does anyone have an argument against 
the public understanding of science?’ and never received a reply. It is really very hard 
to see how one can argue against improving the public understanding o f  science. Can 
it do any damage? Should one keep the public ignorant?158
To him it was therefore self-apparent that ‘the more that people knew about science, the 
more they realise its importance’ (p. 8)
157 ibid.
158 Bodmer, W. (1986). 'The Public Understanding o f Science1. The Seventeenth J.D. Bernal ljicture 
delivered at Birkbeck College, London, p. 6.
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In 1987, two years on from the publication of the Bodmer report, that many scientific 
organisations were encouraging a greater public understanding of science prompted a greater 
academic interest in the PUS phenomenon. A paper by Thomas and Durant asking “Why 
should we Promote the Public Understanding of Science?” was published in the first issue of 
Scientific Literacy Papers with Michael Shortland as editor.159 It was produced by the Scientific 
Literacy group, a research initiative funded by the Department o f Education and Science and 
based in the University of Oxford. The journal was a vehicle by which the group could 
introduce the scientific literacy term to an already label-laden debate surrounding ‘science 
and the public’, ‘the public understanding of science’ or ‘the popularisation o f science’. As 
the editorial made clear, they were also starting to question the claims of scientists as to what 
the problem of PUS was; arguing that their formulation of scientific literacy was superior to 
others’ efforts to increase scientific understanding, as the quote below exemplifies:
Scientific literacy does not rely on a model o f understanding which prescribes what 
members o f the public should know; on the contrary, it reflects an attempt to grasp 
what kind(s) o f understanding(s) o f scientific issues members o f the public may want 
or need. We do not begin with the assumption that the public necessarily requires 
more science in its diet, that scientists are the ones to provide it, or that the major 
problem is one o f  communication or popularisation.160
The Thomas and Durant paper was based on a review o f the small amount of literature that 
had been produced on the public understanding of science, to assess why exactly it was 
regarded as a ‘good thing’. From their review they identified nine different, though 
overlapping, arguments for the promotion of PUS ordered according to the benefits which 
were ascribed to each one. Their paper, therefore, identified a mix o f motivations behind the 
activity called the public understanding of science. As Thomas and Durant acknowledged, 
different authors meant different things by the terms ‘public’, ‘understanding’ and 
‘science’.161 The various justifications identified by the authors are summarised below:
159 Thomas, G. and Durant, J. (1987), 'Why Should We Promote the Public Understanding o f  
Science?' Scientific lJteray Papers, Summer 1987.
160 Shortland, M. (1987), 'Preface', Scientific I Jteracy Papers, Summer 1987.
161 Thomas and Durant (1987), op. cit. p. 2.
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Benefits to Science
Aside from the need to recruit new scientists into the community, the argument that support 
for science depended upon some level of public understanding, or at least awareness o f the 
processes and facts of science, was identified as a common refrain from scientists and 
scientific institutions. The science writer Isaac Asimov, they identified, had even gone as far 
as to claim that ‘Without an informed public, scientists will not only be no longer supported 
financially, they will be actively persecuted’.162 The paper also pointed to the work of Harry 
Collins, a sociologist of science who had put forward a slighdy different sort o f argument.
He had argued that the public needed to understand that scientists, in their role as experts, 
could only offer ‘the best advice that there is to be had’, and to expect more than this would 
risk ‘widespread disillusion with science’.163
Benefits to National Economies
As Thomas and Durant pointed out, this was one of the main arguments which had been 
put forward by the Royal Society in 1985. It derived from the idea that a public with a 
greater understanding o f science would supply scientifically trained personnel into national 
research and development programmes, which in turn would generate new goods and 
services, which would then create a healthy economy both nationally and internationally.
Benefits to National Power and Influence
Greater public understanding o f science, the authors identified, was claimed to bring wider 
political benefits, and such benefits had been widely pronounced in debates about scientific 
education in the United States in the post-Sputnik years. Scientific education had been 
perceived to be a national necessity if the United States was to maintain its position of 
intellectual and ideological leadership in the world. The country needed a greater number of
162 Asimov, I (1984), cited in, Thomas and Durant (1987), op. cit., p. 3.
163 Collins (1985), op. cit.
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scientists and engineers, not only to sustain its expanding civil and military industries, but 
also ‘to help spread American influence to the rest of the world’.164
Benefits to Individuals
This argument again, they pointed out, had been used by the Royal Society in 1985. It had 
claimed that an improved understanding of science and technology was essential to 
everybody living in a scientifically and technologically sophisticated society. More 
knowledgeable citizens would be able to make better decisions about diet, health-care and 
personal safety, as well as make better consumer choices. Individuals with a greater 
understanding of science would also be more employable, and better able to take full 
advantage of technical developments in their place of work.
Benefits to Democratic Government
This argument claimed that in a democratic society citizens possessed the right to influence 
decisions taken on any matters in which they had an interest. So much of science was 
publicly funded, and the results had an impact on the whole o f society. If  science was to be 
influenced by the people, the people had to know something about science. Thus a greater 
public understanding of science could promote, not only more democratic decision-making, 
but also better decision-making. The authors again highlighted that the Royal Society had 
made this argument in 1985.
Benefits to Society as a Whole
Alongside benefits to the individual this argument, the authors detailed, suggested that, for 
the health of a nation, science should not become alienated from the rest o f society, and 
should rather be fully integrated into society.
164 Thomas and Durant (1987), op. cit., p. 4.
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Intellectual benefits
Thomas and Durant noted that this argument, about intellectual benefits, echoed C. P. 
Snow’s in the 1950s, or Matthew Arnold’s in the 1890s, who had asserted that an educated 
and cultured mind should be one which understood and appreciated science and technology. 
Thus the promotion of PUS became part and parcel of the promotion o f a more general 
intellectual culture.
Aesthetic benefits
This argument articulated that PUS should be promoted using the same sorts of arguments 
for the preservation of rare books, the conservation of beautiful buildings and the 
promotion o f the arts. Science helped us to reveal the beauty and order of the natural world 
and thus should be central to a truly cultivated mind.
Moral benefits
This argument in recent years, had, according to Thomas and Durant, become 
unfashionable, however, they noted that earlier arguments, such as those o f Herbert Spencer, 
had rested upon the idea that science provided a superior ethical system by which society 
could be ordered.
As Thomas and Durant pointed out, not all of these arguments would necessarily be used by 
all proponents of PUS. Social, political, or professional interests were likely to dictate which 
of them an individual, or an institution, would favour. The paper did problematise the idea 
that public understanding of science was one coherent goal or entity, and instead argued that 
beneath the tacit consensus that PUS was a good thing lay ‘profound differences of 
orientation, of outlook, and of aim’ (p. 9). So the label of PUS was deceptively simple. O f 
particular note here was their examination of the argument for PUS put forward by many 
scientists, which they argued rested on the assumption that a greater public understanding of 
science was something readily identifiable:
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By understanding do we mean a grasp o f the aims o f science, the norms o f science, 
the processes o f science, the products o f science, or a combination o f some or all o f 
these? And by regard, do we mean approval o f the practice o f  science, the principles 
o f science, the expert judgements o f science, the research priorities o f science, or again 
a combination o f some or all o f these? (pp. 9-10)
This argument raised a greater problem to Thomas and Durant, however, as it appeared to 
rest on the notion that an increase in understanding automatically meant an increase in 
approval. The idea of understanding as the ‘manipulation o f consent’ was unacceptable to 
both authors, who felt that it was unreasonable to assume that science would, or could, 
never be disapproved of by those individuals with an informed understanding of it. If  this 
was not the case then, as their paper pointed out, the ‘relationship between understanding 
and approval is not necessary, but rather contingent upon, the nature of the particular 
understandings and the particular contexts in which they occur’ (p. 10). Having 
problematised this particular argument of public understanding of science, the authors went 
on to argue that the promotion of scientific literacy, their own preferred term, would instead 
be a better goal. Promoting their brand of public understanding o f science, they advocated 
an attempt to ‘enhance people’s abilities to live with, and benefit from [science]’. This would, 
according to the authors, also avoid the public being ‘mystified or oppressed by, the 
scientific and technical expertise that are such fundamental aspects of our society’ (p. 12).
Another early academic exploration of public understanding of science is provided by Harry 
Collins, then Reader in Science Studies and Director o f the Science Studies Centre at the 
University of Bath, and published in the journal Social Studies of Science in 1987.165 Collins’s 
main work was in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and his paper outlined his 
analysis of the way that the representation o f science as certain knowledge on television 
impacted on the public understanding of science. He started his paper by also 
problematising the phrase ‘public understanding of science’ arguing that it contained 
important ambiguities, which he went on to define:
165 Collins, H. (1987), 'Certainty and the Public Understanding o f Science: Science on Television', 
Social Studies of Science, 17: 4.
79
Lost in Translations
... the phrase itself does not make clear whether the understanding is to be o f  the 
content o f scientific knowledge or the nature o f science as a cultural enterprise. These 
two types o f understanding are quite different, (p. 690)
Collins argued that understanding how scientific knowledge was generated was very different 
from understanding the facts of science, and even a scientist may have little understanding of 
the former. He agreed in principle to the argument put forward by the Bodmer working 
group, that providing more knowledge of the agreed facts to the public was a good thing, 
however, he disagreed with some of the rationale that the Bodmer group had outlined:
Now it is true that citizens who understood more about science would be in a better 
position to make decisions where an issue included matters o f science, but it is a 
mistake to think that the crucial issue is more practical understanding. More 
knowledge o f the factual background to disputes, or more familiarity with the findings 
of science, would not help. (p. 690)
Collins argued that the type of scientific issues about which the public were asked to make 
decisions, such as diet, whether to smoke or not, and alternative medicines, were often 
controversial, and often the experts themselves could not agree. What the citizen needed in 
this situation, he argued, was what he called, a ‘reflective’ understanding o f science. This was 
an understanding of science as a cultural enterprise and not an understanding of scientific 
facts. However, in cases of ordinary science, he argued, citizens only needed ‘knowledge of 
the scientific facts, for no decisions concerning competing claims are called for’ (p. 690). It 
was in cases of more controversial science, Collins asserted, that scientists were more likely 
to base their decisions on everyday criteria such as who seemed trustworthy, whom they 
knew personally, who worked at a prestigious institution. He suggested that here scientists 
might benefit from being a little bit more ‘streetwise’ and drawing on public knowledges, 
rather than calling for an increased understanding of science by the public. Calling once 
more for a more reflective understanding of the way science generates certainty, Collins 
attacked the assertion in the Bodmer report that a greater understanding of science would 
assist the public in sifting between scientific and unscientific claims. What is scientific, he 
argued, was a philosophical question that remained to be settled amongst philosophers, and
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providing the public with a large amount of factual knowledge would not assist them in 
solving the demarcation problem.
Quantifying PUS
In July 1989 the results o f the ESRC funded Oxford survey into public attitudes towards, 
and understanding of, science were published in the leading scientific journal Nature,166 
Durant and Thomas (with the addition of a social scientist who specialised in survey 
research, Geoffrey Evans) rehearsed the arguments they had laid out previously, as to why 
anyone should care about the public understanding of science:
First, science is arguably the greatest achievement o f our culture, and people deserve 
to know it; second, science affects everyone’s lives, and people need to know about it; 
third, many public policy decisions involve science, and these can be only genuinely 
democratic if they arise out o f informed public debate; and fourth, science is publicly 
supported, and such support is (or at least ought to be) based on at least a minimal 
level o f public knowledge, (p. 11)
The authors went on to claim that, ‘common sense suggests that the scientific community 
would be unwise to presume upon the continued backing of a public that knows little of 
what they do’ (p. 11). Their appeal to common sense appeared to contradict the 1987 paper 
where Thomas and Durant had felt it was unacceptable of those proponents o f PUS to 
assume that understanding was necessarily linked to public support. Their own stance in this 
paper, however, bore more of a resemblance to the Royal Society’s than their previous paper 
had, suggesting that they had perhaps presented their own research slighdy differently now 
that they were being published in the world’s leading scientific journal, to align themselves 
with their audience. The survey had, however, appeared to show that a higher level of 
education was linked to a more positive attitude towards science. The Nature paper 
compared the data from the Oxford survey with data from a similar survey carried out in the 
United States by Jon Miller and colleagues. This was the first time this type of survey had
166 Durant, J., et al. (1989), 'The public understanding o f science', Nature, 340.
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been compared internationally and consisted o f over two thousand randomly sampled 
participants in each country interviewed in the previous summer. The main findings of the 
surveys, according to the paper, were that levels of British and American interest in science, 
technology and medicine were relatively high, but levels of knowledge in each area were far 
lower. The authors were surprised at the high levels of interest expressed towards science, 
particularly as it was rated as more interesting than sport or politics, but the levels of 
understanding found were less welcomed and, as the authors stated, ‘if modem science is our 
greatest cultural achievement, then it is one of which most members o f our culture are very 
largely ignorant’ (p. 13).
This so called ‘ignorance culture’ of the British public received extensive press coverage, 
which expressed a mixture of surprise and horror at the low levels o f public understanding 
of science.167 The section of the survey that received the most publicity, however, was the 
knowledge-based quiz, which had been a new section of the survey designed to determine 
the level of scientific literacy of the respondents, rather than simply their attitudes to science. 
The quiz asked respondents to decide whether a statement of a scientific fact was true or 
false, and they scored a point for each correct answer; ‘correct’ being determined by what the 
researchers considered to be the currently accepted scientific answer. Examples o f questions 
used, or statements the participants must agree or disagree with included: ‘Does the Earth go 
around the sun or does the sun go around the earth?’; ‘The centre o f the earth is very hot’; 
‘Electrons are smaller than atoms’; and ‘Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria’. The 
results were represented as worrying to both the researchers and the commentators, with 
34% of Britons and 64% of Americans answering that the Earth went around the Sun, or, as 
every press article reported, ‘two-thirds o f Britons did not know that the Earth went around 
the Sun’.168 The second dimension of scientific understanding measured was concerned with 
the process of science, which was assessed in the form of the open-ended question, ‘What 
does it mean to study something scientifically?’. The results would, the authors argued, make 
‘gloomy reading’ for anyone who took the conventional, quasi-Popperian model of scientific
167 Quote taken from Conner, S. 'Ignorance Culture: Science and the British', The Independent, 28 
January 1989.
168 Durant, et al (1989), op. cit.
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method seriously, as less than 14% of respondents made any mention o f either theory 
construction, hypothesis testing, or the experimental method.
The other, more traditional aspect of the survey required respondents to express a positive 
or negative attitude (expressed on a Likert Scale) towards statements such as: ‘Science and 
technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more comfortable’; ‘The benefits of 
science are greater than any harmful effects’; and “We depend too much on science and not 
enough on faith’. These results, as already stated, were more positive, and used to claim that 
interest in science and technology was high, though this appeared to suggest to them that 
many people perceived a gap between themselves and the world of science, about which they 
wanted to know more. Thus the paper concluded that the results did provide a case for 
optimism about the scope for improving the public understanding of science.
Following the publication of the survey work, John Durant was given a visiting chair in the 
history o f science and public understanding o f science at the Science Museum and Imperial 
College London. This appointment was a further sign that public understanding of science 
was both moving up the agenda within certain institutions, and becoming more 
professionalised, with resources and ‘experts’. Similarly, though its publication was perhaps 
not directly responsible, the Bodmer report’s recommendation - that science be taught 
alongside more liberal arts subjects until later in the curriculum - was realised with the 
introduction of the Education Reform Act in 1989, which introduced a national curriculum 
in England and Wales, with science as a core subject that all pupils had to study from 5-16. 
The inclusion o f science into the curriculum was justified by the National Curriculum 
Council, by arguing that:
Appreciating the contribution science makes to society will encourage pupils to 
develop a sense o f their responsibilities as members o f society and o f  the 
contributions they can make to it.169
169 National Curriculum Council (1989), Science: Non-Statutory Guidance, (London: NCC), p. A5.
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Within the National Curriculum an ‘understanding of science’ was given the narrow 
definition of ‘the ability to use theories and models based on scientific ideas’ when it related 
to concepts, and as ‘the ability to bring together skills and concepts into a strategy to 
produce valid and reliable data for solving a problem or answering a question’, when it 
related to procedures (p. 78). In this document we can identify the Government using the 
term ‘public understanding of science’ as a rhetorical resource to legitimate its own activities, 
thus simultaneously forging and instantiating alliances between itself and those scientific 
institutions promoting the same arguments.
Throughout the second half o f the 1980s, COPUS, and the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, continued to provide the main arenas in which scientists carried 
out PUS related activities. Following a review of its activities in 1986, the British Association 
reformulated its mission statement to place public understanding o f science at the centre of 
the institution’s activities.170 In the process, they also decided to change their name to simply 
the ‘British Association’, or ‘BA’ for short, with the strap-line o f ‘Promoting Science and 
Technology’. Their Annual Meetings continued also to be a space at which scientists would 
discuss the role o f science in society, and the discussion o f the public understanding of 
science became a regular topic. Colin Blakemore, gave a Presidential address at a Section 
meeting in Sheffield in 1989 entitled ‘Who Cares about Science?’, in which he spent a lot of 
time discussing the problems of science in the media, and why the public was “painfully ill- 
informed” about science and technology.171 The media, though a source o f concern to 
COPUS, had given some publicity to the public understanding activities in recent months, 
discussing the low score on the scientific literacy section of the national survey. Blakemore 
saw this, however, as a confirmation of the PUS mission:
“Professor John Durant will amuse but shock you with an account o f  the now well- 
publicised results o f recent surveys o f the public understanding o f science ... the one 
that disturbed me most was the finding that nearly half o f Britons believe that nuclear 
power stations cause acid rain. How can people be so staggeringly ignorant on such a 
topic o f vital social and political importance? That result alone should warn us that 
something is seriously wrong in the mechanisms o f communication between science 
and the public.” (p. 10)
170 Briggs (2003), op. cit., p. 30.
171 Blakemore (1989), op. cit. p. 12.
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Science or scientists were not to blame, according to Blakemore, the problem of public 
understanding of science was poor communication. The quantitative research proved a 
useful rhetorical resource with which to rally the scientific community to communicate 
more. Blakemore used this data alongside that from earlier surveys, which had shown that 90 
per cent of the population said that they thought that everybody ought to study some 
science up to the age o f at least 16, and that only 19 per cent of people in the UK had ‘a 
great deal of confidence’ in the scientific community. This, to Blakemore, seemed to make 
the rationale for increasing the public understanding o f science self-evident. His speech also 
provided an insight into just why the PUS mission was so important to the scientific 
community:
“These apparently contradictory results are just one example o f an ambivalence o f  
attitude towards science that is deeply rooted in public opinion and which may be the 
basis o f present government policy. The non-scientific public thinks that science is 
important, but they have little respect for it. And they seem to understand precious 
little about how it works.” (p. 4)
Just like his counterparts at the British Association in the early-nineteenth century, 
Blakemore’s concern was that public misunderstanding or apathy towards science would also 
mean bad science policy, and a lack of funding. Thus he was arguing that the way to 
influence government science policy was to enrol the support of the public. This time, 
however, it was not just a passive appreciation of science that was required: the modern 
world demanded that both the public and government needed “more than just the scientific 
facts: they need to know how to assess risk and how to judge probabilities” (p. 4). Blakemore 
blamed public apathy towards science as a product of “public ignorance” and of “public 
distrust of these things that they do not understand” (p. 9). However, the scientific 
community was also to blame for not taking up the public understanding of science mission 
quickly enough:
“Maybe the main problem for science ... is that the public just doesn’t understand 
because scientists either don’t bother to explain themselves or aren’t very good at it ... 
scientists have grown to think that their only responsibility is to convince their peers 
that their work is worth supporting. We have distanced ourselves from the public and 
the government: re-establishing mutual confidence will not be easy and will require 
scientists to understand that they have a responsibility to justify themselves and their 
work to ordinary people.” (p. 9)
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In the process of arguing for science to be treated as a distinct community, thus attempting 
to consolidate the boundary-lines between science, the public and government, Blakemore 
was also arguing that these boundaries be permeable, yet only in the direction of science to 
the others. Also o f interest here is Blakemore’s formulation of public ignorance as leading to 
mistrust, again showing that the boundary work scientists were engaging in through their 
discourse of PUS was not just about educating the public but to change their attitudes and 
create a more favourable image of science.
The quantitative survey research appeared to have impressed upon the scientific community 
the urgency of the PUS mission as a review of COPUS in 1990 stated:
... a recent study shows that the public is largely uninformed about science, in spite o f  
being interested in it. Many individuals and organisations outside the scientific 
community believe that the attitudes and behaviours of scientists in the past have 
alienated a large sector o f society. COPUS recognises this and realizes that it must 
change scientists’ perception o f the need for a greater public understanding o f science.
It must also increase significantly their involvement in improving public 
understanding.172
172 COPUS (1990), COPUS Jxioks Forward: The N ext Five Years, (London: The Royal Society).
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Phase I: Conclusions
In Phase I we can see that, as in previous episodes of financial strain or perceived public 
hostility, the scientific community turned to the management of their relationship with the 
public, and specifically the public’s understanding of science, as a key issue. Largely speaking, 
scientists’ actions were a re-invention of previous boundary work in the context of 1985.
This boundary work was a means o f legitimacy building and authority manufacturing. An 
increase in science communication, and bringing science to the public, was advocated as a 
means of gaining public understanding, support and acceptance. Science, and scientific 
knowledge, were promoted in a public context as essential to modem life. Yet this process 
of science communication and popularisation tacitly affirms the old idea that the public 
served, in its capacity as passive witnesses to scientific knowledge and practice, to legitimise 
scientific authority. This also affirms a boundary which maintained science as a private, 
specialised practice which was only open to scientific experts, an example of Gieryn’s 
protection of autonomy boundary work.
Constructing a ‘problem’ of public understanding of science - problematising the public as 
ignorant, the media as flawed and scientists as not conducting enough science 
communication — allowed scientists to then set out to solve this problem by appointing 
themselves as experts who needed to communicate science to the public. This in turn, they 
believed, would lead to greater funding for science and an increase in public trust in science. 
In many ways this was a similar strategy to the one that scientific institutions had deployed in 
the past. Science communication was viewed as the means o f correction to the perceived 
social problem identified. They were able to draw on what was a now established discourse 
of science that rhetorically constructed them as experts and the public as needing a greater 
understanding. Within their construction o f PUS scientists problematised the public and 
their cognitive processes, which by implication implicitly suggested that scientific knowledge, 
practice and institutions were unproblematic. Science was only problematic in the sense of 
scientists no longer doing enough popularisation.
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It is interesting to note that there is a sense in which ‘the public’ only mattered in a certain 
respect as something in opposition to the scientist. The construction o f ‘the public’ served as 
a means to construct a specific identity and image o f ‘science’ and ‘the scientist’. The views 
of certain public institutions, such as government, appear to have mattered more than actual 
views of the public, yet public opinion or understanding is used as a proxy for government 
opinion. So a greater positive feeling on behalf of the public is perceived to lead to a more 
scientifically focused government, which in turn would lead to greater resources for science. 
This also suggests that C. P. Snow’s identification of two cultures (the non-scientific one 
being that which largely ran the country) could well have still been in operation in the minds 
of, or at least was being drawn on rhetorically by, some scientists, either to construct science 
as separate from government, or because they felt that government needed to know more 
science, or at least change their attitude to it.
The tensions within scientists’ discourse of science identified in the previous chapter also 
continue within this phase. Scientists were representing science, on the one hand, as 
something to be understood by the public, which implies that it is not an expert discourse, 
and it is accessible to lay-people; while on the other hand they represented science as 
something to be perceived as a form of authoritative knowledge only accessible to experts. 
The problem of PUS, seems to be a phenomenon of this tension, a ‘problem’ which only 
scientists felt they could fix, thus it retains, or reinstates their role as elites who could shape 
society. Equally, we can see this as a good example of Gieryn’s protection boundary work. 
Scientists rhetorically drew boundaries with the public and the media in a way that made 
them useful and important to achieving particular professional goals, while protecting 
‘science’ from any loss of objectivity, or rationality by association with these other cultural 
domains.
This historical episode is, however, also different from previous attempts by scientists to 
construct and maintain scientific authority in a public context. Scientists and scientific 
organisations were placing themselves, as they had previously, in a position o f cognitive and 
social authority; the problem of PUS was defined by them as a matter o f scientific concern 
and thus a matter for scientists to manage. However, scientists were now not the only
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professional group addressing and problematising the public understanding o f science. Social 
scientists, many of whom had conducted research and discussions in this area since the 
1970s, now had the opportunity to get research funding under the banner of public 
understanding of science. So social scientists also became engaged in research and debate 
concerned with a ‘problem’ of public understanding o f science, and, by virtue of mobilising 
different expertise, some problematised the issue in a different manner from the scientists. 
Thus we see the emergence of a different discourse of science and its relation to the public: 
public understanding of science, to social scientists, was not a scientific issue, but was one 
which was subject to social scientific investigation. They felt that the scientists were joining 
an existing social conversation about the public dimensions of science that was already 
happening elsewhere, yet scientists on the other hand had invited social scientists to assist 
them in their ‘problem’ of PUS. So we see here again that this thing called PUS meant 
different things to different people, and was viewed as part of the existing intellectual 
domain of many different professions. Social scientific expertise had been explicitly 
requested by the Bodmer report. Social scientists, the Bodmer report argued, should be able 
to identify gaps in the public’s understandings o f science, and assist scientists in achieving 
maximum fidelity with their scientific communication. This was therefore not in a manner 
which would confer ‘ownership’ o f the issue to social scientists. Thus the implication here is 
that construction and management of the boundary between science and the public, and the 
boundary between science and social science was, to the scientists, legitimately theirs to 
control and maintain.
I have also shown how, within the ESRC social scientific research community concerned 
with PUS, there were different professional approaches to constructing and defining the 
‘problem’ of PUS. Quantitative and qualitative social scientists both felt that their expertise 
was better suited to the investigation of the ‘problem’, and competed for cognitive authority, 
public legitimacy and resources. Thus not only can we identify boundary work between 
social scientists and scientists both competing for legitimate authority to define and mobilise 
their own definition of the ‘problem’, but I have identified this type of boundary work also 
being performed within the ESRC research programme as each group in Gieryn’s expansion 
mode, attempted to increase its resources and authority. Furthermore, we can see that from
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the outset there was boundary work within the scientific community with shifting lines of 
allegiance between institutions and competition as to who should be in charge of managing 
the relationship between science and the public.
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Criticisms and Colonisations
Phase I I
In April 1990 a five-day international conference entitled ‘Policies and Publics for Science
and Technology’, was organised by John Durant’s section at the Science Museum, the 
European Association for the Study of Science and Technology, and SPSG, half of which 
was devoted to public understanding of science research. The other half of the conference, 
dealt with science policy. The overall aim of the conference was to relate the two fields to 
each other, assess the existing work in the fields and how it might develop in the future.173 
The variety of papers given at the conference highlights how diverse research into public 
understanding of science was at this point. Papers on science fiction, and the Victorian 
media sat beside papers on survey data and Thatcher’s science policy-making. The 
conference participants were drawn from many different disciplinary traditions within the 
social sciences and, while the main objective of the conference was to provide an exchange 
between academics, a full day of presentations aimed at an audience o f senior scientists, 
science policy-makers and politicians was also organised, with the aim of ‘communicating the 
results of research to those who are best placed to make good use of them’.174 Thus the 
intention o f the organisers was that this emerging academic research into PUS influenced 
science policy.
The conference also provided the first opportunity for the public dissemination o f all the 
results from the ESRC funded research into public understanding of science. This social 
research, with perhaps the exception of the survey which had been a direct request from the 
Bodmer working group, had approached PUS from a qualitative research perspective, and 
the results, heard for the first time here, challenged many of the assumptions implicit in the 
approach which COPUS had been actively pursuing since 1985. It is also notable that the
173 Science Museum (1990), Policies and Publics for Science and Technology Booking leaflet, (London: Science
Museum).
174 ibid.
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person who articulated this challenge was John Ziman, now acting as a conduit between the 
social science and scientific communities. He here, however, diverged from the views of the 
Bodmer working group, and was critical of the stance taken by the scientific institutions 
following the report. As Irwin reflects, however, Ziman’s motivations had been to conduct 
some serious research into PUS and were not, as many saw it, politically motivated, but 
simply a reaction to the results of the research which had shown a very different picture 
from the one many expected:
“I think John’s a genuine intellectual actually, in the sense that he really was interested 
in the idea, he wasn’t playing this politically ... my recollection is o f John moving his 
position as the programme developed, initially, I think, for good, practical reasons, 
looking back at it -  he wanted to deliver some large-scale quantitative data that his 
friends at the Royal Society would understand. Which I think we’d be right to say was 
basically uncritical. But, in fairness to John, he said, “well actually, what we’ve got here 
is a new paradigm”. And I remember him using that expression which I kind o f  
squirmed at a bit. But that’s what he was saying, it’s a new paradigm for approaching 
this, because you’re talking about science being problematic rather than the public 
being problematic.”175
As the 1987 paper by Thomas and Durant had pointed out, the promotion of PUS by the 
Royal Society and other institutions had rested on the idea that a lack o f public 
understanding could be equated with a lack of support for science. Ziman described this 
ideology and the actions that had been taken by COPUS, and its constituent institutions, to 
address this issue, as a “simple ‘deficit’ model”, the first time that this phrase had been used. 
Ziman argued that this ‘deficit model’ was inadequate as an analytical framework for research 
into PUS, exactly because it tried to “interpret the situation solely in terms of public 
ignorance or scientific literacy”.176 In contrast to this Ziman described how the ESRC 
research had shown a far more complex picture emphasising the importance of the context 
within which the scientific knowledge was being received by the public. This approach was 
backed up by other presentations from Brian Wynne and Roger Silverstone, other 
researchers funded by the programme.
175 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
176 Ziman (1990), op. cit.
92
Lost in Translations
Wynne’s conceptualisation of ‘the problem’ in the public understanding of science was 
different from the one identified by the scientific institutions. He argued that, “the current 
institutional structures within which science is organised and projected may be part o f the 
problem in public understanding of science”.177 He called for a wider conceptual framework 
in which to study the public dimensions of science, which considered these institutions, as 
well as the public, as objects of research. As he argued:
"... it is only from such a conceptual basis that constructive development and 
redesign o f institutional structures concerning science and policy can take place in a 
measured and self aware way, rather than as ad hoc piecemeal and ‘blind’ reaction to 
political events.” (p. 2)
Wynne went on to note, as “an object of curiosity”, the science-centric basis o f the research 
programme on public understanding o f science requested by the scientific community. This 
science-centric focus, and the belief that scientific knowledge should be understood by the 
public, led only to a particular, and in Wynne’s assertion, the wrong, type of research:
“It ... appears only natural to build research and policy programmes on the 
assumption that science is unitary and coherent, and that it should be central to 
everyday beliefs and practices. This allows us not only to measure how far people fall 
short o f some level o f scientific understanding -  i.e. their ‘ignorance’ — but also to 
assume that such ‘ignorance’ indicated a deficit o f democratic capability.” (p. 3)
The starting point for his, and the other’s, qualitative research on the programme was a 
different insight: that there was no clear consensus, even among scientists themselves, as to 
what science, or scientific knowledge, was in any given context. Science meant different 
things, to different people, in different situations. This, Wynne explained, was why, when the 
public was asked in surveys about science in general and abstract terms, they expressed a 
large positive response, but science then suffered from lack of public esteem in many 
specific contexts. Research methods were key to the types of results received, and crucially 
therefore, how the public was framed within the research. As Wynne underlined:
177 Wynne, B. (1990), 'Knowledges in Context', paper presented at the conference 'Policies and Publics 
for Science and Technology, Science Museum, London, p. 27-11 April 1990.
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“Our research methodology has used small-scale and interpretive approaches rather 
than large-scale samples and standardised questions. The main methods o f obtaining 
data have been participant observation, longitudinal panel interviews, structured in- 
depth interviews and some local use o f questionnaires on specific issues.” (p. 5)
These qualitative projects had examined issues of public understanding of science within 
specific practical social contexts. Examples included a study of those who had inherited the 
familial hypercholestorolaemia, an investigation into two communities living close to 
hazardous industry, and an analysis o f the role played by scientists in environmental 
organisations. Understanding how science was contextualised within these people’s lives, 
Wynne argued, was “crucial to understanding the social authority (or lack o f authority) of 
science” (p. 5). One o f the main findings from Wynne’s project was that people did not use, 
assimilate, or experience science as separate from other elements of knowledge, judgement 
or advice; supplementary knowledge was always required to make any scientific 
understanding valid and useful in that context. This supplementary knowledge, he argued, 
despite often not being recognised as such due to the institutional structures of science, 
could often be highly specialist, such as the locally specific knowledge of sheep farmers, 
when faced with scientific responses to the radiation exposure o f their flocks:
“A sheep farmer may therefore understand that radiocaesium is flushed from lambs 
more quickly on improved valley grass than on the high fells. But he may also know 
what the scientist doesn’t -  the valley grass is a precious and fragile resource whose 
loss by intensive grazing can have damaging consequences for future cycles. The 
scientific account is valuable, but the situation requires more than scientific 
understanding.” (p. 7)
A practical implication for current public understanding initiatives by scientific institutions, 
Wynne argued, was that the institutions themselves needed to reorganise themselves so as to 
better understand and relate to public agendas and knowledges. Science and technical 
information were less and less visible in the everyday discussions o f technical issues. People 
considered not simply the scientific knowledge, but the way in which that knowledge was 
clothed in the social and political forms of the institution: what Wynne called its “social body 
language”. These other considerations, particularly whether that institution was perceived to 
be trustworthy or competent, Wynne argued, were more significant than a narrow focus on 
scientific knowledge communication. Apprentices working at the Sellafield nuclear
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processing plant knew little about basic radioactive processes, but more importandy, Wynne 
argued, they did not feel the need to know. The lack of understanding o f what, by some 
scientists, would be considered as absolutely crucial knowledge for people working in their 
institution was, to Wynne, a perfectly functional response. The workers simply learnt the 
organisational procedures, and were sure that the scientific expertise in radiation had been 
considered in the design of the plant and its organisation; they had confidence in the 
institution and thus felt they did not need the scientific information. What could be 
perceived as a lack o f cognitive ability or a rejection of the science by some was simply a 
judgement that the science was not necessarily useful in that context. The judgement of 
whether or not to show an interest in science was therefore a social one tied to judgements 
of one’s own power (or powerlessness) to act in one’s social environment.
‘Ignorance’ of science, was therefore, Wynne argued, far more than a vacuum, but could 
actually be actively constructed and maintained. If, however, people wanted relevant 
scientific information, they had a large capacity to assimilate and understand it, given 
sufficient access to it, as in the case of families suffering from hypercholestorolaemia.178 
Wynne finished his paper by again questioning the current institutional approach to public 
understanding o f science, arguing that lay understandings or misunderstandings of science as 
a cognitive issue were not the central point:
“Whilst many commentators portray a lack o f public understanding o f  science as an 
obstacle to democratic vitality, it may be that the reverse is also true; that 
impoverished democracy and intensifying hegemony around science is a major 
obstacle to the public understanding o f science.”179
Wynne, with this attack on the scientific institutions’ approach to the public understanding 
of science, was engaging in boundary work. He argued that a social scientific, and more 
specifically, a qualitative social scientific, rather than a scientific, definition of PUS was a 
better description. In other words the public were better suited to social scientific study than 
scientific. Wynne was problematising science as being democratically deficient. In opposition
178 Lambert, H. and Rose, H. (1996), 'Disembodied Knowledge? Making sense o f medical science', in 
Irwin and Wynne, eds, Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction of science and technology,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
179 Wynne (1990), op. cit., p. 17.
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to this, social science was therefore constructed as the legitimate and authoritative site of 
expertise in this area. Wynne, in similar boundary work to the scientists’, was constructing a 
problematic ‘science’, which could then be fixed, this time with social scientists constructed 
as the ‘experts’ to do this, and who were aligned with the interests of society and the public.
Roger Silverstone from the Centre for Research into Innovation, Culture and Technology at 
Brunei University followed Wynne’s paper by presenting his research into the 
communication of science in more formal settings: the mass media, museums and schools. 
Drawing on previous research into communication, Silverstone outlined four assumptions 
on which his research rested, which challenged the idea, as expressed by the authors of the 
Bodmer report, that the problems of public understanding of science could be resolved by a 
policy of “more equals better in the communication of science to its various publics”.180 His 
first assumption was that there was no such thing as ‘the communication of science’; science 
and the media were both heterogeneous communities. This meant that science was not 
communicated as a unified phenomenon. Scientists could, and did, disagree with each other 
in public. Science could also be embedded within many different kinds o f communication, 
all with very different agendas. This would create very different understandings which would 
not necessarily be the same as the intended message. The second assumption similarly 
claimed that there was no such thing as ‘the public’. The Bodmer report had identified 
different audiences within the public to which science communication should be directed; 
however, Silverstone’s meaning here was different from simply identifying different target 
audiences. Whereas the Bodmer report had assumed that once the audience had been 
targeted they would receive the message in identical ways, to Silverstone, the differentiation 
within the public meant that their understandings of the science would also differ - “they will 
understand or misunderstand, remember or forget in different ways” (p. 2) His third 
assumption was that, in the modern communication environment, science could not claim 
any privileged status; it had to compete for attention of both the producers o f media and the 
receivers. Despite bemoaning the lack of science in the media, the scientific community was
180 Silverstone, R. (1990), 'Communicating Science to the Public', paper presented at the conference 
Policies and Publics for Science and Technology, Science Museum, 7-11 April 1990, p. 9.
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one interest group amongst many and their knowledge claims would not necessarily come to 
the fore of professional media communications.
Finally, Silverstone challenged the preoccupation with the media by organisations such as 
COPUS, arguing that the “omnipresence of the media does not equal omnipotence”(p. 10). 
He acknowledged that the media played an important role in framing public understandings 
of science, however, these took place alongside the communication o f science in schools and 
museums and incorporated local knowledges, practical understandings and common sense. 
Thus, like Wynne, Silverstone’s message was that the communication of science was a lot 
more complex than many scientists had suggested. Context, he similarly argued, was key to 
understandings:
“The receivers o f such communications are themselves context bound. They have 
their own knowledges. They bring to their understanding o f science their own 
agendas, their own interests, their own cultures ... Local knowledges provide their 
own context for, and, practical understandings provide their own inflection of, science 
communications. Understanding public understanding o f science requires 
understanding public understanding.” (p. 8)
Thus like Wynne, Silverstone was representing scientists as having a deficit o f social 
scientific understanding, particularly when it came to understanding the public, and thus 
social scientists were constructed as the more legitimate and authoritative profession.
The ESRC funded survey research by Durant, Evans and Thomas was also presented to the 
conference. Much of the presentation was concerned with countering the criticisms of their 
quantitative methods, and they started their paper with a substantial justification:
“It may be thought that this attempt is flawed in principle by its reliance upon a so- 
called ‘deficit’ model, according to which science is seen as an unproblematic body o f  
knowledge and the public is judged according to how much o f this knowledge it has 
acquired. This model, it may be argued seriously misrepresents both scientific 
knowledge, which is itself problematic, and the public, which possess informal or 
unofficial knowledge that is different from, rather than merely inferior to conventional 
science.
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We hold no brief with a deficit model. Nevertheless, we are unconvinced by this 
criticism. Science is an enormous and enormously complex body o f knowledge. In our 
view it is unhelpful -  indeed, it is ultimately patronising to those we study -  to 
suppose that it is illegitimate or improper to inquire about the extent to which they are 
familiar with this knowledge. We wish to discover how much science people know, 
and how far beliefs may differ systematically from formal or official science. In neither 
case do we see how this can be done without forming some estimate o f people’s 
understanding against the bench-mark o f science itself.”181
Again, here we can see Durant and colleagues engaging in boundary work. They were firstly 
attempting to draw a line between themselves and the ‘deficit model’ label. This was 
something that was not part of their construction of public understanding of science 
research. More importantly, they identify themselves as the social scientists who are ‘on the 
side’ of the public. Anyone who criticised their work was being ‘patronising’ - the implication 
is that their critics did not have a proper understanding of the public. The analysis of their 
results had suggested to them two important findings. The first was that those respondents 
who scored higher on levels of understanding o f science, also tended to draw sharper 
distinctions between science and non-science. Thus knowledge of science also meant 
familiarity with the concept of the scientific enterprise and, as Ziman had asserted in his 
introduction earlier, “the better informed possess a generally more supportive view of 
science”.182 The second point drew on Moscovici’s idea that complex issues can often take 
on distinct social representations in the public sphere, which could bear little relation to the 
original artefact.183 Medicine, they argued, which came out top in terms of self-reported 
interest in science in the survey, occupied a special place in public perceptions of science. 
They believed that a generally non-cynical and largely supportive attitude towards medicine 
in the public sphere explained why the survey had shown a very positive and supportive 
attitude to science and technology as a whole on the part o f the public, “in spite of the large 
number of social and environmental problems with which science is often associated” (p.
10). The researchers stressed what they perceived as an irony in these results having been 
produced by their survey. Their findings had shown that there were differences between
181 Durant, J., et al. (1990), 'Characterising Public Understanding o f Science in Britain', paper 
presented at the conference Policies and Publics for Science and Technology, Science Museum, London, 7-11 
April, p. 3.
182 Ziman (1990), op. cit., p. 5.
183 Moscovici, S. (1984), 'The phenomenon o f social representations', in Farr and Moscovici, eds, 
Social Representations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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public and scientific perceptions of science, with the former relying on medicine as a 
paradigm for all representations of science. Critics of the deficit model had insisted, 
however, that one of its weaknesses was to force public perceptions o f science into the 
mould of professional, scientific understandings. The authors concluded by hoping that they 
had “done enough to show, both that understanding can be measured, and that this 
measurement is worth making” (p. 11).
Summarising all of the ESRC findings, Ziman occupied a careful middle ground between the 
two different methodological approaches to research into public understanding o f science. 
What was clear from all of the studies, Ziman argued, was that the public did not draw on 
the stable, formal ‘textbook’ accounts of scientific knowledge. In contrast, its meaning was 
“actively constructed by the processes and circumstances under which it is communicated 
and received”.184 Secondly, the engagement with, or selection of, any particular scientific 
knowledge depended on the context in which it was needed, and that this would occur 
according to the public’s own interests, personal and social histories, and involvement. 
Ziman stressed that the public did not passively accept scientific knowledge presented to 
them by experts. The credibility of any source of knowledge, and what the communicators’ 
perceived interests were, would play a major part in the acceptance o f it. Finally, the research 
had suggested that public conflicts between scientific experts would serve to downgrade the 
privileged position o f scientific knowledge, but that this would allow other understandings, 
such as ethical or personal views, to enter into the debate. This should not, however, 
necessarily be seen as a bad thing. Thus Ziman was mobilising a view o f science which was 
rather different from how many scientists represented it, where science stood apart from 
such views.
All o f these points conflicted with the Bodmer report’s characterisation of the ‘PUS 
problem’ as being a lack o f scientific knowledge on the part of the public. This view did not 
take into consideration the life context of any individual during an encounter with science. 
Science, according to the social researchers, was actively constructed and received by the 
public in a multitude of ways, and thus simply trying to educate or ‘correct’ the public’s
184 Ziman (1990), op. cit., p. 3.
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cognitive deficit was not the answer to the problem. Ziman, vouched for the fact that the 
Bodmer report had been the product of thorough research, and that its shortcomings were 
simply based upon the meagre amount of existing research conducted into PUS in the early- 
1980s. The ‘contextual model’ of PUS research which had emerged from the ESRC 
programme, he viewed as a continuation of this research, which now suggested a more 
complex picture than had been originally perceived. Wynne, in contrast, was much more 
critical of this earlier approach to PUS stressing the need to balance the scales by devoting 
equal research time to the various ways in which scientists understand and interpret science. 
If they failed to do this, as Wynne stated, “the false view is tacitly consolidated that the 
problems are all to do with the public’s understandings rather than also with scientists and 
scientific institutions” (p. 3).
Ziman himself did not stray too far from many of the claims of the Bodmer report, 
concluding also that the degree of public ignorance was very distressing and “would seem to 
call for a very determined effort of education and re-education, through formal schooling 
and the media” (p. 5). However, he argued that this sort o f policy response attached a great 
deal of weight to the weaknesses in people’s formal scientific knowledge, and did not make 
allowances for the difference between a person’s tacit understanding o f the state of affairs 
and their ability to state verbally what they know. This point was confirmed, he felt, by the 
contrast in the survey between the poor showing of most people on direct questions about 
the nature of scientific discovery and their good grasp of the practical logic of drug testing 
and of the inheritance of genetic defects. Thus he stated that social scientists must be able to 
locate their qualitative interpretations of public understanding of science on a properly scaled 
map. Appearing to try to reconcile the division between the methodological approaches, he 
argued it was essential to have some “hard” quantitative data about the social phenomenon 
they were studying.
Colonising PUS
The Science Museum conference had also publicised the forthcoming launch of a new 
journal entitled Public Understanding of Science, which was to be set up by John Durant and Jane
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Gregory at the Science Museum, with Durant as editor. A further development at Imperial 
College and the Science Museum was the establishment of a MSc course in science 
communication. The degree, open to applications from those with an honours degree in a 
scientific or science-based subject, was based upon academic work on the public 
understanding of science, to provide a thorough professional training in the principles and 
practices of science communication.185 The rationale for the course, as explained in the 
recruitment brochure, was based upon recent studies, which had revealed ‘widespread public 
ignorance about the nature and content of science, and considerable public unease about 
some scientific and technological developments’. The brochure continued:
Concern about the gap between science and the public has been growing steadily in 
recent years. Part o f the problem has always been a shortage o f people who have both 
an understanding o f science and an ability to explain and interpret it in ways that make 
sense to non-scientists.186
Thus this course which granted the first academic qualification in science communication 
very much interpreted the ‘problem’ of PUS in the same terms as COPUS and the Bodmer 
committee. Those who were to graduate from this degree were seen as agents o f ‘correction’, 
who would help communicate science to an ignorant public. Contrasting this approach the 
academic journal Science, Technology and Human Values published summaries of the 
presentations by Ziman, Wynne and Silverstone at the Science Museum conference, all of 
which had questioned this characterisation of the problem.187 Academic interest in PUS was 
growing, and showed a diversity of approaches.
In early 1992 the first issue of the journal Public Understanding of Science was published.
Durant’s editorial, and indeed the rest of the journal, provides an interesting snapshot of the 
state of thinking around public understanding of science at this time. Reflecting on whether 
there was a need for the journal Durant noted that no other journals at that time were
185 Imperial College London (1991). 'MSc in Science Communication Brochure'. (London: Imperial 
College).
186 ibid.
187 Ziman, J., B. Wynne and R. Silverstone (1991), 'Public Understanding o f Science', Science, Technology 
and Human Values, 16: 1.
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devoted solely to that area.188 When he and colleagues had been considering where to publish 
the results of the Oxford survey in 1989, they had felt that there was no outlet that would 
bring their work before all of their intended audience, and had therefore published two 
different synopses in different places: Nature, and an International report on British Social 
Attitudes.189 This compromise, Durant had felt at the time, had served to reinforce ‘the 
conventional barrier between the natural and the social sciences, that continually works 
against productive dialogue about the place of science and technology in contemporary 
culture’ (p.l). Public Understanding of Science, Durant claimed, would remedy this situation and 
reflect the ‘diversity o f complementary, contrasting and occasionally conflicting research 
practices’ (p. 1). It would present new work on the public dimensions of science and 
technology to all those who may be interested in it, from whatever discipline. Public 
understanding of science was an emerging interdisciplinary research field, and therefore there 
was, Durant claimed, ‘no single generally acknowledged exemplar, no universally accepted 
model, no body of securely established theory’. The field was so new, that Sage, a large social 
science publishing house, had not been interested in publishing the journal. It was instead 
published by the Institute of Physics, a publisher that could afford to take a financial risk, 
due to its large, and successful, output of physics journals and who thought PUS was a good 
thing for the scientific community.190 Thus we can see here one of the institutional 
mechanisms through which boundary work is performed. Durant was attempting to gain 
scientific and social scientific authority by the establishment of a journal, one o f the 
hallmarks of legitimate scientific work being the publishing and peer review of that work in 
an established journal. Sage had, however, rejected the new discipline on the grounds of it 
not being established enough to warrant the financial risk.191
The journal, from the outset, had an international scope, with abstracts published in English, 
French and Spanish, and associate editors from India, Germany, France, the United States, 
and Australia. The journal’s Advisory Board drew its members from a wide range of
188 Durant, J. (1992a), 'Editorial', Public Understanding of Science, 1: 1, p. 1.
189 Durant, et al. (1989), op. cit,; Evans, G. and Durant, J. (1989), 'Understanding o f science in Britain 
and the USA', in Jowell R et al, ed., British Social Attitudes: Special International Report, (Aldershot:
Gower Publishing).
190 Personal communication from Jane Gregory.
191 Sage acquired the journal in 2003.
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academics, again reflecting the variety of interests and approaches to the field. Some 
members were from institutions with an interest in PUS, such as Walter Bodmer from the 
Imperial Cancer Research Fund, Neil Cossons from the Science Museum, and John Ziman 
from SPSG. Others were drawn from academia, largely from science and technology studies, 
such as Bruno Latour, Harry Collins, and David Edge. It is notable also that there were 
members such as Arie Rip and Gerald Holton, both of whom (along with Steven Shapin 
who contributed a paper to the first issue) had been involved in the Newsletter of the Public 
Conceptions on Science and Technology and had therefore been concerned with issues in this area 
for several years before the publication of the Bodmer report. The name of the PUS journal 
had been debated amongst its editorial team before the launch, some feeling that Public 
Understanding of Science vsas too ambiguous, and had no meaning outside of the UK context, 
or indeed, the English language.192 However, as Durant argued, its relation to the UK 
activities, following the Bodmer report, had been a strength, and, as well as being a direct 
and relatively simple name, it was hoped that the title would convey the nature of the field 
the journal intended to cover. The addition of a subtitle, as Durant later reflected, was 
intended to clear up any ambiguities:
“... we called it that knowing that this was a term which had all kinds of ambiguities 
and all kinds o f connotations, but we used the subtitle, “a journal o f research in the 
public dimensions o f science and technology”, which I’ve never been unhappy with 
because it always seemed to me to be explicidy open to many different kinds of  
questions that might be asked about science in public.”193
O f note in the editorial is the implicit criticism by Durant of both the Bodmer report and the 
scientific community. He stated that while the inspiration for the ESRC research programme 
into public understanding of science ‘lay in the concerns of the scientific community, in 
several respects the research itself appears to have gone beyond them’ (p.3). Durant 
underlined the diverse agendas for research in the PUS field, and how he hoped the journal 
would therefore foster ‘frank but (we trust) friendly debate between researchers who come 
to our field with widely different concerns’ (p. 3). His request for friendly debate signalled 
that relations between actors within, both the scientific and social scientific communities,
192 Durant, Interview, 28 June 2004.
193 ibid.
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and indeed within the social scientific community were increasingly fractious. In the previous 
phase this conflict had been confined to discussions behind closed doors, but were now 
increasingly spilling out into more public arenas. All were staking their epistemological 
claims to PUS and promoting different approaches to action and research. Yet these claims 
were not simply epistemological, as each was also promoting a different ideology about 
society, for example the ‘correct’ relationship between scientists and the public, or the public 
and policy makers. All also aligned themselves with the public, in the sense that they claimed 
to be acting in their interests, and others were not.
The first issue of the journal commissioned eight different ‘launch perspectives’ from leading 
figures in this new field to stimulate debate. The papers were also commissioned to display 
the variety of different perspectives on public understanding of science in 1992.194 They also 
show quite clearly how the different professional interests and perspectives shaped the 
various conceptualisations of PUS. Bodmer, now Chair of COPUS, and Janice Wilkins,
Head of Public Relations at the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, wrote the first. It was 
couched as a plea to the social scientific community to provide useful research to help those 
‘involved actively in trying to improve the public understanding of science’.195 However, only 
certain social scientific research was seen as relevant. Ignoring all but the survey research 
from the ESRC research programme, they cited the research conducted in Britain up until 
that point as having ‘plumbed the depths of public ignorance about science’ and 
characterised its main finding as having ‘discovered that the British public has an unsatisfied 
appetite for more information’ (p. 7). Bodmer and Wilkins also made it clear what they 
thought the role of social scientists should be, suggesting that the social research should be 
conducted to serve the needs of existing public understanding of science programmes, or 
more specifically the needs of COPUS:
194 As well as the launch perspectives discussed below, two others were written by science 
communications scholar Sharon Dunwoody and museum director, and physicist, Jorge Wagensberg.
195 Bodmer, W. and Wilkins, J. (1992), 'Research to improve public understanding programmes',
Public Understanding of Science, 1: 1, p. 7.
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... it would be helpful if we knew more about the ways in which various target 
audiences may be reached most effectively with information about science and 
technology ... This would be the standard approach for anyone marketing goods and 
services and a similarly professional approach should be taken for the public 
understanding o f science, (p. 7)
Here we can see that they conceptualised the role of the social researcher as limited to 
providing the evidence on which better communication techniques could be based. The 
public, on the other hand, in opposition to many of the conclusions that had come out of 
the ESRC programme, were again painted by Bodmer as passive receivers of scientific 
information. The idea that the work of COPUS was to some extent a public relations 
exercise comes out here even more explicitly than it had seven years earlier. The fact that his 
co-author was a Public Relations officer (as well as being a member of the Public Affairs 
Committee of the BAAS), points to this idea, as does the use, in the quote above, of 
marketing language which talked about selling a product, in this case science, to the public. 
The media, a constant concern of the COPUS committee members, could, however, be used 
in ‘helping to revise the public’s view of scientists’, and Bodmer and Wilkins had ‘no doubt 
that a fascinating soap opera could be built around a team of scientists who, after all, spend 
their days doing what might be described as a kind of detective work and who have private 
lives as varied and interesting as any other section of the community’ (p. 8).196 This paper 
highlights how little the stance taken by Bodmer had changed since the 1985 report, as well 
as how little impact much of the social research had had on him, and on others in the 
scientific community in so far as he can be taken as the spokesperson for COPUS.
A similar characterisation of public understanding of science was put forward by Jon Miller 
in his paper which outlined the previous thirty years of survey work, much o f which was his 
own, in the United States.197 He also characterised public understanding of science as a 
‘contemporary problem’, though one of which our understanding had become more 
scientific. Though he identified the problem of PUS as one for science to solve, he offered 
no other indication of how this might happen other than arguing for better survey data to
196 Bodmer and Wilkins would perhaps be heartened by the success o f the CSI television drama series 
which started in 2000.
197 Miller, J. (1992), 'Towards a scientific understanding o f the public understanding o f science and 
technology', Public Understanding of Science, 1:1, pp. 23-26.
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measure scientific literacy. No mention was made of qualitative approaches to the subject: 
both Miller’s, and the Bodmer and Wilkins papers were, as Durant argued in his editorial, 
‘chiefly preoccupied with the extent to which the general public has an adequate 
understanding and appreciation of elementary scientific principles’ (p. 3), at least as they had 
defined them.
Some of the other papers in this launch issue, however, questioned this approach and 
characterisation of the public understanding of science. Pierre Fayard, a French science 
journalist and academic asserted that the political motivations behind every popularisation 
venture were to ‘celebrate and emphasise the difference between those who are in the know 
and those who aren’t’.198 A more appropriate question to ask, he suggested, would be how 
these ventures see their public: ‘as empty vessels to be filled, as warped minds in need of 
straightening out, as citizens with whom to enter into dialogue, or as tax payers to be 
convinced of the necessity of funding research?’ (p. 15).
Physicist Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond made a similar plea for a reconsideration o f how the 
public were conceptualised by those deploring their poor understanding o f science. He 
argued in his paper for some symmetry in public understanding of science research, calling 
for research into the understanding of the public by scientists. A scientist could be just as 
much a lay-person in relation to a different branch of science from their own as could a 
member of the public. Levy-Leblond highlighted that while lay-people may not have formal 
and recognised expertise, they did have sophisticated and highly technical skills in other 
domains and were not bad at mastering the technological environment, showing ‘a rather 
uncanny ability to learn what they need and not more\m  Challenging the assertions of 
COPUS, and asking for a more sophisticated and critical approach to the popularisation of 
science, Levy-Leblond argued that scientists should admit and admire the achievements of 
lay-people: ‘driving without knowledge o f mechanics; cooking without knowledge of 
chemistry; word processing without knowledge of computer science’ (p. 19). He criticised
198 Fayard, P. (1992), 'Let's stop persecuting people who don't think like Galileo!' Public Understanding 
of Science, 1: 1, p. 15.
199 Levy-Leblond, J. (1992), 'About misunderstandings about misunderstandings', Public Understanding 
of Science, 1:1, p. 19.
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the quantitative research techniques such as surveys, which asked the public to answer 
‘arbitrary and irrelevant questions’ (p. 19). Levy-Leblond also denied that the public 
understanding of science should be characterised as a special problem, believing that the 
public could be shown as not very knowledgeable about a lot of aspects of society and 
culture when asked through such polls.
Wynne used his paper to be very critical of what he called the ‘dominant public 
understanding of science agenda’, an unstated dimension of which, was the perceived crisis 
by scientists in public support of science.200 He argued that the recent resurgence of interest 
in the area should be seen as part o f the ‘scientific establishment’s anxious response to a 
legitimation vacuum which threatened the well-being and social standing of science’.201 
Wynne therefore agreed with the scientists’ perception that there was a ‘problematic’ 
relationship between science and the public. This legitimation vacuum, he argued, could be 
seen as a direct result of the way science had in the past distanced itself from the public, 
which is notably similar to Bodmer’s conceptualisation of the problem. Science however, 
Wynne argued, now found itself ‘hoist with its very own petard, namely the cultural 
alienation whose establishment it actively, if innocently promoted’ (p. 38). He also 
questioned what he called the ‘presumed authority’ of scientists’ characterisation of the 
problem of public understanding of science, and whether social scientists should follow that 
as a model on which to base research, as Bodmer had suggested earlier in the journal. Wynne 
again argued that the scientific institutions themselves were part of the problem of public 
understanding of science and argued that the findings of his research refuted the scientists’ 
view of the public:
The technical ignorance lamented as an intellectual vacuum (and social defect) is 
revealed instead as a complex ‘active’ social construction which reflects a broader 
array o f particular social relationships o f dependency, trust, alienation, division of 
labour, etc. with which people constitute their moral identities, (p. 39)
200 Wynne, B. (1992a), 'Public understanding o f science research: new horizons or hall o f mirrors?' 
Public Understanding of Science, 1: 1, p. 37.
201 ibid.
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As well as constructing science as problematic, and criticising the scientific misunderstanding 
of the issue of public understanding, Wynne also used this opportunity to criticise 
quantitative methods of social research. The assumption that survey research could assess 
the levels of assimilation of technical concepts or attitudes to science was, he argued, 
misleading, as these attitudes and concepts were defined by the analysts with no regard for 
the context in which the science would normally be embedded in people’s lives.
The first issue also contained a paper by Bruce Lewenstein, Assistant Professor in the 
Departments of Communication and Science and Technology Studies, at Cornell University. 
His paper was a historical examination of those institutions popularising science in the post­
war period in the United States, and argued that these advocates of popular science who 
used the rhetoric of improving the public’s understanding of science, were in practice trying 
to gain the public’s appreciation of science. As Lewenstein stated:
... they were seeking to improve the attitude o f members o f the public toward science 
as a body o f knowledge, science as a way o f knowing about the world, scientists as 
individuals, and the particular requests for support and funding that came from 
scientific institutions ... some people believed that increasing public knowledge about 
scientific discoveries would necessarily yield better public appreciation, while others 
thought that popular science should be aimed at improving public attitudes toward 
science.202
Though Lewenstein referred to contemporary questions only at the start of his historical 
case study he did suggest that it may apply to the more modem usage o f the phrase ‘public 
understanding of science’. Referencing the UK’s Bodmer report, he argued that these more 
modem practitioners of science popularisation still refrained from presenting their motives 
in ‘Machiavellian terms’, and instead presented their interest in public understanding of 
science as part of the general enlightenment appropriate in the modern world. His 
problematisation of the meaning o f the word ‘understanding’ within ‘public understanding 
of science’, thus called in to question the motivations of those advocates in UK using the 
same phrase, just as Thomas and Durant had done.203 Lewenstein noted that Dorothy Nelkin 
had similarly argued that ‘public communication [of science] is shaped by the co-operation
202 Lewenstein (1992), op. cit. p. 46.
203 Thomas and Durant (1987), op. cit.
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and collaboration of several communities, each operating in terms of its own needs, 
motivations and constraints’.204
A further paper in this first edition of the journal, by Gerald Holton, Professor of Physics 
and History of Science at Harvard University, showed another motivation for many 
proponents of public understanding: a concern about a perceived rise o f an anti-scientific 
public. Holton attributed a rise of a ‘dangerous segment of what some call the anti-science 
movement’ to the ‘rampant scientific illiteracy in the USA’, and went on to suggest that this 
high level of poorly informed citizens in a democratic society would in turn lead to 
‘erroneous policy and eventual social instability’ and ‘enormous catastrophes’.205 The need to 
educate the public and stem the tide of the resulting disaffection with science was, to 
Holton, paramount. We can see here Holton mobilising a discourse which promoted science 
and its knowledge as being good for society, as had the Royal Society in the seventeenth 
century. Holton argued that by themselves, these ‘para-scientists’ - astrologers, anti­
evolutionists, spiritualists and peddlers of new-age thinking - would ‘otherwise be merely a 
source o f condescension or amusement’ (pp. 108-9). But Holton argued that delegitmating 
forces, unique to the late-twentieth century, such as philosophers o f science who argued that 
science could now claim no more than the status of a ‘useful myth’, and a general dismay 
with modern science and technology, played into the hands of this anti-science movement. 
Holton believed that science was under attack, and that the ‘“pro-science” imbued world 
picture of the late-twentieth century is a rather vulnerable and fragile minority position’ (p. 
107). An embrace o f para-science was, to Holton, a distinctly anti-modern characteristic, and 
an attack on the whole of the Enlightenment project; and social scientists were the problem. 
Thus in a reverse of Wynne’s boundary work, Holton was blaming certain social scientists 
for science’s lack of authority in society. Holton’s view of the public as vulnerable to ‘para- 
science’, and misrepresentations of science, was a common reason why scientists believed 
that addressing the public understanding of science was necessary. Indeed, Bodmer and 
Wilkins, in their paper, had alluded to this idea when they bemoaned a report in a magazine, 
which suggested ‘that scientific curiosity and lack of caution could lead to someone’s child
204 Nelkin, D. (1987), How the Press Covers Science and Technology, (New York: W. H. Freeman), p. 11.
205 Holton, G. (1992), 'How to think about the 'anti-science' phenomenon', Public Understanding of 
Science, 1: 1, p. 104.
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being born with yellow eyes and three noses’.206 No scientists would be susceptible to this, 
however, as they continued that:
To any scientist, the notion is breathtaking and unbelievable but, sadly, there is no 
doubt that some readers will now just believe in the possibility and await an 
announcement o f the birth o f such a child. It is tempting to get on with the science 
that is one’s job, convincing oneself that the scenario outlined above is so grotesque 
that no member o f the public could ever take it seriously, (p. 8)
Overall, however, the majority of the papers in the launch issue contained a substantial 
amount of criticism of the way in which scientific institutions such as the Royal Society or 
COPUS had formulated the public understanding of science as a problem, and of the sort of 
action they felt was needed to correct it. Wynne certainly was not willing to provide the sort 
of assistance that these institutions wanted, concluding that ‘it would be a pitiful waste if 
social science research could manage no more than to consolidate and justify that [science’s] 
neurosis’.207 Taken as a whole, the range of perspectives on the public, science, public 
understanding, and the relationship between public and science, in the first volume of Public 
Understanding of Science, did show, as intended, how varied scientists and other scholars were 
in their conceptualisation of PUS. Most authors argued that their profession, or their 
methodological approach, was aligned with the public, or public interest. In other words, 
only they had the legitimacy to construct, define or change the public for the better.
PUS, risk and trust
The same boundary dispute that Wynne was engaged in, over qualitative and quantitative 
constructions of scientific facts and public attitudes towards science and risk, was not just 
confined to this emerging academic field of public understanding of science. Similar fault 
lines had also appeared at a conference, and report launch, on risk at the Royal Society that 
same year. As sociologist Les Levidow’s review of the subsequent report, in New Scientist, 
argued:
206 Bodmer and Wilkins (1992), op. cit. p. 8.
207 Wynne (1992a), op. cit. p. 42.
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The latest Royal Society report on risk reveals deeper methodological divisions among 
risk researchers themselves. Although natural and social scientists have gained some 
mutual understanding ... the bridge with social sciences has not been put in place.208
The disciplinary divisions had been explicit at the conference, according to anthropologist 
Mary Douglas, who was quoted in The Times Higher'Educational Supplement (THES) as saying:
Complete decorum reigned until near the end when a psychologist got up from the 
floor. When he asked that the term ‘social construction o f risk’ be eliminated from the 
discussion, shouting, clapping and hissing broke out and the meeting was 
adjourned.209
The tensions were between those who would attempt to put numbers on risk and those who 
would deconstruct its latent assumptions. While the former approach privileged the 
quantitative assessment of risk, presenting it as scientifically rational, the social scientists at 
the meeting challenged two o f its underlying dichotomies - between real and perceived, or 
objective and subjective risk; and between risk analysis and its management. Risks, to these 
social scientists, in a similar conception to Wynne’s socially situated science, were culturally 
constructed, created by people according to their experience and perception of the world.210
Further academic criticism of the ‘dominant approach’ to PUS, and the scientific framings of 
risk analysis, continued to emerge in social scientific journals. Wynne was the most vocal 
critic and in another paper in Public Understanding of Science, he outlined further his problems 
with the scientific institutions’ approach:
208 Levidow, L. (1992), 'Review: Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management', New Scientist, 1851.
209 Hinde, J. 'Why talk o f risks is full o f hazards', The Times Higher Education Supplement, 14 March 
1997.
210 This bitter boundary dispute over whose conception of risks was valid spilled over into the 
construction of the report, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. The preface explicitly distanced 
the Royal Society from the latter part o f its own report, written by qualitative social scientists. As 
John Adams, Reader in Geography at University College London, was quoted as saying: he had 
“never been to a launch party before where the authors o f  part o f the report were being rude about 
the authors o f the other parts.” (Hinde 1997, ibid.)
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... much o f the impetus for the current interest in this subject stems from a broad 
anxiety among scientists and policy-makers about what they see as the public's 
inability or unwillingness to understand ‘correct’ messages about risks as given to 
them by the experts. I have noted the irony that this formulation o f  the problem only 
encourages more public alienation, hence justifying and consolidating the neurosis.211
Wynne argued that it was now accepted that issues of public understanding of science, and 
of public risk perceptions, were not so much about public capabilities in understanding 
technical information, but about the trust and credibility they were prepared to invest in 
scientific spokespersons or institutions (p. 282). Drawing on his research into understanding 
of radioactive fallout in Cumbria from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Wynne proposed 
a different framing of the public understanding of science ‘problem’, and of the closely 
associated risk perception issue:
Public experiences o f risks, risk communications or any other scientific information is 
never, and can never be, a purely intellectual process, about reception o f knowledge 
per se. People experience these in the form o f material social relationships, interactions 
and interests, and thus they logically define and judge the risk, the risk information, or 
the scientific knowledge as part and parcel o f that ‘social package’. A corollary o f this 
is that people do not simply not understand science when they are seen to disregard it; 
they do not recognize it, or identify with it, morally speaking, (p. 281-2)
Criticising both scientists’ and quantitative social scientists’ approaches to studying the 
public’s understanding of science, Wynne asserted that the trustworthiness and credibility of 
the social institutions concerned was basic to people’s definition of risks, or uptake of 
knowledge. Further to this, it should be recognised that trust and credibility were themselves 
analytically derivative o f social relations and identity-negotiation. ‘Thus, like risk’, Wynne 
concluded, ‘they too should not be treated as if they have an objective existence which can 
be unambiguously measured and manipulated’ (p. 300).
Sociologist Mike Michael, provided a further critique of both the Royal Society’s analysis of 
the relationship between science and public, and of what he called, the ‘dominant academic
211 Wynne, B. (1992b), 'Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of  
science', Public Understanding of Science, 1: 3, p. 281.
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approach to the public understanding of science’.212 Drawing on his interviews conducted 
with members of the lay-public, he argued that the manner in which these members of the 
public constructed science in their own discourses was much more complex than the 
dominant approach to public understanding of science had considered. Locating himself in 
the tradition of the sociology of scientific knowledge, Michael also distanced himself from 
quantitative academic studies, and flagged up his social constructivist approach as more 
appropriate to studying the public. Michael differentiated between two main discourses of 
science constructed by the lay public: science-in-general, ‘in which science is talked about as 
a coherent entity and emphasis is placed upon ... its knowledge domain of technological and 
natural phenomena’ (p. 313); and science-in-particular, specific examples of science involving 
particular knowledges and identifiable, and often practical, goals. With respect to science-in- 
general, Michael had found that lay-members often constructed scientific knowledge as 
‘other’, thus also actively constructing themselves as ignorant, though not necessarily, he 
argued, in a negative sense. Michael also referred to Wynne’s research on Cumbrian sheep 
farmers to argue how the status of official scientists was diminished in a science-in- 
particular, local context, by the scientists displaying their own lack o f knowledge of farming 
methods, while still framing their pronouncements in terms of certainties. A less negative 
construction o f science-in-particular was also suggested to Michael by electricians working at 
the Sellafield nuclear fuel processing plant, who freely admitted their own ignorance about 
the inner workings of the power plant, as that was the role of other people, and if they knew 
too much it would only lead to panic in an emergency. Ignorance of science, Michael argued, 
ensured that in this context, practical procedures were followed and all parties concerned 
were working towards a common goal, with science not necessarily privileged above other 
knowledges or discourses. Michael concluded that his findings held important implications 
for ‘the tacit claim, contained in the Royal Society’s report on the public understanding of 
science, that more understanding of science’s basic principles would lead to a greater 
‘rationality’, more ‘informed’ debate and, ultimately, to increased social consensus’ (p. 331). 
Knowledge, or lack o f knowledge, of science could be something that was actively 
constructed by members of the lay-public as a means of maintaining the social status quo,
212 Michael, M. (1992), 'Lay Discourses o f Science: Science-in-General, Science-in-Particular, and 
Self, Science, Technology and Human Values, 17: 3, p. 314.
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and the public were capable of discursively manoeuvring around science in ways which could 
on the one hand ‘sustain the mystique and status of science, and, on the other, undermine 
them’ (p. 330).
Institutional endorsements
An address by Neil Cossons, Director of the Science Museum, to the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, and later published in The Guardian in the UK, suggests 
that, despite growing criticism of their approach, public understanding of science activity had 
changed very little within the scientific community. The Science Museum had become a 
focal point for discussions on the public understanding of science with a research team now 
based there under Durant, and the journal also being administered from there. The Museum 
also had more practical concerns regarding PUS, in terms of how best to communicate and 
represent science through its exhibits. In what appeared to be half a defence of public 
understanding of science, and half a call to redefine, or at least represent more forcefully, the 
position taken by the scientific establishment, Cossons, echoing Holton’s fears of an increase 
in anti-science sentiment from the public, focused his address on what he perceived as 
negative cultural attitudes towards science:
Science is perceived as part o f something bigger, more insidious, threatening, 
inaccessible and sinister ... fashionable people want little o f science. And people who 
want to be fashionable people will distance themselves from science in case they 
become tainted.213
Cossons appeared to be making a case for C.P Snow’s ‘two cultures’ still being in operation 
in British society, if he was equating ‘fashionable people’ as being those without a science 
education, yet in jobs of high political influence.214 The case for public understanding of
213 Cossons, N. 'What do people mean by 'the public understanding o f science'?' The Guardian, 28 
February 1992, p. 28.
214 Lewis Wolpert and cultural critic Fay Weldon had also engaged in a similar argument in the Daily 
Telegraph in 1991; see Weldon, F. 'Thoughts we dare not speak aloud', Daily Telegraph, 2 December 
1991, p. 12. and Wolpert, L. 'So much for artistic license', Daily Telegraph, 9 December 1991, p. 14.
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science as something more than simply an amateur pursuit o f the scientist, was not, Cossons 
felt, being put across well:
If there is an intellectually defensible justification for promoting the public 
understanding o f science then it has yet to be articulated in a compelling way. For 
most, the public understanding o f science, like information technology, is a non­
specific umbrella term for unfocused good intentions that causes mild embarrassment 
amongst those less than already committed. When someone gets passionate about the 
public understanding o f science without telling me what it is, I have difficulty looking 
them in the eye. I have the bruises where the ancient mariners o f the public 
understanding o f science movement have gripped me in order to state their devotion 
to the future o f the “wide-eyed children o f the world”, (p. 28)
There was an indication that he, at least, was aware of the criticism o f the scientific 
establishment’s approach to PUS, which he characterised as charges of PUS being either ‘an 
empty concept or one with an undeclared agenda not made explicit by its supposed aims’.215 
This criticism of scientific institutions was a misunderstanding, but, Cossons felt, a perfectly 
reasonable response to the promotion of confusing aims consisting of both science 
education and concerns about social attitudes to science and technology. As he argued:
The only political leverage to be had for science is perceived public benefit, so the 
“public” in “the public understanding o f science” gives it the appeal o f  egalitarian and 
altruistic worthiness. But it is not self-evident what the title - The Public 
Understanding O f Science - refers to ... It clearly has a vivid meaning for its 
protagonists, but this is imperfectly conveyed through its title and through the actions 
of its proponents. This sows seeds o f doubt about how rigorous, candid or capable 
are its supporters, (p. 28)
Far from promoting a fundamental re-think of COPUS’s aims of public understanding of 
science, however, Cossons was calling for a greater education of the public, more so even 
than those proponents he had criticised. Cossons made a case for science being something 
special, akin to religion, recognising that it had ‘sacred objects which give it validation and 
immortality’, and therefore was something which should rightly be set apart from other 
cultural pursuits such as art, which was solely concerned with personal subjectivities.
215 Cossons (1992), op. cit.
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In 1993 the importance of the scientists’ public understanding of science agenda was given a 
firm endorsement by the UK Government with the publication of the first science White 
Paper for twenty years. It was written under the supervision of William Waldegrave, who, as 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was the first Cabinet minister with a primary 
responsibility for science to have been appointed since Lord Hailsham in 1964. The White 
Paper, 'Realising Our Potential: a strategy for science, engineering and technology, proposed several 
changes to the way science funding was organised and administered, all geared towards 
‘improving the nation’s competitiveness and quality of life by maintaining the excellence of 
science, engineering and technology in the United Kingdom’.216 The paper made it clear that 
a profit motive was central to the new science blueprint being proposed, and the public 
understanding of science was a vital part of enabling this new vision for science. The 
Research Councils were split up into six new bodies, each focusing on a specific area of 
scientific research, and a Council for Science and Technology, direcdy answerable to the 
Prime Minister, was to be set up to ensure that research was directed along profitable lines. 
A Technology Foresight programme was also set up, which would involve government, 
industry and science in anticipating, and exploiting, emerging markets. Getting maximum 
value for money, by ensuring strong links between industry and science, was the key 
message, though this did not come with a promise of any extra money for science, which, 
after years o f lobbying, some in the scientific community felt was disappointing. Bodmer, 
welcoming some of the proposals, was reportedly alarmed at the lack of provision for basic 
physical sciences.217 The White Paper did, however, promise much in the way o f financial 
support for public understanding of science activities, so for the first time the UK 
Government was endorsing what, up until now, had been an activity and concern of the 
science and social science communities.
To the Government the ‘problem’ of PUS was similar to COPUS’s conception: a lack of 
awareness of science and technology on the part of the public. An increase in public 
understanding o f science was seen as beneficial to both government and science, so it is not
216 Office o f Science and Technology (1993), Realising Our Potential: A  Strategy for Science, Engineering and 
Technolog, (London: HMSO), p. 68.
217 Radford, T. and Knewstud, N. 'Profit Motive Central to Science Blueprint', The Guardian, 27 May 
1993.
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surprising that the White Paper echoed much of the same language from the Bodmer report, 
promising support for the ongoing activities of COPUS. The language suggests that 
cultivating a pro-science and technology public was seen as crucial to preparing new business 
and consumer markets:
The understanding and application o f science are fundamental to the fortunes of 
modern nations ... [strength in science and technology! has been, and remains, an 
immense national asset. It should be protected. But it will not be properly utilised 
unless further efforts are made to break down the barriers which still exist in the 
United Kingdom to the acceptance and recognition o f the importance o f science and 
technology to our future.218
The White Paper announced that there would be a new campaign to ‘spread the 
understanding of science and technology in schools and amongst the public’ (p. 7). And, in a 
similar tone to the arguments of T. H. Huxley a century earlier,219 the White Paper justified 
its endorsement of attempts to improve the public understanding of science as a matter of 
general education:
As a country we have suffered in the past from a culture which placed too low a value 
on education and training in general, and which gave insufficient recognition to the 
importance o f knowledge and understanding o f scientific and technological issues, (p.
53)
Again echoing the Bodmer report, the White Paper saw public understanding of science in 
instrumental terms, both as crucial to the economic success of the country, but also critical 
to increase the scientific workforce:
The economy needs an adequate supply o f specialist scientists and engineers ... over 
the long-term, the Government expects that its reforms o f the education and training 
systems will lead to an improvement in the general level o f understanding o f scientific 
and technological issues across the population, and give a corresponding boost to the 
supply o f scientifically literate manpower to industry, (p. 65)
218 Office o f Science and Technology (1993), op. cit., p. 4.
219 See for example Roos, D. (1977), 'Matthew Arnold and Thomas Henry Huxley: Two Speeches at 
the Royal Academy, 1881 and 1883', Modem Philology, 74: 3.
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The consultation which had preceded the paper had included all the founding members of 
COPUS, and unsurprisingly, given the self-interest of their organisations, had identified a 
need to raise the general level of public awareness and understanding o f science and 
technical issues as a major subject of concern. As the Royal Institution’s contribution to the 
preceding consultation had argued, ‘any national policy for science and technology must 
contain, as a necessary foundation, the diffusion among the public at large of an appreciation 
of what science is’ (p. 65). COPUS had recommended to the OPSS (Office of Public Service 
and Science) that it provide £ \m  per year to increase activities, using COPUS as the means 
to manage the programme in cooperation with other participants.220 While the Government 
endorsed the public understanding of science, it felt it would not be sensible to attempt any 
central direction of this diverse activity.221 Instead, the Government wished to encourage and 
increase the activity which was already occurring in this area. A fund was set up, to be 
administered by COPUS, from which small grants would be given to cover part of the costs 
of activities designed to increase public understanding and appreciation of science and 
technology. The new Research Councils were also charged with the task of improving 
scientists’ skills at communicating with the public. When the Science and Engineering 
Research Council later split into the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC), and the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC), both set up 
PUS Advisory Committees as part of their internal structures.
The 1993 White Paper therefore gave a stamp of approval to the ongoing activities of 
COPUS and other scientific organisations in improving the public understanding of science, 
through better communication, education and public outreach. The Government, it could be 
argued, were also borrowing the already established discourse of PUS from within the 
scientific community to legitimate their own policy. The public, viewed as being ignorant and 
often anti-scientific, were an obstacle to scientific and economic progress, and therefore it 
needed to be more aware and better informed of all scientific matters. The PUS agenda was 
given further endorsement in March of the following year when the Government awarded 
money towards a national science, engineering and technology week, to be overseen by the
220 COPUS minutes (1993), P U S /3(93), (London: The Royal Society).
221 Office o f Science and Technology (1993), op. cit., p. 66.
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British Association for the Advancement of Science. The first National Science Week, SET7, 
was held in 1994. It featured more than 1000 different events in 235 towns across the United 
Kingdom, some of them small local events organised in schools, and others large-scale, and 
high-profile exhibitions and events at a national level. The science communication events 
included lectures, debates, exhibitions, plays, television programmes, workshops, 
competitions and quizzes. BBC Radio 1 went around the country with a Science of Sound 
Roadshow, and the Science Museum held a Science Poetry exhibit.222
Lewis Wolpert, Professor of Biology as Applied to Medicine at University College London, 
felt that the commitment to the public understanding of science by the Government 
signalled that things were ‘getting better’; science was starting to be appreciated again.223 
Biologist Steven Rose also reflected at this time how scientists should be pleased about how 
far the Government had supported their PUS agenda:
Waldegrave does deserve unstinting praise for his most imaginative act, increasing his 
Department's budget for something called 'the public understanding o f science'. A few 
hundred thousand pounds for the Royal Society, the British Association and the 
Edinburgh Science Festival, and the successful national Science Engineering and 
Technology week (SET7) in March, lifted, albeit temporarily, the despondency among 
the country's scientists.224
He was, however, also critical of the approach at the same time, arguing:
Although spending money this way fits the government's approach o f manipulating 
image rather than addressing substance, the way researchers threw themselves into 
organising SET7, and the 200,000 visitors to the Edinburgh Science Festival's Easter 
fortnight, speak to a real concern, on the part o f scientists and lay public, to 
comprehend one another better. O f course, the Royal Society sees this as ensuring the 
public love scientists, while lay people find out what scientists are up to and inform 
their critiques. In a democracy, that is how things ought to work.225
Following Waldgrave’s move to the Department of Agriculture the following year, the 
incoming Minister with responsibility for science, David Hunt, in his first major speech on
222 Durant, J. 'Science Thrust to Centre Stage', The Sunday Times, 13 March 1994.
223 Wolpert, L. 'Science makes the world go round', The Sunday Times, 20 March 1994.
224 Rose, S., 'Reshuffle: Cabinet's Hungry Walrus', The Guardian, 4 August 1994.
225 ibid.
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science, reportedly told the British Association that science and technology were central to 
Britain's daily life. “If we fall behind in science”, he argued, “we fall behind in almost every 
other area. It is as simple as that”. He added, “If we are each to play a full part in public 
debate, we increasingly need to understand science”.226 Signalling straight away that the 
public understanding of science remained a priority, he announced he was giving £140,000 
to the British Association for a second national science week, £150,000 to COPUS and 
£85,000 for a Science Museum exhibition.
The nature of science and society
Wolpert succeeded Bodmer as Chair of COPUS at the start of 1994. As one of a few Visible 
scientists’ in the UK, Wolpert had been active in popular lecturing, writing, and television 
and radio broadcasting for many years. He was also no stranger to the public understanding 
of science having, a year earlier, discussed the nature of science, in his book The Unnatural 
Nature of Science.221 He had argued that science had a problematic relationship with society 
because it involved an ‘unnatural’ way of thinking that was in direct conflict with common 
sense. Therefore, as Wolpert explained in his book, ‘the best and probably only way to 
understand science is to do scientific research’ (p. 177). Lay-persons, he argued, lacked any 
familiarity with scientific thinking and science should therefore be left for scientists. The 
implications of this statement, as Durant outlined in an editorial in Public Understanding of 
Science, was that the task of popularising science would be very difficult, if not ‘downright 
impossible’.228 Wolpert was dismissive of the claims of sociologists and philosophers of 
science as to the nature, and the public understanding of, science so Durant commissioned 
several different reviews by scholars working in the academic fields that Wolpert had 
addressed in the book, or who were involved in the popularisation o f science.229 The ensuing
226 ibid.
227 Wolpert, L. (1992), The Unnatural Nature of Science, (London: Faber).
228 Durant, J. (1993), 'Editor's introduction to Multiple Book Review: The Unnatural Nature of Science by 
Lewis Wolpert', Public Understanding of Science, 2: 3, p. 257.
229 The reviewers were Jon Turney, Features Editor for the Times Higher Education Supplement and 
Course Director for the Diploma o f Science Communication at Birkbeck College, University o f  
London; Physicist Paul M. Clark at the Open University; Harry Collins, Professor o f Sociology and
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conflict highlighted the very different stances not only toward the public understanding of 
science, but towards whose definition of science it was deemed appropriate to popularise.
Jon Turney argued that if one believed that there was, as Wolpert argued, an irreconcilable 
gulf o f understanding between scientists and the rest of society, this had grave consequences 
for the public understanding of science:
[PUS] would be reduced to understanding the superiority o f the scientific mode of 
investigation. Scientists would not be the final arbiters on matters o f politics or 
morality, nor would they be able to solve all the world’s problems. But they would 
have a special claim on truth about the world, and that truth would be arrived at in 
such an unnatural way that most o f the population could hope for the dimmest grasp 
o f the results.230
Turney criticised Wolpert for not addressing these implications, and instead simply 
promoting the need for more scientists to devote their time to popularisation, without 
managing to reconcile this with his claim that science was beyond most people’s 
comprehension.
Harry Collins said the book was not ‘witty, informative, or stylishly written’ (p. 259). As 
Collins continued:
On first reading I found the book chilling because it seems not so much an academic 
enterprise, nor even a popularization o f difficult ideas, but a rallying point for the 
‘Colonel Blimps’ in the analysis o f science. On further reading it seems, rather, that it 
is motivated by a series o f misapprehensions, (pp. 261-2)
Collins devoted much of his review to countering Wolpert’s attack on sociologists and 
historians of scientific knowledge. Wolpert had argued that the use of a symmetrical analysis 
of science by sociologists was akin to giving an equivalent status to ‘wrong’ or 
pseudoscientific thinking. Collins, however, argued that sociologists and historians of
Director o f the Science Studies Centre at the University o f Bath; Simon Schaffer, historian o f Science 
at Cambridge University’; James Cornell, a science journalist based at the Harvard Smithsonian Center 
for Astrophysics, and Michael Shortland, at the Department o f History and Philosophy at the 
University o f Sydney.
230 Turney, J., et al. (1993), 'Multiple Book Review: The Unnatural Nature of Science by Lewis Wolpert', 
Public Understanding of Science, 2: 3, p. 259.
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science, aside from the fact that they were paid to unpick and cast doubt on the way science 
had developed, used this principle of symmetry to put themselves in the shoes of a historical 
contemporary who had opposed a scientific theory that had later become accepted. This 
helped, he argued, to understand how the scientific theory became accepted over any others. 
Many of Wolpert’s conclusions were, claimed Collins, close to the conclusions of 
sociologists and historians of science, and, though their methodologies differed, Wolpert 
misunderstood the discipline by characterising it as ‘anti-science’ (p. 262). Collins finished his 
review arguing that Wolpert was trying to portray an image of science that did not actually 
exist, and was instead describing science as how scientists would like it to be:
Now one can see how brilliant scientist, Lewis Wolpert, came to write a book so 
casually argued and so packed with ex-cathedra declarations. The contrasting notions o f  
common sense and scientific thought are all mixed up with what he believes about 
what others don’t know. Everything reads outwards and backwards from there. Those 
who cannot see the world the way he sees it are not in need o f examples o f better 
reasoning, they simply need to be given the facts, (p. 264)
Other reviewers in Public Understanding of Science also took a very critical stance towards 
Wolpert’s book. Historian Simon Schaffer argued that Wolpert took a carefree attitude to 
the history of the sciences, and as such might not have understood the processes used to 
construct and deconstruct historical accounts of scientific knowledge. Science journalist 
James Cornell called it an ‘elitist argument for the specialness of science — and scientists’ and 
argued that Wolpert’s main interest in public understanding of science was simply that 
science needed public acceptance (p. 276). Michael Shortland argued that Wolpert’s views 
would possibly only serve to increase the perceived tensions between science and its cultural 
critics and undermine the mission towards a greater scientific literacy in the general public:
By severing science’s links with common sense, society and culture -  to say nothing of  
religion -  Wolpert’s book seems to me to make the job o f  promoting science far more 
difficult and its purpose less pointed than needs to be. Once science is ethereal, 
individual, the stuff o f far-sighted leaps and bounds, what role for lesser mortals? To 
clap from the sidelines? (pp. 270-1)
Wolpert, having been given the opportunity to respond to these reviews, regretted that his 
views may have had grave consequences for the public understanding of science, but 
rejected the criticism that he was suggesting that the public could have nothing to do with
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science. While he did not go as far as to suggest that they could understand science, he 
argued that non-scientists could appreciate and enjoy science. Wolpert felt that social 
scientists should have no role in communicating their view of science in the public domain, 
calling the sociology of scientific knowledge ‘pretentious’. Sociologists, according to 
Wolpert, claimed that science was a social construct which therefore did not provide special 
knowledge of the world, a view-point Wolpert found distasteful. Following on from this, 
Wolpert, expressed his confusion as to why, when science was not special, should the 
reviewers argue that the public understanding of science was important? The whole 
exchange highlights the boundary work between the different professions. All had very 
different conceptualisations of science, social science and the public understanding of 
science, yet all claimed ownership and authority over the PUS issue.
The UK was experiencing a boom in popular science writing in the early-1990s with Stephen 
Hawking’s book, A  Brief History of Tim , and others by Richard Feynman, Stephen Jay Gould, 
and Richard Dawkins being published and widely available. So Wolpert’s book was one 
among many which brought scientists’ definitions of science into the public domain. In 
opposition to these, later that same year Harry Collins, along with long-time colleague 
Trevor Pinch, Professor in Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University, published 
their book The Golem: What everyone should know about science, which advanced a very different 
idea of the public understanding of science. Like other popular science books, The Golem was 
aimed at a general reader who, according to its authors, wanted ‘to know how science really 
works and to know how much authority to grant experts’.231 Selecting a range of scientific 
case-studies, based on their own original research into gravity waves and solar neutrinos, as 
well as on the work of other scholars, the authors’ aims were to liken science to the powerful 
yet unpredictable creature from Jewish mythology, the Golem:
We aim to show that it is not an evil creature but it is a little daft. Golem Science is 
not to be blamed for its mistakes; they are our mistakes. A golem cannot be blamed if 
it is doing its best. But we must not expect too much. A golem, powerful though it is, 
is the creature o f our art and our craft, (p. 2)
231 Collins, H. and Pinch, T. (1993), The Golem: What Everyone should know about Science, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. xv.
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The book had several main messages, the first of which, as can be seen from the quote 
above, was an attempt to correct a public image of science as something which produced 
certainty. This image, the authors felt, was promulgated by heroic histories of science and 
school science, neither of which portrayed the activity of social negotiation that surrounded 
scientific discovery. The inevitable product of this sort of model of science in public, the 
authors argued, was that science would be viewed as all good or all bad, which was 
dangerous and misleading:
The overweening claims to authority o f many scientists and technologists are 
offensive and unjustified but the likely reaction, born o f failed promises, might 
precipitate a still worse anti-scientific movement. Scientists should promise less; they 
might then be better able to keep their promises. Let us admire them as craft persons: 
the foremost experts in the ways o f the natural world, (p. 142)
Similar to many of the scientists within the public understanding of science movement, 
Collins and Pinch were concerned about anti-science sentiment, and they admired any 
attempts at disabusing the public about unsupported claims. Similarly, the public should still 
be educated, as citizens needed, they argued ‘to know enough to come to some decision 
about whether they prefer more coal mines, or more nuclear power stations’ (p. 144). 
However, they argued that it was ridiculous to expect the public to be educated with 
scientific facts, and then be able to make better sense out of science at the messy research 
frontier, where all sides had expertise ‘way beyond what can ever be hoped o f the person in 
the street’ (p. 144). Thus, what was different in their formulation of PUS, as opposed to the 
more traditional conceptualisation of Bodmer’s, was simply a matter of what sort of 
education was given to the public. Rather than the content of science, it was the relationship 
of experts to politicians, to the media, and to the rest o f us in which the public needed to be 
better educated. As they argued:
To change the public understanding o f the political role o f  science and technology is 
the most important part o f our book and that is why most o f our chapters have 
revealed the inner workings o f science, (p. 145)
The book was controversial to many outside of science and technology studies, indeed 
Nature called it ‘perverse but entertaining’, and Lewis Wolpert stated it gave a ‘distorted and
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highly biased image of science’.232 As sociologist Steve Fuller later reflected, the boundary 
work performed by Collins and Pinch - a combination of publicly suggesting an approach to 
public understanding of science which conflicted with the official institutional approach, 
while also arguing that sociologists of science understood science better than scientists 
themselves - was unwelcome to many:
While it is clear that Collins and Pinch meant to give friendly advice to scientists, the 
book —  and Collins in particular —  were taken to be hostile by the scientists most 
closely identified with the public understanding o f science. At least part o f  the 
misunderstanding here can be traced to a subtext o f The Golem that became 
increasingly prominent in Collins’s public exchanges. Collins was at least as interested 
in defending the autonomy o f science studies as in advising scientists on how to 
improve their public image. This led to a positive feedback loop: the more that Collins 
insisted on drawing a sharp distinction between the sociologist’s and the scientist’s 
work, the more that scientists took him as in fact encroaching on their work, and thus 
the more they felt emboldened to reciprocate by pronouncing on what sociologists o f 
science should be doing.233
232 Hendry, R., et al. (1994), 'Multiple Book Review: The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About 
Science by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch', Public Understanding of Science, 3: 3.
233 Fuller, S. (1995), 'Two Cultures II: Science studies goes public with Bibliographic guide', E A SST  
Review, March 1995.
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4 Two Tribes go to War Phase I I
Academic discussions over definitions of science and the public understanding of science, 
exemplified by both Wolpert’s book and The Golem, continued into the next year when, in 
September of 1994, Collins and Wolpert shared a stage at the British Association’s Annual 
Meeting in Loughborough. Wolpert’s attack on sociologists and philosophers of science had 
continued to stimulate counter-attacks from members of the academic science studies 
community in the years since publishing The Unnatural Nature of Science. The most recent of 
these, from Steve Fuller and published in Social Studies of Science, had suggested that the 
motivation of Wolpert (and Fuller’s other target, physicist Steven Weinberg) in attacking 
science studies was the fear that the field would have ‘a dangerous effect on the thinking of 
non-scientists who make science policy’.234 So what had become a highly charged debate 
within the review section of journals, reached its pinnacle at the Lougborough meeting in 
what was later described by a reporter for the New Statesman as an ‘extraordinarily 
vituperative and horrible’ argument between the two men,235 which left a considerable 
impression on those who witnessed i t236
All of this debate should be viewed against the backdrop of what was later dubbed the 
‘science wars’, which, though more of a phenomenon in the United States, brought the field 
of science studies (or science and technology studies in the UK) under scrutiny and gave it 
media attention. While an in depth historical account of ‘who said what, to whom’ in the 
science wars would take this thesis somewhat off track, it is a relevant context for the 
debates over the public understanding of science between social scientists and scientists that 
were also occurring in the UK at this time. Concerns over a potentially subversive impact on 
the public of definitions of science that were not from the scientific community were at the
234 Fuller, S. (1994), 'Can Science Studies be Spoken in a Civil Tongue?' Social Studies of Science, 24: 1. p. 
143
235Johnson, J. (1995), 'Science Friction', New Statesman and Society, 13 January 1995.
236 Rose, H. (1996), 'My Enemy's Enemy Is, Only Perhaps, My Friend', Social Text, 46/47, p. 65.
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core of the science wars. In the UK many of those actors involved in the public 
understanding of science, both in an institutional, and academic, context entered into the 
debate. What was partly at stake was the legitimacy to define and promote one’s definition of 
science in public. Thus the whole episode is one where the boundary work between the 
professional disciplines becomes explicit.
While, as the last chapter has shown, there had already been conflict over definitions of 
‘science’, and ‘the public’, and, more importantly, who subsequently had the authority to 
construct and influence the relationship between the two, a few specific events can be 
identified as mobilising and sustaining the conflict. Firstly, certain scientists, such as Holton, 
had expressed concern at the Smithsonian Institution’s 1994 exhibition Science in American 
Life, and branded the exhibition as anti-scientific, claiming it would engender anti-scientific 
attitudes in its visitors.237 The exhibition, which showed science in its social and historical 
context, had included images of atomic destruction and chemical pollution. It was too 
negative for its financial backers, the American Chemical Society, and they disowned the 
exhibition’s representation of science a year later, blaming post-modernist sentiments among 
some of the curators and members of the advisory board.238 Picking up where Gerald 
Holton had left off, mathematician Norman Levitt and Paul Gross, former director of the 
Woods Hole Marine Biology research station, published Higher Superstition: the academic left and 
its quarrels with science.239 In the book the authors defended science against what they perceived 
as the ‘anti-scientific’ attitudes proffered by what they called an ‘academic left’ of social 
constructivists, cultural theorists, feminists, multiculturalists and some extreme 
environmentalists. The book was followed by a conference hosted by the New York 
Academy of Sciences in the following year entitled TLe Flight from Science and Reason’ 
which rallied many scientists together to decry those same academics perceived to be taking 
up ‘cudgels against science’. Later, in 1996, Alan Sokal, a professor of physics at New York 
University, submitted a paper of what he called ‘outright nonsense’ for publication in cultural
237 Gieryn, T. (1996), 'Policing STS: A Boundary-Work Souvenir from the Smithsonian Exhibition on 
"Science in American Life"1, Science, Technology and Human Values, 21: 1, p. 106.
238 Thomas Gieryn was a member o f said advisory board. Gieryn (1999), op. cit., p. 338.
239 Gross, P. R. and Levitt, N. (1994), Higher Superstition: the academic left and it's quarrels with science, 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press).
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studies journal Social Text, as an experiment to see if a journal in that field would, ‘publish an 
article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' 
ideological preconceptions’.240 The ensuing debate centred on both the intellectual rigour (or 
lack there of) of the social sciences, and the ethics of Sokal’s attempt to defraud a journal.
Wolpert, in a similar fashion to his American counterparts, appeared to have found science 
studies threatening enough to the public reception of science to devote time and effort to 
trying to deny the authority or legitimacy of science and technology studies’ academics in 
proposing their own definitions of science. The fact that Collins and Pinch had presented 
The Golem as a contribution to the public understanding of science (indeed the book’s 
subtitle was What Everyone Should Know About Science) had also posed an implicit challenge to 
the dominant role that scientists had, up until this point, enjoyed in conducting activity in 
this area. A line was therefore being drawn between differing approaches to PUS, and 
Wolpert, as the Chair of COPUS at this time, was almost duty bound to respond to such 
challenge. Earlier that same year, in a sign that Wolpert was indeed concerned about ‘anti­
science’ thinking, he had, as a member of the BBC Science Consultative Committee, 
attempted to stop BBC Television from making a six part series on scientific ‘heretics’,241 for 
fear it gave the wrong impression of science, and was reported in The Sunday Times to have 
said:
This is an absurd series. The whole way these programmes are being presented just 
fills me with rage. It's a grotesque distortion. It's disgusting. It's just sensational anti­
science, and anti-science is the rationalization for ignorance.242
It was therefore in this already heated and emotive context that the stage was set for Collins 
and Wolpert to meet at the British Association’s Loughborough meeting. The morning 
session at the meeting was scheduled to explore the sociology of science, and the first two 
speakers were Brian Wynne and John Ziman, followed by Lewis Wolpert and finally Harry 
Collins.
240 Sokal, A. (1996), 'A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies', L ingua Franca.
241 BBC Series, 'Heretics', broadcast on BBC 2, written and produced by Tony Edwards, 1994.
242 Margolis, J. 'Heretics', The Sunday Times, 3 July 1994.
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Wolpert, confirming that he was very much aware of the work of Gross and Levitt, 
recommended their book in his talk and, taking a very similar line of attack as they had in 
Higher Superstition, described any comment on science by those from within the social 
sciences as being motivated by a resentment on their part. As he said:
“What it seems to me is, that in some sense the sociologists have won. There’s this 
curious view about the nature o f the world and the nature o f science that is presented 
to the non-scientific world which is totally at variance as to what I consider to be 
science ... what I want to talk about really are the sociologists o f science, who ... have 
not only obfuscated, but they have been extremely hostile to science. And I think that 
one o f the characteristics o f the post-modern world is that many in the humanities 
have failed to come to terms with the enormous success o f science. N ow  that’s not a 
nice thing to say, but I regret to say that it’s probably true.”243
To back up his claim, Wolpert had quoted Howard Newby, who was chairman of the 
Economic and Social Research Council in the UK: “It is not surprising”, Newby had said, 
“because of the massive inferiority complex, social scientists have ... demystified the official 
credo o f science, and ... have sought to demonstrate that science is but one means of 
creating knowledge. I regret to say that it is little more than envy”. Social studies of science, 
continued Wolpert, were intellectually bankrupt:
“If you are in my field you are wildly excited, new results are coming out everyday, 
we’re really making tremendous progress. I feel that that’s not necessarily the case in 
the sociology o f  science. I’ve heard Brian Wynne recycle that particular story o f sheep,
I think at least three times now, where’s the really new evidence?”244
The ‘relativist’ methodological approach employed by some sociologists o f science was, to 
Wolpert, interpreted to mean that they simply saw science as a social construct and therefore 
not any better a means to understand nature than any other form of knowledge. While some 
sociologists did take this ontologically relativist position, many did not and, as Collins 
pointed out in response, most simply used it as a methodology, a distinction that Wolpert 
did not make in his general characterisation of social scientific views. His attacks on all 
sociologists as being anti-scientific and motivated by envy, and his claims that their discipline
243 The British Association for the Advancement o f Science (1994), Meeting on the social sciences, Annual 
Meeting Loughborough, transcribed by Simon Lock, May 2005.
244 ibid.
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was empty of any evidence, were, as Collins and Pinch themselves had argued many years 
before, typical of scientists wishing to reject anything they saw as unorthodox, and maintain 
a boundary of expertise around science.245 Furthermore, by making personal attacks on the 
‘accused’ rather than engaging with the academic content of their claims, Wolpert was 
explicitly denying any authority to those claims, and indeed, in another personal slight, even 
went as far as to dismiss sociology of science as something which was so trivial it did not 
even concern most scientists. As he told the audience:
“If you think that this type o f debate is happening within the scientific community 
then you are wrong. Scientists, as a community know absolutely nothing about this 
whatsoever, and have no interest in it whatsoever.”
The attack by Wolpert was, as the video of the session shows, shocking to some in the 
audience. Several audience members in the question session afterwards criticised him for 
having a lack of understanding of sociology.246 John Ziman denounced Wolpert’s talk:
“I’m not sure that what Lewis is saying has much content to it other than rejecting a 
view from his own emotional stance ... I am actually appalled by Lewis Wolpert’s anti 
academic way o f dealing with these matters, I regard that as really inappropriate and 
really rather scandalous, and I hope that he will mend his ways. I do think that that is 
something that we should not tolerate in our senior academics and intellectuals.”
Harry Collins, who, on the video was visibly angry and, as he claimed, “embarrassed” as he 
stood up to follow Wolpert’s talk, accused Wolpert of lying to the audience, and tried to 
defend the sociology of science from his charges of being anti-scientific:
245 Collins, H. and Pinch, T. (1979), 'The construction o f the paranormal: nothing unscientific is 
happening', in Wallis, ed., On the Margins of Science: the Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, (Keele: 
University o f Keele Press). This rejection according to Collins and Pinch happens in two different 
contexts. The constitutive forum, which is seen to be the part o f science that contributes to scientific 
knowledge: conferences, journals, any o f the normal channels that are used by trained scientists to 
receive recognition o f their work. The other is the contingent forum, which does not necessarily hold 
to the scientific objectivity that must be seen in the constitutive forum. Therefore it can include 
personal views exchanged between scientists, gossip, and the views o f popular science publications all 
contribute, though these are not generally thought to contribute to scientific knowledge.
246 Personal observation from video footage o f debate.
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“N ow  if you’d spoken to myself, or to some o f the other people that you’ve 
mentioned in your talk, you would know that far from being hostile towards science, 
we are all ... science lovers. We love nothing better than to be in science laboratories, 
speaking with scientists, seeing how it works, trying to understand it. And again if 
you’d read books like this more carefully you would have read that quite explicitly one 
of the things that we think we’re doing is trying to make the world a bit safer for 
science, trying to protect it against those who might react against science, because they 
see the failures o f some o f the over the top promises that have been made.”247
Collins continued with a defence of both the relativistic approach of sociologists o f science 
as a methodological principle, and the charge that there was no evidence in the field. The 
defence was as much a personal attack on Wolpert as it was a defence of SSK:
“I’ve been asked to speak on a platform with you before and I’ve refused because it 
seems to me that what you’re engaging in is a pantomime act rather than a scientific 
methodology ... They’re [sociologists] honest, they provide evidence, they argue 
among themselves, like cats and dogs, and we feel ourselves to be going into science 
as Merton described it, although there is this slight irony at the same time because it’s 
not quite like Merton described it and you o f course demonstrate the point quite 
adequately.”
Many of the audience members accused Wolpert of not behaving as an academic should and 
the meeting concluded with John Ziman urging the audience to remember that neither 
academic represented the scientific community or the social scientific community at large, 
and there was a middle ground for more fruitful discussion.
It is noteworthy that the subsequent THES coverage was constructed around the question 
of whether science was a social construct, a narrow interpretation of the debate, which also, 
in a similar fashion to Wolpert, ignored the many sociologists who would not take this view. 
As Wynne had argued at the end of the meeting, “sociological explanations of science do not 
mean that nature doesn’t have a role in the construction of knowledge”, yet the press 
coverage presented the extreme sides of the argument.248 This, however, says as much about 
standard media practice of reporting a controversy, as it might about any particular stance 
the paper may have had.249 As sociologist Hilary Rose later reflected, this focus had left little
247 The British Association for the Advancement o f Science (1994) Ij)ughborough meeting transcript.
248 ibid.
249 Media studies scholars have argued that it is common media practice to portray a scientific debate 
as a two-sided conflict, despite the two-sidedness not necessarily reflecting the real life situation. See
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scope for a meaningful debate about the sociology of science, nor did it reflect the diversity 
of opinion or approaches within either discipline:
The options for those sociologists who disagreed with Collins or those biologists who 
disagreed with Wolpert (to say nothing o f those who as feminists thought both were 
unreconstructedly macho in thought and style) were shrivelled down to the binary 
choice o f either Collins or Wolpert.250
The coverage both prolonged the debate, and moved it further into the public domain. 
While Wolpert’s and Collins’ positions were extremes the multitude o f replies to the THES 
revealed many tensions and ensuing boundary work between certain science studies 
academics and scientists over who had the expertise and legitimacy to discuss science in 
public. Collins continued his defence of the social studies of science in the coverage, here 
resorting to similar ad hominem tactics to Wolpert, branding the conflict a witch-hunt and 
suggesting that the violent attacks on sociology were a result o f a newfound insecurity of 
science, in a world where scientists did not enjoy unquestioned authority. Richard Dawkins 
on the other hand called the sociology of science ‘chic drivel’, and accused sociologists of 
hypocrisy, suggesting that the role of the sociologist o f science should be limited to 
defending the claim that scientists were influenced by their own social and cultural 
background.251 Peter Atkins, a lecturer in physical chemistry at Oxford University 
contributed a commentary, which argued that science was independent of society. Painting a 
picture o f science as progressive, objective, and universal, he argued that those who 
suggested that science could be any other way were ‘motivated by jealousy in one of its 
disguises (such as political correctness) or by a wish to see science’s progress tripped’.252 
Thus despite Wolpert’s claim that science studies was not the concern of scientists, the 
coverage suggests this was not the case. There were many other scientists concerned about 
the influence that science studies may or may not have had on the publics’ views on science,
for example debates around climate change in the early 21st century or debates around the MMR 
vaccination in the UK. The setting up o f an apparently evenly sided debate provides what media 
studies scholars call more “newsvalue”. See for example: Goodell, R. (1987), 'The role o f  the mass 
media in scientific controversy', in Engelhardt and Caplan, eds, Scientific controversies: Case-studies in the 
resolution and closure of disputes in science and technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
250 Rose (1996), op. cit., p. 65.
251 Dawkins, R quoted in Irwin, Afislingj 'Science's social standing', Times Higher Educational 
Supplement, 30 September 1994, p. 17.
252 ibid.
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particularly, it seems, if the discipline was advancing a view of science which conflicted with 
the public image that they felt had been popularised by scientists over many centuries. 
Conversely, this vocal response could also lend support to Fuller’s argument that all the 
attention these critics gave to science studies suggested that the discipline had acquired a 
recognisable voice in the general intellectual discourse that helped shape public opinion and 
policy.253
In the following year the ongoing debate was covered in the New Statesman, a popular 
magazine on the left of the political spectrum. Taking a more sympathetic view towards 
sociologists of science than the THES had done, the article claimed that the debate had little 
to do with philosophical matters, and more to do with scientists becoming ‘aware of a public 
mood that has turned distincdy against science’ and ‘more mundane concerns like status and 
the contest between disciplines for a diminishing pot of funds’.254 Indeed Wolpert appeared 
to agree with this view, but only in reference to the sociologists, attempting to downgrade 
their stance as political, while scientists’ was not:
They have a political agenda ... and that is to show that science does not have the 
authority to describe, in any particularly reliable way, the external world. By 
propagating this dangerous nonsense, they are undermining science, and since they do 
not understand science, they should be stopped. I think they want to get control o f  
science funding.255
Sociologist Andrew Pickering was reported in the New Statesman article to claim that while 
scientists tended to think that they knew how best science was carried out, the way they 
presented the process of scientific inquiry was a ‘story they trot out’ and ‘nothing more than 
Sunday theorising’.256 What was at stake, the article also quoted one historian of science as 
saying, was ‘the right of non-scientists to comment on the way science seems to work’, and, I 
would further argue, who was allowed to popularise these views to the public. Certainly this 
whole episode showed that many scientists felt that it was their right to maintain control 
over their own narrative.
253 Fuller (1994), op. cit., p. 143.
254 Johnson (1995), op. cit.
255 ibid.
256 ibid.
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PUS as social research
The Loughborough debate had focused certain scientists’ attention on the field of science 
and technology studies. However, these debates had been on only one aspect of the field’s 
contribution to questions of science and technology, that of SSK and Collin’s and Pinch’s 
‘golem science’. Alongside these contributions, as activity in Public Understanding of Science, 
Social Studies of Science and Science Technology and Human Values at this time shows, was a 
growing body of other social science academics all engaging in the public understanding of 
science debate. Many of these were critics of the scientific institutions’ conceptualisation of 
the ‘problem’ of public understanding of science. Furthermore, many of them also put 
forward their own conceptualisation of what PUS was. These alternative conceptualisations, 
largely borne out of the work by the qualitative and contextual studies commissioned as part 
of the ESRC programme, were becoming more prominent in the discourse of PUS, 
mobilised as an alternative to the efforts of COPUS and others towards educating the public. 
Evidence that this ‘contextual perspective’ on the public understanding o f science was 
becoming more formalised, and perhaps a more dominant part o f science and technology 
studies can be seen in Wynne’s chapter entitled ‘Public Understanding of Science’ in the 
edited Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, published in 1995.257 The book served as a 
guide to the different areas of research that STS covered, thus PUS research, by virtue of 
having a chapter devoted to it, was here legitimated as a valid area of social scientific inquiry. 
Wynne admitted at the start of his chapter that PUS was ‘a wide and ill-defined area 
involving several different disciplinary perspectives’, with ‘no coherent paradigm having 
gained sovereignty’ (p. 361). The fact that Wynne had been chosen as its author is also 
significant, as the chapter provided Wynne the opportunity to critique other institutional and 
social research perspectives on the public understanding of science, and present his own 
research as STS canon, in this important work of reference. In a drawing together of many 
of his ideas published in separate papers over the previous years, Wynne’s most explicit 
criticism was addressed again to what he called the ‘dominant political paradigm’ which 
‘shaped a particular framing of the PUS problem’ (p. 361). As he had continued:
257 Wynne, B. (1995), 'Public Understanding o f Science', in Jasanoff, et al., eds, The Handbook of Science 
and Technology Studies, (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage).
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Vague though powerful concerns about “public understanding o f science” have been 
woven into ideological programs of various kinds ever since science entered public 
discourse. A common thread has been anxiety among social elites about maintaining 
social control via public assimilation o f “the natural order” as revealed by science, (p.
361)
Wynne argued there was confusion within this dominant formulation of PUS, which he 
attributed to a ‘neglect of the distinctions between public appreciation of, interest in, and 
understanding o f science’ (p. 363). Furthermore, he re-iterated his, and other social 
scientists’, argument that this dominant approach was shaped by ‘problematizing publics, 
and their cognitive processes and capabilities, thereby implying scientific knowledges, 
practices, and institutions to be unproblematic’ (p. 362). Problematising science to Wynne, 
however, was a ‘central part of any serious attempt to define the overall research and public 
policy issues of public understanding of science’ (p. 384). As he noted later in the chapter, 
many outside the scientific community had observed that the public was positive about 
science, but had been alienated from it by most scientists’ reluctance to communicate with 
the public. This, he argued, ignored the ‘challenging sociological finding’ that PUS problems 
were as much to do with ‘institutional and epistemic characteristics of dominant forms of 
science’ as they were to do with the public themselves (p. 385). By suggesting that much 
social scientific work was either misrepresented or misunderstood, Wynne used similar 
boundary work tactics to those scientists who identified a deficit on the part o f the public. 
His criticisms, however, though largely focused on the institutional formulations of PUS, as 
can be seen in his use of the words ‘perverse’, ‘patronizing’ and ‘confusions’ to describe 
these efforts, were also aimed at other social scientists. Here he laid out more clearly his 
criticism of quantitative studies into PUS, arguing that surveys only went some way towards 
‘convergence with the insights of qualitative research’ (p. 367), due to the fact o f ‘inevitably 
building normative assumptions about the public, about what is meant by science and 
scientific knowledge, and about understanding’ (p. 370). Rhetorically linking quantitative 
research to a deficit model of PUS, Wynne argued that attitudinal surveys, ‘uncritically 
assumed that ‘better public information’ would lead to greater ‘understanding’ and this 
would also mean greater acceptance of science; but the competing information or 
‘understanding’ that might be in play were rarely discussed’ (p. 369). Hinting at the difficult 
relationship between quantitative and qualitative researchers, he suggested that there were
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some potentially fruitful correspondences and complementarities between the two 
approaches. However, he characterised the relationship between the two groups as a mirror 
of the relationship between ‘universal’ science and local cultures; the former employed a 
dominating universalist discourse, whereas the latter attempted to negotiate in a more 
reflexive manner. Wynne was uncomfortable with the idea that qualitative studies simply 
served to flesh out the picture within the framework of objective accounts of public 
knowledge as measured in large-scale quantitative surveys. As he argued:
The role of qualitative studies is not to identify more refined and ‘sensitive’ questions 
for surveys to test on an objective level. Rather the relational constructions of 
‘understanding’, ‘science’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘trust’ that the qualitative studies identify 
and explore are simply not accessible to large-scale survey methods, (p. 369)
Turning the concept of ‘understanding’ on its head, Wynne argued that it was, ‘patronizing’ 
of scientists to describe public reactions as ‘subjective irrationality’, as science could be 
rejected on grounds other than technical ignorance, such as trust in, and identification with, 
the institutions controlling and deploying it.
Wynne did maintain a reflexive perspective on his own position, and questioned how far 
micro-social qualitative studies could be used to draw general conclusions on public 
interactions with science. He also conceded that there was, like the institutional approaches 
to PUS, a normative commitment within his own, and other social scientific, formulations, 
which held that pluralism in public science should be possible, and would be beneficial. He 
concluded however that there was a ‘tacit cultural politics of legitimation of science, and of 
related institutions, being conducted under the language of public understanding of science’ 
(p. 388). I would argue that there was also a similar process, seen within this period, of a tacit 
cultural politics of legitimation of certain social scientific perspectives, being conducted 
within his and others’ discourses of public understanding of science.
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A new direction for PUS?
Another sign of the growing professionalisation of social research into the public 
understanding of science was the creation of the first university chair in the area. Having 
been working as a visiting professor at the Science Museum and Imperial College, London 
since 1989, Durant was given a personal chair in the Public Understanding of Science in 
1995. The Science Communication group at Imperial, he stated, had grown into a large 
research centre, which, as he pointed out in his inaugural lecture, had two full-time lecturers 
and three dozen post-graduate students working and studying there.258 Reflecting on the 
decade since the Bodmer report, he felt that COPUS deserved a good deal o f credit for 
much of the expansion in science broadcasting, lectures, festivals and other initiatives that 
had sprung up in the intervening years. The rest of his lecture, however, echoing many of the 
same arguments from Wynne, added to a growing criticism of the status quo in PUS, as he 
argued:
“One weakness had been a tendency towards what I would call a ‘top-down’ approach 
-  that is a tendency to view things from the point o f view o f the scientific community 
rather than o f other key groups (such as mediators and audiences); and another, 
related weakness has been a tendency towards what might be called a celebratory 
approach to science and technology.” (p. 2)
Durant continued with a call for change in the direction of public understanding efforts, 
though was less critical of those within the scientific community than Wynne had been:
“... the scientific community should not be blamed too much for tending towards 
[these] approaches. At the same time, I want to suggest that so long as it confines 
itself to what might be termed the missionary role -  going out, if you like, and looking 
for converts -  the scientific community risks failing to address some crucially 
important issues to do with the changing place o f science and technology in our 
culture ... the time has now come to move on in the public understanding o f science.
What we need is a new agenda and a new programme.”
258 Durant, J. (1995a). 'A new agenda for the public understanding o f science: An inaugural Lecture 
given by John Durant, Professor of Public Understanding o f Science, on 28 November 1995 in the 
Clore Lecture Theatre'. Imperial College, London).
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The impetus for Durant’s plea for change had come from several joint-pieces of research 
that he had published with colleagues at the Science Museum, and other academics, all of 
which had suggested an ambivalence in public attitudes to science and technology.259 He also 
cited his involvement in the UK’s first consensus conference in the previous year as a reason 
for the need to rethink the current dominant approach to the public understanding of 
science.260
The research had, to Durant, suggested that the relationship between science and the public 
was not, as he pointed out, simply to do with knowledge and ignorance, but also to do with 
“trust and distrust; and, needless to say, with the various compounds of trust and distrust 
that are best described as ambivalence”.261 Further evidence that the relationship between 
public attitudes to science and technology and understanding was not as simple as previously 
assumed had also been published in Public Understanding of Science earlier that year, in a paper 
by Geoff Evans and Durant. The authors had argued that, despite the widespread idea that 
greater knowledge of science leads to a greater support for science, there was ‘relatively little 
evidence in the literature to show whether or not the argument is correct’.262 Challenging the 
central tenet o f the scientific institutions’ PUS efforts, they argued that from their analysis of 
quantitative survey results there was ‘at best, a weak correlation between knowledge and 
attitudes’ (p. 57). The real situation was more complex, and they also argued that measures 
of general attitudes were ‘inadequate as a guide to what the public may think o f specific areas 
of scientific research’ (p. 70). The public were more likely to take into account ‘practical 
considerations, and values other than those relating to science itself (p. 59). Their research 
had also argued that people who were well informed in a particular area of science were as 
likely to express less support for the research as they were to express more. So they 
suggested ‘it would be mvwise for scientists and science policy-makers to presume that a
259 See Bauer, M., et al. (1995), Science and Technology in the British Press, 1946-1990. Final Report to the 
Wellcome Trust, (London: Science Museum) for details o f the media analysis.
260 For a discussion o f the consensus conference see Joss, S. and Durant, J. (1995), 'The UK National 
Consensus Conference on Plant Biotechnology', Public Understanding of Science, 4: 2.
261 Durant (1995a), op. cit.
262 Evans, G. and Durant, J. (1995), 'The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the public 
understanding o f science in Britain', Public Understanding of Science, 4: 1, p. 57.
138
Lost in Translations
better informed public is automatically a public that is more supportive of any and all forms 
of scientific research’ (p. 70).
The experience of being involved with a consensus conference had also suggested, to 
Durant, how the relationship between science and the public could be conducted in a 
different manner. The consensus conference, an innovation in public participation in 
technology policy pioneered by the Danish Board of Technology, had been designed to 
allow two-way communication, or dialogue between lay people and experts. During the 
process a panel of lay volunteers conducted an investigation of a scientific or technological 
issue, cross-examined experts, and arrived at a point o f view, which was published and 
presented at a press conference. In the previous year, the Science Museum and the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council had organised the first UK 
National Consensus Conference on Plant Biotechnology.263 Durant’s experience of the 
consensus conference had apparently proven to him that the public’s judgement on scientific 
issues, despite having had no prior acquaintance with plant biotechnology, was often similar 
to the scientists’, and the few areas of divergence were rooted in value differences rather 
than expertise. This experiment, and other participatory models on trial in other parts of 
Europe and North America, such as citizen advisory panels, citizen’s juries, and deliberative 
opinion polls, were, according to Durant, trying to find new ways of closing a credibility gap 
between science and the public by fostering citizen involvement in science and technology 
policy-making.
All of the these findings, experiences and experiments, as Durant had argued in his inaugural 
speech, suggested that the public understanding of science needed to be refocused:
“Our current agenda for the public understanding o f science is dominated by the twin 
aims o f inspiring interest and fostering learning ... I suggest that alongside them we 
should add the aim o f cultivating trust between scientists and non-scientists.”264
263 Joss, S. (1998), The Role of Participation in Institutionalised Technology Assessment: A  Case Study of 
Consensus Conferences, (PhD Thesis: Imperial College London, University o f London).
264 Durant (1995a), op. cit.
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This new agenda for public understanding of science, he argued, would involve learning to 
think about the subject in an entirely different way, not least about the role and concepts of 
its constituent parts:
“Rather than thinking of the public as ‘the great unwashed’ ... we need to think o f it 
as an arena or forum in which scientists and non-scientists meet as equals to consider 
questions together openly and honestly. Rather than thinking o f understanding as 
formal knowledge ... we need to think of it as mutual appreciation between equals 
who have respect for one another’s various competences, interests and points o f view.
And rather than thinking o f science as a closed body o f definitive truths that are 
handed down to the public from on high, we need to think o f it once again as ‘public 
knowledge’; as a body o f evolving findings whose scope, limits, applications and 
implications are always open to public scrutiny, public debate and public criticism.”265
Durant knew that what he was suggesting would be difficult for many in the UK to accept. 
Yet he argued strongly that this new approach to the public understanding of science should 
be given a fair hearing:
“There will be sceptics, I am sure, who will find the ideal o f public participation in 
science absurdly utopian. Is it really possible, they will ask, to engage the public in 
serious debate and decision-making about some o f the most complex matters facing 
our society today? Surely, they will say, we must leave these things to the experts? Well 
the fact is that interest in public participation in science is growing around the 
industrialised world; and to my knowledge, wherever the ideal has been put into 
practice the experience has been positive. In other words, my practical response to the 
sceptics is: please don’t tell us it can’t work, because we’ve tried it and it does.”266
Misunderstanding science?
While alternative academic approaches to PUS were coalescing into a more substantial and 
coherent body o f work than had existed previously, it was still a debate occurring mostly 
within an academic context. The institutional efforts towards PUS had so far remained 
unchanged, or unaware (wilfully or otherwise) of this growing body of knowledge, 
continuing to focus instead, when social research was required, on constructing and carrying 
out surveys of public opinion. Part o f the scepticism of social science by scientists and
265 ibid.
266 ibid.
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policy-makers, claims Mark Dyball, who was Head of the Public Understanding of Science 
Programme at the Office of Science and Technology at this time, was that social scientists 
were failing to communicate their own research in a manner which could be understood by 
them. There was perhaps then an issue o f ‘the “public” understanding of social science’, as 
their findings got lost in translation from one specialised setting to another:
“The barrier was in microcosm exacdy the same barrier that public understanding was 
trying to address - that you have an elite talking a language o f their own with other 
people saying, I can’t actually frame the question and you’re certainly not giving me an 
answer. Well, I think that was always where the breakdown came, that the natural 
scientists trying to do science communication were trying to do something practical, 
whether it was right or wrong, whether it’s the least right or wrong, are different 
questions, but they were trying to do something practical and the studiers were 
studying.”267
In 1996 Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne published an edited collection of the qualitative studies 
funded under the ESRC/SPSG programme.268 Many of the theoretical commitments 
represented had already been expounded by Wynne in his chapter in the STS Handbook. This 
book, however, was intended by the authors to be read by a wider audience than students 
and scholars.269 An exclusion of the quantitative work funded by the same programme was 
controversial, and the publication highlights the continued animosity between particular 
qualitative and quantitative social researchers. As Irwin later reflected:
“In terms o f the book, we then had various decisions to make. One was, should we 
put some o f the quantitative analysis in? But I think the argument at the time was, 
given the quantitative analysis was getting huge amounts o f airtime. They were 
everywhere and our sort o f stuff was just being trivialised. Hostile is too strong but it 
was just ignoring it, basically.”270
The book provided a multitude of case studies backing up what, they argued, was a better 
method to that o f other scientific and social scientific approaches of examining the public 
understanding of science:
267 Dyball, M. (2004), Interview, 19 August 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
268 Irwin, A. and Wynne, B. (1996), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Keconstruction of Science and 
Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
269 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
270 ibid.
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Implicit in our collection is that only a proper sociological approach to contemporary 
science can give us a real insight into the issues o f ‘public understanding’. Otherwise, 
we are doomed to a sterile and even counter-productive juxtaposition o f ‘science’ 
against ‘non-science’ rather than an appreciation o f the diversity and social 
interdependence o f different forms o f science, knowledge and expertise.271
A clue perhaps to the reasons why there was an absence of survey research in the book was 
also provided in the book’s concluding chapter, authored by Irwin and Wynne:
... at the outset o f the ESRC/SPSG public understanding o f science initiative ... 
there existed an assumption amongst some that the role o f the qualitative studies was 
to help elaborate the survey questionnaires ... Qualitative social research on public 
understanding o f science was seen only as intellectual embroidery within the 
‘objective’ macro-social patterns revealed by large-scale surveys, (p. 216)
The editors were apparently struggling with a legitimacy deficit on the part of those social 
scientists investigating PUS qualitatively. Interestingly, while Irwin’s rationale above for 
publishing the book was that the qualitative research was being ignored, those on the other 
side of the divide felt the opposite was the case, as Martin Bauer later reflected:
“... it happened to be that the three projects which were more or less marginalised 
were the survey by Glynis Breakwell on children in adolescence 12- 17, the national 
survey which was the general public, and, I believe, an analysis by Anders Hansen ... 
the other projects considered us alien.”272
Misunderstanding Science served therefore as a position statement of sorts for a group of 
academics committed to a very particular conceptualisation of PUS, and who wished to 
move beyond a problematisation of the public to consider, as the editors outlined, the 
‘operation of science in everyday situations -  and, in particular, the different forms and 
representations of science which confront different groups’.273
As Irwin and Wynne’s introductory chapter and conclusion highlighted, all of the social 
scientists that had been funded by the ESRC, though they came from different disciplinary
271 Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit., p. 8.
272 Bauer Interview, 26 May 2004.
273 Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit., p. 9.
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areas, had arrived at a very similar conceptualisation of ‘science’, ‘the public’, and what 
constituted a ‘scientific understanding’.274 As Hilary Rose, one of the contributors, 
remembers, this convergence in research findings had been a welcome, but surprising, result:
“Half way through the field work the teams had a meeting. Here we confessed to one 
another that none o f our informants, whether they were talking about post-Chernobyl 
radiation in Cumbria, genetic disorders, or chemical factory hazards used the word 
‘science’. As we talked about our disappeared research topic, what had been 
something o f a researcher’s private nightmare became a public conceptual advance: In 
everyday conversation about the assessment and management o f scientific and 
technologically defined risk, the word science is too large, too all encompassing to 
have a place. The everyday conversation is indeed expert; it talks about the problem of  
finding reliable facts about nature.”275
Irwin and Wynne’s book took an explicitly political stance: the editors proposed new policy 
implications that arose from the collection of case studies, and also called for the dominant 
idea of public understanding of science to be re-thought:
The chapters in this book seek to move the analysis o f ‘public understanding of  
science’ away from the prevailing science-centred framework ... (and also from a 
simple oppositional or ‘anti-science’ stance). Instead o f assuming that the problem is 
only or mainly with the public, we examine both the operation o f scientific 
expertises/institutions and different ‘publics’ in relation to one another ... In doing 
so, we interpret both ‘science’ and the ‘general public’ as diverse, shifting and often 
diverging categories. We also adopt a critical-reflexive stance on the current debates 
over public understanding o f science in order to consider their motivation and 
underlying concerns. The general argument in this book is that we need to rethink and 
reconceptualise the relationships between ‘science’ and the ‘public’ if we are to make 
progress at the level either o f understanding or practical intervention.276
The editors, ultimately, were calling for the concept of public understanding of science to be 
turned on its head:
274 The book included chapters for example by Wynne, Irwin, Lambert and Rose, Yearley.
275 Rose, H. (1998), Reflections on PUS, PUM and the weakening of Panglossian cultural tendencies: a speech at 
the public understanding of mathematics seminar,; (Institute of Education), 25th June 1998.
276 Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit., p. 9.
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Now that the discussion over the ‘public understanding o f  science’ has been initiated 
-  and, at least pardy, researched -  it is important that it should be released from its 
orthodox restrictions and developed as a major opportunity for a society-wide debate 
of a more fundamental kind than has so far been officially recognised ... Scientific 
institutions -  and individual scientists -  have an all-important role to play in these 
necessary developments, albeit one which differs markedly from that which had 
dominated so far ... this will be an uncomfortable conclusion for the scientific 
community ... It will lead us to consider not just the ‘public understanding o f science’ 
but also the scientific understanding o f the public and the manner in which the latter 
may be enhanced, (p. 221)
The book received positive reviews in some academic journals.277 However, many reviewers 
disliked the editors’ attempts to exclude and criticise the quantitative PUS research 278 Martin 
Bauer, who himself had been part of the quantitative side of the ESRC funded research, 
argued that the book was ‘rich in concepts and observations’, yet it was also ‘careless, 
unfortunately selective and reflects the posturing within an outdated methodological 
debate’.279 His frustrations were on several fronts. The book had excluded the three 
quantitative surveys from the original programme which, as Bauer argued, served to 
reinforce the boundaries which existed already between social scientists committed to one or 
other of the two different methodological approaches:
It may be that the authors want to continue an anachronistic ‘drole de guerre’ over 
qualitative or quantitative analysis o f public understanding o f science which blocked 
serious dialogue for much o f this research initiative on PUS in the 1980s. (p. 157)
Irwin and Wynne were, in disregarding the quantitative work attempting to draw clear 
boundaries around their own work, and the work of other academics, committed to a 
quantitative analysis. As Bauer suggested, Irwin and Wynne had also attempted to draw these 
boundaries so that quantitative studies were part of the same territory as deficit model 
thinking:
277 See for example: Jasanoff, S. (1997b), 'Public Knowledge, Private Fears', Social Studies of Science, 27: 
2., Mulkay, M. (1997), 'Review: Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction o f science and 
technology', Science, Technology and Human Values, 22: 2.
278 As well as Bauer’s review, see Horlick-Jones, T. (1998), 'Review Essay: Science - The Language of  
the Powerful?' journal of Risk Research, 1: 4.
279 Bauer, M. (1997), 'Review: Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction o f science and 
technology', The British journal of Sociology, 8: 1, p. 157.
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The rhetoric o f the book is dialectically enmeshed with the significant but absent 
other: the ‘quantitative approach’ it is argued is getting it wrong, and the ‘Deficit 
Concept’ is serving the wrong purposes. The exclusion of these studies is unfortunate 
for the PUS research enterprise; the book is a missed opportunity to present a unique 
collection o f research as a whole albeit held together by fracture and conflict. It would 
have required little effort for the editors to work towards a comprehensive 
presentation o f all twelve projects o f the ESRC initiative, but that would have meant 
to listen to develop a critical exchange.
In this implicit debate the stooge ‘survey’ embodies the deficit concept o f the public in 
the interest o f legitimatization, and is juxtaposed with a simplistic link between case 
study ethnography and emancipatory-reflexive knowledge interests, (p. 157)
Finally Bauer, in his own attempt at boundary-drawing, questioned the robustness of the 
methodology of the case studies and the academics’ integrity as researchers, accusing them 
of being closer to activists than academics:
... the procedural detail o f these reports is insufficient. Knowledge is contextual in 
time and space, so are narratives about knowledge; only two out o f the nine reports 
mention the time of the data collection, only one elaborates on the numbers and the 
situations o f interviewing. PUS research as a public good, if it is not more than activist 
ruminations, is not served without attention to minimum procedural standards. Public 
accountability o f research requires more details about primary sources to make a 
warranted claim o f authority, (p. 157)
Reflecting on the reviews almost a decade later, Irwin indeed conceded that the exclusion of 
the quantitative data had indeed been done as a means of drawing a line between the 
sociological accounts of PUS:
“I’m sure some egos were bruised over that qual/quant thing, but it was a creative 
stimulus. It definitely was a way o f saying, well, what are we about if we are not about 
number crunching, over these things. What is it that our argument about science really 
is? So it was a way o f pulling that together. I don’t think any o f the qualitative people 
are sensitive about it at all, but I know, every now and again, from talking to people 
who were around, who felt that the qualitative kind o f abused their position in a way, 
in the sense o f not really understanding the finer points o f the quantitative analysis.”280
Bauer also, reflecting later on this period, felt that the deficit label became a useful tool with 
which to draw boundaries between different approaches to the public understanding of 
science within the social sciences:
280 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
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“I think that the deficit concept became a battle cry, where you could kind o f hover 
around and you had to decide on which side o f the fence you would sit. What became 
very funny was that although the deficit concept is a very crucial preconception about 
whatever you study, society or a group or an individual ... this became associated or 
equalised with a particular methodology. If you used a questionnaire or a survey you 
were doing deficit research, if you talked to people you were not doing deficit 
research. So this is a strange kind o f thing which still today puzzles me, but I think 
that this had to do with the fact that the conflict was so ingrained and dogmatic.”281
Durant also, remembers the use of the deficit model label to draw divisions within the 
community:
“... the deficit model was a term o f criticism from the very beginning ... it was a term 
used to describe pejoratively what some sociologists o f science took some other 
people, both sociologists and natural scientists, to be doing.”282
Horlick-Jones, in his review questioned what exactly would constitute the ‘proper 
sociological approach’ that Irwin and Wynne had called for, and whether their book should 
actually be regarded as an exemplar of that category, arguing it was ‘a highly idiosyncratic 
book, in terms of methodological approach... empirical focus and the politics of its 
conceptual framework’.283 Lewis Wolpert’s view agreed with some of these criticisms, 
arguing that Irwin and Wynne’s editorial appeared ‘to be more of a political agenda’ than 
anything else.284 Wolpert’s review of the book, published in the THES, also rehearsed many 
of his previous arguments against the social studies of science. He questioned the value of 
this approach to the public understanding of science, and, attempting to reinforce the 
primacy of the dominant approach as he saw it, argued:
It is unclear how best to pursue the public understanding o f science.. .the most 
satisfactory approach at present is to focus on providing access to science and 
scientists and to encourage engagement. One might have hoped that those who study 
science and its public understanding professionally could provide some helpful and 
much needed insights and guidance ... The results are limited.
281 Bauer Interview, 26 May 2004.
282 Durant Interview, 28 June 2004.
283 Horlick-Jones (1998), op. cit., p. 325.
284 Wolpert, L., 'Wooly thinking in the field, review o f Irwin and Wynne', The Times Higher Educational 
Supplement: Risk Supplement, 31 May 1996.
146
Lost in Translations
N o suggestions are offered as to what might be done. While all are consistently hostile 
to the ‘deficit model’ o f the public understanding o f science, there is nothing to 
suggest that any o f the authors themselves would not benefit from a better 
understanding o f science. For they provide little evidence that they understand it.285
The review prompted Irwin to forcefully respond to Wolpert in the letters section the
following month:
... he nicely exemplified our argument that the scientific understanding o f the public 
is at least as important as the public understanding o f science. At the same time, he 
illustrated (albeit inadvertently) the difficulties o f establishing an open and critical 
dialogue between social scientific researchers and those such as Wolpert who claim to 
speak for the scientific community ... the various case studies in our book deserve the 
serious academic discussion they have received elsewhere.
The people at the sharp end o f interactions between science and society recognise the 
complexities which Wolpert seems to think can be legislated out o f existence by his 
dogmatic and self-satisfied polarisations. While social science is ready to engage in 
serious, critical but open-minded debate as to how to sustain the cultural and 
instrumental benefits o f science, Wolpert appears to be undermining the very 
enterprise he claims to be defending.286
Irwin, again reflecting later on the reviews the book received, remembered feeling that the
book was neither treated fairly, nor kindly:
Some reviews o f Misunderstanding Science were not generally positive. I remember we 
got it a lot [of] “isn’t this ironic that a group of people are criticising science 
communicators for not being more straightforward and they end up using this 
technical jargon o f their own.” That was Lewis’s critique, but we were never saying the 
problem o f public understanding science was that you need to speak in words o f one 
syllable. That was never what was said, because they always made that kind o f jokey 
thing and they always got a good laugh. And Lewis used it again and again. But I saw 
other reviews as well -  “these obscure social scientists who no one can understand, 
think they can tell us how to do science communication better.” This was a reasonable 
one line. The reviews were not kind, definitely not kind.287
288 ibid.
286 Irwin, A., 'Letter: Lessons at the sharp end1, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 21 June 1996.
287 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
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In attempting to frame the research and the case studies in Misunderstanding Science? Irwin and 
Wynne, in their introduction, had drawn upon an earlier crisis over BSE in the UK, triggered 
by the regulation of catde feed and specified bovine offal in 1988 and 1989. They had used 
this episode as a case study of how the communication of the certainty of science in the 
public domain was an inadequate means of dealing with public concerns. As the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Agriculture had pointed out at the time, ‘Scientists do not 
automatically command public trust’.288
Wynne and Irwin’s book was published at the height of a second and far more politically 
damaging public crisis over BSE in 1996, which resulted in an upheaval in British health and 
safety policy. On 20 May 1996, scientific advisors to the British Government publicly 
announced that ten new cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the degenerative human brain 
illness, had been confirmed as linked to BSE. The announcement led to a European ban on 
the import of British Beef and beef products, calls for the wholesale slaughter of 
contaminated herds, and a drastic drop in the consumption of beef. Government policies for 
disclosing, or, in this particular case, failing to disclose, the risk information to the public 
were blamed for the breakdown in consumer confidence. Politicians had claimed that beef 
was safe, when the evidence had not allowed scientists to make this claim with certainty. 
Rather than discuss the uncertainties of the science, these politicians had relied on a 
discourse of science as certain and apolitical knowledge that could be used to make the 
decision.289 There was, argued Irwin and Wynne, much criticism of the public for their 
‘“emotive and irrational” response to the risks of BSE’.290 All of this confirmed to them that 
science should not be the sole arbiter in structuring everyday choices such as eating habits
288 Quoted in the Guardian 13 July 1990, cited in Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit.
289 Jasanoff, S. (1997a), 'Civilization and madness: The great BSE scare o f 1996', Public Understanding of 
Science, 6: 3.
290 Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit., p. 2.
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and that straight-forward science communication was inadequate as a response to scientific 
uncertainty.
A Shift in focus... ?
Wolpert’s repeated attacks on certain social scientists had attempted to deny any legitimacy 
to their contextual approach to the public understanding of science, which placed trust 
between the public and institutions as central to the ‘problem’. However, he appeared to be 
shifting away from his earlier PUS rhetoric when he described the aims of the public 
understanding o f science in his review of Misunderstanding Science?. Wolpert had used the term 
‘engagement’ rather than ‘understanding’, and while criticising the lack of meaningful input 
from Irwin and Wynne, appeared to have taken on board one of their central arguments by 
admitting that there had been a ‘recognition that scientists and technologists need not only 
to be much better communicators but also to try understanding public concerns’.291 
Similarly, in a debate on ‘Science and Society’ with Alan Irwin, hosted jointly by the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science and the UK Research Councils, Wolpert had changed 
tack in response to criticisms of a deficit model approach, as he argued:
We in COPUS are very strongly committed with the idea that it’s not just a one-way 
process; we do not believe that if only the public understood us, everything would be 
all right and we are committed to the idea that we scientists have to understand the 
public.292
Graham Farmelo, Head of Science Communication at the Science Museum in a comment 
piece in The Guardian, argued that an oppressive climate of political correctness had taken 
hold in the science communication world and many felt that there was a need to change the 
aims of PUS activities:
291 Wolpert, 'Wooly thinking in the field, review of Irwin and Wynne1.
292 Wolpert, L. (1995), 'The Public Understanding of Science', paper presented at the conference 
Science and Society: A  JSPS - UK Research Council Symposium.
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The recent UK National Science Week was not only a celebration o f science, 
engineering and technology, it was also a 10-day orgy o f PUS political correctness. It 
was as if the entire British scientific community had been given a Madison Avenue 
make-over, mandated to keep smiling and be on its best behaviour for fear of  
upsetting the clients.293
Farmelo suggested in the commentary that those funded by scientific institutions to carry 
out the PUS agenda were being tacitly directed to continue to promote science and the 
public understanding of science programme as it stood. However, he felt that it would be 
‘good to hear much more from those who are prepared to go against the grain, those who 
dare to criticise the status quo’ (p.12). Farmelo admitted that he had, only after the event, felt 
able to highlight what he saw as the shortcomings of this centrally controlled, and normative, 
approach to PUS. Scientists, he argued, should not be told to ‘peddle caricatures of what we 
ought to think, but rather ... encourage open discussion and, therefore, disagreement about 
science and its relationship to society’ (p. 12). Questioning whether he was the only 
practitioner to doubt this firmly controlled direction of PUS, he was ‘ashamed to confess to 
having lacked the courage to say so on the record for fear of appearing disloyal or slighting 
to colleagues in the field of science popularisation’ (p. 12). John Durant, reflecting on the 
recent United States’ science wars phenomenon, joined in with this criticism of the status 
quo in the PUS community, arguing that if scientists wanted the public to be interested in 
their work, they must ‘learn to take criticism and give up control’. As he continued:
There is a deep irony about some scientists' simultaneous desire for a greater presence 
within mainstream culture and their dissatisfaction with some o f the more striking 
ways in which science has come to be represented in that culture. Part o f the price that 
science must pay for a more central place within culture is a willingness to tolerate 
comment and criticism from far outside the scientific community ... The real choice 
to be made by the scientific community is whether it will stand aloof from the debate 
(which means leaving the field to others), or whether it will join in so as to ensure that 
scientific voices are heard alongside others. Science is too important be left out o f our 
culture; but, by the same token, culture is too important to be left in the hands of 
scientists alone.294
Durant and Farmelo were in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, Durant wanted to be 
taken seriously as a social researcher, and not be labelled as merely an agent of the scientific
293 Farmelo, G., 'The perils o f being too popular', The Guardian, 15 June 1995.
294 Durant, J., 'Who owns science? ' The Independent, 20 June 1995.
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institutions’ approach to PUS; on the other hand, he worked for the Science Museum, which 
was, to all intents and purposes, the largest institution in charge of popularising science in 
the UK. Farmelo was in a similarly difficult position: to question the PUS agenda would be 
to criticise those people he worked with and who funded him. Equally to do this would be 
to step outside the orthodox boundaries of PUS, as defined by scientific institutions, 
something neither was happy about doing for fear of professional repercussions.
... or institutional business as usual?
Despite this questioning, and change within the language used by some scientists, nothing 
signalled that this had permeated at a government level. In 1995 the ‘Wolfendale Report’, the 
full title of which was the Report of the Committee to review the contribution of scientists and engineers to 
the public understanding of science, engineering and technology,295 had been commissioned by the 
Office of Science and Technology, in the wake of their 1993 White paper on science. The 
Committee, chaired by Sir Arnold Wolfendale, the former Astronomer Royal, and President 
of the Institute o f Physics, had been asked by the Government to make proposals, 
consistent with available funding, for measures to assist the efforts of the scientific 
community towards the public understanding of science, engineering and technology. The 
Committee had defined the public understanding of science, engineering and technology as 
‘an important goal’. This was very much in line with the stated objectives of the 
Government’s policy on public understanding of science, which were:
... to contribute to the economic wealth and quality o f life o f the Nation, particularly 
by drawing more o f our best young people into careers in science, engineering and 
technology [and] to strengthen the effectiveness of the democratic process through 
better informed public debate o f issues o f public concern arising in the fields of 
science, engineering and technology.296
PUS policy, as the Wolfendale committee re-iterated, was about ‘changing public attitudes’, 
and the perceived ‘obstacle’ to achieving the objectives was a ‘relatively low status of science
295 Office o f Science and Technology (1995), Report of the committee to review the contribution of scientists and
engineers to the public understanding of science, engineering and technology, (OST).
296 ibid.
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and engineering in the eyes of the general public relative to other competitor nations’. As the 
Committee also added, the increased take-up of science and engineering subjects by people 
of all ages would depend on public appreciation of science and engineering and their 
practitioners. Thus little appeared to have changed in the decade since the Bodmer report 
had been published. The Committee did recognise that these matters also had ‘non-science 
dimensions, such as economic, political or environmental’ factors.297 ‘Public Understanding’ 
was, however, interpreted by the Committee to include not just scientific concepts, terms 
and issues, but also an ‘awareness and appreciation on the part of the general public’ of the 
contribution that science, engineering and technology had on national life. The Committee’s 
report put forward new ways in which methods of communication, through which scientists 
and engineers could enhance the public understanding of science, could be improved. One 
proposal argued that it should become mandatory for applicants for Research Council grants 
to declare how they would communicate their research to the general public, and why their 
work was important. Indeed, one outcome of the Wolfendale report was that the Research 
Councils each took public understanding of science on as part of their mission statement, 
offering media training and grant incentives to all research council funded scientists.
In the following year the Department of Trade and Industry, to assist this effort, published a 
booklet entitled Going Public: A n  Introduction to Communicating Science, Engineering and Technology, 
written by Michael Kenward, one of the original members of COPUS and former editor of 
New Scientist. As Sir Robert May, the Chief Scientific Advisor and Head o f the Office of 
Science and Technology, asserted in the foreword, scientists and the Government had to 
‘remind an often sceptical public of the value and relevance of science and technology’.298 
They must also, he added, ‘convince young people that a career in scientific research is for 
them’.299 The DTI report provided information about how the media worked and how to 
communicate to different audiences, and pointed scientists towards resources available to 
researchers who wanted to help ‘improve the public understanding of science’, such as 
COPUS grants, or the British Association for the Advancement of Science Festival. The
297 ibid.
298 Department of Trade and Industry (1996), Going Public: An Introduction to Communicating Science, 
Engineering and Technology, (Department o f Trade and Industry).
299 ibid.
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report argued that science communication was needed to ‘reduce the ignorance, and 
sometimes fear, with which many people approach science’, and, with a more instrumental 
aim, it also argued to scientists that ‘give science a higher profile and you might help ensure 
your own job security’.300
Again we can see that the idea of marketing science to the public was still prominent in the 
minds of those promoting PUS within scientific and governmental institutions. The 
Wolfendale report had also put the onus of science communication on universities, who 
were told to appoint staff to run a media/public relations department, as this was, according 
to the Committee, ‘an essential focus through which the public understanding of science can 
be promoted’.301 Within universities there should also be an ‘increased emphasis on the 
acquisition of communication skills and their use for the benefit of the public’.302 His 
committee had also recommended that the Office of Science and Technology should make 
periodic surveys of public attitudes towards, and understanding of, science and engineering, 
to evaluate the success of public understanding of science activities. Writing about his report 
in the UK press, Wolfendale confirmed that the report signalled a continuation of the status 
quo, as laid out by Bodmer a decade earlier, and argued that “much of science is very 
technical”, thus “care must be taken with ‘understanding’ -  a better word is perhaps 
‘appreciation’”.303
The Wolfendale report might have charged the Research Councils by forcing them to take 
on a public understanding of science agenda, but this had not, however, in Hilary Rose’s 
opinion, signified any innovation in approach. As she recalled:
That the Public Relations staff serving the Research Councils were overnight 
designated PUS staff does provide a clue that PUS ... [was] seen as handmaiden 
activities to persuade the public to accept the sciences and mathematics in their 
present cultural form.304
300 ibid.
301 Office of Science and Technology (1995), op. cit.
302 Wolfendale, A., 'Explain or die: why science can't afford to keep secrets from the people', The 
Independent, 24 October 1995.
303 ibid.
304 Rose (1998), op. cit.
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Certainly several scientists continued to promote this agenda in a public context. Nobel 
Prize-winning pharmacologist Sir John Vane argued in the Daily Mail that the status of 
science in the UK was at an all time low. Vane mobilised an image of science as something 
where only rationality and objectivity reigned and was separate from the public and social 
domains. He also represented the public as passive and subject to emotion:
... everywhere there is a flight from reason. Rational explanations and conclusions are 
rejected. Analysis and logic are decried. In their place superstition, myth, mysticism, 
emotion and make believe put themselves up as acceptable substitutes -  and are 
widely and publicly accepted... . Although science permeates all aspects o f our lives, 
appreciation o f science does not.305
Geneticist and popular science writer, Richard Dawkins who was, in 1996, appointed 
Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University, had also 
felt that anti-scientific thinking was on the rise and wrote, in The Independent, a scathing attack 
on astrologers, and called any members of the public that believed in their columns 
‘stupid’.306 In his Dimbleby Lecture for the BBC he had also denounced television shows 
such as the X-Files for peddling anti-science to the public.307 Brenda Maddox, author, and the 
wife of Nature Editor, John Maddox, argued in The Times that ‘public misunderstanding of 
science has never been greater’, and suggested that those working within PUS go on the 
offensive, and attack the media for its misrepresentation of science.308
Ten years of COPUS
To mark the decade that had passed since the publication of the Bodmer report in 1985, 
COPUS published a review of its activities. It argued that the science communication and 
popularisation approach to PUS was not only flourishing under the guidance of COPUS but 
would continue to be encouraged and promoted. The Media Fellowships, Training
305 Vane, J., 'A triumph for the forces o f ignorance', Daily Mail,’ 22 June 1995.
306 Dawkins, R., 'The real romance in the stars', The Independent, 31 December 1995.
307 Dawkins, R., 'The Richard Dimbleby Lecture', 12 November 1996.
308 Maddox, B., 'Let's say goodbye to Frankenstein', The Times, 20 March 1996.
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Workshops, and the Books Prize were still going strong, and the grants programme was 
receiving more applications every year to, in COPUS’s words, ‘prime-pump new and 
imaginative events and projects aimed at bringing science to the public’.309 COPUS had also, 
it reported, collaborated with other organisations, such as the Wellcome Trust, with whom it 
had organised a series of lectures for civil servants on pressing scientific issues; and the 
Research Councils, to develop a course to train all science and engineering students in 
science communication. The review also flagged up the forthcoming release of their report 
To know science is to love it?. The report, written by Jon Turney, now a lecturer in science 
communication at University College London, provided a synthesis of social research into 
PUS which, COPUS suggested, those with immediate, practical concerns in the field might 
want to know about.310 COPUS had also been successful at inserting questions into the 1996 
British Social Attitudes Survey on attitudes to, and knowledge of, science. Many of these 
questions were repeated from John Durant’s 1988 survey so that a comparison could be 
made. COPUS had helped to determine what questions to ask by arranging a consultation 
between science communicators and researchers. The review document made it clear, 
however, that the 1996 study would ask less knowledge-based questions than the 1988 
survey, and instead include questions on different attitudes, particularly issues of trust. Thus 
we have another sign that some scientists were starting to change their language of PUS; 
accepting that some of the social research findings were perhaps valid, and promoting them 
as part of their own programme.
An external evaluation of all the schemes and projects commissioned by COPUS revealed a 
large change in commitments to the public understanding of science since 1985, highlighting 
the large number of organisations and individuals now involved in public understanding of 
science. Fifty-four per cent of Royal Society Research Fellows had taken part in public 
understanding of science activities since starting their Fellowship.311 The report therefore 
concluded that there was no need to still be concerned, as Bodmer and his peers had been,
309 COPUS (1995), COPUS Snapshot: A  review of activities in 1995, (London: The Royal Society), p. 2.
310 Turney, J. (1996), To know science is to love it? Observationsfrom public understanding of science research, 
(London: Royal Society).
311 Evaluation Associates Ltd (1995), COPUS: The committee on the public understanding of science, an 
evaluation of schemes and projects, (Evaluation Associates Ltd).
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that there were not enough scientists involved in communication with the public. The only 
negative part of the evaluation was, what the evaluators described as, a ‘tension between the 
need to integrate science into everyday life with the desire to preserve and enhance the 
respect and status of science and scientists’.312 This impression, it seems, had come from a 
few of the respondents, who had not wanted to see science ‘trivialised’, in the pursuit of 
greater science communication. These respondents thus identified a tension within the PUS 
agenda: the need for a firm boundary between scientists as experts and a ‘lay’ public, while 
simultaneously making that boundary more permeable by communicating scientific 
knowledge to the public and promoting it as understandable. These respondents were, 
however, in the minority, and most others praised the efforts of COPUS over the past 
decade to take science to the public.
An unpublished part of the review, circulated only to members of the Committee, does 
show that there were concerns within COPUS in 1996 as to the ability of the Committee to 
maintain control over the public understanding of science efforts in the UK. They were, as 
the review shows, worried that the Office of Science and Technology’s involvement and 
funding of PUS activities could take the agenda away from COPUS. Also the review shows 
that the Committee members were more aware of academic criticisms of their actions than 
they let on in their public pronouncements. One of the solutions to the concern, proposed 
in this review, was to turn COPUS into a networking and consensus-building body, which 
would ensure that the public understanding of science remained high on the Government 
and science community’s agenda. COPUS in this model, it was proposed, would ‘remain an 
innovator, piloting new approaches to communicating science, but would transfer successful 
initiatives to its partners’.313
312 ibid.
313 ibid.
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Professionalising science communication
Freelance researchers, River Path Associates, published another review of public 
understanding of science activities in 1997, entitled now for the science bit — concentrate!. This 
report first and foremost provides an insight into the consultants’ representation of the state 
of PUS in the UK. Yet we can also use it to provide a snapshot of the positions of those 
interviewees involved in PUS activities and research at this time. River Path conducted forty 
interviews with what they called ‘experts in the field’ as preparation for a brief presentation 
at the Science Communicator’s Forum at the 1997 British Association’s Festival of 
Science.314 What they suggested in the report was that a new agenda was emerging, with 
‘concepts like context and trust taking on greater importance’.315 Following the Festival they 
wrote up the findings as a full report.316 Alongside this sense of a shift in focus, the report 
suggests that there was still a diversity of opinion on what the ‘problem’ of public 
understanding of science actually was, and how to approach ‘solving’ it. To Peter Cochrane, 
Head of Research at British Telecom, the issue was how to remove a “fear of technology”; 
the public were, in his formulation, therefore still the ‘problem’ and changing their concerns 
was key. Many of the interviewees talked about the recent BSE controversy as an indication 
of declining confidence in democratic structures, and by extension of this, public confidence 
in science, as the report’s authors observed:
The BSE issue was repeatedly cited as an example o f bad science communication, 
described as “a fiasco”, “a disaster” and “a mess” ... Roger Highfield, Science Editor 
o f the Daily Telegraph, reports that if you look at BSE we know that the public are 
more mistrustful o f scientists as a result o f that saga.
How it was ‘known’ what exactly the public felt about scientists at this point is unclear, but it 
certainly appears that the BSE issue had represented, to many, a new low, or indeed a
314 As the report said, most o f the ‘experts’ were: academics, journalists, politicians, policy-makers 
and members o f research councils and professional bodies. They also talked to people in the private 
sector. The fact that there were now ‘experts’ in ‘the field’ shows also just how far PUS had become 
discursively embedded in various professions.
315 Pollack, J. and Steven, D. (1997b), 'Don't patronise the public', New Scientist, 21 September 1997.
316 All quotes taken from Pollack, J. and Steven, D. (1997a), now for the science bit - concentrate! 
communicating science, www.riverpath.com/library/pdf/now_for_the_science.pdf, accessed November 
2003.
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turning point, in the relationship between the public and scientists. Bodmer, however, 
blamed the Government for the mishandling of the issue:
“I think the Government made a huge mistake with BSE. How on earth can a 
Minister talk about this rather than a scientist? You talk to civil servants and say this 
and they’re incredulous ... the Government should rethink completely the way it 
presents that kind o f science.”317
Bodmer was identifying a new problem in the way of a successful PUS programme here. The 
Government was, to him, now to blame for public misunderstanding, harking back to similar 
sentiments in the 1830s. River Path argued that the political pressures highlighted by that 
episode called for a ‘new approach -  one that stressed context, transparency and trust’. This 
view, they felt, was already ‘percolating through at all levels’. Colin Morton, Head of 
Information at the Forestry Commission, also detected ‘a new attitude emerging from 
government’, arguing that it was now making more effort and developing policies on 
communication which talked of openness and transparency. A relevant consideration here is 
the election of a New Labour Government, under Tony Blair, in May of 1997. New Labour 
came into power with a new set of operating rules, and one of these was the prominent use 
of public opinion and focus groups in setting their agenda priorities. This also changed the 
way in which public understanding was talked about within government, as Dyball reflected:
“The critical factor was the 1997 election because it provided a break point for 
officials, but most important it brought in ministers with different perspectives so 
John Battle on the science communication, was the first minister that I recall saying if 
science has no understanding o f the public, what’s the importance o f the public’s 
understanding o f science? So that whole change of emphasis was a very critical 
factor.”318
The recollection of Suzanne King, who at the time had been in charge of Public 
Understanding of Science activities at the Wellcome Trust, also suggests an uptake of this 
discourse:
317 Bodmer, W. cited in Pollack, J. and Steven, D. (1997b), ibid.
318 Dyball, Interview, 19 August 2004.
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the ’97 government was all about public consultation, public involvement in 
anything and everything. Therefore modernising government was about bringing in 
that perspective across the board ... that element is never given any credence ... I’ve 
never heard anybody talk about that. Because people are in their own little boxes, but 
actually that got to be an important underpinning o f why they’re putting in money 
into it. I mean the fact that you’ve got rafts o f guidelines on the cabinet office website 
about research, consultation engagement, and good practice and all those sorts o f  
things had not been developed for ... public understanding o f science.”319
Alan Irwin, also reflecting on this period, represented it as such:
“Labour came in ... with the sense o f openness. The language o f democracy [had] the 
sort o f ideological ring o f that made sense. In a way it was probably hardened. And 
there was quite a sense o f just excitement. Different people coming into government 
and a different style.”320
Identifying this new political climate, the River Path authors argued it was not surprising that 
many interviewees were questioning some of the fundamentals of the Public Understanding 
of Science movement.321 ‘Understanding’ was now seen, by some of their respondents, as an 
inappropriate word. However, the implications of this were different for each person. 
Graham Farmelo, at the Science Museum, felt that the public were incapable of such 
understanding:
“Notice I don’t say ‘understanding’ because there are more appropriate words in the 
thesaurus. I f ‘understanding’ is used as the norm, it sets up unreasonable expectations 
of what the public is expected to achieve.”322
Barbara Knowles, Senior Communications Officer at the Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC) disliked the deficit connotations of the word, arguing that ‘most of our 
activities are aimed at awareness and appreciation rather than going out to teach an ‘ignorant’ 
public’. It therefore appears that there were multiple agendas emerging for science 
communication in the UK. Far from the cohesive Royal Society, or COPUS driven agenda 
envisaged in the Bodmer report, and indeed in the recent reviews of COPUS, here we can 
see that the many different professional interests of actors and organisations involved in
319 King, S. (2004), Interview, 19 August, transcribed by Simon Lock.
320 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
321 Pollack and Steven (1997a), op. cit.
322 Farmelo, G. cited in Pollack, J. and Steven, D. (1997b), ibid.
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PUS and science communication activities meant that PUS was framed differently. What is 
clear, however, is that a need for a change in approach towards the audience for science 
communication was heavily signalled by many of River Path’s interviewees:
. .it’s just as important for scientists to be listening to the public, as for the public to 
be listening to scientists” (Helen Wallace, Senior Scientist, Greenpeace)
“ .. .opening up a dialogue with the public about science is o f crucial importance”
(Frank Burnet, Senior Lecturer in Science Communication, Faculty o f Applied 
Science, University o f West o f England)
“. . .to communicate with people you have to put together a contract with people and 
accept that it isn’t a one-way street.” (Jane Bevan, Head o f Marketing and 
Development, Natural History Museum)
Roy Porter, Professor in the History of Science and Medicine at the Wellcome Institute for 
the History of Medicine, urged for the involvement of the public in scientific decision­
making to be taken even further:
“The ultimate purpose is the old cliche that science is too important to leave to the 
scientists. It must, somehow or other, be the public at large which decides if we go 
ahead on these new ventures. The public also, crudely speaking, foot the bill -  and 
you don’t write out blank cheques for anybody.”323
While, to Lewis Wolpert, the belief that the public should be encouraged to question and 
have some input into science was, in his words, ‘monstrous’, and something that would 
‘restrain scientific research’, River Path argued that overall there was a widespread sense 
from their interviewees that science communication needed to shift towards a two-way 
dialogue, based on trust and transparency. In practical terms, the authors suggested that this 
meant that science communication had to be professionalised and move away from what, up 
until now had, to many, been an amateur approach. River Path also argued that much of the 
effort put toward PUS activity was simply reaching the same easily obtainable audience time 
and again, thus (in an unsurprising recommendation from professional evaluators) more 
evaluation was also needed to assess whether these were the right people as well as to get 
information about who was being communicated to, rather than just the numbers of people
323 Porter, R. cited in Pollack, J. and Steven, D. (1997b), ibid.
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in the audience. Thus the evaluators, alongside many of their respondents, were pushing for 
the establishment, or at least recognition of, a professional class of PUS practitioners. They 
were keen to move away from the old ways of doing things, and to define people such as 
themselves as the rightful and authoritative experts in science communication. As their 
conclusion to the report stated, “‘the old school1” had had its day’ and if the public was to be 
genuinely engaged, then a more professional approach was needed.
Publicising their report in New Scientist, the authors further argued that science 
communication organisations had ‘failed to move with the times’ and that the old order was 
being forced to change.324 Their research had suggested to them that if scientists were to be 
frontline participants in a radically changing Britain, then ‘we must change every level of the 
communication process’. How far science organisations with, they argued, ‘an almost 
religious attachment to the amateur’, would change, despite many science communicators 
now talking about two-way dialogue, remained to be seen. However, these calls for a ‘change 
of tack’, away from what the authors characterised as an ‘us and them’ approach to the 
public understanding of science, were growing, as their report had concluded:
Many recognise that if science and scientists are not to lose credibility as politics and 
politicians have done, then they need to renew their mandate with the public. They 
need to set out a more attractive stall, to work hard at building up trust — and to reveal 
more o f the ‘backstage operations’ (including the politics). In essence, scientists need 
to look outwards more -  to build bridges o f understanding.325
Calls for a professionalisation of science communication came at a time when there were 
more people than ever gaining professional qualifications from a growing number of science 
communication courses providing training in this area. Jane Gregory, along with Steve 
Miller, a science journalist and physicist at University College London (UCL) had set up the 
first accredited courses in science communication at UCL several years earlier. Imperial’s 
science communication MSc had now been running for five years, and elsewhere within the 
University of London, Birkbeck College was running a part-time diploma in science 
communication for practising scientists and engineers and UCL continued to provide short
324 Pollack and Steven (1997b), op. cit.
325 Pollack and Steven (1997a), op. cit.
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communication courses for science undergraduates and post-graduates. Two new MSc 
courses had also been launched in 1996, one in Ireland and one based at Techniquest, the 
science centre in Cardiff. Thus there were many with formal qualifications in what was an 
expanding new professional body of science communicators. These new science 
communication practitioners were trying to define themselves as members of a legitimate 
profession by staking their own claims on science communication and PUS activities, just as 
the ‘visible’ scientists such as Wolpert and Bodmer, and the social scientists, such as Wynne 
or Irwin had done previously.
Reflecting on the first six years of Public Understanding of Science, as he stepped down as editor 
in 1997, John Durant argued that the launch perspectives published in the first issue of the 
journal in 1992 still seemed to reflect the significant positions that were on offer in the 
field.326 What had become known as the ‘deficit model’, Durant argued, continued to find 
favour among natural scientists, and science communicators yet, he reflected, it was ‘hard to 
find social scientists who have a good word to say for it’.327 Debate around the deficit model 
had, according to Durant, been ‘the single most significant area of theoretical discussion in 
the field over the past six years’. Reflecting on the acrimonious exchanges between Wolpert 
and Collins in the pages of the journal, which Durant had commissioned as editor, he also 
revealed that a member of the editorial team had resigned on a separate yet related matter. 
Durant stated that this acrimony between particular scientists and social scientists had 
stopped research into the public understanding of science making real progress, though he 
could perhaps have also been talking about the existing divisions within the social sciences:
Somehow, it seems particularly difficult to engage in a good-willed and constructive 
discussion about the nature of science across the natural/social science divide. Yet so 
far as the public understanding o f science itself is concerned, such discussion is surely 
essential if we are to make real progress. Whatever we may take the public 
understanding o f science to be, one thing is evident: it is too culturally, socially and 
politically important to become the victim o f mere in-fighting among rival groups of 
academics anxious to protect the dignity and perceived worth o f their particular 
specialisms.328
326 Durant, J. (1997), 'Editorial', Public Understanding of Science, 6: 4.
327 ibid.
328 ibid.
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In the following year, in a continued commitment to fund social research into the public 
understanding of science, the ESRC launched a new research programme. It was an ESRC 
New Opportunities Programme which provided resources to build on previous investments 
in the social sciences where the ESRC believed there were both policy needs for knowledge, 
and a knowledge base that could be usefully enhanced by a short-term concentration of 
effort. The Programme on Public Understanding of Science ran from February 1998 to April 
1999. Its coordinators were Irwin and Peter Healey, who now ran the Science Policy and 
Society Research Group. The ESRC, according to Irwin, had wanted ‘to dip their toe in the 
water and try and do things a little bit different’, to scope out whether capacity could be built 
within the social sciences community for another, bigger programme, with more policy 
impact.329 The timing of the project, in terms of wishing to have a policy impact was, 
according to Irwin, good. There was a growing consensus within policy circles that the 
current science communication efforts were not sufficient to bridge a perceived gap in 
public trust in science, and with a growing shift in focus onto matters of public participation, 
rather than simply science education, Irwin recalls, there was a definite sense now that 
something had changed, if only in terms of the language used by government and policy 
officials, though perhaps also in their willingness to listen to social scientists:
“In Science Week there was a breakfast meeting in the House o f Commons. John 
Battle introduced me ... by saying it’s about scientific understanding o f the public. You 
could just feel it, because I did my theme about the idea o f  a new social contract 
between science and society. It was just a speech ... but you could just see certain 
comments were being made, which were just dismissed. The old ones about the most 
important thing is get the science right. Or criticisms of the public. Suddenly you 
couldn’t say it any more ... for me to be there, sitting next to the minister and the 
things that I say suddenly... ‘yeah well that’s common sense’. It was quite a shock 
from two or three years earlier ... there was that mood o f the door being opened, 
social science had come to save us kind o f thing.”330
Furthermore, their research programme was well received by those within the policy world 
who appeared to be searching for new, and useful approaches to deal with this perception of 
negative public attitudes. Social scientists, according to Irwin, were suddenly being perceived 
in a new, useful and more relevant light:
329 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
330 ibid.
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It was during that programme that it really came home to me that the policy interest in 
this was sky high. When we set up we would do the usual thing of thinking, ‘oh my 
god, how are we going to get policy people interested?’ I was really quite anxious. And 
then I found Bridget Ogilvie from COPUS welcomed us with open arms, couldn’t be 
more helpful and friendly.331 And we had that treatment over and over and over. It 
was a real shock to discover it was an absolute open door ... by that point in time, 
there was this, ‘it’s fantastic, you’ve come to help us, that’s great, come in’.332
A deficit of trust?
There had been alongside these PUS debates, a developing academic and policy discussion 
of public values, public communication and trust in risk decision-making processes. An 
influential report by the US National Research Council’s 1996, Understanding Risk, had cited 
examples of science and technology issues, such as radioactive waste disposal, in which 
issues of public and stakeholder trust were paramount.333 Furthermore it argued that public 
participation and deliberation were key to good risk management and policymaking. While 
full coverage of these debates is, again, beyond the scope of this project, it is likely that such 
parallel developments were a key influence on the PUS debates occurring in the UK, 
particularly as many key academics were involved in both risk and PUS arenas. The similar 
stance taken later by the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s report Setting 
Environmental Standards in 1998 (discussed in the next chapter) appears to confirm this.
Indeed, issues of trust, or specifically, a perception of a lack of trust in scientists and science, 
continued to be flagged up in more conversations around the public understanding of 
science. The recent announcement by scientists in Scotland that they had cloned a sheep, 
named Dolly, had also prompted much media speculation as to the role of science and 
scientists in society, and questions of whether the public can trust scientists not to go “too
331 Briget Ogilvie was the Chair o f COPUS from 1998 to 2002
332 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
333 Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, (1996), Understanding Risk: Informing 
Decisions in a Democratic Society, (US National Research Council)
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far” were common.334 Notably, the Science Minister, Ian Taylor, in a departure from his 
scripted celebration of science at a Science Week pre-event in 1997, posed the question to 
his audience, “why should the public trust science? I think that’s one question we should 
answer”.335 Taylor appeared to be blaming scientists, as much as Bodmer had blamed the 
Government. His question was not, as systems biologist Tom Wakeford, reported it in The 
Guardian, a welcome deviation to some of his fellow scientists:
The Science Week representative laughed nervously. Sir Ron Oxburgh, president of  
the British Association for the Advancement o f Science, maintained his fixed grin, and 
the minister returned to his brief, as if nothing had happened. Despite the labours of  
their spin-doctors, many scientists realise that their social position is under threat.336
It appears that it was an established discourse within policy circles by now that science had 
lost the trust of the public, or society. This appeared to be dominated by discussion of how 
to restore, or improve, trust. Finding new ways of dealing with public attitudes and opinions 
was also emerging as an important issue, as Wakeford asserted, in what is almost a 
reformulation of Bodmer’s plea to scientists from 1985:
Rebuilding society’s trust in science can only begin when enough scientists emerge 
from their bunker and admit that non-scientists have both valid and valuable 
contributions. With the trenches o f dogma filled in, both armies may find a common 
ground, freed from notions of deficits on either side. If this chance for detente is lost, 
scientists could increasingly be perceived as alienated, self-serving and narrow minded.
Alongside this new terminology we can also identify new allegiances between the different 
professional groups involved in PUS. Government appeared to be more accepting of those 
social scientific arguments which placed trust as an important factor in shaping the 
relationship between science and the public.
The only place where issues of trust were barely mentioned was COPUS, where public 
understanding appeared still to be a matter of increasing understanding of scientific
334 For examples o f these sorts o f media discussion see Dalyell, T. and Dyson, E., 'Why Should the 
Public Trust Science?' The Guardian Online, 13 March 1997; Radford, T., 'Scientists Scorn Sci-Fi Fears 
Over Sheep Clone', The Guardian, 24 February 1997.
335 Wakeford, T., 'Too far, too fast?' The Guardian, 5 March 1997.
336 ibid.
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principles and of the value of science to society. Another review, this time of its funding and 
activities, entitled So did it work? had, however, revealed a chaotic picture of what was now a 
large community of professional science communicators running many public understanding 
activities in the UK, all of which COPUS was, according to the evaluators, failing to co­
ordinate coherently.337 COPUS had several different initiatives running by 1997. Their 
programme of ‘promoting a better understanding of science, engineering and technology in 
society’ had four strands: a ‘COPUS forum’ to enable networking and consultation; a major 
conference called Building Bridges to Science which was run every year; events at the Science 
Festivals around the UK; and a series o f Sharing Best Practice guides, offering advice on how 
to run, or evaluate, science communication events. The grants scheme funded by the Office 
of Science and Technology and administered through the Royal Society, was now well 
established and provided support and encouragement for individuals and organisations to 
provide public access to science, engineering and technology. However, a lack of funding 
was cited in the review as a major problem for the continuation of public understanding 
activities in the UK, together with the increase in activities, and subsequently, in participating 
actors and institutions. A lack of coherent direction was also blamed, with the evaluators 
observing that the Committee could no longer ‘reach a consensus on what it should achieve’. 
As they continued:
There is confusion and duplication o f roles, poor communication and networking 
with new entrants, and a lack o f strategy and leadership. Activists rush chaotically 
rather than stride strategically and push new frontiers before consolidating existing 
gains.338
Perhaps as a response to the River Path review, which had suggested that these old 
approaches were amateur, we can see in the quote above that the report’s authors identified 
‘activists’ as ‘rushing chaotically’ and without ‘strategy’. Thus boundary work continued over 
who should have control over the PUS agenda in the UK, and thus who was a legitimate 
expert in science communication and who was not. The COPUS evaluators called on the 
Science Minister to help equip the field of science communication for the millennium and 
beyond. Suggestions of how to do this ranged from launching a ‘ten or twenty-year
337 Boddington, A. and Coe, T. (1996), So did it work? (London: COPUS).
338 ibid.
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campaign to solve the problem of public understanding of science, a revitalisation of 
COPUS, or an extended role for the British Association to guide development and formal 
recognition of the need to develop science communication as a profession’.339 COPUS and 
its constituent scientific organisations therefore wanted to secure money to continue with 
their existing plans, albeit on a larger scale, at the same time representing themselves as the 
site of professional science communication. A declaration by neuroscientist Susan 
Greenfield, who became Head of the Royal Institution in 1998, also suggests that not only 
did some in the scientific institutions not feel the need to change their approach to the 
public understanding of science, but they still felt that they headed up a firm consensus on it:
Everyone agrees that the Public Understanding o f Science initiatives are among the 
most important for the education not just o f the new generation, but for late 
twentieth-century society. There are some notable full-time professionals who write 
books and, via the media, reach out as never before to excite those for whom the 
word "science" used to be the ultimate turn-off.340
COPUS and ‘visible’ public scientists such as Greenfield and Wolpert continued to rehearse 
these arguments for the public understanding of science341 Richard Dawkins continued to 
bemoan public ignorance, and blamed the media for ‘whipping up ignorant hysteria over 
scientific matters’.342 Yet Neil Cossons, writing a review in Nature of a book by Gregory and 
Miller on science communication, argued that others had abandoned this sort of language.
As Cossons reflected:
Over the past 15 years or so, the aims o f practical public-understanding initiatives 
have changed. In the 1980s there was an emphasis on what science the ignorant public 
needs to know (the 'deficit model'), but this has been superseded by a concern to 
facilitate dialogue between scientists and lay people to encourage mutual trust.343
In their book, Science in Public, Gregory and Miller brought together the work of scientists, 
sociologists, historians and philosophers on the public understanding of science. The book
339 Boddington, A. and Coe, T. 'Jamboree has had its day', The Times Higher Education Supplement, 14 
March 1997.
340 Greenfield, S. 'The absent-minded professor is turning into the well-organised professional', The 
Independent, 15 May 1997.
341 For example Wolpert, L., 'Hypotheses', The Independent, 31 March 1996.
342 Dawkins, R. 'Letter: Engineered crops', The Independent, 14 August 1998.
343 Farmelo, G. (1998), 'Selling science against the odds ', Nature, 394.
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provided their assessment of the history of science in public and provided a critique of both 
scientific and social scientific approaches to the public understanding of science. The authors 
called for some balance to be restored in what had been a continually fractious relationship 
between the two groups:
... it is right and proper that science should be subjected to detailed social scrutiny, by 
academics and the public. Carrying out social, cultural and historical critiques of  
science does not equate with being “anti-science”. Scientists themselves should be part 
of this questioning process .. .344
At the very end of the book, the authors proposed their own approach to science 
communication, which they hoped would further the public understanding of science in a 
manner that would meet the requirements of all concerned, thus suggesting that what had 
occurred up until this point was far from desirable or adequate. Key to this change was 
recognition by scientists, and scientific institutions, that behind much of the activity 
conducted under the rubric of public understanding of science lay many different motives:
The purpose o f science communication may be to empower its recipients, to enhance 
existing democratic processes or help develop new ones where they do not exist, or to 
prevent the alienation of sections o f society; but it may also be to serve the interests of  
the scientific community and their paymasters. Scientists communicating science to 
the public should therefore make their motivations clear, (p. 245)
The authors stressed, however, that acknowledging this would not invalidate a ‘deficit model’ 
of science communication. This model was simply only appropriate for very specific 
circumstances such as ‘a straightforward talk, article or broadcast’ (p. 247). Gregory and 
Miller also felt the public understanding of science was entering new territories, which 
presented the opportunity to change the way in which science, the media and the public 
interacted. Drawing on social scientific research, and acknowledging that these three entities 
were more complex than the current rhetoric implied, would be a first step towards some 
mutual understanding:
344 Gregory and Miller (1998), op. cit., p. 248.
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Like unworldly tourists these groups are inclined to believe that if they speak their 
own language slowly and loudly, they will make themselves understood; sometimes, 
like imperialists in an annexed land, they presume that everyone else is a savage. Just 
as travellers abroad have learnt to understand another culture on its own terms ... so 
might scientists, journalists and the public tread a little more lightly on each others 
toes if they got acquainted first, (p. 250)
The authors concluded that the type of communication ‘designed to bring about an 
awestruck admiration for the mysterious men in white coats’, was not, ‘what we need for the 
challenges of the twenty-first century’ (p. 250).
So by mid-1998, several actors within both academia and elsewhere it seemed were sensing 
that it was an opportune moment to move beyond the acrimony that had characterised 
interactions between scientists and social scientists up until this point. We also start to see 
many actors within the scientific community openly questioning a PUS agenda which solely 
advocated greater science communication. Gregory suggests this also was in part due to a 
British Social Attitudes Survey in 1996 which had shown that levels of scientific literacy and 
attitudes to science had remained static since the previous survey in 1988:
“There was one very strange time ... after the original Oxford survey, [when] some of 
those same questions were repeated in a British Social Attitudes survey. And there was 
no change whatsoever, or something like three per cent more people knew that D N A  
was to do with genes and not rocks, and this was a bit o f a shock I think. Either all the 
activity hadn’t helped the public understanding of science, or the way we were 
conceptualising public understanding o f science was just wrong. We were either not 
changing it in a way that would cause change or we were trying to change the wrong 
thing. That I think woke up some people ... .”345
Gregory suggests there was a sense that ‘it clearly wasn’t working’ and scientists had not 
managed through a vigourous promotion of PUS to affect the change they desired. Alan 
Irwin expressed similar sentiment to Gregory and Miller on an academic online newsgroup 
discussion on the public understanding of science, arguing that it was time to go beyond 
‘simply polarising ‘science’ and the ‘public’, and to try doing things differently. Calling for 
new practical approaches he argued:
345 Gregory Interview, 20 September 2004.
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The challenge now is to find a more open and constructive basis for discussion about 
social and technological development. We need fresh thinking and new ideas. In 
practical terms also, new approaches are needed.346
346 Irwin’s comment was part of the global cyberconference on PUS held in February 1998, archived 
at http://vita.org/technet/archive.html/. For more details on the conference see Fuller, S. (1999), 
'The first global cyberconference on public understanding of science', Public Understanding of Science, 7: 
4.
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Phase II: Conclusions
Overall this phase was characterised by the institutionalisation of PUS activity both in 
academic and non academic settings. This research and activity was dominated by conflict 
and boundary work, both between individuals in different professional groups, and within 
professional groups, involved in debates over science in public. These boundary disputes, as 
I have shown, were predominantly concerned with who had legitimacy and expertise to 
define ‘science’, ‘the public’, the ‘public understanding of science’ and also who was a 
legitimate science communicator. Furthermore, these battles over definitions and 
conceptualisations of the ‘problem’ of public understanding of science can also be attributed 
to concerns over resource allocation, professional authority, and the advancement, 
expansion or continuation, of control of specific practical efforts to address this ‘problem’.
Chapter 3 detailed the rise of a different formulation of the public understanding of science, 
and o f ‘the public’, and ‘science’, from within the social sciences. This challenge, in the 
1990s, to the scientific conceptualisation of PUS marks this episode out as different from 
scientists’ earlier attempts to address the ‘problem’ of their relationship with the public (as 
detailed in Chapter 1). In these earlier episodes there was no formally recognised institutional 
or professional basis with accredited social and cultural legitimacy within the discourse of 
knowledge producing activities from which a critique could come. With the growth of the 
social sciences, and, here particularly, science and technology studies, within universities in 
the mid- to late-twentieth century, such a basis was now available. The social scientific 
critiques of science relied on them mobilising a very different discourse of science from the 
one that scientists had been mobilising for centuries, drawing the boundaries of science and 
public and sources of expertise and authority in a very different manner.
Science had, as part of its professionalisation, mobilised and popularised, definitions of
science and the scientist in public contexts to construct and maintain boundaries between
themselves and the public, with science as the authoritative party. We can, in the early-1990s,
see certain social scientists using similar tactics, particularly those within science and
technology studies, who mobilised their own expertise in attempts to colonise or, as Gieryn
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would argue, expand the space in which debates about PUS were taking place. The public and 
science as a social activity was an area which they felt fell under their purview as experts and 
thus they mobilised their own conceptualisations of the problem of public understanding of 
science. Much of the boundary work in this phase, conducted by the social scientists who 
colonised this area, can be seen as part of their own ‘expansion’ and professionalisation, i.e. 
the establishment of legitimacy and authority. The establishment of a journal for PUS, in 
which they were the major contributors, was one part of this larger goal of expansion of 
resources and authority. Equally, the criticism of the public understanding of science as 
operating within a ‘deficit model’ drew a sharp distinction between the dominant social 
scientific and natural scientific approaches to the ‘problem’.
Wynne had asserted that the preoccupation of certain scientists with the public 
understanding of science should be read as a reflection of the social neurosis of science over 
its authority, public credibility and legitimation. I suggest that perhaps the same was also true 
for certain social scientists as they too entered into the PUS arena attempting to gain greater 
funding and public legitimacy over matters relating to the public and science. Lewenstein, as 
I have also highlighted, argued that scientific institutional interests concerned with their 
image and public standing were often the driving force behind the rhetoric of improving the 
public understanding o f science. The launch perspective piece by Bodmer and Wilkins in 
Public Understanding of Science, is an example: the problem of public understanding of science 
was one of image in their paper.347 They called on social scientists to provide research that 
would assist COPUS in marketing science, or better representing science and scientists to 
the public, but did not acknowledge the social scientists’ expertise in defining science, or 
indeed the public understanding of science. This suggests that there was a need for the social 
scientists to have their public and professional legitimacy in this area recognised, at least by 
scientists, and government bodies. If they were to have any influence over the activities 
being funded by government which addressed the public understanding of science they 
needed to claim ownership of the issue. However, I would suggest that certain social 
scientists, felt that this was their terrain and area of expertise, and it is this territorial conflict 
which precipitates the ensuing boundary conflict. It is worth noting that Wynne’s, and to a
347 Bodmer and Wilkins (1992), op. cit.
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lesser extent Wolpert’s, arguments here are also preoccupied by the challenge to the 
normative values attached to science as an elite authority, and thus we must not characterise 
this conflict solely as a disciplinary one, but also acknowledge that it is also an overtly 
political one. It is equally possible to identify certain actors, such as Wakeford, or Steven 
Rose, both natural scientists by training, who mobilised contrasting arguments to scientific 
institutions such as COPUS in this period, which would confirm this observation.
Chapter 4 located the growing conflict between certain social scientists and natural scientists 
in the wider phenomenon known as the ‘science wars’. We can again view this conflict as 
boundary work. The scientists wanted to remain in charge of their own discourse and 
maintain their cultural status as sole experts on matters scientific, what Gieryn characterises 
as protectionism boundary work. With the rise of many different social scientific disciplines all 
defining and critiquing science and its methods, many scientists went on the offensive. The 
rise, over the latter half of the twentieth century, of a body of expertise -  social science -  
that claimed ownership over the specific issue of the public, meant that the public became a 
key battle-ground over the legitimacy of these differing expertises. Each professional group, 
particularly within debates over PUS, defined ‘the public’ differently while attempting to 
align themselves with it. The boundary work here serves to construct each professional 
group as ‘on the side of the public’, or working towards their interests; a normative 
assumption that members of each profession know what is best for the public. For scientists 
this was largely a continuation of the protection boundary work strategy that I have already 
discussed: science is at one and the same time separate from the public, yet is also something 
which can help to restructure society and the public for the better. This alignment is 
particularly pronounced during the so called ‘science wars’ where many scientists argued for 
a need to act to save the public from both itself (or its ignorant uptake of ‘pseudoscience’) 
and from social scientific approaches that they felt undermined their expertise and 
objectivity. Particular social scientists, on the other hand, were mobilising what they believed 
was a more honest and realistic construction of science, which portrayed social interests as 
part of the scientific enterprise, and questioned the hegemony over public authority that 
science was perceived to hold.
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We also see in Chapter 4 boundary work continuing to occur within the social scientific 
community. This was largely a debate about competing methodologies, and therefore 
subsequendy how the public was constructed by quantitative and qualitative methods, but 
we can also view it as a rhetorical fight for legitimacy and expertise, and the allocation of 
funds. Wynne and colleagues particularly attempted to draw a distinction between 
themselves and those scientists and quantitative social scientists operating under a ‘deficit 
model’. We can view this as boundary work in keeping with Gieryn’s idea of expulsion, 
qualitative social scientists, by advancing a view of the ‘correct’ form of social scientific 
inquiry, were also denying authority or membership of this domain, to actors whose 
expertise or views did not chime with the prevailing paradigm.
Ryan has argued that those constructing social problems in terms of particular deficiencies in 
certain actors leads naturally to programmes aimed at correcting those deficiencies. As he 
argues, the formula for action thus becomes extraordinarily simple: ‘change the victim’.348 A 
critiquing of a ‘deficit model’ position, is a strategy that occurs frequently in this phase, and 
is not limited to social scientific arguments against scientists’ construction of PUS. The 
analytical usage of this term to describe the position of others, tends to imply a normative 
position of the analyst, to the effect that the perception of the deficit is wrong. For example, 
Ziman and Wynne deployed it to criticise the dualism in scientific formulations of PUS 
between those with and without scientific knowledge. Those without could be considered 
Ryan’s ‘victims’ in this particular case. Locke has criticised both Collins and Pinch’s ‘golem 
science’, in which the public is constructed as having a deficiency of social scientific 
understanding, and also Wynne’s construction of the PUS problem, in which scientists and 
the scientific establishment are deficient in social knowledge and expertise. A reverse reading 
is also possible here which could suggest that those asserting a deficit on the part of others 
indicates a deficiency of understanding on the part of those doing the ascribing.
Within this history deployment of the term ‘deficit model’ is used by different professionals 
to challenge and critique the inherent dualism, and subsequent boundary set up between 
certain social groups by others. At the same time it can be seen as part of a repertoire of
348 Ryan, W. (1971), Blaming the Victim, (New York: Pantheon Books).
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argumentative practices used to draw boundaries between differing expertises and 
constructions of the relationship between science and public.
Chapter 5 detailed new allegiances between the professional disciplines while the role of 
government became more explicit in issues of public understanding of science, mobilising its 
own interests. The public controversy over BSE certainly drew attention to issues of 
scientific certainty and authority, and matters of risk and expertise, something over which 
many social scientists felt they had greater epistemological claim. The BSE episode also 
allocated blame to government in managing (or mismanaging) the relationship between 
science and the public and, in 1997, the New Labour Government brought with it a different 
political ideology legitimising the idea of public consultation and openness as a new means 
of managing the public. This also apparently brought government policy-making much more 
in line with many qualitative social scientists’ conceptualisation of how to manage the science 
and public relationship. The ‘problem’ of public understanding of science thus became 
rhetorically less about one-way science communication and science education and more 
about relational issues of trust and governance.
I have also identified the rise of a new group of actors in these debates: professional science 
communicators. This was a growing group of practitioners who were engaging in boundary 
work in what Gieryn would call expansion mode, to define their role and increase legitimacy 
in managing the science and society relationship, at the same time as drawing a line between 
what they saw as their territory and that o f those they branded as scientific amateurs, 
charaterisable as expulsion boundary work.
We are left at the end of this phase with a variety of attitudes and approaches within the 
scientific and academic communities in the UK, with many different constructions and 
interpretations of ‘PUS’, ‘the public’, ‘science’ and ‘science communication’ in operation. For 
example, the ‘problem’ of PUS, depending on who was defining it within this phase, could 
be assigned to the public, to scientists and their institutions, to the media and also to the 
Government. The public, within the multiplicity of constructs of PUS, were constructed 
variably as ignorant of science, ignorant of social science, irrational, or lay-experts. ‘Science’
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within this phase can be identified as being common-sense, not common-sense, public 
knowledge, private knowledge, free from social and political values or constructed by them. 
Equally ‘science communication’ could be one-way pedagogic communication, or two-way 
communication whereby scientists understand the public, which also raised implications in 
terms of who was an expert in managing such communication exercises. Depending on who 
was drawing the boundaries, any one of these definitions was mobilised to protect, enlarge, 
critique professional groups’ autonomy and authority, or indeed expel those deemed to be 
acting counter to the interests aims and ideology of a group.
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6 Governing science and the publicPhase I I I  
Public values and science
A sign that a different, and more participatory, conceptualisation of the relationship between 
science and public was gaining ground outside of a growing professional science 
communication arena came in late-1998, from the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution’s report Setting Environmental Standards. The report argued that public values were 
an essential element in decision-making about environmental policies and standards, and ‘to 
ensure that such values are articulated and taken into account, less familiar approaches need 
to be used to extend and complement present procedures for consultation and 
participation’.349 Furthermore, it argued that a simple top-down communication of the 
science and risks was inadequate, and that participation and dialogue with the public was 
required, as the report stated:
Environmental and social values, in particular, are not necessarily pre-formed or fixed 
but, for many people, emerge out o f debate, discussion and challenge, as they 
encounter new facts, insights and judgements contributed by others, (p. 101)
This formulation of communication as a dialogue suggests, on the one hand, that public 
values were, as certain social scientists had been arguing for some time, contingent on the 
specific circumstances, but also could suggest that public values could be managed by 
facilitating the right sort of debate and producing the right sort of facts. The language in the 
report, however, also showed a shift in rhetoric, away from the need to be educating the 
public about scientific issues, towards a focus on public trust and confidence, and public 
participation. Launching the Report, the Chairman of the Royal Commission, Sir Tom 
Blundell, said:
349 RCEP (1998a), SettingEnvironmentalStandards, (HMSO), p. 101.
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For environmental policies to be successful, people must have confidence in the way 
they are being protected against risks. That is best achieved if they are involved at 
every stage. Controversies over the last few years in this and related fields show clearly 
that governments, industry, the public and scientists all need a much better 
understanding of the relationship between policies, science and values.350
Similarly, explaining the Royal Commission's approach to the study, Sir John Houghton, the 
previous Chairman of the Commission who had led the report, said at the launch:
[We] must recognise that scientific assessments, and analyses of technology, 
economics and risk, must inform policy decisions, but cannot pre-empt them. Setting 
a standard or target is not only a scientific or technical matter, but a practical 
judgement which has to be made in the light of all the relevant factors. People's values 
must be taken into account from the earliest stages of defining the problem and 
framing the questions that need to be addressed.351
The Commission argued that traditional public opinion polling on scientific issues was 
inadequate for the purposes of setting environmental standards, as they did not believe that 
survey research could provide useful information about values. A ‘failure to provide an 
opportunity for interaction, and for clarifying the values underlying the responses made’, the 
report argued, was ‘a major shortcoming of traditional forms of consultation’.352 Instead, the 
methods suggested for articulating public values were qualitative. The Commission also 
argued that public values should be articulated at the earliest stage possible in the policy­
making procedure, which would allow people to ‘question assumptions about the character 
of environmental issues and the scientific understanding upon which the analysis is based’.353 
Thus we can see a conceptualisation of a public that could question scientific understanding 
in operation here, rather than one who had to have this improved.
Another method of promoting the interaction of expert knowledge and lay values, suggested 
in the report, was to break down the barriers between public and expert and introduce lay 
membership into expert bodies. These, it was argued, would provide an alternative 
viewpoint, and could suggest alternative ways of framing issues, or how issues can be
350 RCEP (1998b), Press Re/ease: New Millennium needs new approach to making environmentalpolicies, 
(HMSO).
351 ibid.
352 RCEP (1998a), op. cit., p. 105.
353 ibid.
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communicated in a meaningful way to a wider audience. Warning that such expert bodies 
should be careful of tokenism, however, the Commission continued:
There is ... a danger that they may be appointed for presentational reasons, and may 
not provide a sufficiently effective or representative reflection o f people’s values.
Appointment of lay members is certainly not a substitute for making expert bodies 
more transparent and open in their working methods. The real requirement is that 
expert bodies themselves should develop a sensitivity to questions o f values, (p. 109)
Overall, the report was proposing a new type of relationship between scientific experts and 
the public, apparently moving away from the top-down deficit model communication. This 
was couched in instrumental terms, to improve what was being conceptualised as a new 
‘problem’ in the relationship between science and the public, that of a lack of public trust. As 
the report concluded:
This approach, based on partnership rather than confrontation, makes transparency 
and openness even more crucial. Ways must be found to maintain accountability and 
improve public trust.354
The Royal Commission argued that bodies setting environmental standards should now 
operate in an ‘open and transparent way’ as a basic requirement for public trust. However, in 
what amounted to a new public deficit problem, the public perception of openness and 
transparency was as important as its actual operation, this time to be solved by the 
communication of trustworthiness. Once the public saw these requirements were met, the 
presumption was that openness and transparency would help ‘satisfy the public about the 
expertise, objectivity and impartiality of the bodies involved in dealing with environmental 
problems’.355
Thus the report provided slightly contradictory conceptualisations of the public and its 
relationship with science. On the one hand, efforts should be encouraged to allow the public 
to question the assumptions behind the science; yet on the other hand, if the public could be 
assuaged with a display of policy-makers and scientists working in an open and transparent
354 RCEP (1998b), op. cit.
355 RCEP (1998a), op. cit., p. 126.
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manner, they would be satisfied, and thus allow science and policy to continue without the 
need for input. Irwin criticised the report, for calling for an end to top-down scientific 
assessment of new technologies, while also marginalising the social and ethical.356 Most of 
the report was concerned with how to ascertain a proper scientific understanding of 
environmental risks, as the following passage exemplifies:
A clear dividing line should be drawn between analysis o f scientific evidence and 
consideration of ethical and social issues which are outside the scope of a scientific 
assessment.357
Though one chapter was devoted to public values, the overall report maintained a focus on 
technocratic management and policy-making, and continued to enforce a distinction 
between the social world of values and morals and the scientific world of technical, cognitive 
knowledge.
Despite this caveat, the RCEP report did, according to Irwin, raise the issue of public input 
into scientific developments and policy as a central component in the relationship between 
science and the public. This, he felt, lent ‘weight to arguments for a more democratic and 
open treatment o f science’ and, I would argue, thus conferred legitimacy on his, Wynne’s 
and others’ discourse, which gave this issue importance in debates concerned with PUS.358 
With the explicit acknowledgement that ethical issues and public trust in scientific 
institutions were important, it suggested to Irwin, a ‘newly harmonious relationship between 
UK policy processes and social scientific research’ into science and publics, as the language 
of the two, previously quite separate institutions, converged onto similar areas of concern.359 
Gary Kass, a policy advisor in the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology at the 
time, also cites the report as significant in bringing this issue to the fore within 
government.360
356 Irwin (2006), op. cit.
357 RCEP (1998a), op. cit., p. 26.
358 Irwin, A. (2001), 'Constructing the scientific citizen: science and democracy in the biosciences', 
Public Understanding of Science, 10: 1, p. 2.
359 ibid.
360 Kass, G. (2004), Interview, 21 May 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
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The public and biosciences
A further example that those within the science policy environment were questioning the 
traditionally closed, and scientific expert led, manner in which science policy was formulated 
had been signalled with an announcement the previous year by John Batde, the Minister for 
Science, Energy and Industry, of a public consultation on the biosciences. Battle was 
concerned that while he was receiving a good deal of correspondence on bioscience issues, it 
was almost exclusively from those with a particular interest or preconceived perception.361 
He believed it to be important that the debate about biotechnology should also include 
members of the public with no such preconceived views. The Minister wished to go beyond 
those who normally lobbied him on policy issues to tap into an untouched public. Battle 
wished to hold a public consultation exercise which, he argued, ‘allowed a deeper exploration 
of the wider, including ethical, issues associated with developments in the biosciences; and 
provided an opportunity for the general public to participate’.362 The intention, as Battle’s 
announcement stated, was ‘to construct a project that allowed lay people to identify their 
hopes and concerns, and to feed this information into policy-making’.363 The Minister 
stressed also, however, that the exercise was not designed to explore whether participants 
felt that a particular technology should go ahead.
Battle convened a preparatory meeting in early 1998 with people from science 
communication and the biosciences. Irwin argued that from the outset there was an apparent 
tension between those wishing to use the exercise as a means of educating the public, and 
those trying to access what the public felt about the issue.364 The official documentation 
stated that the main topic of conversation in this meeting was ‘access to and use of 
information ... this included the information available to policy-makers and to the general 
public, as well as any mismatch between the two and the way that people used this
361 Office of Science and Technology (1998d), Public Consultation on the Biosciences, (London: DTI), 
http:// dtiinfol .dti.gov.uk/ost/ostbusiness/puset/public.htm.
362 ibid.
363 ibid.
364 Irwin (2001), op. cit.
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information to inform their judgements relating to risk and trust’.365 The minutes of the 
meeting show, however, that several of the attendees, specifically those from a social science, 
or public lobby group background, were concerned that the consultation avoid trying to 
educate people in a deficit style manner, and, most importantly, should be framed by the 
public’s attitudes and concerns and not the Government’s. The planned consultation was 
designed to incorporate both a qualitative stage of research, which would then be scaled up 
into a quantitative survey. The rationale behind this, as a Government official explained, was 
that the Government needed quantitative results ‘in order for the study to be taken seriously 
by ministers and other observers’.366 Thus quantitative work into the public, their views, and 
attitudes were still, this suggests, prioritised within policy circles over qualitative methods.
The qualitative research ran from December 1998 to February 1999, previous to which the 
new incoming Science Minister Lord Sainsbury had stated clearly that his aims for the 
consultation were to ensure that optimum use was made of ‘scientific advice to inform 
decision-making, both by government and the general population’.367 Moreover, Lord 
Sainsbury accepted a perception that there was a general lack of faith in the Government’s 
use of science, and declared that the exercise was to be used as a means of restoring public 
confidence, as he told the advisory group:
... this Government has to ensure that not only are its systems appropriate, but that 
their existence and role are communicated. To restore public confidence in the 
Government’s use o f scientific advice requires people to understand the mechanisms 
used to arrive at decisions and accept that those were appropriate and based on sound 
principles.368
Thus, in a similar fashion to the Royal Commission’s report, the ultimate aim of the 
consultation exercise, for Lord Sainsbury at least, was to address this perceived new deficit 
problem: a lack of public confidence in science and scientists. The general aims for the 
consultation were changed to assessing the levels of public knowledge of the Government’s
365 Office of Science and Technology (1998a), Bioscience Consultation - minutes of 10th March 1998,
Meeting to discuss public consultation on developments in the biosciences - hosted by John Battle, (DTI).
366 Irwin (2001), op. cit.
367 Office o f Science and Technology (1998b), Biosciences Public Consultation Advisory Group, Minutes of 
Third Meeting: 20 October 1998, (DTI).
368 ibid.
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regulatory process, and to assess what information people needed to plug any gaps in this 
knowledge.369 A press release publicising the consultation stated that the exercise served the 
dual purposes of ‘seeking the public’s views and promoting informed debate’.370 Irwin 
criticised this concept of informed debate as meaning that subsequent conversation would 
be centred around officially recognised scientific issues and would likely not allow for the 
public participants to speak about other areas or frame the discussion within their own terms 
of reference.371 The House of Lords Select Committee criticised the whole exercise for much 
the same reasons a year later, arguing that it was closer to market research than to public 
consultation. Irwin later reflected that in the late-1990s there appeared a remarkable 
congruence between official policy statements and social scientific research on the way to 
manage the relationship between science and the public. Yet within this ‘more attentive 
policy audience’, there was still a large discrepancy between his ideal of public dialogue, 
deliberation and communication, and the more conservative policy-making environment 
which relied on scientific framings of issues first and foremost372
The effects o f the controversy over BSE continued to be felt across government throughout
1999. The Government established a group of experts to provide advice on communicating 
risks in a bid to restore public confidence in its ability to handle issues such as food safety.373 
The group’s creation coincided with the publication of a report from the UK Consumers’ 
Association, which concluded that a science-based approach could not, on its own, be relied 
upon to reach ‘socially acceptable decisions on issues involving the communication of 
risk’.374 Echoing the views of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, the 
Consumers’ Association report had also concluded that the Government needed to be more 
open and transparent in the way it managed risk, including as many people - particularly 
from the public - as possible in the decision-making process. Thus we can see two different
369 Office o f Science and Technology (1998c), DTI Press Notice: Lord Sainsbury announces public 
consultation on the biosciences, (DTI).
370 ibid.
371 Irwin (2001), op. cit., p. 9.
372 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
373 Masood, E. (1999), 'UK Panel formed to rebuild trust in government science advice', Nature, 397, 
p. 458.
374 Consumers' Association (1999), Confronting Risk - A  New Approach to Food Safety, (London: 
Consumers' Association).
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approaches being promoted: one arguing for opening up government processes to allow 
more public input; and the other, relying on a better communication of risk and uncertainty 
to correct public misunderstandings. The former constructed the public as having values to 
bring to bear on science and science policy; the latter did not, constructing scientists and 
government as the authoritative parties in the policy process.
GM crops in the UK
The relationship between science and the public was put under a harsh spotlight at the 
beginning of the same year when genetically modified (GM) crops became a controversial 
issue, drawing the Government, scientific institutions, the public, the media and industry 
into a public debate about scientific uncertainty, risks and how best to communicate science 
to the public. GM crops had been rapidly introduced in the UK market over the previous 
few years, prompting unease amongst activist groups. Media coverage grew, and GM became 
a political issue in the House of Commons. On 12 February 1999 The Guardian published a 
letter from twelve scientists supporting the unpublished research of Dr Arpad Pusztai on the 
harmful effects of GM potatoes fed to rats, and the issue became front-page news for almost 
two weeks. Many of the media outlets initiated high profile campaigns against GM crops, 
and this, as the House of Lords Select Committee later reflected, ‘drove the debate in ways 
that both the UK Government and significant sections of United Kingdom science and 
industry found extremely uncomfortable’.375 The episode also echoed the BSE controversy. 
Despite the change in language within government about dealing with scientific uncertainty 
and risks, we can see that there remained different conceptualisations of the public and how 
to manage their relationship with science. The Prime Minister was quoted in a national 
newspaper as being happy to eat “Frankenstein Food” and to feed it to his children and it
375 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), Science and Society, (HMSO), 
p. 83.
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was reported that he was frustrated that the potential benefits of GM food were being 
ignored in the escalating row.376 Irwin, reflecting on the period, argued:
The rather depressing implication seemed to be that, despite the widely held view that 
science/public relations had been badly managed in the BSE case, very little had 
actually been learned at the highest political level. Once again, an uncertain field of 
science was being employed as the basis for categorical assurances over safety while 
public concerns were arrogandy dismissed as irrational and emotional.377
A few months later Nature added its own calls for scientific and governmental efforts to 
restore public trust with an editorial which blamed the recent ‘public outcry’ on exaggerated 
claims and the mass-media market drive for newspaper sales -  a problematisation here of the 
media as the cause of public misunderstanding of science. Nature accepted that public values 
might have an input into the decision-making process, but only so far as ‘the soundest 
possible science’ underlied any attempt to regulate GM foods and the editorial also argued:
Broad public concerns, however “irrational” they may appear to some, must be taken 
into account in food safety regulations if they are to maintain their credibility. Industry 
complains that the public has lost trust in its scientific experts, but it will only make 
matters worse by declaring its own loss of trust in the judgement of the consumer.378
In May 1999 the House of Commons Audit Select Committee issued a report proposing, as 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution had recommended, that members of the 
public be appointed to the advisory bodies responsible to the oversight of GM crops. The 
following week the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee issued 
its own report on the role of science advice in regulating GM crops, and argued conversely 
that the make-up of scientific advisory bodies should only include suitably qualified experts 
from ‘other, not necessarily scientific, disciplines’.379 Furthermore, the Committee 
emphasised that any scientific advice should be free of any direct input from environmental 
or consumer groups. ‘Scientific advice should not’, argued the chairman of the Committee, 
‘be tinged with ethical and consumer concerns. Scientists should concentrate on the
376 The headline o f the Daily Mail on 16 February 1999 read: “THE PRIME MONSTER. Fury as 
Blair says: I eat Frankenstein food and its safe.”
377 Irwin (2001), op. cit., pp. 1-2.
378 Editorial (1999), 'GM Foods debate needs a recipe for restoring trust', Nature, 398.
379 Dickson, D. (1999), 'UK debates public's role in science advice', Nature, 399.
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science’.380 The environmental campaign group Greenpeace disagreed, and, writing in Nature, 
argued that the only way to manage GM crops, and crucially to try to ‘restore public trust in 
science’, was to accept that ‘sound science’ was not enough.381 Science could not determine 
which questions should be posed, nor could it determine what the public considered an 
acceptable level of risk. Scientists, Greenpeace argued, were ‘no longer perceived exclusively 
as guardians of objective truth, but also as smart promoters of their own interests in a media- 
driven marketplace’ (p. 499). Thus many different groups were constructing a ‘problem’ of a 
lack of public trust or confidence in science, or government, but they proposed different 
ways to solve this, which, again, relied on how the public and science were represented.
Following calls for openness and transparency, and a perception that public confidence in 
the Government’s handling of science needed to be improved, two new bodies were 
established to manage scientific advice on biotechnology. The results of the Biosciences 
Consultation in 1999 had fed into a review by the Cabinet Office and the Office of Science 
and Technology of the advisory and regulatory framework for Biotechnology, and in June 
2000 the Agriculture, Environment and Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was set up with 
a remit to ‘offer strategic advice to Government on biotechnology issues which impact on 
agriculture and the environment ... [and] keep under review current and possible future 
developments in biotechnology with actual or potential implications for agriculture and the 
environment.382 Its terms of reference also stated that it would: ‘advise Government on the 
ethical and social implications arising from any new developments and their public 
acceptability; and seek to involve and consult stakeholders and the public on a regular basis 
on the issues which it is considering’.383 The second body in this new independent, and at- 
arms-length, format was the Human Genetics Commission, which was set up to advise the 
Government on new developments in human genetics and how they impacted on people’s 
lives. It, like the AEBC, was to focus particularly on the social, ethical and legal issues. As its 
website stated, it would operate in an open and transparent manner, with one of its key roles
380 ibid.
381 Haerlin, B. and Parr, D. (1999), 'How to restore public trust in science', Nature, 400.
382 AEBC website, AEBC: Terns of reference, www.aebc.gov.uk/aebc/terms.shtml, accessed June 2000.
383 ibid.
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being to ‘actively seek input from the public and other stakeholders’.384 These bodies both 
still enforced, however, a boundary between science on the one hand, and social, ethical and 
‘public’ knowledge on the other.
384 Human Genetics Commission website, www.hgc.gov.uk/about_approach.htm, accessed May
2000.
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7 ‘Crisis Point’ 2000?Phase I I I
A new ‘humility on the part of science.. .*?
In April 1999, the Science and Technology Select Committee of the House of Lords 
appointed Lord Jenkin of Roding to conduct a study into society’s relationship with science. 
The impetus for the study had primarily come from experience of an earlier Lords report 
into the management of nuclear waste,385 which had devoted a chapter to considering the 
public acceptability of the issue. That report had acknowledged the complexity of public 
attitudes and values with respect to science and technology, the influence of the media, and 
the importance of public trust in institutions. Following the controversy over GM foods, and 
the changing nature of the scientific advisory processes within government in response to 
the BSE affair, the Select Committee asked Lord Jenkin to examine both the sources of 
information that shaped public attitudes to science, and the mechanisms for facilitating 
dialogue between scientists and the rest o f society.
Over the course of the next year the Committee took oral evidence from many different 
sources, and received written evidence from 80 different individuals, and organisations, 
many of whom had been involved in public understanding of science activities or research 
over the previous decade. Two notable aspects of the Committee’s constitution, however, 
suggested that it might produce something different from previous reports. The first was 
that the phrase ‘public understanding of science’, was not mentioned in the Committee’s 
brief. As John Durant later remembered:
385 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (1998), Management of Nuclear Waste, 
3rd Report, Session 1998-1999, H L Paper 41, (London: HMSO).
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“Patrick Jenkin himself was already in a seriously questioning frame o f mind about 
this whole area in a quite constructive way ... at the time he was appointed and that’s 
clearly evidenced by his reluctance to have the Committee brief be described as public 
understanding o f science. He would not accept that from the beginning, so it’s telling 
us something about where he’s coming from. I mean, quite a number o f his 
committee members would not have questioned that description at all.”386
A further sign of difference was the appointment of two special advisors to the Committee: 
Durant and Wynne. Both academics had been critical of the institutional status quo in recent 
public understanding of science activities.387 They had ostensibly been on opposite sides of 
the quantitative/qualitative divide within the social scientific PUS research community, yet 
both had been vocal in calling for a change in focus. As Durant reflected, he sensed the 
report would be different:
“ ... they chose Brian and me as advisors. I do think that was significant. Brian 
probably had more time to give to detailed drafting assistance than I did ... he did a 
lot more work between them than I did. But the thing that really I think made a 
difference is that he and I ... found ourselves largely in agreement about issues as they 
arose before that committee, so the Committee were not only hearing a different 
perspective from one of their advisors, they were hearing both their advisors 
encouraging them in particular direction and the chairman himself was sympathetic to 
that direction. The report did seem at the time, I think, to many of us to capture 
something o f the spirit o f where things were moving rather than where things had 
come from.”388
Irwin, who gave evidence to the Committee, reflected that at the time there were signals that 
the report would listen to social scientific approaches to PUS in a way that past initiatives in 
the public understanding of science had not:
“Looking at the report ... it seems to be quite influential. Again the role o f social 
scientists, o f course John and Brian were there behind the scenes. But it was quite a 
joy to give evidence, there was a real sense of, they’re really taking this in. Again, you 
wouldn’t expect this ... but there was a real sense of, yeah, this is what we want.”389
386 Durant Interview, 28 June 2004.
387 Though Wynne’s general criticism o f the status quo in policy institutions’ management of science 
and technology issues dates back much further to at least the mid-1970s. For example, he was a 
prominent academic critic o f the Windscale Inquiry. See, for example, Wynne, B. (1975), ‘The 
rhetoric o f consensus politics: a critical review o f technology assessment’, Research Policy 4: 3, pp. 108 
-  158, Wynne, B. (1982) Rationality and ritual: The windscale inquiry and nuclear decisions in Britain, (British 
Society for the History of Science: Meyer, J. W. & Scott).
388 ibid.
389 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
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Jon Turney represented the turn to social science as a direct effect of recent problems the 
Government had experienced with scientific issues:
... some public crises helped the social science find an audience within Whitehall, 
because over such tremendous crises they were reaching out for any help they could 
get. Starting with salmonella, and right through to really horrendous things like 
BSE.390
Dyball also located the drivers for a change in focus to multiple factors:
BSE, change o f government, GM, the whole thing was going to flip around, because it 
was all about finding an answer to make people trust us, whoever the ‘us’ was.391
The House of Lords report drew on a lot of social scientific research, both qualitative and 
quantitative. So the involvement of two social scientists in drawing up the report does 
appear to have had an effect. Indeed, the Committee acknowledged that in reaching their 
conclusions the inquiry had taken them further than it would usually go into the realms of 
social science, which speaks of the status o f social science in other scientific enquiries within 
Parliament.392 Several social scientists who had been conducting research into the public 
understanding o f science also gave evidence to the Committee.393 Other professionals 
involved in PUS, not from the social sciences, also argued that these disciplines had much 
value to bring to bear on this issue. Chief Executive of the British Association Peter Briggs, 
for example, acknowledged that the area was one where scientists needed to acknowledge 
that they might need help from the social scientists, which suggests there was a new found 
legitimacy for social scientific perspectives in the eyes of some involved in this area.394
390 Turney Interview, 11 August 2004.
391 Dyball Interview, 19 August 2004.
392 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 14.
393 For example Jon Turney, Professor Alan Irwin, and Peter Healey all gave oral evidence. Many 
other social scientists gave written evidence.
394 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000b), Science and Society - Evidence, 
(HMSO), p. 37.
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The report, entitled Science and Society, was published in February 2000, and concluded that 
society’s relationship with science was in a critical phase.395 It put forward many different 
recommendations as to how this relationship could be improved, not least by advocating a 
shift away from ‘simply giving information’, to ‘engaging the wider public in dialogue about 
what science could and should be doing’ (p. 13). The report reveals a mixture of different, 
and sometimes conflicting, representations of the public and their relationship with science, 
mobilising many of the original conceptualisations of what the ‘problem’ in public 
understanding of science was and where the boundary between science and society should 
lie. The public, the Committee believed, as evidenced in large-scale survey results and the 
high sales of popular science books, were interested in science, but they were also more 
sceptical and questioning of its uses.396 As the Committee stated:
... public confidence in scientific advice to Government has been rocked by a series 
of events, culminating in the BSE fiasco; and many people are deeply uneasy about 
the huge opportunities presented by areas of science including biotechnology and 
information technology, which seem to be advancing far ahead o f their awareness and 
assent. In turn, public unease, mistrust and occasional outright hostility are breeding a 
climate o f deep anxiety among scientists themselves.397
A ‘crisis in confidence’ on the part of the public, was how the Committee characterised the 
relationship between science and society; the public still therefore being constructed in this 
report, as in the Bodmer report, as a ‘problem’. This, as already discussed, conceptualised a 
deficit on the part of the public, though now of trust and confidence in scientists and/or 
government, instead of scientific knowledge.398 Thus the publication of the Lords report 
gave further official ‘recognition’ and legitimation of this perceived new problem. O f interest 
here also is the mention in the House of Lords report of a ‘deep anxiety among scientists 
themselves’ (p. 11). Again, as in 1985, we can identify that an underlying reason for dealing 
with a perceived problematic public was based on tensions within the scientific community,
395 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 11.
396 For example Office o f Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust (2000), Science and the 
'Public: A  Review of Science Communication and Public Attitudes to Science in Britain, (The Wellcome Trust).
397 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 11.
398 In the previous year the Office of Science and Technology had issued a consultation paper, within 
which there were also questions which asked how to improve public confidence by creating greater 
transparency in the regulation o f science.
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and the need to address their relationship (or indeed manage their image or boundary with 
the public) head on with some sort of ‘corrective’, and communication-based, measure.
The Committee identified many different reasons why this perceived crisis of confidence 
was important to address and, in the process, mobilised many older arguments for an 
increased public understanding of science though with some notable new caveats. 
‘Democratic citizenship in a modern society’, the Committee argued, ‘depends, among other 
things, on the ability of citizens to comprehend, criticise and use scientific ideas and claims’ 
(p. 12). Issues of public understanding were therefore still present, despite the phrase not 
being used; however, the public here were conceptualised in a less passive manner than 
before, with communication referred to as a two-way process. It was also, the Committee 
believed, up to government and industry to handle complex and ethical social questions in 
ways which ‘command public confidence’ (p. 12). A concern with public resistance to 
science and new technology was discussed at length in the report highlighting a 
conceptualisation of public attitudes and opinion as something which had a negative impact 
on science. As the excerpts below exemplify:
... resistance, whether well founded or misguided, on the part o f the public whether 
as citizens or consumers, may inhibit technological progress.
Public hostility to a product or process may drive industrial investment in production 
or research overseas.
Public misunderstanding may lead to technology being rejected; it may also lead to 
technology being abused, (p. 12)
The Committee also argued that, ‘the future wealth and welfare of society depends critically 
upon the enthusiasm of young people to pursue scientific careers’ (p. 12). Thus the 
promotion of a positive attitude towards science was also still desired. Little therefore 
appeared to have changed in the way of arguments for improving the public understanding 
of science since Thomas and Durant had commented on them in 1987.399
399 Thomas and Durant (1987), op. cit.
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Having characterised the ‘problem’, and the importance of remedying it, the rest of the 
report recommended ways to, as they put it, ‘improve the dialogue on both sides’.400 This 
could be achieved through what they called ‘public understanding of science activities’: 
improving the communication of uncertainty and risk, and by changing the nature of policy­
making so that it became normal to bring science and the public into dialogue about new 
developments at an early stage’ (p. 13). Public understanding of science activities were 
therefore still, it appears, seen as central to the improvement of science’s relationship with 
the public. The Committee identified public understanding of science as a shorthand term 
for ‘all forms of outreach by the scientific community, or by others on their behalf ... to the 
public at large, aimed at improving that understanding’ (p. 25). The Committee elsewhere in 
the report, however, stated how the usefulness of this term was now questionable, after 
considering much of the evidence submitted:
Despite all this activity and commitment, we have been told from several quarters that 
the expression “public understanding o f science” may not be the most appropriate 
label. Sir Robert May [the Chief Scientific Adviser] called it a “rather backward 
looking vision” . . . .  It is argued that the words imply a condescending assumption that 
any difficulties in the relationship between science and society are due entirely to 
ignorance and misunderstanding on the part o f the public; and that, with enough 
public-understanding activity, the public can be brought to greater knowledge, 
whereupon all will be well. This approach is felt by many o f our witnesses to be 
inadequate; the British Council went so far as to call it “outmoded and potentially 
disastrous” (p. 25)
The Committee felt that language was important, and while COPUS had argued during the 
inquiry that PUS activity should retain this name, so many of the witnesses had expressed 
doubts about it that the Committee felt a new name would, in their view, acknowledge a 
fresh start. As they argued:
we have found that the title o f our inquiry, “Science and Society”, has had wide appeal 
... this is perhaps because it implies a dialogue, in a way that “public understanding of 
science” does not. (p. 27)
400 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 13.
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There was still much talk, despite this, of needing to improve the public’s understanding of 
science in certain respects. For example, the Committee argued that within the context of 
communicating risk and uncertainty, the public’s understanding o f the nature and processes 
of science needed to improve.
Public understanding of science to the Committee, however, was not now enough to solve 
the perceived problem in science/public relations, and they argued that the need for 
scientists to engage the public was the right means to restore public confidence. Identifying 
what they called a ‘new mood for dialogue’ within the public and the PUS community, they 
argued:
Today’s public expects not merely to know what is going on, but to be consulted; 
science is beginning to see the wisdom of this, and to move “out of the laboratory and 
into the community” to engage in dialogue aimed at mutual understanding. Several o f  
our witnesses agree that a shift along these lines is taking place, (p. 37)
What ‘dialogue’, or ‘engagement’ entailed, however, is formulated in different ways.
Evidence of this ‘new mood’ was attributed to the growing body of experience in the UK at 
staging consultation exercises, for example, consensus conferences, deliberative polls, focus 
groups and citizen’s juries. The Committee, however, stressed that they felt many of these 
consultation exercises were more akin to market research than public engagement, and 
provided only a sample of the public’s attitudes and opinions, rather than allowing the public 
to be actively engaged. Only certain types of dialogue were therefore acceptable to the 
Committee, and conducting more of these event-based initiatives would not be a ‘meaningful 
response’ to the need for more and better dialogue between the public and science. They 
required a larger change, arguing that ‘the United Kingdom must change existing 
institutional terms of reference and procedures to open them up to more substantial inputs 
from diverse groups’ (p. 37). Government science advisory bodies, they clarified, should 
conduct as much of their proceedings in public as possible and, echoing the earlier RCEP 
report, appoint ‘lay’ members to their advisory groups or committees to allow ‘lay-values’ to 
enter into the policy making process (p. 44). Thus a ‘change in the culture’ of existing 
institutions was being called for, not simply public dialogue as an optional add-on. The
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Committee argued that these exercises and approaches were not substitutes for decision­
making, but aids to it; engaging with the public should secure science’s ‘licence to practice’, 
and not restrict it. Again a boundary between science and the public was being constructed 
here. Science was the cognitive content, provided by scientific experts, and values were 
provided by the public involved in these exercises. Dialogue, though costly and difficult, 
would, the Committee argued, avoid other perceived difficulties:
Listening has a cost. But so does not listening, and this cost may be far higher, paid in 
hostile headlines and ground lost to single-issue groups in consumer boycotts and lost 
jobs. (p. 42)
There is therefore a tension within the report: dialogue and engagement appeared to mean 
assigning a level of legitimacy to the public, allowing public values to be considered, and 
opening up the policy-making process; whereas in other senses it appeared more to do with 
listening to the public’s attitudes, and then, having done so, science could be trusted to get 
on with scientific research. As the report emphasises, dialogue was intended to secure 
science’s licence to practice, but not to restrict it: thus the scientific experts maintained 
authority and responsibility over science. However, new methods of communication needed 
to be sought to allow this to continue. All of the new language did, however, imply a two- 
way communication of some sort, rather than the one-way, top-down communication, which 
had, up until then, been carried out by most political and scientific organisations.
What also came out very strongly in the report Were mixed feelings about the role of the 
media in influencing the relationship between science and the public. Many of the academics 
and journalists who gave evidence to the report had stressed that scientists needed to 
understand how the media operated, rather than blaming it for misleading or irresponsible 
headlines about science.401 The Committee concluded that much of the reporting on science 
by science journalists was very good, but expressed concern at the manner in which science 
was treated by non-specialist journalists, and recommended that the Press Complaints 
Commission adopt a set of guidelines, already drawn up by the Royal Society, for journalists
401 See for example, Turney, J, p. 25; Irwin p. 16; Conner, S and T. Radford, p.50
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reporting on science. These guidelines stressed the need for accuracy, balance, credibility and 
legitimacy in the reporting of science in the press. Jon Turney, reflecting on this verdict, 
argued that it showed little had changed since Bodmer in the way the relationship and 
boundary between science and the media was conceptualised:
... the same language then as now, about being distorted, sensationalist, irresponsible, 
scandal-mongering alarmist, what you like, not getting their facts straight, not enough 
science and what there was, not a good medium, not a good enough quality or 
fidelity.402
However, having endorsed the guidelines, the Committee concluded with a pragmatic 
approach to the media and argued that science should learn to work with the media as they 
are and could not expect ‘special treatment from the media, or a special code of practice’, 
any more than any other specialist subject which was covered in the press.403
Taken as a whole the report made a lot of arguments for the need for the established public 
understanding of science agenda to be reconsidered and renewed, with a new goal of 
restoring public confidence in science and scientists. What is evident, however, is that 
despite the Science Minister having pronounced the ‘demise of the deficit model’ at the 1999 
meeting of the BAAS, there remained many old and new ‘deficit style’ ideas within official 
discussions of science and society, particularly around conceptualisations of the public 404 In 
comparison to the Bodmer report we can see that, to the House of Lords, the issue of the 
publics’ relationship with science was to be managed less through educating them and more 
by ‘engaging’ them in the policymaking process. Also much of the language and concepts 
used in the report were similar to that found in an academic PUS context.
The House of Lords report exemplifies the multiplicity of conceptualisations o f ‘science’,
‘the public’ and science communication and engagement now operating within the PUS
402 Turney Interview, 11 August 2004.
403 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 58.
404 Miller (2001), op.cit.
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arena. The dominant language of public understanding of science activity appeared to have 
shifted away from science communication and education and now referred more to science 
policy and governance, risk management, public dialogue and engagement as the key factors 
on which to focus to improve the relationship with the public. The way the relationship was 
characterised, or indeed, what an improvement entailed, was still varied.
Official responses to the House of Lords report
The Government, in its response to the report, committed itself to a more open style of 
regulatory process, and agreed that any change in COPUS should reflect, they stated, ‘the 
change in emphasis from public understanding of science towards dialogue between 
scientists and society in general’.405 Science communication was mentioned in their response 
only in the context of arguing that training courses for scientists should be changed to allow 
scientists to become aware of ‘the social context of their research and its applications’ 406 The 
main focus of their response was firmly placed upon regulatory issues and scientific advice, 
with public dialogue now a priority. The Government pointed out that the Food Standards 
Agency and the two new biotechnology commissions, the Human Genetics Commission and 
the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission, all had a specific remit to 
involve and consult stakeholders and the public.
The need for the public to have greater confidence in science and technology and, more 
specifically, the Government’s handling of science and technology was underlined again that 
year, with the publication of the first science White Paper of the New Labour Government. 
Throughout the White Paper, entitled Excellence and Opportunity: A  Science and Innovation Policy 
for the 2V‘ Century, we see the use of the terms ‘the public’ and ‘consumers’. At points the two
405 Department o f Trade and Industry (2000b), The Government Response to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology Third Report: Science and Society, (London: HSMO).
406 ibid.
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terms are used separately, at others, they appear to mean the same thing.407 A ‘consumer’ is 
someone whose relationship with science and technology is solely defined by their 
consumption of its products and services, which is a different conceptualisation from a 
public which brings values to, and was engaged in, the science policy process. The White 
Paper laid out its vision of innovation in the UK, placing science and technology at the 
centre of a vibrant economy in a successful nation:
To be a successful nation we must make sure our science base is strong and excellent, 
that we have the facility to quickly transform the fruits o f scientific research and 
invention into products and services that people need to improve their well-being and 
quality o f life. And we must do all o f this in a way that has public support and 
involvement. We must have the ability to generate, harness and exploit the creative 
power o f modern science, (pp. 2-3)
Throughout the White Paper the public, and its confidence and support, was identified as a 
key component of the innovation process, which would, as the excerpts below exemplify, 
subsequendy determine the success, or otherwise, of the UK’s fortunes:
An innovation will only succeed if it is desired and accepted by consumers and the 
public ...
Companies will invest in new products if they recognise that consumers are open to 
innovation and quick to adopt new services, (p. 5)
... public support is a key part o f the process o f innovation. Public support for 
science underpins the Government’s investment in the science base, refuelling the 
cycle o f innovation by allowing research to go in new directions, (p. 8)
Public confidence, as the House of Lords Select Committee had argued, was of high 
importance, so much so that a quarter of the White Paper on science and innovation was 
devoted to the issue of ‘confident consumers’. In contrast to the White Paper published in 
1993, where public understanding of science had been the heading under which issues of the 
public were discussed, public controversy over scientific issues had evidently suggested the 
need for a different approach. As the Government argued:
407 Department o f Trade and Industry (2000a), Excellence and Opportunity: A  Science and Innovation Polity 
for the 21st century, (London: Department of Trade and Industry).
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Science must be our servant and not our master. Public acceptance o f science cannot 
be taken for granted. The challenge for scientists is to engage with people in debate 
about the benefits o f what they do ... .(p. 8)
... public confidence in the whole notion of science must be strong and well founded.
People must feel that science is serving society and that it is properly regulated, open 
and accountable. The BSE crisis and the controversy over GM foods have raised 
questions about the value o f scientific progress in society. These are questions we 
should ask. It is in the public interest, in the interests of scientists and in the interests 
o f companies seeking to exploit science commercially that they are addressed. We 
need a more systematic and independent approach to satisfy public concerns about 
the risks created by scientific innovation ... Science and innovation need a stable and 
transparent framework of public support within which they can develop, (p. 5)
Again we can see a boundary between science and scientists, and ‘people’ being rhetorically 
constructed here. Also, in a similar fashion to the earlier House of Lords report, much of the 
language in the White Paper which referred to the relationship between science and the 
public was couched in terms o f ‘engagement’, ‘trust’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘confidence’. One can 
see, however, a tension implicit in the paper between the idea that the public, or consumer, 
should not inhibit innovation (at several points the paper stresses that the Government 
‘must’ press ahead with the development of new technologies) and the idea that public views 
should be taken into consideration, exemplified in phrases such as ‘science is too important 
to be left only to the scientists’, or ‘when science raises profound ethical and social issues, 
the whole of society needs to take part’ (p. 54). This suggests that science was conceptualised 
as something separate from society; society was where ethics and values were located. The 
tensions imply that the Government saw the mission of restoring public confidence and 
engagement to be about finding ways to bring the public on board so that innovation could 
continue unabated, therefore public input was desired, but only if it was positive.
Throughout the report the public is conceptualised as having only ‘concerns’ about science, 
and as being a potential brake on scientific progress. Companies, for example, were only 
likely to invest in research, the Government argued, if they could ‘see the possibility of 
recouping its investment in consumer markets’, thus by implication the public needed to 
show willingness to accept whatever new product was being marketed, otherwise the 
companies would not invest (p. 49). Equally, the White Paper argues elsewhere, ‘were a 
climate of distrust to build up around science, it could drive scientists away from the UK and 
in the long run impoverish us’ (p. 51). Thus again the public seems only conceptualised in a
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negative and problematic manner, and public engagement is a means of reversing this 
‘problem’.
The Government made many different suggestions as to how it would restore public 
confidence in the scientific advice process within government. This was essential, it argued, 
to allow innovation to develop successfully. As Stephen Byers, the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry announced in the introduction to the White Paper, the Government 
would introduce a framework of proper safeguards, information and accountability, which 
would provide ‘the public trust which scientific developments must secure in order to 
benefit society’ (p. ii). As a first step it promised to implement stronger guidelines from the 
Chief Scientific Adviser on how scientific advice would be used in drawing up government 
policy; and to publish a new code of practice for scientific advisers to government, which 
would ‘commit them to high levels of openness and transparency in their work’ (p. 11). The 
updated version of the Chief Scientific Adviser’s guidelines on scientific advice and policy­
making within government was published alongside the Government’s White Paper. These 
also represented the ‘problem’ of the public understanding of science (discussed here under 
the more general heading o f ‘science and society5) as a problem of public mistrust of, and 
confidence in, scientists, especially those within government. As the other official bodies had 
argued before it, key to addressing this lack of confidence was, to the Government, to open 
up policy-making procedures, allowing a broader range of views, and, vitally, being ‘open and 
transparent’ when communicating science to the public. The Guidelines 2000 built on this 
view arguing that, when forming scientific advice, government departments should draw on 
a wide range of sources, and should consult on these sources with ‘interested stakeholders 
and stakeholder groups representing the interests of consumers and members of the 
public’.408 Thus we can see a distinction being made between different types of public: 
stakeholders, consumers, and members of the public.
The conceptualisation of ‘expert advice’ in the guidelines was wider than had previously been 
seen. Now members of the public and public groups were being granted an input into the
408 Department o f Trade and Industry (2000c), Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice and Polity Making, 
(London: DTI).
200
Lost in Translations
formation of expert policy advice. It is worth noting, however, that the lay members of the 
advisory group were being invited as something separate from the advisory committee itself, 
which highlights some boundary work, constructing them as different from a ‘scientific 
expert’. As the guidelines stated, ‘scientific advice is only one element among the 
considerations which may need to be taken into account by decision makers, which might 
also include social political, economic, moral or ethical concerns’, the lay-members were thus 
being included specifically to bring in these social concerns, rather than any scientific, or 
other, knowledge or understanding.
Communication of scientific advice to the public was also identified as very important and, 
the guidelines argued, it would be ‘important that sufficient early thought is given to 
presenting the issues, uncertainties and policy options to the public so that departments are 
perceived as open, well prepared and consistent’. Again the perception of openness and 
transparency, if not the actual presence of it, was deemed a crucial way of managing any 
potential adverse public reaction and, as the White Paper had argued, restoring public 
confidence in science. These guidelines, and the White Paper, suggest a shift in styles of 
policy-making and communicating scientific uncertainty to the public, both of which had 
previously relied solely on scientific advice. The main problem, however, in effective and 
trustworthy scientific governance remained, in these reports, the public, and efforts to 
address this problem were still concerned with managing public attitudes and opinion, and 
the image of scientists and scientific organisations.
Further evidence of a managerial approach to the public in relation to science and 
technology came in early 2001 with the publication of the Phillips Report on the 
Government’s handling of BSE. One of the key findings of the report was that concern over 
an irrational public reaction to the risks of BSE had shaped the manner in which the 
Government dealt with the issue, and this had dented public confidence. As the report 
concluded:
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The Government did not lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risks posed 
by BSE to humans were remote. The Government was preoccupied with preventing 
an alarmist over-reaction to BSE because it believed that the risk was remote. It is 
now clear that this campaign o f reassurance was a mistake. When on 20 March 1996 
the Government announced that BSE had probably been transmitted to humans, the 
public felt that they had been betrayed. Confidence in government pronouncements 
about risk was a further casualty o f BSE.409
BSE had therefore highlighted a failure of scientific advice within government to deal with 
communicating uncertain science to the public. The failure also implied that the 
Government had conceptualised the public as passive and deficient in scientific 
understanding. As Sir Robert May the Chief Scientific Adviser at the time of the inquiry 
described in his evidence, the prevailing instinct in these situations up until this episode had 
been “to hold the facts close” so that a “simple message can be taken out into the market 
place”. BSE, however, had suggested to him that the “full messy process whereby scientific 
understanding is arrived at, with all its problems, has to be spilled out into the open”.410 One 
other lesson put forward by the Phillips Report is also relevant here. The report argued that 
the public should be trusted to respond rationally to openness. This suggested that previous 
assumptions which existed within government - that an admission of uncertainty would only 
confuse the public, and therefore sticking to only ‘rational’ expert advice, and giving out 
reassurances of safety, despite no evidence of no risk, was the best way to manage the 
situation — needed to change. The Phillips Inquiry argued that a line must be drawn under 
this style of governance, and this way of conceptualising the public; ‘trust’, it concluded, ‘can 
only be generated by openness’.411
The Government’s response to the Phillips Report agreed with many of the ‘lessons learned’. 
The report, the Government stated, had ‘rightly commented that the Government should 
trust the public with information and treat people like adults’ and pointed to its new
409 (Lord) Phillips, N., et al (2000), The BSE Inquiry Report: evidence and supporting papers of the Inquiry into 
the emergence and identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creuttfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(vCJD) and the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 1996, www.bseinquiry.gov.uk, accessed July 
2006.
410 (Lord) Phillips, N., et al (2000), The BSE Inquiry Report: evidence and supporting papers of the Inquiry into 
the emergence and identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutrfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(vCJD) and the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 1996,
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volumel/chaptl42.htm, section 1297, accessed July 2006.
411 ibid., section 1301.
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guidelines on scientific advice, and the establishment of new arms-length science advisory 
bodies like the Food Standards Agency, to show that it was changing the policy approach to 
reflect this new need for openness and transparency.412 A consultation to the Government’s 
interim response to the Phillips report had apparently confirmed that openness was seen as 
essential to regaining public trust and the Government also pointed out that following the 
General Election in June 2001, a Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Science Policy, chaired 
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, had also been established and was attended 
by all of the Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers. This Committee’s terms of reference 
were ‘to consider the Government’s policies in relation to scientific advances and public 
acceptance of them’.413 Thus ‘public acceptance’ of scientific advances again appears to have 
been the ultimate goal of the Government, with openness and transparency a means of 
restoring public trust to allow this to occur. This new language of dialogue was widespread, 
and can be seen not just in the UK, but also in the European Union’s Science and Society Action 
Plan published in the following year, the stated objective of which was to ‘change the 
relationship between science and society’414 Again alongside arguments for increasing the 
flow of good quality scientific information to the public and enthusing the public about new 
technology, sat the argument that ‘a true dialogue must ... be instituted between science and 
society’ (p. 12), and with a commitment to ‘improving transparency and consultation’ (p. 14).
The OST/W ellcome report
This shift in policy language away from a top-down approach to the science communication 
of facts and knowledge, towards a focus on issues of trust, risk, dialogue and policy-making, 
placed many of the PUS organisations in a new terrain. Having consistently maintained that 
key to managing the relationship between the public and science was the communication of 
a greater understanding of science, all were now faced with having to respond to this new
412 HM Government (2001), Response to the report of the BSE inquiry, 
www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/general/response.pdf, accessed July 2006.
413 ibid.
414 Commission o f the European Communities (2002), Science and Society: Action Plan, (European 
Commission), p. 24.
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dominant rhetoric, and with this, embrace the idea that one-way science communication was 
no longer a main focus of governmental concerns; dialogue and engagement in the policy 
process had taken primacy.415 The first sign that some members of the scientific community 
were dealing with these changes came with the publication of a joint survey report in 2000, 
by the Office of Science and Technology and the Wellcome Trust, entitled Science and the 
Public: A  Review of Science Communication and Public Attitudes to Science in Britain. In the forward 
to the report, Lord Sainsbury, Minister for Science, and Mike Dexter, Director of the 
Wellcome Trust, affirmed how attitudes had changed towards science communication in 
recent years, stating:
Most o f us agree that the ‘deficit’ model of the public understanding o f science is less 
relevant today. This report is intended to start the process o f discussion that will take 
us forward into the ‘engagement’ model o f Science and Society,416
Furthermore, as was clearly stated at the outset of the report, to these institutions the main 
issue in science communication policy was now described as ‘how best to develop a dialogue 
between scientists, policy-makers and the public, and to bring public opinion into the 
development of policy and practice in science communication’ (p. 4). As the two 
organisations continued:
The Wellcome Trust and the OST believe that an ‘engagement model’ o f science 
communication -  a two-way dialogue between specialists and nonspecialists — is more 
appropriate than the ‘deficit model’, which just gives people information about 
science, (p. 10)
The report formed part of a Government review of activity in the public understanding of 
science, in order to target government resources more effectively. The survey was also 
intended to set a baseline for public attitudes to science, engineering and technology so that 
future changes in these areas could be measured. Along with the earlier House of Lords
415 It is worth noting that both COPUS, the Royal Society and the British Association all received 
large parts o f their funding from Parliament or from the Office o f Science and Technology, thus 
were all in a position o f having to reformulate their own objectives if they wished to continue to 
receive patronage from their benefactors.
416 Office of Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust (2000), op. cit.
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report and the Government’s White Paper, this report began a period of consultation. The 
Government and the Wellcome Trust hoped that scientists and science communicators 
would consider what role they could now play in ‘informing the debate about those aspects 
of science which are of concern to the public’ (p. i). The definition of public understanding 
of science in the report shows a change from previous usages of the phrase. The term 
‘science communication’ was used in preference to public understanding of science. Science 
communication, the report laid out, encompassed:
... print and broadcast media activities; traditional museums; Government and 
voluntary sector public understanding o f science programmes; existing and new 
science centres; efforts o f private industry; and the scientific community’s activities 
more widely, (p. 11)
As the report acknowledged, this wide definition included ‘any and all activities that intend 
to educate or engage people in science, engineering and technology’ (p. 11).' The deficit 
model of public understanding of science was supposedly no longer appropriate, yet this 
broad definition of activities, most of which were largely still in a one-way information 
provision mode, suggests that in practice ‘deficit model’ activities were acceptable so long as 
they were not labelled as such. As the report stated, the institutions were ‘concerned with the 
communication of science to the nonspecialist public’ (p. 12). Elsewhere, however, the 
report identified science communication to mean communication between various different 
groups such as: scientists and the public, the scientific community and the media, the 
scientific community and the Government. Thus the suggestion that it was only one-way 
was less pronounced. What is apparent in this report are the multiple definitions o f ‘science 
and society’ and ‘the public’, and the tensions that existed within the scientific community at 
this time while they took on board new aims and new language, and reformulated and put 
into practice their communication activities. Indeed the report itself acknowledged ‘tensions 
within and between these players about what, why and how they are communicating with the 
public’, as it stated:
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A desire to communicate definite ‘facts’ about science can conflict with the need to 
communicate how the scientific process works. The former aims to provide relatively 
clear-cut scientific information, while the latter tries to give the public an insight into 
the continually questioning method o f scientific discovery, (p. 12)
In a similar call to Collins and Pinch’s a decade before, an understanding of how science 
works was now seen as essential to head off public disenchantment with, or 
misunderstanding of, scientists. Thus the image and acceptance of science was still an 
important facet of science communication activities, as the report suggested:
Greater understanding o f the scientific process is important if nonscientists are to 
appreciate how accepted theories can be overturned and new interpretations or results 
take precedence. This should prevent science and scientists being dismissed as 
confused or confusing when new findings are announced, (p. 12)
Further tensions were also acknowledged in the report within the motivations of some 
organisations for conducting science communication:
Organizations often have more than one reason for embarking on science 
communication activities -  reasons such as raising the profile o f an institution or 
cause, recruitment or fundraising. Overt public relations masquerading as science 
communication can lead to scepticism among the public, (p. 13)
Furthermore, these more self-interested motivations, the report argued, stood in the way of a 
joined-up and strategic approach to science communication between all of the organisations. 
The ‘historical tendency’ for activities to be driven by the needs of the provider of the 
science communication rather than the needs or desires of ‘potential consumers’, was 
blamed in part for this.
Multiple, and often conflicting, definitions o f ‘the public’, ‘science communication’, and what 
a good relationship between science and public meant, can be identified in this report. Again, 
the ‘deficit model’, according to both institutions, was now ‘inappropriate’, and the 
objectives of their own public understanding of science activities, they stated, embodied this
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belief. However, the objectives of both institutions still maintained that information 
provision was important. So on the one hand science was being described as a much more 
open and public enterprise; and on the other, a boundary between science and the public 
was rhetorically enforced. Both of these institutions were struggling to define their role in 
the ‘new’ area of science and society, and we can see this diversity of definitions as part of 
the shifting boundary work strategies they were engaged in, in what was now a crowded field 
of ‘expertise’. The Wellcome Trust’s objectives were to:
... stimulate and inform debate about the social and ethical issues arising from current 
biomedical developments; and to make information about biomedical science and its 
achievements and applications more widely accessible, (p. 10)
The Office of Science and Technology’s objectives were to:
... increase public understanding and awareness of: scientific facts and more 
importantly, scientific and engineering processes; the role played by science, 
engineering and technology in everyday life; the benefits brought by science, 
engineering and technology and an appreciation that these benefits are not without 
potential drawbacks, (p. 10)
Thus while both appear to have acknowledged that science presented social and ethical
issues, and/or potential drawbacks, which signalled a shift away from purely promoting
science as a positive force, OST’s objectives particularly highlight that they wished also to
engineer a change in knowledge and attitude within the public. Differences in the extent to
which both institutions had changed are exemplified further when they turned to discussing
the role of science communication. The Wellcome Trust believed that some scientific
developments were so fundamental that there needed to be a national debate, and that
‘politicians and scientists should not be making decisions without wider public discussion’ (p.
13). The Office of Science and Technology, on the other hand, was not so inclusive, arguing
that public perceptions of science played an increasingly important role in developing policy,
and dialogue with the public and informed debate were essential. This suggests that a deficit
model, and the social hierarchy that this maintained, was still in operation. The Government
appeared to conceptualise ‘dialogue’ more as a means of changing the public’s perceptions of
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science to something more positive, whereas the Wellcome Trust’s approach appeared more 
to do with a promotion of a two-way discussion of scientific issues, so that public views and 
attitudes could feed into the policy-making process.
‘The public’ was categorised in the report in a very specific manner. It was, as in the House 
of Lords report and the White Paper that had followed it, generally conceptualised in a 
negative way, with the public expressing concerns that needed to be somehow dealt with by 
these institutions. The public were also referred to as ‘consumers’, this time of science 
communication rather than the products of science. Thus we can see again a mix of 
discourses defining the public: one of democratic citizenship, and one of the market. To help 
target science communication exercises more effectively, six attitudinal groups, with differing 
socio-economic profiles, were identified in the OST/Wellcome report, which were based on 
the results of a large survey of public attitudes.417 The way in which these discrete groups 
were conceptualised suggests there was a belief that once identified, all science 
communication activities could be targeted at these individuals. As the report argued, there 
were many organisations that needed to ‘improve their understanding of their audiences and 
of traditional marketing techniques if they are to gain maximum benefit from their efforts’
(p. 13). Thus, again, the point of science communication here appears to be more about 
improving marketing techniques to target the right audience for the scientific community’s 
message whether through communication or dialogue.
As the Wellcome/OST report exemplified, and as Briggs, reflected at the time, ‘since the 
Lords report was published, dialogue had become the “in thing” in science communication’, 
with, he reflected, ‘most organisations with public programmes planning to get involved’.418 
Briggs also pointed, however, to what he thought was the worrying uptake of this new 
approach without much thought as to what it actually meant, as he recalled:
417 See p.7 o f the report for full descriptions o f the six attitudinal groups.
418 Briggs, P. (2001), 'A recipe for dialogue', Science and Public Affairs, June 2001.
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... I have sat through one lengthy talk, with little time for questions, on the 
importance o f two-way communication between science and the public. I have been at 
an hour-long lecture followed by a few questions, which was described as a major 
contribution to public debate. And I have been told that the BA should get more 
involved in dialogue because that is the way better to get our message across! Perhaps 
there are as many interpretations of ‘dialogue’ as there are o f ‘public understanding of  
science’.419
419 ibid.
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8 From Deficit to Dialogue? Phase I I I
The renegotiation of definitions of public understanding of science, the public, dialogue and 
science communication, in the year following the House of Lords report, resulted in almost 
all initiatives previously labelled as public understanding of science being re-launched with a 
new ‘Science and Society’ rhetoric at their core. The Royal Society’s response to the report 
was the establishment of a five-year ‘Science in Society Initiative’, funded with a grant of £\ 
million from the Kohn Foundation.420 It was set up as part o f the Royal Society’s 
commitment to respond to their growing concern and perception that ‘the public’s 
confidence in certain areas of science was failing’.421 The Society’s aim was to offer 
‘leadership in addressing the underlying causes of this concern, which were set out clearly in 
the House of Lords’ Science and Society report’. These causes, according to the Royal 
Society, included ‘poor communications between scientists, the public and the media, lack of 
recognition of public values and the need for transparency’. While the Government had 
identified the problem as one of scientific governance, and was subsequendy promoting a 
dialogue agenda to restore public confidence in the handling of science, many within the 
scientific community interpreted the problem as one in which the public’s confidence in 
science, and scientists, needed to be restored. This suggests a shaping of ‘the problem’ as 
being guided by each institution’s own immediate interests and concerns, precipitating 
boundary work to construct their identity and the boundary between themselves and the 
public, and each other.
The aim of the Royal Society’s new Science in Society Programme was to ‘take forward the 
Science in Society approach’, which aimed for openness, transparency, dialogue and
420 I worked as the Project Officer on this Programme in the first year o f this five-year programme 
from May 2001, to January 2002 therefore much of this section is based on my impressions and 
experiences o f being inside the Society and ‘backstage’ to the public discussions.
421 The Royal Society Science in Society Website, www.royalsoc.ac.uk/scienceinsociety, accessed 
September 2001.
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accountability as well as responsiveness to the concerns and values of the public. More 
specifically, the original aims as set out by the Society were:
• To help restore confidence in science
• To find and develop new, interesting, widespread and effective ways of 
communicating with the public
• To make sure that the voice of the public is heard when discussing and shaping 
science policy422
The new programme also coincided with a re-branding of the Society’s Science Promotion 
Section, now called the Science Communication Section which, again, highlights how 
scientific organisations were attempting to move away from any association with a top- 
down, ‘deficit model style’ language. An explanation of the Society’s response to the House 
of Lords report, and the internal changes, was provided by a new Science in Society 
Committee which oversaw the programme, as detailed on the Programme website:
The Science in Society Committee has recognised that the Royal Society itself needs to 
be more accessible to the public and transparent to the outside world. The more 
society desires to know about scientific research, medical advances, and technological 
developments, the more the role o f the Royal Society will have to evolve to meet the 
public’s needs. It is largely through the Science in Society Programme that this can be 
made possible. Such an exciting initiative will, we hope, place the Royal Society at the 
forefront o f efforts to ensure that scientific research in the UK will continue in a 
supportive, open and understanding way.423
So again the suggestion here was that this new Science and Society agenda had a goal of 
ensuring that science research went ahead, with the guaranteed support of the public. The 
need for the change was also characterised by a knowledge deficit on the part of the public.
Alongside the promise of a culture change in how the society operated, Lord May, former 
Chief Scientific Adviser and now President of the Royal Society, argued in a Presidential 
Address that science had nothing do with values or politics and it should be allowed to
422 ibid.
423 ibid.
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present the facts before the public were engaged. Thus we see a continuation of boundary 
work by scientists attempting to distance science from social influences:
Society needs to do a better job o f asking what kind o f tomorrow we create with the 
possibilities that science offers. Such decisions are governed by values, beliefs, 
feelings; science has no special voice in such democratic debates about values. But 
science does serve a crucial function in painting the landscape o f facts and 
uncertainties against which such societal debates take place.424
In contrast to this, Sir Paul Nurse, Nobel Prize winner and the Chairman of the Society’s 
Science in Society Committee, was concerned about dialogue and the involvement of public 
values being “bolt-on”, adding dialogue where it was easy to do so but leaving the scientific 
activities of the Royal Society untouched.425 He also disagreed with Lord May that science 
alone should set the terms of any dialogue with the public, and argued that people’s concerns 
even when they, as scientists, did not believe that these were justified, should be considered. 
Thus the adoption o f a new language of dialogue, openness and transparency by Fellows and 
staff within the Royal Society did not signal a similar adoption of consistent definitions of 
‘science’, ‘the public’, or ‘dialogue’.
The Science in Society programme embarked on its ‘dialogue initiatives’. The main activity in 
2001 was a series of ‘dialogue meetings’ around the country culminating in a National Forum 
in London. In the first year of the programme, participants invited from local businesses and 
community groups were asked whether they trusted scientists. Other initiatives of the 
programme included an MP/Scientists Pairing Scheme which, the Committee argued, 
showed scientists the constraints of being a politician, and politicians the way in which 
science was conducted. There was also a new website which would have an online dialogue 
facility to allow members of the public to ‘have their say’. Much discussion was had amongst 
staff running the programme as to whether the public could be trusted to use this online 
facility in a responsible manner, and it was eventually decided that all comments (of which
424 May, R. (2001), President''s Anniversary Day Address, (Royal Society).
425 Nurse, P. (2001), 'Primary Roles o f the Science in Society Programme, included with the minutes 
of the Science in Society Committee meeting, 17th September 2001', (London: The Royal Society).
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there were few) would be screened first, to avoid negative and critical comments dominating 
the website.426 Much of the work of the Science in Society programme was experimental and 
their own dialogue exercises were designed to display the Society’s leadership and authority 
in this area. In the initial years of the programme therefore, much activity appears designed 
to show that the Royal Society had changed, and could be perceived to be open and 
transparent, and was engaging with the public. Little, if anything, was done with the results 
of their conversations with the public. Indeed, the National Forum was conceived as a day 
which would provide national media coverage for the Society, including an evening debate 
with BBC Radio 4 listeners, the meaning of the dialogue results appearing almost secondary 
to these goals.427 Just as previous efforts to improve the public understanding of science 
were also concerned with improving the public’s attitudes to science, again we can see here 
that part of the agenda of these new dialogue efforts was to improve the public’s view and 
attitudes towards science and scientists, and, in this particular example, towards the Royal 
Society itself. So the language and methods of communication had changed, but the 
boundary work was attempting to achieve a similar outcome to previous formulations.
What is this thing called ‘Science and Society’?
Several o f the Research Councils also reformulated their initiatives to fit in with, as the 
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) described, the ‘new approach to what was 
previously called “Public Understanding of Science”, but which we now term “Science and 
Society’”. NERC acknowledged that ‘Science and Society’ was a very broad concept and, 
they argued, was ‘even less amenable to definition than the “Public Understanding of 
Science’”. They used the term to ‘describe the interfaces between the science which NERC 
funds and carries out and the public in its widest sense’. They stated that where previous
426 Observation based on my personal experience at the Royal Society. The Programme was overseen 
at this time by Shona Falconer, ex Head o f PR for Shell, and Dr David Boak, chemist and Director 
of Communications for the Royal Society. Despite the explicit idea that dialogue should inform 
policy, there were no links with the Science Policy unit o f the Royal Society in the initial couple of 
years.
427 Personal notes from planning meeting November 2001.
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attempts at science communication had tended to be one way, i.e. scientists informing the 
public about their findings, they would now engage more in dialogue with the public, asking 
for responses, feedback and views as well as promising to take those views into account.428 
The Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) established a Science 
and Society Programme. Taking on almost all of the recommendations set out in the House 
of Lords Report, their programme encouraged public debate about the potential applications 
and implications of their research, as well as promising to respond to issues of public 
concern and to make sure that its processes were transparent to the public.429 The 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) continued with their Public 
Awareness Programme without reworking a new Science in Society angle into it. Equally, the 
Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC) set up a new Science and 
Society programme, which did involve public engagement and public accountability, but only 
as part of its overall communications strategy to promote ‘the understanding, appreciation 
and awareness of their science’.430 The Medical Research Council stood apart from the others 
in not responding to the report at all. Rather it continued with its already established ‘public 
interest’ approach, to ‘share its work with the public in order to increase awareness of the 
way in which medical research affects each of us, and to promote dialogue and debate on 
major issues’.431
The Economic and Social Research Council, on the back of its New Opportunities Public 
Understanding of Science Research Programme in 1998, launched a new Science in Society 
Research Programme in 2001, after a long consultation period amongst social scientists 
about what it should address. Alan Irwin, who had drawn up the initial proposal for the new 
programme recalled that the ESRC had also argued that the label public understanding of
428 NERC website, Programme on Science and Society - A  N ERC polity paper, 
www.nerc.ac.uk/insight/openness/scisocpolicy.asp, accessed October 2002.
429 BBSRC Science and Society webpages, www.bbsrc.ac.uk/society/overview/Welcome.html, accessed 
October 2002.
430 PPARC website Science and Society Programme, www.pparc.ac.uk/Rs/Fs/Pu/PUSTPanel.asp, 
accessed October 2002.
431 Medical Research Council website, Public Interest Pages, www.mrc.ac.uk/index/public- 
interest.htm, accessed November 2001.
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science was “far too backdated”.432 The Programme took the issue of scientific governance, 
with its primary goal being ‘to explore and facilitate the rapidly changing relations between 
science (including engineering and technology) and wider society’. In so doing, the 
programme sought to ‘place British social science at the heart of international debates and 
practical interventions concerning the public understanding of science, science and 
technology policy, science studies, and the nature of citizenship and expertise within 
contemporary society’. Like all other research council programmes, the ESRC cited the 
House of Lords Report, and its claim that the relationship between the public, scientists and 
government was in crisis, as impetus for the research. However, unlike the other science- 
based institutions which represented scientists and scientific research, the ESRC’s 
programme was established to examine these relationships and influence the renegotiation of 
them through research that engaged ‘major public, private, and voluntary sector stakeholders 
with practising scientists and institutions’.433 Unlike the early ESRC public understanding of 
science programme in 1986, social scientists would therefore not just examine what was 
going on, but were expected to change and influence the relationship between science and 
public.
The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, which was charged by the House of 
Lords with keeping a watching brief on the state of science and society activities in the 
UK,434 produced a report which gave a snapshot of how institutions were responding to the 
call for dialogue, and it highlights the variation in the objectives and methods of those 
activities being undertaken in 2001. The report, entitled Open Channels, concluded that while 
there was a growing interest in engaging the public more directly in policy and decision­
making, the quality of these exercises was variable, and scientific institutions may not have 
the necessary commitment, skills or resources to plan and undertake suitable public 
dialogue.435
432 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
433 ESRC Science and Society Research Programme website, http://sbs-xnet.sbs.ox.ac.uk/scisoc, accessed 
November 2001.
434 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 9.
435 Parliamentary Office o f Science and Technology (2001), Report No. 153: Open Channels: Public 
Dialogue in Science and Technology, (HMSO).
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Perhaps the most obvious sign of all institutional changes to PUS at this time, and a sign of 
how much the House of Lords report had changed both the landscape and language used in 
a short space of time, was the reformulation of COPUS. Following extensive reviews of the 
Committee in the previous two years, it was agreed by all the partners that COPUS should 
be remodelled in this new climate as ‘an inclusive partnership between the many sectors now 
involved in communicating science’.436 This remodelling was to respond to the increase in 
science communication activity in recent years, and the fact that the House of Lords had 
themselves suggested that COPUS change.437 As a COPUS position paper argued, the 
professional arena of science communication had not formally existed at the time the 
Bodmer report was written, thus things had changed remarkably. COPUS, in its old guise, 
had been struggling to maintain its influence over the myriad of new schemes and science 
communication activities, which, as the position paper noted, encompassed a range of 
different aims and objectives:
What began largely as an exercise in improving levels o f public understanding o f  
science has since matured into a more complex series o f activities whose aims include: 
improving public confidence in science; raising the profile o f science as a career; and 
improving public support for research.438
The final impetus for the review, however, had apparently been the realisation by members 
of COPUS that ‘the pattern of its activities and membership had not changed to meet 
developments in an increasingly critical public’, and many of the institutions designed to 
make science more accessible had been ‘left behind’ 439 Thus the public was problematised 
here also as a reason for the change in approach. COPUS was now no longer to be used as 
an acronym, but as a brand ‘Copus’, with a new expanded Council overseeing it, reflecting a 
broader range of stakeholders in science communication than the original three founding 
bodies. Chaired by Bridget Ogilvie, previously Chief Executive of the Wellcome Trust, the 
new Council was established with members who represented the science communication 
interests of several sectors, including research funding bodies, learned institutions, museums,
436 Copus website (2001), A  new direction for Copus, www.copus.org.uk/copus_councilpaper.htm, 
accessed November 2001.
437 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000a), op. cit., p. 8.
438 Copus website (2001), op. cit.
439 Ogilvie, B. (2001), 'View From the Top', Research Fortnight, 1 August 2001.
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science centres and the media. The new body intended to oversee science communication at 
a national level, but made it clear that this was not to be one-way science communication, 
but was to be focused on ‘supporting ways of increasing public engagement with the issues 
and processes of science’.440 The Copus grant schemes were also reformulated under this 
new agenda, to fund efforts at dialogue with the public. As Copus acknowledged, what 
counted as good dialogue, and what was self-promotion for those conducting the 
engagement, was complicated:
The dividing line between public relations and public engagement activities is not an 
easy one to draw, and very often one organisation’s public relations is another’s public 
engagement. We do, however, need to recognise the different reasons for 
communicating science and find ways o f  using them to our advantage. This will 
become increasingly important under the new Science and Society agenda as we seek 
to identify ways o f establishing constructive dialogue with stakeholders.441
Copus stated further that they intended to ‘represent the interests of the scientific 
community by focussing interactions with target audiences that include business, media, 
education (schools and universities), single-issue groups and politicians, as well as general 
public audiences’.442 Thus we can see the implication that science communication was still 
being used to manage the boundary between scientists and other professional and social 
groups.
Another new initiative from within the scientific community geared towards managing just 
one of these boundaries, was the launch of the Science Media Centre in November 2001. 
Housed at the Royal Institution yet independent from both it and the Government, the 
Centre proposed to take a pro-active stance by providing science stories, and scientists, to 
the media where they felt there was ‘a public interest or a developing controversy’ 443 Its 
mission statement claimed to ‘provide a focal point for scientists to explain the nature of 
their work, discuss its consequences, and engage in public discussion over the benefits and
440 Copus website (2001), op. cit.
441 ibid.
442 ibid.
443 Science Media Centre (2001), Invitation to the launch of the Science Media Centre, sent to author.
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risks’.444 The House of Lords report had largely concluded that the scientific community 
should deal with the media the way it was, and the establishment of the Science Media 
Centre was, on the one hand a sign that members of the scientific community were trying to 
deal with the media on its own terms - through effective lobbying - yet this could equally be 
interpreted as suggesting that some within the community were still angling for more control 
over media messages about science, for example by being able to field the ‘right’ scientists to 
communicate particular messages through it. Communication of accurate science was seen as 
the means of improving the relationship between the two, as the Centre proposed:
Our ultimate goal is to facilitate more scientists to engage with the media, in the hope 
that the public will have improved access to accurate, evidence-based scientific 
information about the stories o f the day.445
All this new activity within the scientific community shows that those institutions that were 
dealing with science and the public were changing, yet how this manifested itself within the 
different institutions varied and there were many definitions and understandings of what 
dialogue was, how and why engagement should be used, what science communication now 
meant, and who ‘the public’ was. By this time there was a substantial ‘industry’ around 
‘public understanding of science’ and science communication activities, consisting of 
organisations (several were government funded), private companies and freelance individuals 
whose livelihoods relied on others giving them money to conduct science communication 
exercises or events and unsurprisingly the need for more science communication, or dialogue 
was not questioned by them.
Critiquing dialogue
Not everyone embraced this call for dialogue, indeed, some were explicitly critical of it. An 
article by Bill Durodie, Director o f the International Centre for Security Analysis at King’s
444 Cookson, C. 'New independent media centre aims to give scientists a voice1, Financial Times, 30 
January 2001.
445 Science Media Centre, Invitation to the launch of the Science Media Centre.
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College London, and published at Spiked- online, argued that the Government should stop 
‘hiding behind participation’ and let scientists maintain their authority of expert decision­
making.446 As he argued:
Comparing the subjective opinions o f the public to the considered deliberation 
denigrates science, and panders to the conceit o f  those who claim to represent the 
public. And if things go wrong, rather than be held accountable for their decisions 
based upon the available scientific evidence, politicians and officials are able to point 
to other participants in the decision-making process who should now share 
responsibility for any problems that ensue.447
Durodie did not believe that the public had the relevant expertise to make decisions over 
scientific matters, and argued that:
...scientific expertise at the highest level is crucial, to inform democratic decision 
making. But consequent decisions should be taken by democratically accountable 
politicians, not by hand-picked officials or self-appointed interest groups.
Durodie was representative of a wider questioning by a few new organisations of these 
recent calls for openness, transparency and engagement by scientists with the public over 
scientific policy. He was a member o f the Advisory Board for an organisation called the 
Scientific Alliance, which was formed in 2001 as a non-profit membership-based 
organisation that brought together both ‘scientists and non-scientists committed to rational 
discussion and debate on the challenges facing the environment today’.448 Suggesting 
therefore that other attempts to discuss science in public were not rational, it had, the 
Alliance claimed, been set up to. redress what they saw as a misrepresentation of science in 
public:
446 Spiked-online (www.spiked-online.org) describes itself today as an independent online phenomenon 
dedicated to raising the horizons o f  humanity by waging a culture war of words against misanthropy, 
priggishness, prejudice, luddism, illiberalism and irrationalism in all their ancient and modern forms.
447Durodie, B., 'To help build a more advances world, the government should stop hiding behind 
'precaution' and 'participation', and encourage scientists to experiment and to think big', spiked-online,
7 June 2001, www.spiked-online.com.
448 Scientific Alliance website (2003), About the Scientific Alliance, www.scientific-alliance.org, accessed 
October 2003.
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Members o f the Scientific Alliance are concerned about the many ways in which 
science is often misinterpreted, and at times misrepresented, within both policy circles 
and in the media. The Alliance thus works to overcome this misunderstanding by 
aiming to: promote sound science in the environmental debate; ensure that scientific 
arguments remain prominent throughout the policy making process; and facilitate an 
informed dialogue between all stakeholders involved in the environmental debate 
through events and publications.449
The idea here, was couched in similar terms to Lord May’s earlier Presidential Address: that 
policies should be based upon sound and reliable scientific evidence alone, and any debate 
surrounding science should be ‘rational and informed’.450 Thus the scope for public dialogue 
was slim to the Scientific Alliance. They believed that the media distorted science in the 
public domain or that it was misinterpreted by single-issue groups, despite the fact that to all 
intents and purposes the Scientific Alliance was itself a single-issue lobby group, albeit one 
which believed that science should be promoted and communicated only by scientific 
experts.
Another organisation, Sense About Science, was formed in 2002 to campaign from a similar 
standpoint of combating public misunderstanding. It had been set up in response to what 
they perceived as a challenge to reasoned debate:
Back in 2001, the newspaper front pages were ablaze with headlines about mobile 
phones ‘frying your brain’, genetically modified ‘Frankenstein foods’, the MMR 
vaccine, experiments using animals and the dangers o f cloning. Scientists seemed very 
much on the fringes o f many o f these debates, and their scientific evidence and data 
had even less o f a presence.451
Lord Taverne, a Liberal Democrat peer and member of the House of Lords Animals in 
Scientific Procedures Committee, had written and published a series of articles damning the 
manner in which scientific evidence was being ignored in these debates 452 At the end of 
2001 he convened a meeting of other concerned parties who had ‘resolved that scientists 
need to take more responsibility, and do so immediately, for putting evidence at the centre
449 ibid.
450 May, R. (2002a), 'Address o f  the President, Given at the Anniversary Meeting on 29 November 
2002', Notes and Records of the Royal Society ofloondon, 57: 1.
451 Raphael, E. (2005), 'Sense About Science', Healthwatcb News, 56.
452 Taverne, D. (1999), 'Against anti-science', Prospect, 47.
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of debates about scientific issues’.453 Sense About Science was formed as, in its own words, 
an ‘organisation to promote an evidence-based response to matters of science and risk 
among institutions, government, the media and NGOs’. They operated in a proactive 
manner, encouraging scientists to enter into controversial public debates, responding to 
inaccuracies in public claims about science, medicine, and technology, and promoting the 
‘benefits of scientific research to the public’.454 While some have cast doubts on the impartial 
nature of the organisation, Sense About Science argued against public engagement 
vociferously, based on its belief that scientists and science should maintain primacy in 
decision-making and communicating science.455
While these new and, one could argue, idiosyncratic scientific groups were critical of new 
‘dialogue’ approaches to managing the relationship between science and the public, 
elsewhere there had been a wide uptake o f terms, such as ‘trust’, ‘dialogue’, and ‘engagement’ 
which had previously been used only by certain social scientists when constructing the 
science/public relationship within both government and the scientific community. There 
remained, however, a flexibility in these terms. The public was formulated as deficient in 
scientific knowledge, or trust, or confidence, but also as an active, knowledgeable and 
important part of decision-making in science policy. Equally ‘dialogue’, and ‘science 
communication’ served a variety o f purposes, and could be used to construct clear 
boundaries around science and its expertise, keeping public values out or to facilitate a more 
unified formulation of science and public in forming science policy.
In 2001 a Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe (PABE) report, an 
EU funded research project conducted by Brian Wynne and colleagues, had argued that
453 Raphael (2005), op. cit.
454 ibid.
455 Lobbywatch.org has argued that both the Director and the Programme Manager for Sense about 
Science, having been previously employed by the biotech PR firm Register Larkin, were more 
interested in promoting the interests o f  particular science and scientists, some of which also funded 
Sense About Science. They also make explicit connections between some members o f Sense About 
Science, Spiked-Online, the Institute o f Ideas and Global Futures, the Science Media Centre, for 
example, Bill Durodie and claim that all o f these groups were a front for advancing the libertarian 
views of the Living Marxism Group, which advanced a view that scientific progress should not be 
hampered. Members o f all o f these organisations had apparendy been involved with this group at 
some point. See www.lobbywatch.org/profilel.asp?PrId=151.
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there was a ‘persistence of a number o f entrenched views about the public shared by 
numerous policy actors’ which had not been backed up by their own focus group research 
involving members of the public. The authors characterised these views as ten ‘myths’ held 
by dominant stakeholders about public responses to GM organisms. The report argued these 
myths, five of which are listed below, had important policy implications; mistaken 
interpretations of public perceptions played an influential role in shaping the communication 
strategies and policies of all institutional stakeholders:
It's the fault o f the BSE crisis: since then, citizens no longer trust regulatory 
institutions
The primordial cause of the problem is that lay people are ignorant about scientific 
facts
Public opposition to GMOs is due to “other - ethical or political -  factors”
The public demands ‘zero risk’ - and this is not reasonable
The public is a malleable victim o f  distorting sensationalist media456
If the perception of the public as the problem to be overcome did not change, the authors 
argued, ‘new policies and strategies - even if they are innovative and sincerely seek to 
integrate public views are likely to fail’ (p. 7). These social scientists took a different critical 
stance on the new dialogue agenda, and were far from satisfied that their conceptualisation 
of public dialogue had been embraced by the scientific and policy-making communities.
Deficits and dialogues
An indication that the older rhetoric used by scientists and scientific institutions to construct 
the boundary between science and the public had not disappeared is provided by a report in 
The Financial Times in 2002. In the middle of a media controversy about the MMR vaccine,
456 Marris, C., et al. (2001), Public Perceptions ofAgricultural Biotechnologies in Furope, final report of the PABE 
research project funded by the European Communities, http://csec.lancs.ac.uk/pabe/, August 2005, p. 9.
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the Chair of the House of Commons’ Select Committee on Science and Technology, Ian 
Gibson, was quoted as blaming “ignorance about science” for hampering the Government’s 
efforts to engage the public in policy debates. The Financial Times quoted Gibson as 
describing the Government’s policy on the mumps, measles and rubella triple vaccine as 
almost impossible because “people do not understand the arguments”.457 He was not alone 
in making this claim; in the same article Fiona Fox, the head of the Science Media Centre, 
claimed entrenched public misconceptions about science needed to be dispelled if public 
dialogue on scientific issues was to move forward:
We need to be able to debate issues [such as] genetically modified foods, but if the 
public is expecting a guarantee o f 100 per cent safety, how can we have an informed 
debate?458
Fox’s view is interesting, in that she identified the exact opposite problem to the one that 
social scientists had in the PABE report as a barrier to effective public dialogue. The shadow 
science Minister Robert Key went further, for in his view (which echoed Holton’s stance a 
decade earlier) we were experiencing the effects of a whole generation of people who had 
grown up in a “culture that was anti-science”.459 He also blamed journalists for reporting 
‘scare stories’ which, he argued, confused the public. The public were being represented as 
only having concerns about science, whereas some social scientists had argued that public 
attitudes were complex and both positive and negative views could be held with regard to 
different areas of science, different institutions of science and wider social issues.460 The six 
attitudinal groups identified in the OST/Wellcome report (2000) had also highlighted a 
prevalence for conceptualising the public into large homogeneous groups which held static 
attitudes to science in the aggregate sense, as opposed to having multiple attitudes to many 
different types of science at the same tim e461 So again we can see that ‘the public’ was being
457 Lee, N. 'Public ignorance 'limits debate' on science policy', Financial Times, 15 July 2002.
458 ibid.
459 ibid.
460 See for example Kerr, A., et al. (1998), 'The new genetics and health: mobilizing lay expertise', 
Public Understanding of Science, 7: 1; Grove-White, Rv et al. (2000), Wising Up: The public and new 
technologies, (Lancaster: Lancaster University); Durant, J., et al. (1998), Biotechnology in the Public Sphere: A  
European Sourcebook, (London: Science Museum).
461 Office o f Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust (2000), op. cit.
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constructed in certain ways that enabled particular boundary work. A deficient public was 
constructed in opposition to scientists who could fill the gap, or a concerned public could be 
used to justify a different sort o f intervention, just as a social scientific construction of a 
deficient science required an intervention by the public, or social scientists.
A high profile example of the different boundary work around science and the public 
occurring within the UK can be seen in a speech made at the Royal Society by the Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, in April 2002, entitled ‘Science Matters’. Though Blair reiterated the 
House o f Lords’ rhetoric of renewing a dialogue between science and society, his speech was 
in many other respects a reiteration of many older arguments for improving the public 
understanding o f science, drawing on discourses o f science that affirmed its separate and 
expert status. He claimed that his impetus for giving the speech came from a group of 
Indian academics telling him that Europe had gone ‘soft on science’, that the debates on GM 
were considered to be astonishing, and that we in the UK were overrun by protestors and 
pressure groups who used emotion to drive out reason. He argued that if we did not get “a 
better understanding o f science and its role”, they may be proved right.462 His main rationale 
for improving this understanding was that science was vital to the UK’s future prosperity. 
Blair went on to promote ‘cutting edge’ UK scientific endeavours, declaring how exciting 
they all were and, crucially, how vital it was that this new science continued with “strong 
funding and strong public support”. His argument echoed the most recent White Paper on 
science, again suggesting that the public had little scope to influence or change technological 
advancement; it was simply a matter of bringing them on board so that scientific progress 
could continue. Blair argued that science was “posing hard questions o f moral judgement 
and o f practical concern”, which, if addressed in the wrong way, could lead to “prejudice 
against science”, which he believed would be profoundly damaging. In this context, he noted 
the previous G overnm ent’s handling of the BSE crisis. He also argued that the media often 
amplified public concerns into fear.
462 All quotes cited from Blair, T. (2002), Science Matters - Speech made at the Royal Society, 10 April 2002, 
www.number-10.gov.uk, accessed June 2002.
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Science, through the speech, was left unscathed and unproblematic - perhaps unsurprising 
given the main audience. Science may have posed ethical questions and these should be 
discussed. But Blair asked that scientists be left to provide government with the best possible 
science, on which a judgement could be made as to how it was to be used or acted upon. His 
final argument was that the benefits o f science would only “be exploited through a renewed 
contract between science and society, based on a proper understanding o f what science is 
trying to achieve”, which implies that, in Blair’s opinion, ‘society’ - described as a different 
cultural space from ‘science’ - did not have a proper understanding, thus suggesting a deficit 
of knowledge. The dangers, as Blair perceived them, were “ignorance o f each others’ point 
of view”; his solution was understanding them through “a robust, engaging dialogue with the 
public”. Arguing that vital work could not be stifled simply because it was controversial, he 
claimed that the Government needed “to re-establish trust and confidence in the way that 
science can demonstrate new opportunities”. This, to Blair, meant embedding a more 
“mature attitude towards science in our society”. Again, the idea of dialogue here seemed to 
be to allow the scientists and government to convince an ‘immature’ public that what they 
were doing was uncontroversial, and should not be stopped.
While the Royal Society welcomed the attention the Prime Minister’s speech gave to UK 
science, not everyone agreed with his representation o f the status quo. Sue Mayer, Executive 
Director o f Genewatch UK and a member o f the AEBC, argued that the Prime Minister’s 
speech had ‘portrayed science as providing the ‘facts’ and public questioning as being 
emotional and trying to obstruct emergence of the “facts’”.463 Others also later criticised 
Blair for misrepresenting the public and its concerns.464
463 Mayer, S. (2002), 'Misrepresenting public concerns', Science and Public Affairs.
464 See for example Wakeford, T. (2002b), 'Blair's Bangalore blinkers', Science and Public Affairs, August 
2002; Irwin (2006), op. cit.; Wilsdon, J. and R. Willis (2004), See-through Science: Why public engagement 
needs to move upstream, (London: Demos).
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The demise o f Copus
In May 2002, Bridget Ogilvie unexpectedly resigned as Chair of Copus.465 Exisiting tensions 
between the three institutions came to light in a House of Commons Science and 
Technology Select Committee report investigating all the learned societies funded by 
Parliament, and then attracted the attentions o f some scientific publications.466 These reports 
suggest conflict between the original three founding bodies for control over the definition, 
direction and funds o f a national science communication agenda. At the British 
Association’s Festival in September of that year Lord Sainsbury asked the British 
Association to conduct a study looking at how the Government should proceed with science 
communication policy and activity. Launching the study Sainsbury said:
... we need today, in a period o f  rapid scientific advances, a more effective dialogue 
between scientists and the public. We have moved decisively away from the era in 
which it was enough for science communicators simply to educate the public about 
science and its benefits. What is needed now is an effective two-way dialogue and 
debate between those who do scientific research and the public.467
The press release went on to state that the British Association would ‘consult with a wide 
range o f those involved in science communication including representatives o f the public’ 
and then report back to the Department o f Trade and Industry on how best to take forward 
dialogue on science and technology. The heads of the British Association, the Royal 
Institution and the Royal Society (the original three founders of Copus) all welcomed the 
study. This might have appeared to be a strange endorsement for a report which would 
potentially conflict with their own efforts in this area and with the work o f Copus, and 
indeed was being conducted by only one o f the founding members. However, following the
465 Ogilvie, B. (2002), Resignation letter to Copus, dated 17 May 2002.
466 House o f Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology (2002), 5th Report: Government 
Funding of the Scientific I earned Societies,
www.publications.parliam ent.uk/pa/cm 200102/cm select/cm sctech/774/77402.htm , accessed July 
2005; Gavaghan, H., 'Royal Society called to account', The Scientist, 13 June 2002. May, R. (2002b), 
'Copus futures', Research Fortnight, 10 July 2002.
467 Department o f  Trade and Industry (2002), Press Release 'Science Communication Study’, 10 September 
2002, (London: DTI).
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publication o f the report by the British Association a month later, it was announced that 
Copus would cease to exist. This suggests that an agreement had been made behind the 
scenes for the organisations to go their separate ways. Thus, amidst this struggle for control 
of Government funded-science communication activity, Lord Sainsbury removed the 
responsibility for overseeing science communication activities in the UK from inside the 
Royal Society, signalling, after 15 years, the demise of Copus. In their joint statement the 
Copus founders said:
We have reached the conclusion that the top-down approach which Copus currently 
exemplifies is no longer appropriate to the wider agenda that the science 
communication community is now addressing. We believe it will be more effective to 
allow organisations to seek their own partnerships and develop their own activities, 
within the strategic framework outlined by the British Association in its report. For 
this reason, we have decided not to appoint a new Chair for Copus and to stand down 
the Council as it is presently constituted.468
The report by the British Association had been informed by consulting a wide range of 
individuals through a web-based questionnaire, and a half-day meeting with individuals and 
organisations involved in, what was now, the large science communication community in the 
UK. They were asked to propose a process that would enable Government to know: what 
science communication activities were taking place; their quality and how effective they were 
in meeting the interests and needs of the public; how organisers of activities could best co­
ordinate their efforts to avoid duplication and potential confusion; and how the Office of 
Science and Technology’s own Science in Society programmes might be developed.469
This report includes a formal definition of the term ‘science in society activities’, which had 
referred in a vague sense to the recommendations of the House o f Lords report, or had been 
self-explanatory, sometimes being used as something which stood in opposition to the 
‘deficit model’ approach, sometimes encompassing it. The British Association defined such 
activities as:
468 Copus (2002), Press Release: Statement on Copus by the British Association, the Royal Institution and the 
Royal Society, 9 December 2002, (The Royal Society)
469 The British Association (2002), Science in Society — Advice to the Office of Science and Technology from the 
BA, 21 November 2002, (The British Association), p. 3.
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... all activities, relating to both the public and private sectors that have an impact on 
the public’s understanding of, attitudes towards, and engagement with science, 
engineering and technology and the issues they raise. In particular, we include within 
their scope all activities that enable the public to engage with, and to influence, the 
people and processes by which policy is determined and implemented including the 
directions and priorities for science-based research in the public and private sectors. 
(P- 3)
‘Dialogue in itself, the report argued, could ‘not be assumed to result in increased support 
for existing policies nor in increased public trust in government’ (p. 3). Instead it should help 
to ensure that the public was ‘well-informed about the nature, potential benefits and risks of 
developments and that those engaged in these developments take public views into account 
in establishing their priorities’ (p. 3).
The research for the report was carried out by Science, Policy and People Ltd who, in their 
own words, were ‘an independent science policy consultancy that specialises in science and 
society issues’.470 The rise of ‘science and society’ consultants highlights the 
professionalisation o f  science communication which had now, over the eighteen-year period 
since the Bodmer report, grown to encompass many professional roles. Many of the actors 
were also graduates from university science communication courses. A criticism o f this 
increasing professionalisation of science communication, which relied on increasing use of 
consultants, came from the Royal Geographical Society in its submission o f evidence to the 
British Association’s report. It argued that the ‘overall thrust o f the report [was] misguided’, 
and went on to state;
470 People, Science and Policy Ltd. highlights an increasing trend at this time for consultants to claim 
they specialised in “doing dialogue”. Since its conception PSP had conducted many reports for 
government departments and other organisations in the PUS/Science and Society arena. This is 
perhaps in no small part due to the fact that its directors both moved, from positions at the 
Wellcome Trust and OST where they had been heavily involved in setting the PUS agenda, to 
establishing their own business addressing the same issues. With this move they managed to direct 
high-level policy agendas while presenting themselves as neutral and independent from governmental 
or corporate influence. See http://www.peoplescienceandpolicy.com/
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It is perhaps not surprising that when a body like the British Association is asked to 
suggest a range o f actions, its answers will be couched in terms o f those things that 
the organisation in question tends to do. This lies at the root o f what we perceive to 
be the problem with this document. The question is -  will the mapping exercises, 
conferences and consultations oudined above produce practical answers, or are they 
more likely to merely subsidise further the growing Public Understanding o f  Science 
(PUS) industry? ... Despite its commitment and the best efforts o f its staff, much o f  
what the Royal Society’s Committee on the Public Understanding o f  Science has done 
over its long lifetime we believe to be o f limited value.471
The ‘PUS Industry’, the Royal Geographical Society argued, consisted o f certain scientists, 
government and other bureaucracies, who understood ‘meetings and mapping exercises, but 
nothing about communication proper, and a clutch of self-interested commercial pollsters, 
conference organisers and PR agencies eager to supply their services’.472 Unlike Bodmer’s 
conceptualisation o f more scientists doing science communication, this role had increasingly 
been taken over by these new professional actors, and we can see yet more boundary work 
here between institutions conflicting over what proper ‘science communication’ was as a 
practice, or an academic discipline, and also who was serving the public’s interests. As the 
Royal Geographical Society argued, while criticising ‘professional science communicators’ in 
their submission to the British Association:
Events organised by this group -  a perfect example o f  which is the so-called Science 
Communicator’s Forum, held each year at the British Association’s Annual Festival -  
succeed largely in allowing these groups to whinge ineffectually at each other while 
other actual science communicators (other scientists, science journalists and media 
relations officers) stay away.473
This commentary also suggests that the reformulation of science communication, with its 
grant schemes and other support now focusing on dialogue that would inform policy, was 
supported by those institutions who were able, or wanted, to do this; those who wanted to 
continue to communicate science to the public had no grants scheme to facilitate this, nor 
perhaps the contacts with, or the relevance to, current science policy concerns. The criticism
471 The Royal Geographical Society (2002), Response to the BA report to the Office of Science and Technology, 
Science and Society, www.rgs.org, accessed November 2002.
472 ibid.
473 ibid.
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also raises the distinction between, and multiple meanings of, communication and dialogue. 
While most institutions previously involved in science communication had simply broadened 
its meaning to encompass dialogue as a two-way form of communication, there was a 
distinct difference between those institutions wishing to engage in either one-way or two- 
way conversations with the public and those institutions trying to influence science policy, or 
restore confidence or trust. For example, the explicit aim of the Royal Society’s Science in 
Society programme was to allow the public to feed into government policy. Their public 
dialogue exercise were promoted by the Society as an example of “doing dialogue”, but they 
had no pathway by which to feed their results into policy-making, begging the question of 
whether this was the ‘dialogue’ the House of Lords committee had recommended.
In a separate endeavour from its Science in Society programme, the Royal Society 
announced that it had formed a working group that would look at the ways in which science 
reached the public via the media.474 The focus of the review was an examination of the peer 
review process, and whether this process managed to facilitate the communication of 
credible research. Communication o f ‘good science’, rather than engagement was seen here 
as part of the way to control the manner in which science was represented in the media. This 
suggests that what Hilgartner termed a ‘dominant model’ o f science communication was 
indeed still commonplace, and that scientists felt it was their responsibility to ensure that the 
media only covered research which had first been approved by them 475 We can also identify 
a reliance on a deficit model, which suggests that the representation provided a useful 
repertoire when performing particular boundary work to make a distinction between science 
and other cultural spaces. Susan Greenfield, writing in The Guardian in 2003, in an echo of C. 
P. Snow’s arguments nearly half a decade before, lamented a ‘widening gulf between a 
science cognoscenti and everyone else. The public, according to Greenfield, now feared 
science, as it became ever removed from the ordinary person. As she argued:
474 The Royal Society, 'Press Release: Royal Society to investigate how research results are 
communicated', 11 August 2003.
475 Hilgartner (1990), op. cit.
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Small wonder there is a knee-jerk to veto all this confusion and scary technology in 
one go. How can Joe Public, after a hard day at work, come home and be expected to 
tease out the pros and cons, weigh up the risks, consider all the implications, and 
differentiate the “yuck” from the reality?476
The only way to evaluate the implications of science was, she continued, to be scientifically 
literate. Jon Turney, responding to her arguments the following week, claimed Greenfield, in 
making the arguments for a greater scientific literacy on the part o f the public, was simply 
joining ‘a long line o f well-intentioned but not very well informed scientists’, who were the 
only people that had believed in an anti-science movement in the first place.477 Thus the 
boundary work between certain social scientists and scientists over definitions o f ‘the public’ 
and the ‘problem’ still continued four years after Lord Sainsbury had declared that the deficit 
model was dead.
GM Nation: O pening Pandora’s lunchbox?
Despite the plethora o f reports, meetings and new initiatives that had occurred since the 
publication o f the House of Lords report, the commitment within governmental circles to 
public dialogue, had extended as far as discussion. In 2003, this commitment was put to the 
test and the ensuing activity highlights the multiple meanings o f ‘the public’ and 
‘engagement’ that existed within the new dialogue agenda for science and technology policy 
within the UK Government. In 1999 GM foods were withdrawn by all the UK’s food 
retailers and producers after consumer pressure, and the Government then agreed that GM 
crops would not be grown commercially in Britain until the results o f the Farm-Scale 
Evaluations (FSEs) were known. The AEBC, charged with advising the Government on GM 
crops, had in their 2001 report Crops on Trial argued that the results o f the FSEs alone would 
be an insufficient basis upon which to make a decision, and public concerns would need to 
be addressed. The AEBC therefore recommended that the Government hold a public debate
476 Greenfield, S. 'A new kind o f  literacy', The Guardian, 10 April 2003.
477 Turney, J. 'How Greenfield got it wrong', The Guardian, 17 April 2003.
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on the issue. The Commission had stressed the importance of encouraging this broader 
national debate:
It will be crucial for the public to be involved in the important decisions which need 
to be taken. We have to find a way to foster informed public discussion o f  the 
development and application o f new technologies.478
The AEBC had also expressed the opinion that a different kind o f consultation was needed 
for GM crops, arguing that the public should be given the opportunity to guide the way in 
which the issue was debated, rather than respond to an agenda set by others.479 Drawing on 
the advice o f many social scientists, the recent work on public engagement in science by the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,480 and the earlier report by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution,481 in early 2002 the AEBC made specific 
recommendations on how a public debate might be conducted.482
The Government, facing wide-spread media controversy over GM foods, accepted the 
AEBC's advice and the design o f a public debate began in July 2002. GM Nation? was run in 
parallel with two other strands of activity established by the Government: a review of the 
science behind GM to be conducted by Sir David King, the Chief Scientific Adviser, and a 
study into the overall costs and benefits associated with the growing o f GM crops by the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. Kass, a member of the steering board, claims that from the 
outset the relationship between these three strands, and how they inter-related, was not very 
clear. There was discussion amongst members of the Steering Group as to whether the 
results o f the public debate would inform the other strands, or whether the public debate 
was being sidelined in terms o f shaping subsequent policy.483
478 AEBC (2001), Crops on Trial: A  Report by the AEBC, (London: AEBC).
479 PDSB (2003), GM Nation? The findings from the public debate - Report by the Public Debate Steering Board, 
(London: Department o f  Trade and Industry).
480 Parliamentary Office o f Science and Technology (2001), op. cit.
481 RCEP (1998a), op. cit.
482 AEBC (2002), A  debate about the issue of possible commercialisation of GM  crops in the UK, (London: 
AEBC).
483 Kass Interview, 21 May 2004. See also Mason, J. 'Doubts over GM crops debate', Financial Times, 21 
March 2003.
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The purpose o f the public debate was represented in a variety o f ways in Government 
statements: it was an opportunity for the public to voice their concerns and feed these into 
the policy process, or it was an opportunity to educate the public on the science o f GM 
crops. Announcing the debate in 2002, Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett stated:
The Government wants a genuinely open and balanced discussion on GM. There is 
clearly a wide range o f  views on this issue and we want to ensure all voices are heard 
... the public debate will deepen public understanding o f all the issues surrounding 
GM. If there are gaps and uncertainties in knowledge these need to be ascertained, 
acknowledged and addressed.484
The aim o f the debate as expressed by the independent Steering Board,485 which had been 
convened to run the debate, was to:
... promote an innovative, effective and deliberative programme o f  debate on GM 
issues, framed by the public, against the background o f the possible commercial 
production o f  GM crops in the UK and the options for possibly proceeding with this.
The debate [would] provide meaningful information to Government about the nature 
and spectrum o f the public's views, particularly at grass roots level, to inform decision­
making.486
Further communication from Beckett to Malcolm Grant, Chairman of the AEBC and the 
GM Debate Steering Board, suggested that there was a discrepancy between their 
conceptualisations o f what the debate was for:
The Government’s ambition, at the end o f this process, is to have achieved a broader 
and deeper understanding o f  what genetic modification is, how it can be used, and 
what the risks and the benefits are. We also want to have a clearer picture o f  the 
questions that most interest or concern the public within the UK on GM issues.
484 Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs (2002), Press Release: "Public to Choose Issues for 
GM Debate" - Beckett, (DTI).
485 The GM Debate Steering Board was comprised o f members with a wide range o f expertise and 
perspectives on GM issues, which was to avoid the debate being perceived as biased in one way or 
another. These included some members o f the AEBC, scientists, social scientists, and representatives 
o f environmental and consumer NG O s.
486 GM Nation website, GM  Nation Public Debate website, www.gmnation.org.uk, accessed July 2006.
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The starting point is that decisions are based on the scientific evidence as to whether 
there is a risk to human health or the environment. It is, however, important that 
these decisions are taken in the context o f a full understanding amongst the public o f  
their implications.487
The manner in which the output o f the debate would be considered by the Government was 
not formally laid out, and after a request from the Steering Group the Government agreed, 
in January 2003, to respond formally to the report from the debate, and to demonstrate how 
it had taken into account the public views expressed in developing policy on GM. The 
Government had originally allocated only a budget of £250,000 for the debate. In response 
to much criticism, including concerns from ten senior social scientists during the planning of 
the debate, the Steering Board advised the Government that this would be insufficient to 
fund a credible debate, and the overall budget was doubled to £500,000.488
Further questioning o f the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the results of the 
public debate would influence policy came, a few months later in early 2003, with the 
announcement that the EU approval process for the import or cultivation o f GM crops was 
to be restarted. As Grant pointed out in a letter to Beckett, this would mean that the 
Government would begin to give opinions on GM products before the public debate had 
finished taking place. As he continued:
The public may wonder, however, why the Government is participating in approval 
processes while the programme o f GM debate activities is underway. They may think 
that if the approvals process seems to be carrying on regardless, it undermines the 
credibility o f  calling for a debate.489
On the eve o f the debate, Grant expressed his concern that the Government might not take 
the results into account. A group of eight NGOs also criticised the organisation o f the
487 Beckett, M., letter to Malcolm Grant, 7 November 2002, www.gmnation.org.uk, accessed January 
2004.
488 Burgess, J., et al. (2002), Some observations and proposals on the 2002-2003 Public Dialogue on possible 
commercialisation of GM  crops in the UK, (For the Public Debate Steering Board meeting, N ov 7th 2002).
489 Grant, M., letter to Margaret Beckett, 18 March 2003, www.gmnation.org.uk, accessed January 2004.
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exercise as being ‘chaotic’, and the Government for not giving enough time, or the right 
quality of information, for people to properly engage in the debate.490
GM Nation? began on 3 June 2003, with the first of six regional public meetings, and over 
the following six weeks more than six hundred public meetings took place and 37,000 
questionnaire forms were returned. Alongside the public meetings a series o f discussion 
groups had been convened and reconvened to provide more in-depth analysis, and to act as 
a control group for the results that came out o f the wider debate, to avoid the potential for 
the public groups to be solely comprised by members o f ‘special interest groups’ who were 
campaigning on GM issues. The Steering Board reported the views on GM that emerged 
from the debate to the Government in September 2003. Their analysis of all o f the data 
concluded that there were far more people, in both the focus groups and the wider public 
meetings, who were ‘cautious, suspicious or outrightly hostile to GM crops’ than there were 
supportive towards them.491 There was also little support for the early commercialisation of 
them.492 Thanking the Steering Board for the report, Beckett acknowledged that the process 
had been ‘long and sometimes difficult’, as she continued:
I recognise that the debate was a new and innovative way o f  engaging the public on a 
complex policy issue, and that it has helped to raise awareness and understanding 
about GM .493
The extract above highlights the multiple conceptualisations o f ‘dialogue’ and ‘the public’ 
within the Government. The AEBC had conceptualised GM Nation? as an opportunity to 
ascertain public views and values, and feed these into the policy-making process, yet Beckett 
conceptualised it as something which had increased awareness and understanding of GM. 
The process o f getting the Government to commit to the idea o f taking the debate, and
490BBC News, 'Public needs voice on GM issue', BBC News Online, 2 June 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/uk_politics/2955150.stm , accessed Novem ber 2003.
491 PDSB (2003), op. cit.
492 Later evaluations o f the data , however, have questioned the validity o f these overall assertions. 
See for example, Campbell, S. and Townsend, E. (2003), 'Flaws undermine results o f UK biotech 
debate', Nature, 425; Rowe, G. et al. (2005), 'Difficulties in evaluating public engagement initiatives: 
reflections on an evaluation o f  the UK GM Nation? public debate about transgenic crops', Public 
Understanding of Science, 14: 4.
493 Beckett, M., Letter to Malcolm Grant, 6 November 2003, www.gmnation.org.uk, accessed January 
2004.
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public opinions and values seriously, had, according to Kass, been a battle throughout.494 
Thus we can see that the Government was here rhetorically reinforcing the idea that the 
‘expertise’ that was applicable to policy-making, was something that could be located within 
science or government, but was not something within ‘the public’. The Government 
response to the outcomes of the public debate, however, stated that the Government took 
public concerns very seriously, and that it had recognised the need to address the people’s 
anxieties about GM crops 495 We can identify several different versions o f ‘the public’ within 
their response, each o f which performs its own boundary work, legitimating the 
Government’s views. Stating that it had carefully considered each of the concerns raised in 
the debate, the Government acknowledged that general negative opinions on GM crops 
existed but then appeared to downgrade the negative views of those participants in the 
debate on the grounds that they were not representative of a general public’s views. As the 
report stated:
We accept that the findings o f the public debate broadly reflect the current state of  
public opinion on GM crops. We acknowledge that people are generally uneasy about 
GM crops and food, and that there is little support for early commercialisation o f GM 
crops in this country. However the results suggest that the general public may have a 
lower degree o f  outright opposition to GM than the participants in the debate, while 
still being very cautious, (p. 5)
The Government also committed itself to providing better information on GM products and 
application, and also continued openness and transparency in this area, stating that the EU 
regulatory framework now required mandatory public consultation on any new GM 
application. What remained unclear, both with respect to future consultations, and in this 
response, was how the Government intended to use the data gained. Much o f the response 
suggests that the Government perceived holding the public debate as the main achievement 
and had not considered what would then be done with the results. The flexibility in the term 
‘the public’ allowed the Government to define what, or who, that was, and then do so in a 
manner which discounted the results o f the public dialogue as not legitimate for not 
representing the ‘true’ public. The National Consumer Council, later argued that:
494 Kass Interview, 21 May 2004.
495 HM Government (2004), Government’s response to the GM Nation?public debate, accessed at 
www.genewatch.org/sub-531175 February 2007, p. 5.
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... the Government has proved unable to deal with the scope o f  public questioning 
about the trajectory o f GM technology. Whilst it had the courage to hold a public 
debate, it did not have the maturity to deal with the outcomes in any depth.496
GM Nation? was an ‘unprecedented’, and therefore experimental, national event in public 
engagement. A semi-official evaluation which was not funded by Government, or part o f the 
debate process itself, but did have access to all the proceedings and was recognised by the 
debate steering board, concluded, like the genetics pressure group GeneWatch,497 that there 
had been some problems with the conduct o f the debate 498 This evaluation did not, 
however, go on to look at how the findings of the debate were used by Government, or how 
they influenced policy.
Engaging or m anaging the public?
Kass reflected that by 2003 there had been a noticeable change in attitudes towards science 
communication and the public, and managing risk and uncertainty. These encompassed ideas 
of public dialogue and engagement and precaution, however, this change had not, within 
government, spread far beyond those within the Office o f Science and Technology499 
Barbara Knowles also characterised the situation in a similar manner:
496 National Consumer Council Memorandum submitted as evidence to the House o f Commons 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2003), Conduct of the GM  Public Debate, Eighteenth 
Report of Session 2002-03, (London: HMSO).
497 Mayer, S. (2003), Avoiding the difficult issues: A  GeneWatch report on the Government's response to the GM  
Nation?public debate, www.genewatch.org/sub-531175, accessed February 2007.
498 Rowe, et al. (2005), op. cit.
499 Kass Interview, 21 May 2004.
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“I think we’re certainly not at the stage where what you might call Science and Society 
thinking has become embedded in the rest o f the DTI, but that depends which bit o f  
DTI you’re talking about actually. So the area o f DTI that’s most obviously thinking 
about these sort o f issues is the Biotech part. I guess because there’s fear that there 
won’t be a Biotech industry in the UK if the public doesn’t support it and the public is 
generally viewed as not supporting it. I don’t think there should be any conflict 
actually, what the DTI is about, is the UK being great at innovation, and at exploiting 
the outputs o f academic research into industrial outputs and new products, new 
services. Except that none o f these things are actually going to lead to wealth creation 
unless the public, in their role as consumers, buy the products or the services or allow 
the research to be done.”500
Another extreme, though telling, episode also begs the question of how much the discussion 
and legitimacy o f academic perspectives outside o f the natural sciences were accepted in a 
science policy-making context. Policy Researcher Andy Stirling had been appointed to the 
GM Science Review panel one of the three GM reviews the Government had undertaken in 
2003. He had taken a sceptical and precautionary approach to GM crops and as a result a 
senior scientist had attempted to undermine Stirling’s standing, and research, and threatened 
his funding if he continued to make such views known to the panel. The event, as 
environmental group Friends of the Earth argued at the time, threatened to undermine the 
public’s confidence in the scientific advisory and regulatory process.501 An investigation was 
launched into the matter as another member o f the panel - a social scientist - had also 
resigned, for fears that his own research funding might be threatened by his views 
challenging GM crop approvals. The Chief Scientific Adviser made it very clear that the 
Government deplored the attack on Stirling.502 Jeff Thomas, lecturer in science 
communication, reflecting on this period questioned how far scientists were willing to take 
onboard perspectives from other disciplines and whether these were legitimately welcomed 
wholeheartedly into the scientific advice process:
500 Knowles, B. (2004), Interview, 9 August 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
501 Friends o f  the Earth, 'Press release: "Deplorable" attack on GM Scientific Critic', 25 July 2003.
502 GM Science Review Panel Minutes (2003), Minutes of the Science Review Panel 24 June, (London:
DTI).
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“If I was being sceptical I would think that the deeply ingrained, embedded 
philosophies o f at least the practicing scientists has not shifted a great deal and how  
significant and also how real is this apparent change on the surface?”503
Knowles, however, claimed that the lack o f uptake within government o f much social 
science research into science and the public was due to civil servants and science 
communication practitioners not being able to understand the social science. This, 
apparently had facilitated the separation between them:
[there is] quite a gulf between the social science theory and the public engagement 
practice. The public engagement practitioners have looked to social science in the past 
for advice ‘what should we be doing differently then?’, and most social scientists 
don’t, can’t, answer that question. And the practitioners have stopped asking, there’s 
this sort o f feeling that some o f  the social science research that’s being done, while 
probably hugely academically valuable is actually o f no practical use at all to any o f the 
science communicators, or if it is, it is too late. And there’s also a problem about the 
communicating o f it, so the social sciences will be talking in their own groups about 
Science and Society and often aren’t talking to the policy-makers or science 
communicators.”504
The multiplicity o f understandings within institutional circles as to the role of dialogue and 
science communication, and just who was the public that should be engaged with, can also 
be seen in the Department o f Trade and Industry’s Forward Look 2003 report.505 Much of the 
report discussed the need for innovation to be increased, and the desire for science to be 
forging ahead. Only in a few places did the idea of public engagement arise, and these were 
generally within the departments charged with conducting it, which suggests that public 
engagement with science was not something that permeated the Government’s approach to 
science and innovation. There was some discussion of the public, and public engagement 
which suggested some level o f acceptance o f this approach. Lord Sainsbury argued that the 
public must be given opportunities for dialogue with scientists and policy-makers, ‘to learn 
about and express their views about the possible directions o f science and its impacts on
503 Thomas, J. (2004), Interview, 14 July 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
504 Knowles Interview, 9 August 2004.
505 Office o f  Science and Technology (2003), The Forward Ijook 2003: Government Funded Science, 
Engineering and Technology, (DTI).
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society’.506 No mention was made of what would be done with these views. Thus 
engagement could be undertaken to make the public feel that they had been listened to or to 
allow these views to influence the policy-making process. The issue o f public engagement 
would be addressed, Lord Sainsbury argued, by the Office of Science and Technology’s 
Public Engagement with Science and Technology programme (previously the Public 
Understanding o f Science Programme), and the Research Councils. These programmes 
aimed, he argued, to ‘raise public awareness o f the outcomes of publicly funded science and 
the role of science in everyday life, encourage dialogue between the public and scientists, and 
increase the impact o f public engagement activities’ (p. 8). The first o f these aims mobilised a 
deficit model conception of the public; the latter two aims, however, were more in keeping 
with social scientific ideas of a ‘dialogue model’ of science and society relations, and the 
public. A telling final sentence, however, which followed Lord Sainsbury’s declaration that 
the DTI would be implementing most o f the British Association’s recommendations on 
science and society, suggests the ultimate aim, to him at least, for all these activities was a 
change in public attitudes towards science and scientists:
It is my firm aim that the steps that we and others are taking should help to ensure 
that science becomes an even more relevant, valued and understood part o f  society in 
its widest sense, (p. 9)
506 ibid., p. 8.
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Phase III: Conclusions
This phase is dominated by the emergence o f a new language, used by scientists and policy­
makers, which suggests that the relationship between science and the public was being 
constructed in a different manner from previous accounts. What is evident within this new 
language, however, is a multiplicity o f meanings o f ‘the public’, and ‘science’, as well as 
different usages o f the terms ‘science communication’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘engagement’. While 
much of the new language used by scientists and policy makers was similar to that used by 
social scientists, thus suggesting some convergence of the rhetoric of public understanding 
of science, I would argue that instead we see the specific meanings assigned to these terms in 
a social scientific context getting ‘lost in translation’ as they were taken up by other 
professions and used to achieve other purposes. Thus the new dominant discourse of 
‘science and society’ was as contested a cultural space as PUS had been. We can see that 
these new terms were being rhetorically employed in boundary work just as earlier ones 
were. The legitimacy now afforded to some social scientific research into science and the 
public by policy-makers - particularly the idea that there is not one public which must be 
dealt with but multiple publics - I would suggest allowed a greater flexibility in the rhetorical 
usage o f this term. Thus we see many different conceptualisations o f these multiple publics, 
often used by the same actors, but drawing the boundaries between science and society in 
different ways to suit their specific interests at that moment. For example the results of GM 
Nation were able to be discounted by the UK Government for not being representative of 
the ‘true’ public, who in this case were those perceived not to have a special interest in GM. 
In other instances, for example, in pronouncements by the Department o f Trade and 
Industry, the relevant ‘public’, or ‘consumer’ is variably constructed, however, as the whole 
nation, or anyone who will be buying scientific products. The OST/Wellcome, on the other 
hand, divided the public up in their 2000 report into distinct categories on the basis of their 
interest in science, and which media sources they consumed, thus serving the ‘marketing’ 
interests o f the specific science communication industry the report was aimed at.
Chapter 6 detailed a rhetorical redrawing of the boundaries between science, policy-making 
and the public. Here we can see a different construction o f the problem between science and
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the public, within which a new deficit model operated, predominantly concerned with a 
deficit o f ‘correct’ attitudinal responses in the public (trust and/or confidence) rather than a 
knowledge deficit. The ‘problem’ was variably defined as a need to restore, rebuild or 
manufacture these public attitudes with respect to science, or science policy-making. That 
the ‘problem’ o f ‘science and society’ was couched in terms of ‘rebuilding’, or ‘restoring’ 
confidence also assumes that these attitudes were present in the first place, and almost 
explicidy acknowledges that the efforts were about engineering a public attitude change, 
where before the explicit aim was to engineer an increase in knowledge. This discourse of 
‘restoration’, again problematises the public, suggesting that the way things should be was 
how they once were.
New boundaries become more prominent, particularly in the wake o f controversy over BSE, 
particularly those between the Government and the public, and the Government and 
science. Equally, where before the boundary work around issues of the public understanding 
of science can be interpreted as concerned with promoting an expert or authoritative notion 
of science and scientists, here we also see the Government concerned variably with 
expanding, rebuilding or manufacturing its own authority to govern over scientific matters.
Communicating that science was open and transparent to the public was seen as a means of 
addressing the ‘problem’ o f a lack of trust or confidence, and thus managing the relationship 
between science and the public. I would argue that the implication o f the use o f this new 
discourse by scientists and policy-makers, was that it put the public back in a passive role of 
the ‘modest witness’: if the public was satisfied that science was operating in an open and 
transparent manner then science would be left alone to continue its work. Alongside this, the 
idea that ‘public values’ should feed into policy-making around science and technology was 
discussed at length in policy-making circles. Again, however, public values and attitudes were 
largely constructed as separate, and secondary, from scientific information in the process of 
decision-making, thus this construction o f the public as having values, simultaneously 
reinforced the primacy and authority of science as something that is separate from these, in 
keeping with Gieryn’s definition of protection of autonomy boundary work. Thus much of the 
variety in language seen in policy-makers’ and scientists’ arguments can be seen as them
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rhetorically redrawing the boundaries around their professions to appear ‘open’ and 
‘transparent’ in the way they communicate with the public, while simultaneously attempting 
to reinforce the separate social space, and authoritative role of, science and scientists in 
decision-making.
Chapter 7 detailed the continued renegotiation o f boundaries within the PUS arena. This can 
be seen most strongly in the House of Lords Report Science and Society which almost 
overnight appears to have legitimised a ‘new’ orthodoxy in science and public relations. The 
inclusion o f Wynne in drafting this report suggests a new legitimacy for certain social 
scientific views, and actors, within scientific and policy-making circles and the final report 
did reflect a change in language, discarding the label of ‘Public Understanding of Science’ in 
favour o f ‘Science and Society’, alongside official proclamations that the deficit model of the 
public understanding o f science was ‘dead’. We can interpret this as an indication that 
scientists and policy-makers were attempting to redraw, or renegotiate, their boundaries 
around this thing that had been called PUS and, with the new name, to discard the deficit 
model and methods o f communication associated with the former. With this uptake o f terms 
previously used only by certain social scientists, we can, however, identify an increasing 
variety of definitions o f the problem of science and society relations. Alongside this we also 
see different constructions of ‘the public’, ‘science communication’, ‘science’, ‘public 
engagement’, and ‘dialogue’ which were used, sometimes simultaneously by the same 
individuals or organisations, to rhetorically construct themselves and the boundaries between 
science, government, the public, and social scientists in different ways.
While the deficit model o f PUS was acknowledged as ‘deficient’ itself, or indeed ‘dead’, by 
many actors, the construction o f the public as ‘deficient’ is still present within these new 
‘problems’ of science and society, albeit now the deficiency being allocated was a different 
concern. Most prominent is the allocation o f a deficit o f trust and confidence, which was 
now a central focus o f many scientific and policymaking individuals and organisations. 
However, again we see deficiencies being allocated by, and applied to, many different 
professional groups. Certain scientists and policy-makers were also identified as deficient in 
terms o f their efforts to engage and communicate with the public. Equally the media was
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problematised by the House of Lords committee as being deficient in its role as a science 
communicator, while at the same time scientists were told to work with it as it is. The deficit 
label remained then a useful rhetorical weapon to be deployed against rival professional 
groups competing over the same epistemological space. It is worth noting also, that 
alongside these newer uses of the deficit label, we can still identify within this period that 
there was also much discussion o f improving the public’s understanding o f science, risk, and 
of the processes o f science. Thus again multiple interpretations of the public are identifiable 
within the phrase ‘science and society’.
Chapter 8 continued to show the variety in framings of the ‘science and society’ problem 
and/or relationship. Blair’s speech, I would argue, succincdy displays the manner in which a 
particular social scientific discourse of ‘dialogue’, ‘trust’, ‘openness’, ‘uncertainty’, had been 
taken up and used within government and scientific institutions, yet the boundaries these 
organisations were drawing with their usage were very different. Much o f the original work 
by academics such as Wynne and Irwin had specifically called for science itself to be 
problematised, yet at no point is this suggested in any o f the discussion by government, 
policy-makers or scientists. Thus the rhetorical strategies may have changed to utilise new 
language, but the boundaries being constructed were very similar to those we have seen in 
earlier phases, with science and the public kept bounded off from each other, the latter being 
problematised, and the former not. Indeed Blair explicitly argued for a reliance on “sound 
science”, on which to make decisions, the alternative being a “culture o f unreason” where 
public opinions would hamper much needed innovation.
We also can identify a growing conflict and boundary work within science, or, more 
specifically, the science communication community, over the authority o f particular 
organisations to define and act upon this new science and society agenda. One-way 
‘dominant model’ methods of science communication had served to position scientists in an 
expert, and therefore authoritative role, with respect to the public. However, this new 
conception o f ‘science and society’ and dialogue was formulated in a manner which 
potentially put scientists on an even level with the public, and encouraged two-way 
communication, and a mutual understanding of each other. Much of the activity at this time
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suggests that the organisations were attempting to construct, expand, or protect their role 
within this new landscape of science and society in a way that did not compromise their 
authority over scientific communication and decision-making. Equally many were dealing 
with an expansion in the field of professional science communicators and consultants who 
were also positioning themselves as the legitimate actors to manage the relationship between 
science and the public.
Furthermore, while the language of dialogue was now ubiquitous across government and the 
science communication arena, there was still little interaction or involvement of social 
scientists in the running, designing, advising or evaluating of these dialogue or engagement 
exercises. Given that for some time social scientists had been engaged in running 
participatory exercises, or, as in the case o f Lancaster University running training courses in 
how to conduct them, this brings us back to the science/social science boundary issue which 
was prominent in Phase II.507 One should be careful, however, not to characterise this divide 
in a general and overtly dichotomous nature. Though it is significant, as in the previous 
Phase, one can find examples of protagonists mobilising and adopting critiques o f other’s 
from within their own, or related disciplines.508
The redefinition o f ‘Public Understanding o f Science’ into ‘Science and Society’ meant that 
those scientific institutions previously promoting the former, simply took on responsibility 
for the latter as their primary task. The rationale behind the new ‘science and society’ agenda, 
as identified in the House of Lords report, put the impetus for most o f these institutions on 
‘restoring’, or ‘improving’ the public’s confidence, or trust, in ‘science’, ‘scientists’, or ‘the
507 The Centre for the Study o f Environmental Change, where academics Brian Wynne and Robin 
Grove-White were based had run in 2000 a 2-day training course entided ‘Listening to the Public: 
Consultation, Participation and Deliberation’, which covered amongst other subjects, training in how  
to run participatory exercises which would help shape policies, both local and national. 
www.lancs.ac.uk/users/profession/programme_outline.htm, accessed October 2003
508 Biologist Steven Rose, for example, had, in 2003 (op. cit.), criticised scientific PUS protagonists 
for not understanding the public. Biologist Wakeford (2002a), now working in a social science 
research centre had argued that the use o f citizen’s juries could be as used to advance a public 
relations agenda as much as it could be to allow citizen input into a scientific policy decision. Mayer 
and Stirling (2001), equally, had advocated caution on the part o f those who might assume that new 
participatory models o f  engagement would necessarily remove the obstacles inherent in the 
regulatory appraisal o f  technological risks.
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governance o f science’. Contrary to this, many of the social scientists critical o f a traditional 
public understanding of science agenda had always largely been arguing for the 
democratisation o f science and its institutions to allow public values to play a role in shaping 
the scientific agenda, and science policy. They were not, nor had they ever been, arguing for 
the restoration o f the authority o f science and scientists; they were specifically wanting to 
change this power dynamic, while also in the process advancing their own professional 
expertise. This could explain why many within the two groups were still, in 2003, largely 
operating within different spheres o f influence and expertise despite using much more 
similar language than before.
‘Engagement’ or ‘dialogue’ with the public became an official approach to dealing with the 
relationship between science and society by many scientific and political organisations in this 
phase. Yet, again we can identify that these terms are used flexibly to achieve different goals. 
The end-goal o f engagement with the public, as already identified, could be very different: 
restoring or building confidence or trust in science, scientists or government policy-making, 
allowing public values to feed into policy-making, or to make better decisions in science 
policy. The GM Nation? exercise also highlights another formulation o f ‘the public’ within 
conversations o f science and society. Previously the public had been problematised for 
having no scientific knowledge; but here, the legitimate public participant in such an exercise 
was characterised as exactly one who does not have any knowledge, or, more importantly, 
any entrenched social or political views. Thus emerges an idea o f an ideal public, what 
Lezaun and Soneryd call ‘the idiot public’,509 untouched by any previous attitudes towards 
science. This suggests again a departure from Wynne and others’ conceptualisation of the 
public as having just this sort o f expertise, but also reinforces the idea that scientists were 
not, or should not be, ‘tainted’ by social and ethical values, harking back to Boyle’s idea of 
the scientific ‘gentleman’.510
509 Lezaun, J. and Soneryd, L. (2007), 'Consulting Citizens: Technologies o f Elicitation and the 
Mobility o f Publics', Public Understanding of Science, 16: 3.
510 Shapin, S. and Schaffer, S. (1985), Nviathan and the A ir Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental JJfe, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
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The desire to involve this idealised public in engagement or dialogue is open to the 
interpretation that these methods had attitudinal engineering as a primary goal. If a member 
o f the public did not hold any particular views on an issue, and those who did were not 
desired, then the implication was that the ideal participants could be led to the ‘proper’ or 
desired outcome. Thus public engagement in this formulation is conceived as a tool with 
which to manufacture public consent for established innovation and technological 
trajectories, and not to allow the public to shape these. Further to these constructions o f the 
public, we can also identify many others being mobilised by actors within this phase, each 
rhetorically drawing the boundaries between the public and science in a different manner. 
Some, as in previous phases, conceptualised the public as ‘ignorant’, or ‘irrational’, whereas 
now we also find other ‘deficient’ characterisations, which relate to a lack o f the right kind of 
attitude, be this trust, or confidence in science, scientists or scientific governance. Further to 
this we also find the public variably being defined as a ‘mass public’, ‘consumers’, ‘citizens’, 
or multiple and variegated ‘publics’. Furthermore, ‘science’ continued to be mobilised by 
certain scientists and policy-makers in this phase, as something that was separate from social 
and ethical values, albeit as something that needed to be influenced by them.
Thus in this phase, though it is characterised by a general shift towards a dominant, and 
more unified, language, we see a variety of understandings and motivations behind a single 
phrase ‘science and society’, as we also saw behind ‘public understanding of science’ in the 
previous 15 years.
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9 Going ‘upstream* without a paddle? Phase I V
As we approach this last phase, this history enters a period which was developing as I carried 
out my research. This phase therefore relies on far less interview data and secondary sources 
as it post-dates the period in which I carried out my primary research. Furthermore, it is a 
period in which I was professionally involved in some of the events and reports,511 thus the 
evidential basis is slightly different to previous phases. As discussed in Chapter 1, my status 
as ‘researcher’ in this period is more akin to a ‘participant observer’. While I do not feel that 
this invalidates an attempt at a faithful account or interpretation of the proceeding events, it 
is important to both acknowledge and be reflexive about this change in perspective which 
entailed a more structured approach to the data analysis. To reiterate, I had to accept that 
being an actor in the history I was writing will, by necessity, influence the way in which I 
interpret it. Thus I had to ensure, when using different sorts o f data, such as media coverage 
collected during the period, or subjective observational data, that I cross checked and 
triangulated the events and arguments to ensure a fair and accurate representation.
It is a period in which the debates over the relationship between science and the public 
continue to evolve and we will see that many social scientists were now engaging in policy 
discussions surrounding the question of whether dialogue between science and society was a 
viable alternative to one-way science communication.512 Significantly, as the last chapter 
showed, the social scientific language surrounding ‘the public’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘public 
engagement’, which had been ignored during the earlier phases o f public understanding of 
science when led by the scientific institutions, had now been taken up and was being used by 
those same institutions, as well as within government and policy-making circles. Indeed, as 
Irwin and Michael argued in 2003 in their book Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge, very
511 I worked as a researcher at the RSA between 2002 -  2005, and also within the Office o f Science 
and Technology for four months in 2005.
512 Wynne and Durant had been involved in the House o f Lords report. Andy Stirling and Robin 
Grove-White had sat on committee’s involved in the government’s GM review.
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often, arguments from social scientists were now being drawn upon as support for public 
dialogue ventures. They called the language of restoring public trust and confidence ‘the new 
orthodoxy’ within scientific and science policy-making organisations.513
Many social scientists were not wholly welcoming, or at least were sceptical, o f this apparent 
shift in focus with respect to the relationship between science and public. With respect to 
gene technology specifically, sociologist Anne Kerr argued that despite the recent shift in 
efforts to engage the public over the technology, many attempts at dialogue seemed 
structured simply to identify deficits in knowledge in an effort to persuade the public to align 
their views with the technical experts, rather than to understand the wider social context. 
Kerr concluded, ‘it would be naive to assume that present relationships between 
professionals, patients, publics and genetic diseases are fundamentally different from those 
of the past’.514
Irwin and Michael also argued that it would be important to ‘take a critical and informed 
look at the supposed shift from deficit theory to ‘dialogue theory’.515 Their book addressed 
both the practical public understanding o f science movement and the use o f social science to 
study it:
The truth is that Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge has been written as much in 
frustration as in celebration. When we looked to the practical sphere o f  ‘scientific and 
public governance’, we found understandings and techniques still largely uninformed 
by the significant insights yielded by ‘public understanding o f science and technology’ 
and ‘social theory’ . . . .  We have written this book, however, in the conviction that 
things could be an awful lot better, (p. xi)
The book reiterated the authors’ earlier criticisms of the deficit model o f public 
understanding o f science,516 as well as Irwin’s scepticism at new governmental approaches to 
public engagement having moved away from the deficit model.517 As they explained:
513 Irwin, A. and Michael, M. (2003), Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge, (McGraw Hill: Open 
University Press), p. x.
514 Kerr, A. (2003), 'Rights and Responsibilities in the New Genetic Era', Critical Social Polity, 2.
515 Irwin and Michael (2003), op. cit., p. x.
516 Irwin and Wynne (1996), op. cit.; Michael (1992), op. cit.
517 Irwin (2001) op. cit.
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... we detect a partial shift away from this model and pointed to several examples 
where public groups were seemingly afforded a far more prominent role in the 
process o f  negotiation and discussion. Despite this, closer inspection suggested that, 
even those instances where the public were invited to ‘participate’ or were ‘consulted’, 
the notion o f  the public as deficient was still very much in evidence.518
Problematising social studies of science also, particularly those that studied science and lay- 
publics as distinct spheres, they called for a more complex and sophisticated approach to the 
public understanding of science and scientific governance. This approach, they urged, would 
accept that science, publics and knowledge were all co-constructed and fluid entities, with 
the line between them blurred constantly. What then, they asked in their concluding chapter, 
were the implications of their arguments and approach for the multidiscipline o f public 
understanding of science? The answer, they suggested, would perhaps not be a welcome one 
to the many professional bodies and individuals involved and invested in the area after 
twenty years o f activity:
At one level, the proper response is that this should be disbanded (if that is possible 
for a multidiscipline). Our approach has so problematised the categories o f  public and 
science (not to say understanding), that it seems that a rather different intellectual and 
political project is called for. (p. 157)
Sociologist Rob Hagendijk also argued that it remained to be seen to what extent 
governments would distance themselves from a “‘deficit’ perspective”. Discussing the recent 
European Commission’s paper entided ‘Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe’ he 
argued that two different voices were struggling to be heard:
The dominant voice is the inclusive voice, assuring the reader that citizens’ concerns 
should be taken seriously, and ought not to be treated in a condescending way. In 
contrast with this, however, a second, more ‘scientistic’ voice argues that the public 
can only contribute properly if it is adequately educated and instructed.519
He argued that in the same document one found sentences such as: T be dialogue between 
society and science needs to be a two-way street where each listens as much as he talks’ and:
518 Irwin and Michael (2003), op. cit., p. xi.
519 Hagendijk, R. P. (2004), 'The Public Understanding o f Science and Public Participation in 
Regulated Worlds', Minerva, 42, p. 46.
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‘The dialogue will be all the more rewarding.. .when [the public] has a thorough knowledge 
and understanding o f science and technology, of scientific ‘facts’, o f the results o f research, 
of scientific action and of the way in which research operates in practical 
terms’ (p. 46). This does suggest that there was still a tension within policy circles over how 
best to manage the relationship between science and society, and a reluctance to give up 
previous convictions as to how it might operate.
An official move ‘upstream*
One of the criticisms which had been levelled at the 2003 GM Nation? debate was that it had 
taken place too late to influence the direction o f GM research, and thus it had failed as a 
example o f ‘true’ public engagement.520 Addressing this concern in a paper for a Progressive 
Governance conference at the No. 10 Policy Unit towards the end o f that same year, the 
think-tanks Demos and Green Alliance explored the possibility of conducting public 
engagement at an earlier stage in the innovation process, within the context of 
nanotechnology:
Much nanotechnology is at an equivalent stage in R&D terms to biotechnology in the 
late 1970s or early 1980s. The forms and eventual applications o f the technology are 
not yet determined. We still have the opportunity to intervene and improve the social 
sensitivity o f  innovation processes at the design stage -  to avoid the mistakes that 
were made over other technologies.521
This idea that public engagement should move to an earlier point in the innovation process, 
where there might still be time to influence the outcome of the technology in question, was 
echoed by other organisations. The Forum for Technology, Citizens and the Market, a 
collaborative project between the Royal Society of Arts and the Department o f Science and 
Technology Studies at UCL, had been exploring the interactions between science-based 
businesses, their product development and their publics, and promoted this same idea. Their
520Mayer (2003), op. cit.; National Consumer Council Memorandum submitted as evidence to the 
House o f Commons (2003), op. cit.
521 Wilsdon, J. and R. Willis (2004), See-through Science: why public engagement needs to move upstream, 
(London: Demos).
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research showed that there was, however, very little conception o f a wider public, or social 
and ethical issues, in science-based companies beyond that of the immediate customer.522 
This suggests that many of the businesses had a similar conception o f the public as the 
Labour Government, as demonstrated by the rhetoric of the market in its White Paper, and 
Blair’s speech to the Royal Society in 2002. The idea of businesses engaging with citizens at 
an earlier stage o f the innovation cycle was a strange one to many managers within the 
companies that took part in the research.523
Despite this lack o f awareness of public engagement in the business sector, it was becoming 
more common to hear this term being used within government and policy-making circles. 
When the Treasury published its science and innovation investment framework for the next 
ten years in July 2004, a chapter was devoted to the subject o f public engagement under the 
heading ‘Science and Society’ - a signal of the importance now placed on public engagement 
by the UK Government as a part o f the innovation process. The chapter argued for the 
importance of taking action to achieve ‘greater public confidence and improved engagement 
in science and technology’.524 Achieving these goals included the ‘intelligent regulation of 
research, openness, dialogue, effective communication with the public and responsiveness to 
public priorities and concerns’ (p. 103). Unlike the report from the House o f Lords, the 
Government did not identify a ‘crisis o f confidence’ in science, at least in a general sense. 
Instead, the Government drew on the data from the OST/Wellcome survey published in 
2000 to argue that the public was ‘generally supportive o f science’ as a whole.525 Despite this, 
the Government also acknowledged that there was sometimes unease about scientific and 
technological developments, and whether government was able to regulate and control these 
effectively:
522 Gregory, J., et al. (2007), 'Public engagement in the private sector: a new form o f Public 
Relations?' in Bauer and Bucchi, eds, Science Communication for the 21 st Century, (London: Routledge).
523 I worked as Researcher on this project alongside Jane Gregory and Jon Agar, at UCL. Royal 
Society for the encouragement o f Arts Manufacturers and Commerce (2004), What's There To Talk 
About? Public engagement by science-based companies in the UK, (RSA Forum for Technology, Citizens and 
the Market).
524 HM Treasury (2004), Science &  innovation investment framework 2004 - 2014, (HMSO), p. 103.
525 Office o f  Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust (2000), op. cit.
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Recent controversies, such as those surrounding BSE and mobile telephone masts, 
have exposed deep public concerns over the governance and regulation o f  science and 
the quality and use o f scientific advice in government, and have illustrated how 
citizens can feel disconnected from decision-making on important issues.526
The Government also recognised that it had had to change its approach to engaging with the 
public. As Barbara Knowles claimed at the time:
We all want the public somehow to feel that science and technology are important for 
the UK, that the public feels comfortable with the sort o f pace o f  change that’s 
happening, that they feel well enough informed to take part in debates, that they feel 
that their views are being taken seriously, but we’re all struggling actually to know how 
to get there and how to know we’ve got there.527
It is possible to identify a mixture of different ideas in the Treasury report about what public 
engagement was to be for. The aim of public engagement, as put forward in the passage 
below, appeared to be as a means of managing a negative public response to government 
science by promoting the benefits:
... over recent years the focus o f the Government’s Science and Society public 
engagement activities has moved forward from simply promoting public 
understanding o f  science to the wider agenda o f facilitating public engagement with 
science and its application. This has the aims of: government and scientists responding 
proactively to public priorities and concerns; people having greater confidence in the 
benefits offered by science, (p. 103)
Furthermore, science and society activities, it argued, should be able to support science 
activities that could achieve a ‘positive national impact’ and promote ‘best practice in the 
media coverage o f science and technology’ (p. 104). The report, as had earlier government 
reports, characterised the public as a potential obstacle to scientific progress. Thus public 
engagement was again seen to be a solution to avoiding this situation:
526 HM Treasury (2004), op. cit., p. 103.
527 Knowles Interview, 9 August 2004.
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To ensure that areas o f  science that could yield important quality o f life and economic 
benefits are not held back the Government’s next steps in this field will be in two key 
areas:
Understanding, through careful monitoring, and then responding, to the population’s 
developing concerns and expectations o f science and technology; and
Working harder on horizon scanning to identify key upcoming developments in 
science and technology and any likely concerns surrounding them. (pp. 104-5)
An example o f this characterisation of public engagement can be seen in the report in its 
very brief discussion o f nanotechnology, which, we were told, the Government was already 
‘committed to supporting’ (p. 107). It was vital to the Government that as this technology 
developed the public ‘felt confident’ about it’ (p. 107). There appeared therefore no room 
for a wider discussion about whether this technology was desirable to the public; the task 
was to find a way o f ensuring that the public were satisfied that it was being developed 
responsibly. While this was still a different idea of ‘communication’ from earlier efforts of 
trying to educate the public about a new science, no consideration appeared to have been 
given to what the Government would do were the public to express their unease at the 
technology in the course o f a public engagement exercise. Contradicting this, however, the 
Government also argued that the public must feel that their views were taken into 
consideration:
To better understand concerns and expectations, efforts will be focussed on enabling 
public fora where the ethical, health, safety and environmental impact o f  new science 
and technology can be debated. The Government wants constructive, inclusive and 
open public debate and dialogue on these issues, so that the public can be satisfied 
that science and technology is being developed responsibly and responsively, and that 
their concerns are being addressed. To do this, the Government will work to move 
the debate forward — beyond simplistic notions o f the public being ignorant o f  
science, or being either pro-science or anti-science; and beyond crude notions o f a 
particular technology being either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, (p. 105)528
528 The idea that the public should not be viewed as either pro-science or anti-science does appear to 
contradict the earlier use o f  the OST/W ellcome statistics to back up their claim that the public was 
overall positive about science. Thus the report shows the variety o f ways in which the representations 
o f ‘the public’ shift and were used to make different arguments by different individuals and 
institutions.
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What marks this report out as different from earlier government discussions of dialogue is 
the idea that engagement happening earlier in the innovation process was considered more 
appropriate:
The Government will also work to enable the debate to take place ‘upstream’ in the 
scientific and development process, and not ‘downstream’ where technologies are 
waiting to be exploited but may be held back by public scepticism brought about 
through poor engagement and dialogue on issues o f concern, (p. 105)
To the Government then the idea of ‘upstream’ public engagement appeared to have been a 
means of avoiding expensive and failed public engagement processes which had, until now, 
for example, in the case o f GM crops, been happening too late to change the public’s 
impression or confidence. The priority given to public engagement as a key component of 
policy-making was also signalled with the announcement that the budget for the Office of 
Science and Technology’s Science and Society expenditure would be increased, from £4.25 
million per year in 2005-06, to over £9 million per year by 2006-07. As part o f this, a new 
grants scheme was to be launched to ‘build the capacity of citizens, the science community 
and policy-makers to engage in the dialogue necessary to establish and maintain public 
confidence in making better choices about critical areas in science and technology’ (p. 108). 
This again suggested that the public were not to be given a say on matters of science policy, 
but needed to have confidence that others were able to do this. Thus here, the idea of public 
engagement was conceived as a tool which could maintain a boundary between experts who 
had control and power over scientific matters, and those who did not, and were there to 
witness (though in a manner filled with confidence) the science policy-making. The grants 
scheme was also to be shifted away from a responsive mode of funding public dialogue 
exercises, as the previous Copus schemes for PUS and dialogue had been, towards a directed 
scheme, focused around government policy objectives and based on the results of horizon 
scanning exercises. Again, this put control of which scientific and technological issues would 
be discussed in the hands o f the Government.
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Nano-nation?
The new term ‘upstream engagement’ became more widely used throughout 2004. A second 
report, also published in July of that year, discussed the importance o f placing public 
engagement exercises ‘upstream’ in the innovation process. In June 2003 the UK 
Government had commissioned the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, 
to carry out an independent study o f likely developments in nanotechnology and whether it 
raised, or was likely to raise, new ethical, health and safety or social issues which were not 
covered by current regulation.529 As the report argued, ‘most developments in 
nanotechnologies, as viewed in 2004 were clearly “upstream” in nature’.530 From the outset 
the way in which the issues were to be investigated, and reported on, suggested that the final 
product would be a more open and wide-ranging report than would normally be produced 
by the Royal Society. The working group was comprised o f many scientists working in all 
different aspects o f nanoscience, but also included Baroness Onora O ’Neill, a member of 
the House o f Lords, and lecturer in philosophy; Nick Pidgeon, a social scientist concerned 
with issues o f risk and science communication in public; and Sir Jonathon Porritt, the 
environmental campaigner. The science advice process had therefore been opened up to 
include those with social and political expertise in addition to the scientific experts. Barbara 
Knowles, Science and Society Manager at the Office o f Science and Technology claimed that 
the inclusion o f social scientists was “partly to provide credibility”, suggesting that social 
scientists held more legitimacy in these discussions now, than they had previously.531 The 
inclusion o f Pidgeon was significant, in that it signalled a shift in the Royal Society’s 
approach to risk and uncertainties. His earlier work on the social construction of risks in 
1992 had not been endorsed by the Society, and yet now he was being included on their 
expert panel. As he observed at this time, “a new understanding o f science and society is
529 That both the Royal Society and the Royal Academy o f Engineering are wholly, as they claim, 
‘independent’ when both received large grants from the Government, is questionable. One could 
perhaps see this term ‘independent’ being used in a similar way to the idea that all gentlemen in 
Boyle’s time were ‘independent’, o f certain social beliefs and roles.
530 The Royal Academy o f Engineering and The Royal Society (2004), Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: 
opportunities and uncertainties, (London: The Royal Society), p. 64.
531 Knowles Interview, 9 August 2004.
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spreading through the work of the Royal Society... these perspectives are finally being 
mainstreamed”.532
Much o f the report was concerned with the scientific potential of nanoscience and the 
uncertainties surrounding its possible applications. However, as the report stated, it seemed 
‘highly likely that some nanotechnologies will raise significant social and ethical concerns’,533 
and, one chapter was devoted to a discussion of the social and ethical issues. It further 
acknowledged that new developments in science and technology did not ‘take place in a 
social vacuum’ (p. 51). A chapter of the report was also allocated to exploring issues of 
stakeholder and public dialogue, and public attitudes, which were deemed to play a ‘crucial 
role in the realisation o f the potential of technological advances’ (p. 59). During the writing 
of the report, on top o f the usual call for written and oral evidence, two public workshops 
had been held by the Committee to explore public attitudes and understandings of 
nanotechnology, and questions had also been added to a social attitudes survey to gauge the 
level of public awareness o f nanotechnology. 534 Both the survey questions and the 
workshops had reported a low awareness of nanotechnology in the public, and the report 
argued ‘that much will hinge upon how attitudes to nanotechnologies are shaped over the 
next few years’.535 At other points in the report, the rhetoric suggests that the idea that the 
public could have an input into technology policy was far more accepted than it had been 
previously. Public attitudes and uncertainties were explored and, using arguments from social 
scientific researchers, the report suggested that public concerns should not be dismissed:
It can be helpful to separate governance into two strands. The first involves the role 
and behaviour o f  institutions, and their abilities to minimise unintended consequences 
and adequately regulate. Such questions are not, as Wynne points out, the product o f a 
mis-informed or ‘irrational’ public. Rather, they are legitimate questions touching 
upon areas o f  very real potential risk ... Nor should such questions be seen as the 
product o f  views that are anti-science or anti-technology, (p. 61)
532 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit. p. 15.
533 The Royal Academy o f Engineering and The Royal Society (2004), op. cit., p. 51.
534 BMRB (2004), Nanotechnology: Views of the General Public, (London: BMRB International Ltd).
535 The Royal Academy o f Engineering and The Royal Society (2004), op. cit., p. 61.
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In setting out a more general case for wider societal dialogue about new technologies and 
more open science policy formulation, the working group drew again on social scientific 
research, using the work of Daniel Fiorino,536 to characterise the different rationales for 
public engagement: ‘normative’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘substantive’:
The normative argument proposes that dialogue is a good thing in and o f  itself and as 
such forms a part o f wider democratic processes through which controversial 
decisions are made. The normative argument suggests, in particular, that it is 
important to make decisions sensitive, as far as possible, to the ethical and value 
concerns o f directly affected groups or populations. The instrumental argument 
suggests that dialogue, as one means o f rendering decision-making more open and 
transparent, will increase the legitimacy o f decisions and through this generate 
secondary effects such as greater trust in the policy making process ... Finally the 
substantive argument is that dialogue will help to generate better quality outcomes.537
There was also some discussion that upstream engagement would lead to a non-conflictual 
outcome where the development of new technologies was concerned, avoiding a similar 
episode to the GM crops controversy of five years earlier. This appeared to be a widespread 
view and there was much hope expressed in the evidence submitted to the working group 
that ‘methods for upstream deliberation may help society to find appropriate resolutions for 
potential conflicts in advance, by better anticipation o f sensitive issues’.538 It is unclear 
whether ‘society’ here included science, or was used to demarcate it from a troublesome 
public. This also suggests that one outcome was the development o f a positive consensus 
regarding any technology under deliberation:
One can make the argument that with many o f  these more mature technologies public 
dialogue has typically arrived too little too late, only being seen as an optional ‘add-on’ 
when the decision-making surrounding an issue (for example radioactive waste siting) 
has become pressing, difficult or uncomfortable for regulators or governments. Under 
such circumstances the existence o f highly polarised positions can make it very 
difficult, if not impossible, to take any real dialogue forward, (p. 64)
536 Fiorino, D. (1990), 'Citizen participation and environmental risk: a survey o f institutional 
mechanisms', Science, Technology and Human Values, 5: 2.
537 The Royal Academy o f Engineering and The Royal Society (2004), op. cit., p. 63.
538 ibid.
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Similar concerns over GM Nation? having been ‘hijacked’ by interest groups with firmly held 
beliefs about GM suggests several different ideas about public engagement and ‘the public’. 
First, upstream engagement would not create people who were vehemently ‘anti’ any given 
technology, so the public would be persuaded to accept the views o f the Government, or 
whoever was running the public engagement exercises; and second, that upstream 
engagement would necessarily lead to consensus regarding any given technology. Third, 
there is an implicit suggestion here that those groups advancing polarised views did not have 
a valid place within these exercises, as had been suggested during GM Nation?, and thus were 
not considered to be ‘the public’. This in turn suggested that only those with the potential to 
be persuaded, one way or another, were to be involved in these sorts o f exercises. Thus 
public engagement was not, it appeared, about listening to the range o f opinions that existed 
within society, but to engage those members of the public who had no formed opinions, 
again suggesting a particular deficit model of the public. Furthermore, there is a final implicit 
suggestion that if members of the public were exposed to scientific information at an early 
stage, before they were influenced by the polarised views o f special interest groups, they 
would reach a more ‘mature’ decision. Indeed, echoing Blair’s earlier argument that a 
“mature attitude towards science” needed to be embedded in society, the working group 
identified the need for a ‘mature debate’ that would ‘discriminate between the many ... and 
... sometimes exaggerated claims for the technology’ (p. 64).
The role of scientific information in the process o f engagement was also explicitly discussed, 
and while, as the report stated, the development and incorporation o f ‘good-quality, 
independent scientific information’ would be central to the success o f any analytic- 
deliberative process, this was not to be communicated to the public in a manner previously 
associated with the deficit model of PUS:
Information provision has to aim at more than just ‘educating’ the public as a 
presumed means o f avoiding controversy, a view embedded in the so-called ‘deficit 
model’ o f  much traditional public understanding o f science and science 
communication practice. Meeting such an objective has proven unrealistic time and 
again: in particular because people resent attempts at direct manipulation, greater 
knowledge does not necessarily bring greater acceptance o f risks, and one-way 
communication without genuine dialogue about science issues may not address 
people’s wider concerns, (p. 64)
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Thus particular social scientific rhetoric had been adopted by these scientific organisations 
regarding ideas about the way in which the public should be communicated with. We can see 
this even more clearly in the Royal Society’s Science in Society 'Rsport published at the same 
time, which argued that:
The public understanding o f science approach has been questioned as a deficit model 
of understanding. The implied relationship that support for science can be achieved 
through better communication overlooks the fact that different groups may frame 
scientific issues differently. The approach did not adequately conceptualise how  
publics’ views and attitudes towards science were embedded within wider social, 
political and institutional understandings, and risks discounting the role o f local 
knowledge and different public values in science debates (see Irwin 1995; Irwin and 
Wynne 1996).539
While the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report used social scientific 
research and language to make the case for no longer operating under a deficit model and 
for upstream engagement around nanotechnology, there appears also to be an assumption 
that the public would want nanoscience, and thus what was up for debate was simply the 
manner in which this technology would develop.540 Ultimately, although public engagement 
was now endorsed by institutions such as the Royal Society, no-one appeared sure how to 
embed it into normal policy-making practice.
See-through science
In September 2004, Wilsdon and Willis, having earlier promoted the idea of ‘upstream’ 
engagement to Government, provided a lengthier articulation of why it was needed in a 
Demos pamphlet, entitled See-through science: why public engagement needs to move upstream.541 The 
involvement o f a political think-tank in what had previously been the domain of scientists 
and science communicators highlights the way in which the discussions about science and
539 The Royal Society (2004), op. cit., p. 2.
540 The report also discussed deliberative engagement, and what lessons it had learned from GM  
Nation?.
541 Dem os had come to this issue via an active involvement in issues o f participatory democracy. See 
for example: Leadbeater, C. and Mulgan, G. (1994), 'Lean democracy and the leadership vacuum', 
Demos Quarterly, 3; Adonis, A. and Mulgan, G. (1994), 'Back to Greece: the scope for direct 
democracy', Demos Quarterly, 3.
260
Lost in Translations
society had changed to include different institutions and individuals, and thus embodied 
different ideas of this relationship. The Demos report drew heavily on academic work by 
Wynne, Irwin and other social scientists. Reflecting on the four years that had passed since 
the publication of the House of Lords Report, Wilsdon and Willis felt that there had been a 
perceptible change, with consultation papers, focus groups, stakeholder dialogues and 
citizens’ juries having been ‘grafted onto the ailing body of British science, in the hope that 
they will give it a new lease of life’.542 While they accepted that not everyone had embraced 
this new mood for dialogue entirely, Wilsdon and Willis felt those in disagreement were now 
rare:
Every so often, a few drops o f PUS still dribble out from a Lewis Wolpert or a Lord 
Taverne, but these voices are now a dwindling force. The science community has 
embraced dialogue and engagement, if not always with enthusiasm, then at least out of  
a recognition that BSE, GM, and other controversies have made it a non-negotiable 
clause o f their “licence to operate”, (p. 18)
Barbara Young, the Head of the Environment Agency, who wrote the foreword to the 
pamphlet, speaking at the launch event at the RSA in early September 2004,543 also reflected 
on how her perception o f interacting with the public had changed:
“... scientists really have adjusted and changed over the years, they’ve started to 
involve the public in their work. First o f all it was very much a sort o f sell and tell and 
educate approach. I used to be a member, and I must confess, having read the 
pamphlet I’m feeling slightly ashamed about this, I used to be a member o f  the 
Committee o f the Public Understanding o f  Science, and we were a bit in tell and sell 
mode in those days I must confess.”544
Wilsdon, presenting the main points from the pamphlet at the launch, argued to the 
audience, which was comprised largely of actors who had been involved in the area of 
PUS/Science and Society over the last twenty years, that the UK activity in this area might 
finally have moved away from what had been, in his opinion, a ‘flawed’ project:
542 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit., p. 18.
543 I worked on the report launch while at the RSA.
544 Dem os Launch Event (2004), 'See Through Science' launch event at the RSA, transcribed by Simon 
Lock, comment by B. Young
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.. we sit on the cusp o f  a new phase o f debates around the public engagement in 
science. The first phase was all about educating the public following the publication of  
the Bodmer report in 1985, the language o f public understanding o f science, or PUS 
for short, oozed across the face o f British science policy. But rather than lubricating 
an understanding, PUS clogged the pores and cracks that might have allowed genuine 
dialogue to breathe. Implicit within it was a flawed understanding o f science, a flawed 
understanding o f the public, and a flawed understanding o f understanding.”545
Wilsdon also argued that the PUS agenda was actually partly to blame for the difficult 
relations between science and the public over the last decade:
... [the agenda] relied on a deficit model which has been widely discussed, which 
assumed that the more the public knew about science, they’d fall into line behind it.
As a result relations between science and society festered throughout the 1990s and 
unsurprisingly an occasional rash o f blisters erupted; BSE, GM, mobile phones, now 
nano.546
The controversy over GM crops, Wilsdon and Willis argued, had had a very strong influence 
on shifting the opinion of those people who had previously not accepted the need for public 
engagement:
... policy-makers and the scientific community are desperate to avoid new 
developments, especially nanotechnology, becoming the next GM. The wounds o f  
that battle are still very raw and there’s little appetite on any side for a rerun.547
The GM Nation? exercise, as they argued in the pamphlet, had occurred too late in the 
innovation process for the public to influence the trajectory o f the technology.548 Now 
because o f this, there seemed to be a new commitment to the idea o f public engagement 
upstream in the innovation process, shown by the prevalence o f the phrase in both the 
Treasury 10-year strategy document and the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering’s report on nanotechnology. As Wilsdon and Willis explained, their rationale for 
publishing the pamphlet at this point was to ensure that the lessons from previous attempts 
to manage the relationship between science and society were learned and the mistakes
545 ibid., comment by J. Wilsdon
546 ibid., comment by J. Wilsdon
547 ibid., comment by J. Wilsdon
548 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit., p. 19.
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avoided. Their own rationale for promoting upstream dialogue with the public on science 
and technology issues was defined here as such:
Downstream, the flow o f innovation has absorbed numerous engagement processes.
Yet few o f these have any real connection to the upstream questions that motivate 
public concern: Why this technology? Why not another? Who needs it? Who is 
controlling it? Who benefits from it? Can they be trusted? What will it mean for me 
and my family? Will it improve the environment? What will it mean for people in the 
developing world? (pp. 28-9)
The challenge -  and opportunity -  for upstream engagement, as Wilsdon and Willis saw it, 
was to try to force some of these questions back onto the negotiating table, and to do so at a 
point when the public were still able to influence the trajectories o f scientific and 
technological development. The danger, they argued, was that one deficit model would be 
replaced by yet another - as Wilsdon argued, “a misunderstanding o f what’s at stake in these 
discussions, and what forms the basis of public concern”.549 Though one should note that, 
while scientific organisations where blamed for misrepresenting the public without the 
appropriate engagement, the authors appeared to already know what questions the public 
would want to ask.
While Wilsdon and Willis praised the fact that the Royal Society/Royal Academy of 
Engineering report on nanotechnology had happened at all, they were sceptical of just how 
far they had embraced a new approach to the public, arguing that it had instead focused 
largely on the risks o f the technology as if these were the main basis for public concern. 
They drew on the work of Andy Stirling, who had been critical of the way in which many of 
the favoured participatory modes of social appraisal could actually be used to justify existing 
political objectives in the same way conventional expert scientific forms of appraisal could, 
rather than open them up to some o f the deeper framing questions (such as those cited on 
the previous page). Arguing that decisions made about the type o f process used, the 
participants, the questions asked, or the information provided, could lead to inadvertent bias
549 Dem os Launch Event (2004), op. cit., comment by J. Wilsdon
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or deliberate influence,550 Wilsdon and Willis therefore questioned the motivations behind 
the nanotechnology report’s authors’ promotion of upstream engagement:
There’s a lot o f positive noises in the report about public engagement, but it doesn’t 
seem entirely clear in the report what purposes that engagement is designed to serve.
Is the motivation normative? Is it the right thing to do? Because dialogue is a healthy 
ingredient o f a healthy democracy. Or is the motivation more instrumental? A way of  
building trust in nanotech, and to remove any obstacles that may upset the innovation 
applecart. Or is it substantive? Does it actually aim to improve the quality o f decision 
making by incorporating new forms of public knowledge, new forms o f  social 
intelligence into the very design o f the technology from the start?551
Defending their nanotechnology report at the Demos pamphlet launch, John Enderby, 
Deputy President of the Royal Society, argued that the Royal Society was still catching up 
with the times, and still learning how to deal with the public:
I believe that our most recent report jointly with the Royal Academy o f  Engineering is 
indeed part o f  an evolutionary process. It’s what theologians would call progressive 
revelation. I also feel that poor old Walter Bodmer, and his report has been rather 
badly treated ... it’s true that it was believed that by educating people then they would 
understand the validity o f what scientists were saying in the 50s and 60s, but in my 
view it was the first step towards redemption.552
Regardless o f how sincere or effective those scientific institutions’ attempts to change their 
approach to managing their relationship with the public were, Wilsdon and Willis were still 
sceptical as to whether those same institutions and government had sufficient expertise in, 
and commitment to, running good dialogue processes:
Simply slotting deliberative processes into existing ways o f  doing things will not result 
in any real change. Some o f  the more naive proponents o f  public engagement seem to 
assume that the way to resolve difficult issues is by bringing together the concerned 
parties, adding a mix o f methods and a family pack o f post-it notes, and then allowing 
the facilitators to save the day.553
Tracey Brown, Head o f Sense About Science felt that this criticism, however, hid self- 
serving professional interests:
550 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit., p. 40.
551 Dem os Launch Event (2004), op. cit. comment by J. Wilsdon
552 ibid., comment by J. Enderby
553 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit., pp. 46-7.
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I find it odd that some o f the organisations that have been drawing our attention to 
things like low voter registration and a general lack o f civic participation, were so 
determined about public involvement in scientific research priorities ... it really only 
makes sense to me when I think about it as describing an enhanced policy role for 
those who present their ideas in the language o f public engagement ... I think that 
some o f these suggestions that are in this pamphlet are really about expanding the 
opportunities in policy making for those particular groups o f people. Everything is 
very much focused on that, in fact, I think it’s become quite a self-referential 
discussion, and a highly jargonistic one.554
Her criticism suggests that professional boundaries were being challenged once more by this 
new focus on ‘upstream engagement’, and certainly the nature o f the launch event itself 
suggested that things had changed in the PUS/Science and Society arena. The pamphlet had 
been published by a political think-tank, and launched at the RSA, which had also been 
engaged in promoting upstream engagement in the business sector for the previous three 
years.555 N ot only did this highlight the political focus of this new public engagement debate, 
but the inclusion o f speakers from Greenpeace, the Green Alliance, and Forum for the 
Future shows that the professional groups now influencing the debate were also not the 
same individuals and organisations that I have treated as central to the PUS debate in 
previous phases. Responding to Tracey Brown’s criticism o f the upstream engagement 
agenda, Wilsdon was openly critical of the scientific establishment, blaming them again for 
not moving away from their old ways of managing their relationship with the public:
... the science establishment, if it could be described as such, funds organisations like 
Sense About Science, whose job it is to stand up and dribble PUS over this debate, on 
an ongoing basis. ... they perpetuate a particular rebarbative view ... and I think that’s 
a problem in this debate, that perhaps needs to be opened and aired for discussion 
too.556
What the authors wanted, like many o f the social scientists whose work had featured in the 
pamphlet, was to change the whole relationship between science and society, rather than 
simply finding a better way to manage the existing one, which maintained certain 
professional power for selected groups. As they concluded:
554 Dem os Launch Event (2004), op. cit. comment by T. Brown
555 Gregory, et al. (2007), op. cit.
556 Dem os Launch Event (2004), op. cit. comment by J. Wilsdon
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Taken to its logical conclusions our argument in this pamphlet has profound 
implications for the future o f science. At its most ambitious, can upstream 
engagement reshape not only the way that science relates to public decision-making, 
but also the very foundations o f knowledge on which the scientific enterprise rests?
Five years on from the House o f Lords report, this is the question that the science and 
society agenda now needs to address.557
Finally, they challenged those scientific and policy organisations to back up their stated 
commitments to upstream engagement with meaningful actions. It was, the authors’ felt, still 
too early to say whether this would actually happen. Throwing money at the ‘problem’ was 
one thing, but a meaningful cultural shift in the way in which these organisations dealt with 
the public was what was truly desired:
An extra £ lb n  was allocated in the latest spending review towards science. But a big 
question remains unanswered in that document; will all o f  this extra cash, and the 
innovation it seeks to unleash, actually improve, or worsen relations between science 
and society. So looking across this landscape, as we see some sort o f shift is underway, 
but it is still unclear whether this new vogue for upstream engagement will prove 
ephemeral, or develop into something more meaningful and promising, (p. 20)
Shortly after the launch of the Demos pamphlet, an editorial in Nature lent further support 
to the idea o f upstream engagement, though acknowledged that it would be a difficult 
concept for many in the scientific community to accept. For many researchers, Nature 
argued, the Demos pamphlet would make ‘frightening reading’, and for those scientists who 
believed the public to be easily swayed by ‘misleading media’ on scientific issues, the 
proposal ‘must seem close to giving the lunatics the key to the asylum’.558 However, Nature 
felt that there were good reasons why scientists should ‘ignore these fears and embrace 
upstream engagement’. As the editorial concluded:
Upstream engagement is no panacea. On its own, it won’t solve Britain’s crisis over 
trust in science. Nor will it resolve thorny questions about what types o f science are 
worth pursuing, and which should be avoided.. .but it is worth doing.
557 Wilsdon and Willis (2004), op. cit., p. 56.
558 Editorial (2004), 'Going public', Nature, 431: 7011.
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Nature also felt that it was only worth doing provided that the processes were first, long-term 
and properly funded, and second, that the funding organisations made a genuine 
commitment to react to the results of engagement processes. This did not mean simply 
accepting the outcomes, but explaining why some public advice was taken into consideration 
and some not. Criticising GM Nation? the editorial argued:
The UK Government ran a public debate on genetic modification last year and is 
widely believed to have ignored the results -  something only a little less offensive than 
talking about babbling hags.559
Lord Taverne, Chair of Sense About Science, responding to Nature’s support o f Demos and 
what he called ‘the fashionable demand by a group of sociologists for more democratic 
science’, argued that ‘unthinking subservience to the principle o f participation’, should not 
be given by the scientific community.560 This would lead to greater involvement of special 
interest groups, and research priorities being set onto the wrong problem by the public. As 
he concluded:
The fact is that science, like art, is not a democratic activity. You do not decide by 
referendum whether the Earth goes around the Sun.
What is this thing we call ‘dialogue’?
The new and promised grants scheme for public engagement, Sciencewise, was launched by 
the Office o f Science and Technology in September 2004, with a budget of £1.2 million over 
two years to provide matched funding for projects that brought public dialogue into policy. 
All bids were assessed by an independent steering panel, which made recommendations to 
government on the awarding of grants. The chair of the panel was Kathy Sykes, the Collier 
Professor in the Public Understanding of Science and Technology at Bristol University. By
559 The editorial had started with a quote from the seventeenth century researcher William Gilbert, 
describing discussions with the public as little better that listening to the ‘maunderings o f a babbling 
hag’, ibid.
560 Taverne, D. (2004), 'Let's be sensible about public participation', Nature, 432: 18 November 2004.
267
Lost in Translations
now her title had been changed to Chair in Public Engagement in Science and Technology. 
The press release announcing Sykes’ appointment a couple of years earlier had stated she 
would:
... seek to communicate scientific and technological research in a user-friendly way to 
the general public. She will find out what the public is interested in, and concerned 
about, and find ways o f getting scientists to talk face-to-face with them about ethical 
and controversial issues in science.561
Sykes, a physicist by training, moved into science communication and is well-known for 
presenting television shows on scientific issues. It may have appeared a strange choice for a 
professorship in the public engagement of science, as Sykes had no publications or 
experience o f social scientific practices, nor a history within the academic fields of public 
understanding o f science or science communication. One could argue that again this was an 
indication o f how institutionally, the issue o f managing the public’s relationship with science 
was still thought o f as the domain of professional science communicators and natural 
scientists, while social science academics were conceived as providing external help only 
when it was required. The fact that Sykes’ appointment was press released, and she was 
subsequently appointed to Chair of the Sciencewise grants panel, and onto the Council for 
Science and Technology - the highest science advisory panel within government -  perhaps 
shows also an attempt, through the appointment o f a ‘celebrity’ to raise the profile of the 
issue o f public engagement.
Discussions continued into 2005 about what dialogue meant, and what it was for among the 
many different professional groups involved in addressing (or managing) the relationship 
between science and society. In a response to Durodie’s earlier attack on the idea of public 
dialogue in science,562 three members of the British Association - the Chief Executive Sir 
Roland Jackson, Fiona Barbagallo, and psychologist Helen Haste of Bath University - 
published their own defence o f public engagement, in the process defining what they meant
561 University o f Bristol (21 October 2002), Media Release: Sykes to bring science to the people.
562 Durodie, B. (2003), 'Limitations o f Public Dialogue in Science and the Rise o f New 'Experts", 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 6: 4.
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by ‘dialogue’ and the context within which it could take place in relation to science.563 They 
cited social scientific studies in their paper to back up their own arguments, many of which 
had previously been ignored by the British Association, as one of the founding members of 
Copus.564 While the paper largely argued for the value of dialogue in scientific matters, 
against Durodie’s more sceptical position,565 the authors also questioned how much progress 
had been made in the UK in the last five years:
... although the language has changed, the sentiments o f the House o f Lords report 
have not been readily endorsed. Sociologist Brian Wynne has stated that that deficit 
model is more an ‘ideological construct than a research method’ and it is not simply 
avoided by changing the format o f public engagement activities.566
Dialogue should not, the authors argued, be primarily about ‘providing a platform for 
scientists to explain to the receptive lay person how the world works’, but should be:
... an open exchange and sharing o f knowledge, ideas, values, attitudes and beliefs 
between stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, commercial organisations, interest groups), 
scientists, publics (e.g. members o f the general public, farmers, consumers) and 
decision-makers (local, regional and national), (p. 350)
However, dialogue should also not, they stated, ‘remove authority or expertise from science’. 
Instead it should locate scientific developments in a wider social context, enabling the 
inclusion o f a wider range of relevant expertise with regard to the implications o f such 
developments. Thus on the one hand Jackson et al wished to allow a two-way exchange of 
communication, yet on the other hand, the primacy of scientific authority and expertise was 
to be maintained.
563 Jackson, R., et al. (2005), 'Strengths o f  Public Dialogue on Science-related Issues', Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 8: 3.
564 The paper not only quotes Brian Wynne, but also specifically mentions the qualitative work o f  
Wynne, Michael, Irwin, Kerr, and Jasanoff to make the point that local and contextual knowledges 
were important and should be taken into consideration by policy-makers and scientists.
565 Durodie’s position can be taken as largely representative o f the view taken by many o f the closely- 
knit organisations with which he was involved. See footnotes 450 and 459 for discussion o f these.
566 Jackson, et al (2005), op. cit., p. 350.
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Jackson et al. also, while arguing for public dialogue on scientific matters, specifically with 
respect to nanotechnology, stated what questions they believed the public dialogue would 
cover:
The public is likely to want to see that the issue o f who controls the technology will be 
discussed, and be confident that regulation balances societal and consumer benefits 
with rewards to businesses exploiting the technologies. It will want to ask about 
ethical implications (especially regarding health and the human body), equity o f access 
to technologies, long-term effects, known and unknown areas o f consequences, and 
impact o f  life and our environment.567
The phrase ‘It will want to ask’, suggests that the dialogue would still largely be about an 
information flow from experts to the public, who once satisfied that their concerns were 
being addressed, would allow the technology to continue.
Despite the mixed messages over the role o f the public in dialogue exercises the paper 
attempted to dismantle Durodie’s argument against public dialogue in science: that scientific 
facts should not be subject to democratic decision-making. As the authors retorted, the 
implication that the validity of scientific knowledge itself could be democratically decided 
was misleading. The kind of future that society wanted could, however, be democratically 
decided and, within this, what type of science and technology would shape that future. 
Finally, Jackson et al. argued for a need for scientists and policy-makers to acknowledge 
public views and opinions as legitimate, something they clearly felt was still lacking within 
UK scientific and policy-making cultures. This was difficult to achieve in practice, as Alan 
Irwin’s recollection of attending a National Dialogue Event, run as part o f the Royal 
Society’s Science in Society Programme, in 2004, suggests:
“... there was someone from the Royal Society... and every time someone from the 
public said, “I’m really worried about this.” The response would be: “Oh no, no, no, 
that’s not a problem at all, I really don’t think we should be afraid o f that.” So in the 
end it was, “okay, you tell us, you’re the Royal Society experts, you tell us what it’s 
going to be.” And I sat there thinking, just beam me up, I really felt I didn’t want to 
be a part o f it.568
567 ibid.
568 Irwin Interview, 29 June 2004.
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Durodie, rather than publish a response in the peer-reviewed journal, issued a response on 
his website, suggesting, perhaps, this was less an academic exercise for him and more a 
personal or political one by this point. He argued that Jackson et al. were being presumptive 
in themselves defining what the public would want to discuss in any given public dialogue, 
arguing, ‘it seems as though those who speak the loudest of the need for evidence-based 
uncertainty and humility are amongst the least able to practice it’.569 Durodie also questioned 
the value placed on public dialogue in science, and suggested that perhaps the process was 
more important than the content:
Dialogue is variously described as ‘an open exchange and sharing’, something that 
‘enables’ inclusion and seeks to ‘recognise’ other factors. As dialogue ‘does not 
remove authority’ from science or ‘somehow set public opinion as equal’, there 
appears to be no requirement to act upon it, just to ‘respect’ and ‘acknowledge’.
Adopting the therapeutic language o f our times, dialogue is no longer a means to an 
end, but rather an end in itself. So much for the possibility o f real change then.
Durodie was not the only academic to note the therapeutic language and nature of public 
dialogue. Bauer also argued that the work o f Wynne specifically took the relationship 
between science and the public more into the realms o f psychoanalysis than social science 
and policy:
“I think Brian Wynne operates in mainly a psychoanalytic notion ... he wants to talk 
about institutional neurosis, that the scientific community has an institutional neurosis 
with the public, they are ... afraid o f  the public and the deficit concept became a way 
o f  elucidating that and I think that that’s important. So you become an action 
researcher, you work on people ... which is a sociological psychoanalysis. But the 
problem is if you think that through then you end up becoming mediators, and all you 
have to do then is create, or to make people become reflexive, you have to organise 
psychoanalytic cultures, or you have to organise encounters o f people who have 
conflict to come together and talk nicely to each other and don’t walk out, so it’s 
mediating. N ow  this is very important, but it’s self-defeating, it eradicates social 
science, there’s something more than just becoming mediators . . .”570
While Bauer suggests that this approach to managing the relationship between science and 
public would diminish the role of social scientists, Durodie felt differently, and like all the 
closely interlinked organisations he was closely aligned with such as the Scientific Alliance,
569 Durodie, B. (2005), Inclusion versus Experimentation, www.durodie.net, accessed January 2006.
570 Bauer Interview, 26 May 2004.
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and Sense About Science,571 suggested that this shift towards public engagement had placed 
social scientific authority higher than ever before, and unlike the scientific expertise, went 
unquestioned:
Ironically, whilst preaching the virtues o f  humility in science, Jackson et al. confidently 
tout the input and relevance o f social scientists who ‘can and should offer valuable 
specialist expertise’. Notably, this claim to authority is not associated with any calls for 
public dialogue in the social sciences. This tacitly accepts the input o f such experts as 
having no real and lasting impact upon the world in the way they believe science 
does.572
A further sign o f dissatisfaction with the new ‘orthodoxy’ of public engagement in science 
came from a scientist writing in The Guardian in June 2005. Again, it is worth noting that this 
criticism was discussed in a public forum rather than within the peer-reviewed literature, as 
much o f the positive commentary had. This suggests perhaps, the politically oriented nature 
o f the comments, rather than them being intended as additions to the ongoing social 
scientific research in this area. Equally it could suggest that these scientists were attempting 
to downgrade the social scientific work which they had been involved in by bypassing the 
usual channels of professional research communication. D r John Warren, from the Institute 
o f Rural Sciences at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, had been involved in a 
government funded project designed to find out how much the public valued biodiversity. 
The experience had clearly not been welcome, nor was the idea that scientists should now be 
engaging with the public, as he was quoted as saying:
As a scientist in the 21st century I am not only expected to unravel the mysteries o f the 
universe, but also to engage the public in dialogue. Unlike my predecessors, who were 
simply encouraged to go forth and educate the masses -  or more politely “enhance 
the public’s understanding o f science”, I am told to be involved in a two way 
process.573
The trouble with dialogue was, Warren argued, that ‘for a meaningful two-way discussion to 
occur there must be at least some understanding on the part o f the non-specialist’. Thus the 
problem appeared to be that of an uninformed public being obstructive to a discussion with
571 See, for example, Tracey Brown’s comments at the See-through science- launch, on p. 266.
572 Durodie (2005), op. cit.
573 Warren, J., 'End this two-way process', The Guardian, 8 June 2005.
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the public about science. Again, we see here that the idea of public engagement with science 
was assumed to mean that the public should decide whether a scientific fact was or was not 
valid, as Warren also argued:
... the real craziness o f  this kind o f focus group involvement in science; [is] much o f  
what scientists do is just about discovering facts, but there is little scope for 
meaningful dialogue in a fact.
Warren did, however, identify certain issues involving science - the risks o f nuclear power 
versus its benefits for climate change, the ethics o f embryo research, the environmental and 
health implications of GM crops - that were ‘worthy of public discussion and debate’. 
‘Scientists’, however, were ‘too busy discovering hard facts to inform debate in all these 
controversial areas’, and were also frustrated, ‘not because no one is listening to our opinions 
-  but because public debate is occurring but no one is listening to the facts’.574
Warren was not the only scientist to publicly question the value of public engagement as a 
means o f informing government policy. Criticising the public consultation exercises carried 
out by the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), David Ball of 
Middlesex University, and member of the Committee, writing to Elliot Morley, the Minister 
responsible for nuclear waste, argued that the Committee was ‘deciding the fate of hazardous 
material ... in the way that one might decide on the location of next year’s village fete’.575 
CoRWM had been constituted in 2003 as a result o f a previous government public 
consultation.576 It had a specific remit to conduct public dialogue and then recommend a 
socially and technically acceptable solution to the problem of waste management. Drawing 
on academic research and advice from social scientists at University College London, it had 
embarked on a programme o f public dialogue to ascertain the most acceptable idea for
574 ibid.
575 McKie, R. and Townsend, M. 'Ministers denounced for nuclear waste 'spin", The Observer, 24 April 
2005.
576 HM Government (2001), Managing Radioactive Waste Safely - proposals for developing a polity for managing 
solid radioactive waste in the UK, (London: HMSO).
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managing the nuclear waste.577 Ball’s letter, which was reprinted in The Observer,; called the 
public engagement exercises ‘a dangerous and surreal fantasy’, which he felt had substituted 
expertise with ‘insubstantial PR gloss’. The methods of engagement were, he argued, ‘out of 
kilter with all known government and regulatory advice on decision-making’. Ball, as one of 
the scientific experts on the Committee, clearly felt that the exercise was ‘window dressing’ 
to provide political legitimation for any decisions made in what had been a long running and 
polarised debate:
... we wasted 17 months pretending to consult the public about the idea before 
dismissing it. If this is the new way the government is making policy then it should be 
stopped right now. It is misguided and harmful.578
CoRWM’s report had, indeed, revealed that the choices for nuclear waste management had 
been narrowed down to deep burial o f waste with an option of storing some on the surface 
for a few decades. Ball had accused the Committee of wasting time by unnecessary public 
engagement arguing that they ‘should have come to that conclusion in the first few weeks of 
our deliberations’.579 CoRWM continued, however, to maintain that the public engagement 
was necessary to inspire public confidence in the way in which it worked and to inspire 
confidence in the final decision.580
Singing from the same hymn sheet?
The variety o f representations o f ‘upstream’ public engagement came to light again in the 
Government’s Response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering Roport on 
nanotechnologies. Under the heading o f ‘Public Dialogue’, the Government argued that as a 
society we needed to be ‘aware o f the social and economic benefits to be gained from 
science-derived technologies, but also aware that inevitable scientific uncertainties will mean
577 Burgess, J. et al. (July 2004), Citizens and specialists deliberate options for managing the UK's legacy 
intermediate and high level radio-active waste: a report of the Deliberative Mapping Trial. Initial Report to CoRWM, 
(London: UCL).
578 McKie and Townsend, (2005), op. cit.
579 ibid.
580 CoRWM (July 2006), Managing Our Radioactive Waste Safely: CoRWM's recommendations to Government 
(London: CoRWM).
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that new technologies may carry risks’.581 Properly targeted and sufficiently resourced public 
dialogue was ‘crucial in securing a future for nanotechnologies’ (p. 20). Thus engagement 
was conceived as a way of managing the public and their reactions to the ends of a 
technological innovation process, and not, as many social scientists and Demos, had been 
arguing, a means of eliciting social intelligence to inform the technological trajectories 
themselves.
Much o f the Government’s response mobilised a negative view of the public, as a potential 
barrier to technology and a managerial style o f governance. However, Annex B in the report 
gave a slightly different picture. The Annex outlined the Government’s Principles for Public 
Dialogue on Science and Technology, and argued that public dialogue should focus on both the 
‘aspirations and concerns held by the public, scientists in the public and private sector, and 
policy-makers’, thus this part of the report had a less managerial tone and negative 
conceptualisation o f the public. The Government also stated that all public dialogue should 
clearly feed into public policy, and participants should be provided with a wide range of 
information from a range of perspectives and sources.582
The second round of the Sciencewise grants for public engagement on science and 
technology moved in early 2005 from an open scheme to a commissioning scheme, allowing 
the Government to specify in detail the areas in which they wished to conduct public 
engagement, and ensure that these were linked into policy priorities. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
all subsequent engagement activities were held on issues such as nanotechnology, animal 
testing and other scientific issues the Government was already funding and committed to 
pursuing. This highlights how far the management of the science/society relationship had 
shifted away from the encouragement o f more one-way science communication, as the old 
COPUS scheme had funded, towards a problem about political legitimacy of decision­
making. As Jane Gregory, a Sciencewise panel member, noted, this change in focus 
highlighted the political and financial motives leading the activities:
581 HM Government (2005), Response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering Report: 
'Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties', (London: HMSO), p. 7.
582 Department o f Trade and Industry (2005), Annex B. Response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering report: nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties, (DTI).
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I think it acknowledges that public understanding o f science is about politics ... it was 
a political movement ... European Commissions do not give money for PUS research 
because it wants everybody to be happy, it gives money for PUS research because it 
wants a thriving biotech industry, or a thriving computer industry ...
Why else would they do it? It’s trying to prepare a common culture in which these 
industries can survive. You only have to look at the kind o f projects that get funded in 
PUS, they’re the ones with the commercial potential basically. Speaking as someone 
who has never been funded for work on public understanding o f cosmology! It is a 
political thing. There’s nothing else to it.583
In March 2005, the results were published of an Office of Science and Technology/MORI 
national public survey on public attitudes to science and to public engagement with science 
and technology. The survey had been recommended by the British Association’s review of 
science and society activities, and was intended to follow up the OST/Wellcome Trust 
survey o f 2000. It was to provide data that would enable the Government and other 
institutions to ‘improve dialogue’ between science and the public, creating a mutual 
understanding and thus also target their public engagement exercises more effectively.584 The 
Government had predominantly asked about attitudes to ‘science’ as if this was a 
homogeneous entity. The main finding o f the survey was that 86 per cent o f people thought 
that science ‘makes a good contribution to society’ — up 5 per cent on a similar poll two 
years previously, and widely reported by the Government as proof that the relationship 
between science and society was both a healthy one, and improving.585 Qualitative focus 
groups were used to frame the questions in the national survey, but many o f the same 
questions that had been asked in the previous incarnations of the national public attitudes 
survey were repeated. In the results the public was characterised as having fixed views on 
‘science’, which could be measured and represented by a percentage value o f ‘trust’ or 
‘confidence’. This highlights a difference in the use and understanding of these terms 
between policy-makers and social scientists. Wynne had argued that ‘public trust’ was not a 
fixed and discrete value that could be measured independently of other social factors but was 
negotiated in specific social contexts. The Royal Society’s Science in Society Programme had
583 Gregory Interview, 20 September 2004.
584 MORI (2005), Science in Society: Findings from Qualitative and Quantitative Research, (MORI).
585 1 worked on both the MORI report and the press releases and speeches related to the report, as 
part o f a four month ESRC/OST Fellowship scheme.
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also, through the use of a survey, taken a similar approach to monitoring the impact of their 
own engagement exercise on Cybertrust and Information Society in 2004.586 They wanted to 
show the specific percentage increase in public interest and trust on several different 
scientific areas after the dialogue event had occurred, which again lends credence to the idea 
that many o f these organisations viewed engagement exercises as a means of changing public 
opinion rather than understanding what the public felt or thought about an issue or 
developing social relationships.
In March 2005 the Council for Science and Technology, the Advisory Board to the Prime 
Minister which scrutinised the Government’s work on scientific matters, in their report 
analysing public dialogue within Government, argued that public concerns should not be 
viewed in terms of scientific issues.587 Yet again in this report two different voices can be 
heard: one based more on social scientific approaches; and the other trying to balance the 
more technologically deterministic voice o f government.588 The Council’s report, reflecting 
on the history o f science and public relations, argued, as had so many other scientific and 
government reports, that public confidence in the way in which science is used by 
government had been rocked by its handling o f such issues as BSE, GM and MMR.589 On 
the other hand, the report suggested that this decline in confidence could be part of a ‘wider 
trend o f disengagement from government and a decline in deference to authority’ (para. 4).590 
Regardless o f the cause, this situation had, the report argued, apparently begun to inhibit 
decision-making by government:
Unless this trend can be stemmed or reversed, there is a risk that many o f the 
economic and social benefits that might otherwise flow from the government’s ten- 
year investment framework for science and innovation will be jeopardised, (para. 4)
586 The Royal Society (2004), op. cit.
587 Council for Science and Technology (2005), Policy through dialogue: informing policies based on science and 
technology, (Council for Science and Technology).
588 Brian Wynne was co-opted onto the sub-group o f the Council so was influential in the writing up 
o f  the report.
589 For an account o f the controversy over MMR, see Horton, R. (2004), MMR: Science and Fiction: 
Exploring a Vaccine Crisis, (London: Granta Books); Leach, M. (2005), M M R mobilisation: citizens and 
science in a British controversy. IDS working paper 247, accessed February 2008
590 Council for Science and Technology (2005), op. cit.
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The problem was, however, not framed in a way that blamed the public, as previous 
proclamations from any government advisory body had largely done, and instead brought 
the rationale for the situation closer to social scientific formulations o f the public than ever 
before, as the report argued:
Three issues lie close to the heart o f the problem. Firstly, government, and some 
scientists are inclined to misrepresent science as certainty. This is far from the case for 
much o f  the new science that drives innovative technologies and underlies many 
policy initiatives. Secondly, public concerns have often been assumed to focus around 
the risks that arise from scientific uncertainty. Thirdly, scientific inputs to the policy 
making process often hide unstated assumptions, for example based on personal 
values, that need to be questioned and openly discussed in debates about policy, (para.
5)
The Council welcomed the guiding principles for public engagement on science and 
technology that had been recendy set out by the DTI.591 These were, however, not enough, 
and the report argued that not only should they be adopted across government, but was now 
time to create a cultural change, in which more systematic approaches to public engagement 
and dialogue were adopted:
We believe that they will prove to be more efficient means o f  developing broadly 
acceptable policies for issues where the problem o f public consent is real, and which 
cannot be readily sidestepped by a quick fix or political sleight o f hand. (para. 11)
The report also made it clear that the type of engagement that they were promoting was not 
simply any sort o f encounter between the public and science, such as a visit to a science 
museum, which other institutional definitions of engagement encompassed, but was 
specifically ‘those processes that: on the one hand enable the public to act as better informed 
citizens and thereby inform democratic decision-making; and on the other enable those 
charged with decision-making to be more aware of public interests’ (para. 12). The public 
still, it seemed, required information about science and technology to be able to act as better 
citizens. The purpose o f dialogue processes, however, was not to allow citizens to determine 
government policy but to inform it. So the Government retained control over decision­
making as long as, the Council argued, they could explain how the results of any given
591 Department o f Trade and Industry (2005), op. cit.
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dialogue process had been used. The Council accepted that at this time many were sceptical 
of the Government’s desire for genuine, deliberative engagement. It was also believed, 
however, that the more dialogue processes were used by government, the more their 
credibility would grow. More dialogue would have, they argued, two effects:
It will have a foreground effect o f increasing the probability o f public acceptance o f  
specific policy decisions, and a background effect o f changing the culture within which 
policies are developed. Thus it will help create an environment o f greater trust in the 
processes o f science-based decision-making, which in turn may diffuse some o f  the 
tensions and suspicions surrounding individual issues, (para. 15)
One major function of dialogue processes then, to the Committee, was that they would 
remove the polarised views that had arisen around issues such as GM or Radioactive Waste 
Management. There is an assumption in the above extract that the fact that these processes 
were happening would show the public that the Government could be trusted. The quote 
below further suggests that upstream engagement was conceptualised as a means of heading 
off future possible conflict:
One purpose o f  dialogue that anticipates emerging issues is to ensure that, as far as 
possible, these do not become legacy issues for the future. At the same time, greater 
upstream engagement with the public about the implications o f  new science and 
technology must avoid impeding the creativity o f UK science.
We also see above an explicit assumption that public engagement might actually act as an 
obstacle to scientific progress. The report also made it very clear that dialogue around 
science and technology would only be effective if it were linked into the related government 
departments or Ministers responsible for that area; it was, after all, an issue of governance. 
The implications o f this, for all those other groups attempting to conduct public dialogue on 
science and technology, were that they were unlikely to have the resources from government 
unless they were tied-in to current government technological priorities.
The change in availability of funding for science communication to processes that engaged 
the public over policy-relevant issues had had its effect on the science communication 
community. The British Association itself was struggling to know how to change itself to fit
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with the new dialogue and policy oriented approach to managing the relationship between 
science and the public. A review o f strategy had developed a new purpose for the 
Association, ‘to create a positive social climate in which science, and organisations 
dependent on it, advances with public consent, involvement and active support’, moving it 
away from strictly science communication and issues of public understanding as it had been 
previously.592 Their Annual Science Communication Conference 2005 was a fractious affair 
with a clear division between those individuals and organisations there to discuss practical 
efforts to improve science communication and those interested in discussing dialogue and 
influencing government policy.593 The closing session of the conference proved antagonistic, 
with many audience members criticising the British Association for being “stifling, old 
school and traditional” by running a conference about dialogue without managing to 
facilitate any dialogue within the sessions itself and allowing no one but the “same old 
people” to speak and to finalise recommendations to government.594
Another critical turn?
Demos’s earlier pamphlet See-through Science had contributed to the discourse o f public 
engagement within policy-making circles, and focused attention more specifically on how 
these efforts might be shifted ‘upstream’ in the innovation process. The think-tank brought 
out a further pamphlet in 2005, which addressed a similar theme and the feedback and 
criticisms of the original work. The pamphlet called for a ‘fresh injection of energy’ into the 
science and society debates,595 otherwise, argued Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe, ‘we would end 
up with little more than the scientific equivalent of corporate social responsibility: a well- 
meaning, professionalised field, propelled along by its own conferences and reports, but 
never quite impinging on fundamental practices, assumptions and cultures’ (p. 19). Their
592 Jackson, R. (2005), 'Letter from Roland Jackson to all members o f the British Association, 20 
April 2005'.
593 This observation is based on my own attendance at the conference.
594 Un-identified audience member, as written up in the minutes o f  the conference session: The 
British Association for the Advancement o f Science (2005), 'Session 9 - Closing Session', Science 
Communication Conference, 23-24 May 2005, p. 6.
595 Wilsdon, J., et at. (2005), The Public Value of Science: Or how to ensure that science really matters, (London: 
Demos), p. 19.
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concern was also that BSE and GM were now being talked about as ‘aberrant blips, rather 
than episodes which highlight deeper, more systemic problems in the governance of science 
and technology’ (p. 17). They argued that the public engagement was now seen as the answer 
to these problems and science and its relationships with other individuals and institutions 
was not where the problems lay. As they continued:
There is a creeping sense o f complacency within some sections o f government and the 
scientific community: a belief that we can return to business as usual, with a few new 
committees and a little extra public consultation, but without any fundamental reform 
o f  scientific culture and practice, (p. 17)
They quoted Steve Rayner, sociologist and manager of the ESRC Science and Society 
Research Programme as blaming in part the social scientists for this perceived turn of events. 
Having positioned themselves as pro-public engagement, Rayner argued that he and other 
social scientists had sidestepped the wider issues of responsibility and culture. The authors of 
the Demos pamphlet, to address this lack o f a wider consideration of what public 
engagement might be for, and the context in which it operated, introduced the idea of 
‘public value’. They argued that discussion about science should go beyond simply the ends 
and the means, and talk about the wider social good. Viewed through a ‘public value lens’, 
they argued, ‘public engagement might no longer be seen as a ‘brake on progress’, but 
instead as a way o f maintaining and renewing the social contract that supports science’ (p.
29)'
The foreword to the Demos pamphlet written by physician and science communicator Lord 
Winston, represented the scientific community as having already reformulated its views on 
the best means o f forging the relationship between scientists and society. As his perspective 
on the history o f PUS outlined:
The scientific community once believed it could assuage public concerns over the 
misuse o f science by better communication o f the benefits o f scientific knowledge.
There has been gradual, sometimes grudging, recognition that mere communication -  
whilst important -  cannot alleviate justifiable anxieties. N ow  the scientific community 
is beginning to realise but often reluctantly accept, that we scientists need to take 
greater notice o f public concerns, and relate and react to them. Expressions o f despair 
at public ignorance, impotent polemics about the advantages o f technology, assertions
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that our economy is threatened by reactionary attitudes, attempts at manipulation of  
the press, are all totally inadequate responses. Neither will mere lip-service about the 
value o f public engagement be helpful, (p. 29)
Engineer Alec Broers, in his 2005 Reith Lectures, The Triumph of Technology, also argued that it 
was time “to move away from the old concept of ‘the public understanding o f science’ to a 
more dynamic ‘public engagement’”.596 Minutes later, however, in response to a question of 
whether the public was well informed enough to be involved in planning around new 
nuclear reactors, he answered:
I don’t know how quickly we can educate the public, to bring the evidence forward in 
a calm and rational way.
Thus ideas o f a deficitent and/or irrational public still sat alongside other models and 
rhetorical constructs of the relationship between science and society. Equally, another 
repeated rhetorical strategy in the maintenance of these boundaries had remained: a 
continued blaming of the media for negatively influencing public opinion. As Sir David 
King, the Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government, described to attendees at a 
workshop entitled ‘Improving Science Coverage in the Media’ in 2005, he had become:
... increasingly concerned at the media’s adverse portrayal o f science in the news.
From the scant media coverage o f the MORI poll, which showed the extent to which 
people support science, to the negative coverage surrounding brain drain ... these 
stories continue to run and run. We have to take action now, and demonstrate that we 
have a good story to tell, and raise the reputation o f science in the media.597
Thus despite Lord Winston’s claim that the scientific community had learnt lessons over the 
previous twenty years, there remained a variety of representations and meanings within 
debates around science and the public.
In 2005 we can identify continued and growing criticism by some social scientists to stake 
their ownership over the territory o f science/public relations. For example, dissatisfaction
596 Broers, A. (2005), 'Risk and Responsibility' (Lecture 5), The Triumph o f Technology, (London: 
Reith Lectures).
597 King, D. (2005). 'Improving science coverage in the media - invitation to a stakeholder 
communications workshop - dated July 2005'. sent to author.
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with the current approach to public engagement is to be found in the writings of Brian 
Wynne. He called the publication of the House of Lords Report in 2000 an ‘apparent 
watershed’ moment in attitudes towards public engagement. He described how over the last 
five years there had been a huge flowering of both practical and analytical work aimed at 
nurturing a mutual understanding between science and society, and he was optimistic that 
this shift could embody the potential for more constructive practices of citizenship and 
knowledge. But the shift needed to be more than simply a change in language. The radical 
potential o f all o f these activities was compromised by what Wynne called the ‘deeper, less 
manifest cultural assumptions and commitments’ that framed the initiatives.598 Wynne pin­
pointed two factors that contributed to this problem: the first was that most public 
participation had been focused on downstream risks or impacts, which reflected a false 
assumption that these instrumental consequences were what concerned the public. The 
second factor was the assumption that the task of defining what the salient issues were 
should automatically fall to experts, leaving the rest of society with no role in creating or 
negotiating more diverse public meanings.
Much had changed since his early critiques o f the public understanding of science agenda, 
yet, essentially, Wynne was asking why those same ‘problematic foundations’ he had 
characterised, then and now, had still not been ‘identified, confronted and changed’ (pp. 66- 
67). The ideologies and assumptions within this new engagement agenda in science and 
technology had not been changed,599 and he blamed this failure on the ‘extravagant 
investments of enthusiasm, energy and expectation pouring relentlessly into new 
participatory initiatives by which citizens may influence science.’ (p. 67). As Wynne 
continued:
598 Wynne, B. (2005), 'Risk as globalising 'democratic' discourse? Framing subjects and citizens', in 
Leach, et al., eds, Science and Citizens: Globalisation and the Challenge of Engagement, (London: Zed Books),
p. 66.
599 Something which he was also keen to point out was that this perspective was not new to the UK 
and though not recognised by those within the science and technology arena, they had been playing 
catch up. Similar moves begun a decade earlier in development work, such as agriculture and land- 
use.
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... with dogmatic insistence, unspoken internal institutional insecurities are externally 
projected in models o f the ‘public’ and the ‘public world’ (for example, claims o f  
media and non-governmental organization misinformation o f those publics) as 
scapegoats for these institutional problems o f public mistrust and resistance to 
‘science’. Thus enmeshed in this culture, powerful institutions o f science and policy 
tend simply to circulate in their own self-perpetuating myths, including myths o f the 
‘public’ and o f their own openness to them. (pp. 79-80)
Wynne also believed that ‘reified scientific discourses’ were being privileged, while their 
constructed and contingent character was ‘systematically misunderstood and misread instead 
as purely innocent object representation, untouched by any performative, normatively potent 
models of the human’ (p. 81). Thus with these same myths in place and the same 
unreconstructed institutions, Wynne concluded critically that:
... virtually all o f the mushrooming commitment to public citizen engagement in 
‘science policy’ or ‘scientific-technical issues’, or to ‘democratizing science’, is 
something o f  a mirage, at least thus far. (p. 68)
Almost twenty years after the renewed enthusiasm in the UK for PUS, his criticisms 
remained very similar, with challenges not just to the management of that relationship but 
calls for a breakdown of the existing boundaries between, and conceptualisations of, public 
and science.
Harry Collins, in contrast, had expressed his belief in the previous year that the idea that the 
public should be involved in science, or as he branded it, “a dewy-eyed, mass romantic 
movement to bring in the public to say whatever they like about technology”,600 had been 
taken too far:
“In 1983 that problem was to bust open the scientific community in some way and get 
some sort o f wedge in there so that other sorts of opinions could go through that sort 
of arrogant carapace. So that’s been solved but now it’s kind o f opened up too 
m uch...in the Golem we talk about flip-flop reasoning and it’s as though we’ve gone 
from the flip right over to the flop.”601
At the same time Gregory also remained sceptical of the new language of engagement:
600 Collins, H. (2004), Interview, 3 August 2004, transcribed by Simon Lock.
601 ibid.
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“This engagement thing is the latest flash in the pan, it’s not going to last, it’s another 
kind o f parading o f the resources, it’s people wanting to go out there and say ‘I’m a 
nice guy, and I’m listening to you’ ... it will demonstrate a point that the literature has 
been making for a long time, which is that the public think about things about a much 
broader range o f criteria than the experts do. So what the experts will learn ... is that 
there’s this broader criteria along which they may have to judge things if they want to 
be successful socially. If experts can think along that broader range o f criteria then 
they don’t need to go out and ask the public, they can do it for themselves. And that’s 
what I hope will come out o f this: the experts will take responsibility, (which is a word 
which is never used in these discussions), and understand their social role better, 
because they’ve been reminded o f it by society, in the process o f engagement.”602
Thus by the end of 2005 there remained a multiplicity of constructions o f science, the public 
and ideas about how to manage their relationship, and equally, continued boundary work 
between actors over who had the legitimacy to mobilise such constructions.
602 Gregory, Interview, 20 September 2004.
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Phase IV: Conclusions
I have identified this period as a separate phase characterised by a widespread uptake, by 
scientists, policy-makers and political and N G O  organisations, of the term ‘upstream 
engagement’. Yet again, this term is as contested as was ‘science and society’ or ‘public 
understanding o f science’, and allows for a flexibility in meaning by different actors engaged 
in boundary work to define ‘science’, ‘the public’, and the relationship between the two. We 
continue to see a variety of uses of these terms in this phase, many of which draw on 
previous and established interpretations and forms of boundary work.
Several different interpretations of the term ‘upstream engagement’ exist within this period. 
To some scientific and policy-making organisations, upstream engagement was a means of 
managing public concerns, or indeed, heading off public concerns, so that the public did not 
obstruct technology and innovation. Thus the public is problematised as a potential ‘brake 
on progress’ and upstream engagement is conceptualised as a means of dealing with 
potential impacts o f particular technologies. Science is characterised within this as a realm of 
asocial and apolitical knowledge, and the public are characterised as having values and social 
concerns that need addressing before science can proceed, or that need addressing to avoid 
conflict later.
Other interpretations of the term ‘upstream engagement’ suggest it was viewed as a tool to 
break down the boundary between science and the public, and reconstruct it in a different 
manner. Upstream engagement should allow public values, concerns and aspirations into the 
policy-making process to discuss the role of science in shaping society and vice-versa. In the 
formulation o f Demos, for example, upstream engagement reflected a desire to stop public 
concerns being reduced to solely those concerned with risks, and, furthermore, to stop the 
public being problematised as having a negative impact on scientific progress. The public 
here is thus conceptualised as having legitimate expertise and a role in the scientific sphere 
and science is seen as one type of knowledge and expertise within a larger conversation 
about visions of the future of society.
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The idea that upstream engagement can manage public opinion and attitudes before social 
concerns are entrenched, and views are set, suggests that it was viewed as a means of 
manufacturing consent. A controversy about a technology can then be blamed on a lack, or 
deficit, o f upstream public engagement, rather than being a sign that valid social issues are 
being discussed. Thus upstream engagement here is viewed as a legitimating process: if the 
engagement is successful, it should affirm the preset technological trajectory.
A striking aspect o f this phase was the role of different individuals and organisations in 
mobilising constructions of science and society. Whereas twenty years before, discussions of 
PUS, or of the relationship between science and the public, had been dominated by scientists 
and scientific organisations, here we can see that NGOs, and political think-tanks, in 
combination with social scientists, have much greater involvement. What also emerged was a 
renewed criticality from certain social scientists of scientific and political formulations of 
science and society. Having had their ideas taken up, and their expertise co-opted by 
government, to retain their status as an autonomous expert and critic of government and 
science this critical turn could be interpreted as protection of automomy boundary work on their 
part. Thus despite a marked unification in language, and changing activity, over this period, 
the boundary work by scientists, policy-makers and social scientists was trying to 
manufacture a different society, and construct different boundaries between science and 
public. A few scientists, and scientific groups, such as Sense About Science, continue to 
argue against public engagement, upstream or otherwise, preferring that scientific decision­
making be left to scientists. Thus despite a widespread change in rhetoric by many scientific 
institutions, there were still some, who wanted to keep the public at arms’ length and deny 
them any say in scientific decision-making.
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Conclusions
Scientists, engineers, social scientists, politicians, NG O s and wider publics tend to 
think and talk about science and technology in different ways, so that shared meanings 
and potential common ground are often missed and genuine differences are fudged or 
misrepresented. The language that we use can obscure the values, assumptions and 
interests that we bring to the conversation.
(Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe 2005, pp. 24-25)
This thesis has documented the historical development of debates around the public 
understanding o f science in the UK. Specifically, I have detailed how this issue was 
problematised by scientists in the mid-1980s, and how this issue developed into a contested 
field of activity, political interest and academic research through to 2005.
This thesis, in providing a richer and more detailed historical account of this period, has 
aimed to move away from a narrative which represents the recent concerns over the 
relationship between science and the public in the UK as being characterised as a ‘deficit to 
dialogue’ story. I have identified, in contrast to this simplistic interpretation of events, that 
the issue of the public understanding of science, and later, science and society, have 
consistently been contested spaces in which different definitions of science and the public, 
and different models o f society, have been mobilised. The rhetorical flexibility within terms 
such as ‘the public’, ‘science’ and ‘society’ has, as the quote at the start of this chapter 
suggests, allowed several groups to advance their own agendas, while also maintaining a 
sense that they are doing the same thing. Thus where the ‘deficit to dialogue’ story suggests 
a linear progression o f objectives and epistemology, I have identified the manner in which 
multiple definitions o f ‘science’, and ‘the public’, have been continually defined and 
mobilised throughout this history of PUS.
Ideas of public understanding of science are also ideas about how the relationship between 
science and the public operates, or should operate and about the best way to manage this
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relationship (which often is tied up with ideas of communication) and various versions of 
these ideas have also existed and been subject to negotiation. Thus this history of the public 
understanding of science in the UK has highlighted the complex nature of an ongoing 
debate in the UK, where multiple positions on, and constructions of, ‘science’, ‘the public’, 
‘society’ and ‘science communication’, have existed, and continue to exist, simultaneously.
Furthermore, there is a tendency, at least within a scientific and policy context, to locate 
concerns over the public understanding o f science as originating in the mid-1980s.603 1 have 
situated the debates over PUS in a longer history of debates over science and public. As the 
historical section in Chapter 1 shows, actions over concerns with this relationship have, in 
many ways, been crucial to the development and professionalisation o f science and many 
similar arguments concerned with the public’s understanding of science, and constructions 
of the relationship between science and public, have been identified in this earlier history.
Over time the constructions of scientific authority in public can become ‘naturalised’, so that 
science's authority is no longer seen publicly as constructed, but as immanent and therefore 
less challengeable (if at all). However, this history of debates about public understanding of 
science, from the mid-1980s, has highlighted the conflict and negotiation between 
competing professional groups over public definitions of what, and who, is scientific. I 
outlined in Chapter 1 the analytical framework of boundary work which provides a useful 
way of bringing to the fore the social interests which can be inherent, yet often invisible, in 
the specific demarcations o f science from non-science, or scientist, from non-scientist.
We can see that the types o f rhetorical boundary work identified by Gieryn - expulsion, 
protection and expansion - which scientists have spent centuries engaged in to construct their 
profession as a specific and/or distinct cultural domain - are similarly utilised by them when
603 The Royal Society’s Science in Society Report (2004) makes just such a claim, unsurprisingly crediting 
the Society with starting, and leading this debate in 1985. It is also interesting to note that their 
activities in 1985 are located in a history o f the Society’s involvement in ‘Science and Society’, which 
points again to how scientific institutions reconstruct their own history to fit with contemporary 
rhetoric around PUS.
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turning to address the public understanding of science in the mid-1980s.604 The construction 
of science as a public source of expertise and cognitive authority has been achieved by 
mobilising it in contrast to a separate ‘public’, or ‘society’ where, for example, ethics, 
irrational thought and politics occur, and which is filled with people who are passive 
recipients of scientific knowledge and popularisation. Thus a co-construction of science and 
society has taken place. I have identified that very similar boundary work tactics are used, in 
the period under study, and the boundaries are rhetorically constructed in line with scientists’ 
previous attempts at managing their relationship with the public.
The demarcation o f science from other cultural domains, particularly the public, society or 
politics, has been achieved by the communication of differences, and the promotion of 
science by scientists, as a distinct bounded area of knowledge and practice. We can see this 
most clearly in their continued reliance on mobilising a discourse of science which is free 
from public knowledges, values, and politics. In continually drawing the boundary in this 
way, scientists are also, however, careful not to construct the boundary so strictly as to be 
irrelevant to society and lose a course of social legitimation, thus science remains semiotically 
‘public’, yet to all intents and purposes separate from it. This is what Gieryn identifies as 
protection boundary work and I argue that this is the most common type of boundary work 
being performed within this history. Science is constructed by scientists as separate from, but 
also essential for, a properly functioning society.605
Scientists, as a professional group, are not, however, the only actors in this recent history of 
PUS to engage in such boundary work, and promote themselves as the best placed to shape 
society and to tell the public what is in their best interests. Several professions approach the 
issue o f public understanding o f science with a normative assumption that they are acting in 
line with public or societal interests, in opposition to other professional groups. Social 
scientists have argued for institutional change within government and science to reshape the
604 See for example Gieryn (1999), op. cit., Shapin and Schaffer (1985), op. cit., Jasanoff (1987), op. 
cit.
605 Shapin and Schaffer have argued that Boyle and his colleagues conceived the newly formed Royal 
Society as just such an institution to help restructure society along rational lines, after the Civil War in 
the seventeenth century. Shapin and Schaffer (1985), op. cit.
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way in which science constructs society. The UK Government has also argued that it is 
acting in the interests of the nation, the population, society or consumers.
Returning to Gieryn’s boundary work typology, we can see that as well as protection boundary 
work, another common form is expansion, and this applies to several of the professional 
groups in this history. Scientists, social scientists, science communicators, and government 
officials all, at points, mobilise their expertise in competition for jurisdictional control over 
the contested domain that is PUS — in both an epistemological and a practical sense. Thus 
the history o f public understanding of science is also a history of the way in which scientists, 
and other professional groups, have addressed the ‘demarcation problem’, particularly 
focusing on how scientific authority or expertise in its cultural setting has been demarcated 
from other forms o f professional, or ‘lay’, authority and expertises. Thus, demarcation 
continues to be as much a social and political issue as an epistemological one.
I have divided the time period under study into four historical phases. Each phase has a 
dominant discourse of public understanding of science and, during each, different actors 
come to challenge this dominant conceptualisation of the ‘problem of PUS’, and mobilise 
their own as they engage in boundary work. These phases further our understanding of the 
history o f public understanding of science in the UK, by showing how the dominant 
discourse of, and debates over, PUS/Science and Society has developed and changed over 
time, and how this has subsequently shaped the activity and the institutions involved.
Phase I
Phase I is characterised by the concern within the scientific community that science was not 
appreciated enough by society. A lack o f funding and governmental support led to a 
crystallisation o f the term ‘public understanding of science’, which problematised particular 
sections o f society for not having enough understanding, or appreciation, of science, and 
equally problematised scientists for not conducting enough science communication to 
correct this perceived problem. In many ways the activity within this phase mirrors earlier 
attempts by scientists to engineer societal attitudes through a campaign of communication. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the 1830s and the 1940s, scientists, perceiving a lack of public
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or governmental support, or perceiving themselves to be under financial strain, turned to the 
idea of managing their relationship with the public. Furthermore, I have argued that their 
actions should be considered as boundary work. By communicating a definition of science, 
how scientific knowledge can help shape society, and that the public should know it, 
scientists were constructing themselves as separate from society, yet indispensable, and free 
from social values, which is part o f their justification in claiming that science and scientists 
should be given greater respect and financial support. Tied up in their rhetoric were also 
ideas that science, and scientists, could help make society and the public better, create a 
better citizenry, and a better functioning democracy, and improve the nation’s industry. 
Equally it constructs in opposition, a public which is passive, often irrational, and in need of 
scientists’ help.
Phase I should, therefore, be considered a continuation of scientists’, and scientific 
organisations’, attempts to mobilise this particular discourse of science. Scientists presented 
the issue of PUS to be one that was theirs to manage and control, and themselves to be the 
legitimate experts in communicating science to the public. However, this phase is also 
different from the previous historical episodes of scientific concern over the public in that 
many social scientists, who had been researching the relationship between scientific 
knowledge, scientists and the public for many years by the 1980s, were given research 
funding by the Government under programmes specifically identified as dealing with PUS. 
Whereas scientists conceptualised these social scientists as experts who would help them 
identify gaps in the public’s knowledge of science, and thus enable them to promote science 
more effectively (in keeping with the aims o f organisations such as COPUS’s construction of 
PUS), much o f the research took a different approach to the issue, and constructed a very 
different idea o f the public understanding o f science itself. Therefore, I have identified 
another body o f experts — social scientists - who also felt that this issue, or problem, was 
legitimately theirs to define and manage, and they began to colonise this space, mobilising 
their own knowledge and expertise, and doing their own boundary work.
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Phase II
Phase II is dominated by both the institutionalisation of PUS activity and the increasingly 
public encounters between scientists and social scientists in the PUS-domain. Members of 
these two groups mobilised very different discourses of science and the public, and their 
relationship. Many social scientists characterised scientific approaches to PUS as operating 
within a deficit model, criticising the focus on a perceived cognitive deficit on the part of the 
public. Social scientists advanced several ideas about the public and science. Collins, for 
example, characterised the public as having a lack of understanding of the social processes of 
science; and Wynne characterised scientific organisations as having a lack of sociological 
understanding of what the public is and how they relate to scientists and scientific matters. 
Wynne put the focus on social relationships, particularly trust relationships, and 
problematised science, scientific framings of PUS, and the implied scientific hegemony over 
matters of science and public.
There is a sense in which both scientists and social scientists felt that their area of expertise 
was being colonised by the other, and I have identified the explicit conflicts that occurred 
within the UK (as elsewhere in the context of the science wars) between scientists such as 
Wolpert and Dawkins, and social scientists such as Collins, Wynne and Irwin. Again, all of 
these conflicts can be characterised as boundary work: each individual, or group, was 
advancing their particular conceptualisation of science, the public and the relationship 
between them. Scientists continued to mobilise a ‘science’ which was separate from the 
public, but needed to combat public misunderstanding of pseudo-science, or relativist social 
scientific claims. Social scientists were rhetorically reconstructing these boundaries, and thus 
the relationship between science and public, in a very different manner. Wynne, and others, 
advanced a model o f the public which conflicted with a deficit model characterisation of 
them as ignorant and passive, and argued that the public could mobilise their own expertise 
in social situations involving science, and though their framing o f issues could be different 
(drawing on a wider criteria o f ethical, social, political, and moral perspectives), this should 
enrich the relationship between the two, and allow for more fruitful, and equal, discussion of 
scientific matters.
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In crude terms we can identify a fundamental difference in the perspectives taken by 
organisations such as COPUS and social scientists such as Irwin and Wynne: each was 
mobilising a different meaning of ‘society’. This boundary work does not simply construct 
‘science’, or ‘the public’, or PUS. Constructs of the boundary - the relationship between 
science and public -  also embody particular normative ideas of ‘society’ and the balance of 
power, legitimacy and expertise within it. Many scientists, in this instance, can largely be 
characterised as engaging in protection of autonomy boundary work, attempting to maintain what 
they perceived as the status quo, with respect to their position of cognitive and political 
authority, whereas many of the social scientists were trying to deconstruct this, and establish 
a different type o f relationship between science and the public, attempting to expand their 
resources and influence, and promote themselves as the best placed to define and intervene 
in this relationship. In each construction communication is seen as key to maintaining or 
enabling these boundaries, but the type of communication, and the hierarchies implied by 
the models o f science communication being used, is different.
Within this phase too I have also identified the boundary work which occurred within social 
science. This was a debate about competing methodologies, and about how the public is 
constructed by quantitative and qualitative methods. We can also view it as a rhetorical fight 
amongst social scientists for legitimacy and expertise over whose definition of the public, 
science and society was right, and over the allocation of funds in what was still a relatively 
young and expanding field. Wynne and his colleagues in particular attempted to draw a 
distinction between themselves and a deficit model, which, they argued, both scientists and 
quantitative social scientists were operating under.
Phase III
Phase III is characterised by the uptake and use of social scientific expertise and language, 
first by science policy-makers, and then very quickly by many scientific organisations in the 
wake of the influential House of Lords Report in 2000. The widespread uptake of the 
language of ‘dialogue’, ‘engagement’, and ‘public values’, and a widespread acknowledgement 
that scientists’ understanding of the public was of importance, suggest that the social 
scientists (in particular the qualitative researchers) were the rhetorical victors of the previous
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phase. Under the new banner o f ‘science and society’ many scientific institutions attempted 
to rhetorically redraw the boundaries of PUS to include much of this language, and a 
different, less separate conceptualisation of the public. However, I have argued that much of 
the meaning gets ‘lost in translation’ from the social scientific to the scientific or policy 
arenas.
Whereas certain social scientists were mobilising a particular normative idea of society with 
their use of such terms, the scientists and policy-makers deployed the same terms, in line 
with their own interests, to construct a new problem of ‘science and society’ which identified 
attitudinal deficiencies in the public, and dialogue and engagement were conceptualised as 
the means to restore, or manufacture, trust and confidence in science or scientists, (the loss 
o f which was almost universally blamed on controversies over BSE and GM crops, hence 
also the heightened focus on science policy-making). Thus I have identified that the 
boundary work performed by many scientists and many within the UK Government - 
though it used similar language and terms to those being used by the social scientists - 
rhetorically draws the boundaries in a manner similar to previous episodes, and certainly 
differently from those mobilised by many qualitative social scientists. The public is 
problematised as attitudinally deficient by scientific organisations and government officials, 
and scientists, it is decreed, need to attempt a dialogue with this public to manufacture a 
change that would restore social relationships to how they were perceived to have been 
previously: that is, with science as a separate cultural domain, but in a dominant position 
over the public.
I have therefore identified in this phase a variety of representations being mobilised by 
different individuals and organisations, o f ‘publics’, ‘science’, o f engagement and 
communication, and thus ideas about society and the manner in which science and the 
public relate, or should relate. I want to avoid characterising a ‘dominant discourse’ in this 
phase too closely as there is no clear dominant formulation of either ‘PUS’ or ‘Science in 
Society’. Indeed the phase is dominated by the variety o f uses and meanings of these terms 
by individuals, organisations and, indeed, within organisations. The GM Nation? exercise 
exemplifies the complexity within this phase, with many different actors working on this
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project, each holding many different ideas about what it was for, who it should engage, and 
the proper relationship of scientific knowledge and politics to the public. Equally we can see 
that not all scientists and scientific organisations were attempting to correct a perceived 
public trust deficit, and the conflict within the science communication community reflects 
the diversity of agendas, interests and definitions of the problem and the action to be taken.
Phase IV
The uptake of the term ‘upstream engagement’ in Phase IV highlights again the different 
approaches to the public and its relationship with science. I have highlighted the different 
constructs o f this idea, as well as the way in which the uses of this term rhetorically draw the 
boundaries o f science and society in different ways in line with the interests o f those 
deploying the term. I have argued that upstream engagement was promoted by policy­
makers to manufacture early consent for the products of innovation. Others, such as 
Demos, promoted upstream engagement as a means of redrawing the boundaries between 
science and the public, to shift the focus away from what they argued was a narrow scientific 
and risk-based framing o f issues that needed public discussion, and to open up innovation to 
a wider range o f social perspectives, which would potentially influence technological 
innovation in other directions, though with collective social consent. I have identified, 
therefore, that within the mobilisation of the term ‘upstream engagement’ we can identify 
that the public is both problematised and assigned an almost equal status as experts in 
decision-making about science and society. We can also identify the term being used to 
rhetorically construct the relationship between science and society in different, and often 
opposing ways. Many scientific and government actors conceptualise upstream engagement 
as a means o f manufacturing public consent, or legitimacy, for their expertise or scientific 
products. Many social scientists, on the other hand, continue to deploy their own 
conceptualisations in which such boundaries are dissolved and public values and knowledges 
become part o f a more egalitarian process of discussing and influencing the impact of 
science on society.
I have also identified in this phase the beginnings of a new critical turn within social science. 
Many social scientists, though initially enthusiastic about the change in rhetoric by scientific
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and governmental organisations, begin to criticise them for misunderstanding, or misusing 
their research or claims, and not changing their practices in the manner in which these social 
scientists had been advocating. This does suggest that these social scientific constructions of 
the science and society relationship, and the ideologies inherent within them, get ‘lost in 
translation’ as they are taken up by other professional groups and rhetorically deployed in 
line with other interests. This critical turn continues to the present day.606 This phase does 
not end in 2005, where my research and analysis stopped, but I have included it to indicate 
another shift in the dominant discourse o f public and science, with a focus on ‘upstream 
engagement’.
A richer historical perspective would be gained by identifying how discourses of PUS 
articulate with other expert discourses of risk and uncertainty, and citizenship more widely. 
The recent shift towards explaining public opposition to science in terms of ‘distrust’ instead 
of ‘ignorance’ is in line with more general observations about a decline of public deference 
with respect to governments, courts of law, and other cultural sources of authority in 
Western countries. Further research will be necessary to locate PUS history within the 
context o f these wider social and political discourses over the same period. Equally, one 
might wish to view this history as part of, or indicative of, a wider intellectual phenomenon 
whereby enlightenment discourses, such as scientific notions of progress and rationality, 
have been subject to attack by post-modernist and post-structuralist critiques. In particular, 
many sociologists have undergone a post-modernist turn, claiming to be attempting to 
recover the ‘public voice’ suppressed by a rationalist modernist enlightenment discourse. 
These two competing discourses could also be interpreted as further boundary work 
between, and within, different ‘expert’ professions.
606 See for example, Wynne (2006), op. cit.; Irwin (2006), op. cit.
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